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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of ideas in relation to institutional change.  It develops a critical 
constructivist analysis, drawing on neo-Gramscian political economy perspectives in IR, in order to 
understand how ideational factors such as beliefs, values and interests intertwine with material 
factors in order to understand processes of institutional transformation.  It argues that ideology 
and hegemony, concepts sometimes associated with a structuralist position, can be usefully re-
invigorated by introducing them into a socio-cultural constructivist analysis.  The critical elements 
of the Marxist/Gramscian legacy and its strong credentials in analysing the development of 
capitalist social forms and modes of production provide its key contribution.  Constructivism on the 
other hand can act as a corrective to the structuralist tendencies of some historical materialism as 
well as offering new methods of analysis which emphasize the importance of ideational and cultural 
factors.  Following a discussion of the idealism/materialism and structure/agency dichotomies, the 
thesis argues that a discourse-historical approach presents a fruitful methodology to interrogate 
the transformation from Keynesian social democracy to neoliberal deregulation, privatisation and 
monetarism during the closing decades of the twentieth century.  In addition, analysis of how 
neoliberal discourse represents those agents who oppose or question its fundamental principles 
and policy prescriptions gives an insight into the way in which a dominant discourse remains 
dominant in the face of growing evidence to counter its claims. 
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Ch. 1 Introduction: Globalisation, Neoliberalism and Institutional 
Shift 
 
Introduction 
 
It is almost universally agreed that we are living in an age of globalisation, even if disagreements 
regarding the extent, significance, potential, direction, temporality, spatiality and even the reality 
of such a process are almost equally universal.  The huge scope of the debates across the academy, 
and indeed public discussion, means that we can only attempt one very narrow slice of analysis at 
any one time.  This work is an attempt at such an incision.  Here I will introduce the main themes 
of the thesis, outline the research questions and begin to map out the ontological and 
epistemological positions which situate the research in a particular body of literature that informs 
the research methodology.  It is worth stating briefly before proceeding further that this research 
adopts a critical normative approach to global politics which draws chiefly on constructivist and 
interpretivist developments in social science but also on a number of neo-Marxist concepts and 
categories such as hegemony and class.1  Indeed, neoliberal ideas and institutions which represent 
a central focus of this thesis are inextricably intertwined with late capitalism and a critique of those 
institutions is by nature a critique of the contemporary free market system of global capitalist 
economic organisation.  It is difficult to conceive of a critical account of these institutions then 
without some considerable reference to the insights of Marxian analysis, despite some of the 
problems associated with these which will be discussed below.  This introduction will conclude with 
an outline of chapters, detailing how the analysis will proceed throughout the thesis. 
                                                          
1 Andrew Linklater (1996) notes that a Marxian inspired critical theory is distinguishable from a post-
modern variant in its retention of the emancipatory element central to that tradition but rejected by 
postmodernism. 
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One of the more welcome consequences of the politics of globalisation (and the globalisation of 
politics) has been the widespread acknowledgement that such complexity warrants a more 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of social, cultural and political phenomena.  In particular, 
the divide between the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and Politics will be further blurred 
in this work along with insights drawn from other fields of the social sciences.2  While IR has long 
held as its own the diplomatic and military strategic realm of relations between states, especially 
in the dominant accounts of realism and neorealism, Politics and Political Science have tended to 
examine the internal workings and institutions of the state.  Meanwhile the dominant liberal 
paradigm has tended to separate the economic from the political.  Challenges to this separation 
emerged most notably during the late 1960s and 1970s for example in the ground-breaking work 
of Susan Strange (1970, 1971, 1972a, 1972b, 1972c, 1974) and others working in the field of what 
came to be known as international (now more commonly ‘Global’) Political Economy. 3  Indeed, 
these initial suspicions regarding the increasing porosity of the state’s borders were 
overwhelmingly in recognition of the early economic aspects of what we now term globalisation 
and the inseparability of the political and the economic.  These economic intrusions were 
presciently indicated by Charles Kindleburger’s now well-known and oft quoted remark that “the 
state is just about over as an economic unit” (1969:207).   
The important arguments made by Strange in particular were however mostly aimed towards 
blending international economic analysis with the more established preoccupations of IR and 
foreign-policy analysis such as diplomacy and military strategy and where “the interaction of 
economic processes and enterprises is often largely ignored.” (1972a: 192).  This explicit plea for 
an end to such an “intellectual apartheid”  (where Strange notes that the economists represented 
                                                          
2 In particular the focus upon ideas, ideology, and the critical discursive turn have drawn insights from the 
Frankfurt School of Cultural Studies. 
3 See also a number of essays in the edited collection by Robert Cox (1969) 
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the role of the Afrikaner, 1972b: 63), along with those of Kindleburger (1969, 1970), were a timely 
and welcome response to the inherently political nature of the international economic (Sterling and 
Dollar) crises of the 1960s and 70s, the intellectual and political responses to which, as I will later 
argue in more detail, ushered in the era of transnational governance, economic integration and 
rapid institutional shift we recognise today as central to, even definitive of globalisation.  The key 
technological aspects of these historical changes and their complex myriad implications for 
international organisation were highlighted by J. G. Ruggie who noted that “technological, 
ecological, political, economic, and social environments are becoming so globally enmeshed that 
changes taking place in one segment of international society will have consequential repercussions 
in all others.” (1975: 557).  The point then, is that although the exact term itself would not be 
officially coined until 1983 by Theodore Levitt in his Harvard Business Review article The 
Globalization of Markets, the important political implications of this phenomenon were already 
well understood by Strange, Kindleburger, Ruggie and the numerous IR/IPE scholars who followed 
in their wake, analysing and interpreting what Keohane and Nye later and now famously termed 
“complex interdependence” (1977).  Indeed, it was this work by US scholars Keohane and Nye which 
ushered in the early ‘neoliberal’ approaches and the growing popularity of institutional analysis in 
IR as a challenge to the prevailing dominance of realism.4 
In a critical review of this seminal work in IR however, Kal Holsti (1978) immediately recognised and 
highlighted the profoundly uneven nature of this ‘interdependence’ and suggested that the 
increased connectedness and ‘transnationality’ of international politics was as much, if not more, a 
                                                          
4 It should be noted here that the term neoliberalism refers rather confusingly to both a major school in the 
IR literature and to a set of arrangements and policy prescriptions which characterise the key aspects 
contemporary or ‘late’ capitalism.  This confusion is perhaps further complicated as these two distinct uses 
of the word also share a number of core principles and assumptions.  These will be made more explicit 
below in the discussion of neoliberal institutionalism as a perspective in IR and in Ch. 4’s genealogy of 
neoliberalism.  I will indicate which I am referring to by using the acronym NI for Neoliberal Institutionalism 
as a school of IR   
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matter of dependency.  Indeed, the Marxian, neo-Marxist and Gramscian traditions of socio-
economic and political analysis had long espoused the inseparability of the political and economic 
realms (see eg. Wood, 1981).  Holsti (1978) identifies Frank (1969) and Galtung (1971) as the key 
early exponents of this emphasis on dependency rather than simple interdependence.5  A central 
component of these analyses of the world-system was the structured hierarchies of unequal power 
which survived the emergence of that significant proportion of humanity from the formal political 
status of colonial subordination.  While the world-system nevertheless retains the political and 
economic status of the dominant/subaltern relationship, the overly determinist slant of these 
analyses tend to limit their conception of human agency.  However, recognition of this remaining 
and exacerbating economic hierarchy, inequality and socio-cultural dislocation must remain a core 
element of any critical analysis of contemporary global governance and an account of the attendant 
power relations is vital for an adequate interpretation of this stark and multidimensional inequality.  
In addition, the appreciation of the long cycles in the historical development of capitalist social 
relations is a useful counterweight to the contemporary biases of much current globalisation 
theory. 
Discussions and interpretations of global political economy require analysis of both state and 
market and most importantly the ways in which these fields of action constitute each other in the 
process of globalisation.  Within such analysis, abstract talk of ‘the state’ must be carefully qualified 
with the recognition that states encounter globalisation and global markets in very different ways 
and from very different positions of capability.  Most notably, such distinctions must be regarded 
in the differences between so-called ‘western’ states and the situation of postcolonial states.  
                                                          
5 See also Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 1979) in a similar vein and also Paul James (1997) who details the 
declining purchase of these theories with the passage of time and changing context but makes a number of 
interesting proposals which retain the critical and emancipatory elements of dependency theories.  Also 
Andrews (1982) provides a useful brief review of these woks and a more recent exposition can be found in 
van der Pijl (2009 ch. 7) 
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Moreover, within these loosely defined categories, many further differences exist, such as those 
between the powerful newly modernising BRICs6 and the underdeveloped and even so-called 
‘failed’ states of sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.  These divisions should not mark the only axes 
of stark and apparently growing inequalities.  It should also be noted that socio-economic trends 
demonstrate that in addition to the long disparities of the so-called ‘north’ and ‘south’, it is also 
possible to identify the growth of a ‘north within the south and a south within the north’, whereby 
inequality intensifies cheek by jowl within these regions and cities, politically destabilising them 
(Sassen 2005).    
While the more open-minded and academically adventurous scholars began to challenge such 
disciplinary and categorical boundaries some decades ago, the study of economics (market forms) 
and politics (state forms), have at least until relatively recently (and in many places continue to) 
been treated separately.   Processes of globalisation and regionalisation over recent decades 
however have revealed that such a strong divide between the international/ transnational/ global 
and the state, and between the economic and the political is simply no longer feasible in any study 
which attempts to understand the challenges of social, political, cultural, economic analysis in the 
21st century.  The state is continuously and deeply permeated by multiple external forces and these 
forces themselves remain largely a product of the policies of a number of still remarkably powerful 
and salient states.  To ignore one is to severely delimit the possibilities of our understanding the 
other.   
This thesis addresses the process of political globalisation and institutional shift through an 
argument that considers it to be a contingent and therefore contestable outcome of deliberate 
policy interventions, on the part of a variety of actors and institutions, including states, designed to 
                                                          
6 The acronym refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China but we might add some of the resource rich countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Nigeria which perhaps retain a little more agency in the international arena than 
the poorest states. 
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relocate or ‘re-centralise’ aspects of power from the national to the global.  As we have seen, there 
is little new in the assertion that the modern state, organised more or less around the concept of 
the nation,7 is becoming less coherent as a unitary political actor.  It has become something of a 
mainstream perspective to acknowledge, or at least discuss, the diminishing autonomy of the 
modern state and the apparent re-scaling of sovereignty.  Indeed, a powerful strand of neoliberal 
ideology exists in what has come to be known as the ‘hyperglobalist thesis’8  (Ohmae 1996; 
Friedman 2000; Strange 1996, although see in contrast:  Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009; Weiss 
1998).   The transformation of the state is however not simply a case of its diminishing power.  As 
Randeria notes, “the state is both an agent and an object of globalization.  Although inadequate, 
the state remains indispensable as its laws and policies play a key role in transposing neo-liberal 
agendas to the national and local levels” (2007: 2).  The reconfiguration of power within states is 
an important element of the process and one particularly salient factor, particularly within states 
in advanced capitalist societies (SIACS) has been the accumulation of power from the legislature to 
the executive (Sassen 2007).  But nor is globalisation simply the transformation of the state, 
however important that may be.  It is also about the proliferation and increased salience and agency 
of non-state actors.9 
While in some instances this process appears to have been something of a deliberate and internally 
driven process, as with the advanced industrialised countries, in other cases such as the less 
                                                          
7 I use the term modern state rather than nation state to downplay the national coherence which these 
institutions represent.  Very few modern states can now, if they ever could, be considered as nationally 
and/or culturally homogenous.  The term modern state locates these institutions historically in the modern 
age and confirms their historical specificity while leaving to one side the thorny question of whether the 
nation ever or anywhere corresponded with a particular state. 
8 However, the hyperglobalist thesis exists across the ideological spectrum including many theorists and 
activists among the global justice, anti-capitalist and alter-globalisation movements. (Colas, 2003:98) 
9 Here global governance does not merely refer to the well-known and much discussed Bretton Woods 
economic institutions (IMF, GATT/WTO and WB) and the various regimes for the maintenance of security, 
human rights promotion and environmental regulation as important as these are.  Equally pertinent but less 
discussed and recognised are the emergence of transnational institutions of private authority (Hall and 
Biersteker, 2002),, and more or less democratic forms of global civil society.  See also Keane (2003) and for 
a more sceptical and critical account of GCS Lipschutz, (2005) 
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developed regions of the global south or periphery, the driving factors have been more external.  
Despite these important differences, globalisation has transformed the internal structure of all 
modern states and is rendering them increasingly similar in terms of their political culture and policy 
frameworks.  Whilst many differences remain, globalisation can be seen as a homogenising process 
where national economic policy is heavily determined by the market logics of global capitalism and 
the political culture moves towards a limited liberal democracy.  By limited I refer to the fact that 
elected governments claim an increasingly limited set of policy options from which to choose as a 
result of the perceived need to compete in response to the exigencies of global capital markets and 
the demands of private interests in the form of trans-national corporations.10  Perhaps the defining 
feature of this process is the privatisation of public assets and institutions such as education, 
welfare and healthcare, but this is not an automatic evolutionary process, it requires concrete and 
on-going political action on the part of the state and other powerful actors.   In addition, it is 
possible to identify an enhanced role for those state agencies which are connected more directly 
with the institutions and processes of global governance such as central banks and ministries of 
finance matched with a relative decline in the effective function of ministries of labour and welfare 
as these aspects are increasingly subject to private interests and market forces.  This result of this 
trend has been identified by Andrew Baker, with the UK as a primary example, as a ‘residual state’ 
whereby “transnationalised interests have effectively penetrated the very core of central state 
agencies” (2000: 366). But this is by no means to suggest that such interests are necessarily external 
to the state.  Rather, it is more accurate to recognise this interpretation of globalisation as one in 
which “the British state restructures itself to reflect the extent of Britain’s integration into the global 
economy.”  As a result, according to Baker, “the emerging global economy is not something that 
exists independently of the state.  It is developing because certain state agencies have acted on 
                                                          
10 Coffey and Thornley’s (2009) description of Third Way policies in the UK as leading to what they refer to 
as the ‘abject state’ is another interesting and persuasive interpretation of the contemporary relationship 
between SIACs and processes of globalization. 
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behalf of certain social forces and actively promoted it” (2000:366).  This process, and in particular 
the implications that it holds for the possibility of democratic politics both within and beyond the 
state, will be examined in more detail below and in the following chapters.  My purpose here is to 
establish at the outset the need for a combined state/globality focus to provide an adequate 
understanding of the institutional changes which characterise the contemporary processes and 
practices of global governance.  Philip Cerny (2000: 301) describes the process as a transformation 
from the ‘national’ to the ‘competition’ state involving a threefold paradox whereby firstly: 
Globalisation can both undermine the domestic authority of the state and at the same time lead 
to the de facto expansion of state intervention and regulation in the name of competitiveness 
and marketization.  Second, states and state actors are in themselves the greatest promoters of 
globalisation as they attempt to cope more effectively with ‘global realities’.  In undermining the 
autonomy of their own ‘national models’—embedded state forms, contrasting state 
interventionism, and differing state/society arrangements—by chasing international 
competitiveness, they disarm themselves.  Finally, states seem to be getting more and more 
socially fragile—thereby further undermining the capacity of political and social forces within the 
state to resist globalisation.  
This increasing fragility and narrowing of policy options open to state actors is matched at the global 
level by the enhanced growing power of a set of institutions which combine to intervene and 
regulate global political processes in what has come to be known neutrally as ‘global governance’.  
As agency and soveregnty appear to drain away from the modern state, they gather form at the 
global level and this coalescence of power increasingly resembles something akin to a global state.  
This process has been recognised and articulated by a handful of authors in various ways, but most 
of whom draw more or less from a (neo-)Marxist tradition (eg. Hardt and Negri, 2000; Shaw, 2000; 
Robinson, 2004), although see also Wendt for a more constructivist but equally persuasive account 
of the formation of a transnational/global/world state.  However, “the highlighting of broad-based 
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governance is dangerous, if it serves to obscure the state core of contemporary globality” (Shaw, 
2000: 90). In short, no account of globalisation is complete without a theory of the state and the 
recognition that some states have retained more power, agency and room for manoeuvre than 
others.   
 
Research questions and thesis outline 
 
A central aspect of the argument developed in this thesis is that a body of ideas which can be 
attributed the shorthand of neoliberal ideology are important for understanding neoliberal forms 
of governmentality and can, at least to a limited extent, even be considered explanatory factors in 
themselves.  One key purpose of focussing on ideational variables in constructing and constituting 
forms, processes and practices of global governance/governmentality is to show that such a process 
is not ineluctable or inexorable but highly contingent and therefore contestable.  Contrary to much 
conventional wisdom, alternative globalisations are not only possible but also desirable, as 
discussed in the final chapter.  Indeed, a powerful element of neoliberal ideology is the portrayal 
and reification of this form of globalisation as inevitable in a historical narrative of progress, due to 
a particularly narrow representation of human nature.   Although as Karl Popper (1957) persuasively 
warns us in his critique of one determinist variant of historical materialism, we should be highly 
suspicious of any theory of historical development which claims the status of inevitability.  Many 
aspects and accounts of neoliberalism come very close to such claims.11   
                                                          
11 Take for example then, the following extract from the The (1995) Commission on Global Governance. 
“The development of global governance is part of the evolution of human efforts to organize life on the 
planet, and that process will always be going on. Our work is no more than a transit stop on that journey.”  
While not exactly what one might describe as an archetypal neoliberal tract, many aspects of the report 
illustrate the futility of resisting the contemporary drive for governance at the global level. 
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The broad-based question from which this research derives is:  How, and to what extent, does 
neoliberal ideology (ideas, beliefs, norms and discourses) constitute the processes, mechanisms 
and institutional arrangements of global economic governance (GEG)?  However, as we shall see, 
the study of ideas and institutions now covers a vast field of research in Politics and IR and cannot 
be restricted to institutional arrangements as either state or global.  In contrast to such a distinction 
these institutions and processes must be recognised as transcending this increasingly arbitrary 
boundary (Walker 1993).  The fundamental role of ideas and ideology in politics has returned and 
been enhanced with the emergence of constructivism as a ‘new mainstream’ approach and 
traditional forms of institutional analysis have been reinvigorated by interpretivist elements of the 
‘new institutionalism’ which has itself felt the need to take some account of ideational and 
discursive factors in the understanding and attempted explanation of institutional change.12  In light 
of these interesting and welcome developments, the thesis then narrows the above ‘meta’ question 
to more manageable questions of: (1) How and from where did neoliberal ideology emerge as a 
normative discursive force and (2) How does the neoliberal discourse of The Economist reify, help 
to authorise and legitimate a particular conception and practice of GEG as inevitable and 
inexorable? 
This question will hopefully provide some better answers to the broader inquiry as well as 
demonstrating the importance of understanding globalisation as an ideological and discursive 
process of change as well as a material one.  Indeed, it will attempt to show that a satisfactory 
understanding of globalisation must recognise the dialectical relationship between 
ideational/discursive and material/institutional aspects of this historical process.  This will provide 
                                                          
12 As I will discuss below, the debate around the combined goals and relative merits of explanation and 
understanding has itself become an issue of some considerable dispute within the constructivist school of 
thought.   
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a more complex and nuanced account of the historical rise of neoliberal ideas and institutions than 
those explanations provided by rationalist theories of neoliberal institutionalism itself. 
I begin with an initial introductory discussion of the concepts of ideas and power which will lead 
into an outline of the (critical constructivist) ontological and epistemological premises that inform 
this research and its methods of analysis.  These premises and assumptions must be discussed in 
relation to, and weighed against, alternative approaches which might instead be taken to address 
the proposed objects of research.  As such I will provide a critique of the rationalist assumptions 
which inform neoliberal institutionalism that might be seen as the dominant school of thought in 
relation to the study of political institutions and global governance.  Following this, I will return to 
questions of power through a discussion of structure and agency debates.  In brief, I suggest that 
the inherently dialectical nature of these categories requires that we search for and focus upon the 
factors which mediate this relationship between agents, structures and social change.  My 
argument will attempt to show that ideas and ideology, expressed in a variety of discursive forms 
and processes, can exhibit such a role in the constitution of political forms—not least the neoliberal 
institutions of global governmentality.   
In what remains of this chapter I will introduce very briefly the key concepts of power, ideas and 
interests as an initial set of signposts from which the rest of the thesis will proceed.  In addition, I 
will lay the foundations for the epistemological assumptions and methodological procedures upon 
which the research is based.   Some ontological premises have already been outlined above but I 
hope to clarify these further as the chapter and the rest of the thesis develops. 
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Ontology, Epistemology and Methods – Ideas, Power and Critique 
 
The study of politics is, above all, the examination of power in its myriad forms and locations.  
Indeed, so diverse are they that no single study could adequately interrogate all the many aspects 
of power.  The various approaches and sub-disciplines of political analysis therefore, tend to focus 
upon just one or two of these at any one time.  Individual actors, classes, states, civic institutions, 
private corporations, etcetera. One key aspect of power which has until quite recently received only 
rather marginal attention, and yet arguably runs through all the above locations, is its relationship 
with ideas.  On reason for this oversight in mainstream political analysis has been the attempt to 
emulate the positivism of the natural sciences in the study of the social and the political.   The 
inherent indeterminacy of ideas leads some to suggest they are simply too ‘fuzzy’ to study 
compared with ‘hard’ data such as voting patterns, trade figures, arms budgets etcetera.  But to 
ignore the role of ideas in politics on this basis is to submit to the vicious circle identified by Philip 
Converse, it is “a primary example for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be 
measured and what can be measured is not important to study” (1964: 206).  Converse challenges 
this awkward conundrum by suggesting we accept types of ‘measurement’ which are not reduced 
to brute quantification or pure observation, but remain attached to notions of logic, reason, 
plausibility, justification, probability etcetera, which play a central role in our ability to make claims, 
arguments and judgements about the likely effects and consequences of social phenomena such as 
ideas and belief systems.   Ideas and beliefs are simply too important to be excluded from political 
analysis and too complex to be reduced entirely to quantitative data.  As a result we must make use 
of analytical tools which extend beyond the scientism that characterises much social, political and 
especially contemporary economic analysis. 
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Ideas 
It is worth leaving theory and methodology aside perhaps for one minute to note that, while the 
academic practice of social and political analysis has mostly and for the large part of the past several 
decades played down the role of ideas, the most significant and successful political movement of 
the period has placed the role of ideas and their dissemination at the very centre of their project.  
Neoliberalism has, since the end of World War II, grown from a trampled, discredited and 
apparently outdated set of ideas into what can only be described as the dominant ideology of 
contemporary globalisation.  The individuals who set about building this movement in the 1930’s 
were all too aware of the claim, attributed to Victor Hugo, that “[a]ll the forces in the world are not 
so powerful as an idea whose time has come.”  Indeed, they would have to wait many years for the 
time to be right for these particular ideas to take hold in the public consciousness as conventional 
wisdom, but when that time came with the various political and economic crises of the 1970’s, an 
apparently coherent set of explanations and contiguous policy recommendations were waiting in 
the historical wings, ready and raring to go. 
 One of the most important individual thinkers of the Neoliberal movement gave the following 
advice to Antony Fisher when he asked his advice about entering politics: "Society's course will be 
changed only by a change in ideas. First you must reach the intellectuals, the teachers and writers, 
with reasoned argument. It will be their influence on society which will prevail, and the politicians 
will follow." (Hayek, quoted in Blundell, 1990:6). Fisher went on to incorporate the Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA) in 1955, a key think-tank for the promotion of neoliberal ideas in Britain and 
according to Milton Friedman, Fisher was to become the “single most important person in the 
development of Thatcherism” (quoted in Cockett 1995:122).   
This appreciation of the power of ideas has for a long time been lost to many of those active in the 
study and practice of politics and I will argue that the connection between theory and practice, so 
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important to many Marxists and ‘left progressives’ has been insufficiently demonstrated until 
recent years.  The role of ideas in helping to articulate theory and practice is however recognised 
by Michel Foucault in his assertion that:  
[t]here are more ideas on earth than intellectuals imagine.   And these ideas are more active, 
stronger, more resistant, more passionate than "politicians" think.  We have to be there at the 
birth of ideas, the bursting outward of their force: not in books expressing them, but in events 
manifesting this force, in struggles carried on around ideas, for or against them.  (quoted in Eribon 
1991: 282) 
Of course then, it is not ideas working in isolation which have material consequences.  For ideational 
factors to gain social, cultural and political purchase they must somehow resonate with the 
historical, social and institutional context in which they are voiced.  The ideas which constituted 
social democracy and a regulated system of open international trade made sense to the populations 
of Western Europe and North America in the 1940s and 50s due to the widespread consensus that 
the war and depression, followed by the rise of fascism and the descent once again into global 
conflict, where largely a result of economic crises and social precarity which were, in turn, 
increasingly assumed to be a feature of unfettered market forces (Polanyi, 1957; Blyth, 2002; 
Kindleburger, 1986; O’Brien and Williams, 2007).   
In an alternative interpretation, early neoliberal ideas attempted to cluster Stalinism and fascism 
together as merely different shades of a dangerous and degenerate collectivism, and their 
supposedly shared anti-democratic tendencies an inevitable outcome of any form of social planning 
and government intervention, democratic, national or whatever (Hayek 1944).  These particular 
ideas which clearly offered a very different analysis of the crises of the 1914-1945 period would 
remain marginal at best, until the institutional arrangements of Bretton Woods and the domestic 
policies of Keynesian demand-management appeared to begin to unravel during the 1970s.  At this 
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new point of crisis, in a new political, economic, cultural context, their policy prescriptions for 
institutional revision and transformation gained their own increased legitimacy and purchase on 
the popular consciousness.  This complex historical interplay between ideas and material events 
and actions is key for understanding the potential dangers, progressive possibilities and even 
strategic insights  for future institutional transformation in pursuit of a more democratic, just and 
equitable institutional design for world politics. 
Power and interests 
 
At the centre of this analysis is the claim that any political study must have at its heart the concept 
of power and that power can only be fully understood in its complex ideational as well as 
dispositional form.  This is a contentious claim.  However, power is necessarily one of the key 
concepts in politics which can be recognised as an ‘essentially contestable’ term.   As Gallie remarks 
in his 1956 essay “When we examine the different uses of these terms and the characteristic 
arguments in which they figure we soon see that there is no one clearly definable general use of 
any of them which can be set up as the correct or standard” (168).  On the necessarily subjective 
nature of this contestability and the kind of things we desire to achieve when we speak of power, 
Edward Said asks: “what is the relationship between one’s motive for imagining power, and the 
image one ends up with?” (1986:151).   For these reasons and more, ‘power’ and a number of other 
key concepts in politics including ‘freedom’ and ‘interests’ (for an excellent discussion see Connelly, 
1983) which are also important elements of this study, are the subject of much disagreement and 
debate.  My purpose is by no means to argue for any correct definition of these terms, indeed 
Connelly asserts that any such “desire to expunge contestability from the terms of political enquiry 
expresses a wish to escape politics” (1983: 213) This being the case, it is nevertheless necessary to 
make some initial claims regarding the conceptualisation of power which underpins the present 
work and the way in which I intend to answer questions about it.   
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Constraints of space obviously prevent a full, or perhaps even adequate, discussion of the nature 
of power here but a few guiding points are helpful to initiate and direct the discussion that will 
evolve further in subsequent chapters.  To begin, I suggest that power is the problem which politics, 
both academic and practical, attempts to solve.  The purpose of democratic thought and practice 
is not simply about individual liberty but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, the legitimisation 
and equalisation of power.  While recognising that a complete solution to such a problem may well 
be impossible, it is the concept which provides the vital link between theory and practice in the 
social sciences.  The unequal distribution of power which has characterised the history of human 
civilisation is the problem for which democratic theory and practice has evolved and the earliest 
thinkers who can be considered ‘political’ have wrestled with these issues.  From Aristotle and 
Plato, through La Boetie, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx and Weber, to the 
establishment of Politics as a professional discipline in the 20th century the distribution of power 
has been the central problem to be considered.  In modern politics these problems have necessarily 
engaged with key political institutions such as the state which, as we shall see, is another 
heavyweight contender for contestability.  However, a number of other actors and institutions have 
also attracted the attention of theorists of power.  It is nevertheless beyond dispute that social 
institutions, broadly defined, are inextricably intertwined with the concept of power. 
More recent discussions of the concept of power in what has come to be known (for better or 
worse) as ‘Political Science’ developed that concept in ways which went way beyond pre-modern 
and early political philosophy (while still heavily indebted to them) and has since expanded upon 
much of the initial discussions and debates of the 1940’s and 50’s. These early debates around 
pluralism and elite theory (Truman, 1951; Mills, 1956; Dahl, 1956, 1961, 1957, 1958; Polsby, 1963) 
and the move to focus on overtly observable political behaviour as means of locating and analysing 
power have been greatly enhanced (and admittedly complicated) by discussions of systemic and 
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structural power.  The early behavioural focus of political science13 was deemed by many to 
overemphasise the level of consensus pay insufficient attention to hidden or ‘latent’ conflict in the 
political system which is not so easily measured and thus largely overlooked in the work of many 
early behaviourists.   The consensual bias might be seen as resulting from the post-war context of 
US politics where most of the analysis was applied.  This particular context is perhaps not entirely 
characteristic of many instances of the effects of power in society but as I will suggest, the contexts 
in which power is exercised and analysed are relevant to the possible outcomes. 
A well-known and useful schema of this development of the treatment of power from the 
behavioural to the more structural and contextual is that laid out by Steven Lukes in his three 
dimensional typology.  This significantly enhanced the earlier works of Dahl and Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) who, respectively, identified power primarily with decision-making and agenda 
setting.   
By drawing upon the writings of Antonio Gramsci and his concept of hegemony, Lukes’ ‘third 
dimension’ stresses the ideological factors by which actors preferences might be shaped in order 
to achieve their consent in situations contrary to their real interests.  Lukes recognises the 
normative and political associations of these three rather different ways of conceptualising power.  
Decision-making is associated with a liberal account of politics, agenda-setting corresponds with a 
more reformist agenda, while Lukes’ own contributions represent a more radical or critical account 
of power politics.  Despite the important recognition of this significant factor, Lukes’ analysis throws 
up some intriguing and difficult problems of its own, many of which are acknowledged explicitly 
within the book but their lack of resolution requires some further discussion and analysis.14  Perhaps 
                                                          
13 For a well-balanced review and critique of behavioural analysis in politics, see Sanders (2010) 
14 Lukes has indeed done this in a (2005) second edition with two substantial extra chapters which clarify a 
number of points, respond to the numerous criticisms and expands the Third dimension of power slightly to 
incorporate the insights of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and others.  While in this new edition the third 
dimension or radical view of power is better explicated, the three-dimensional schema of his original 
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the key difficulty is the age old problem of what Friedrich Engels termed ‘false consciousness’ 
(Gabel, 1975; Rosen, 1996) which itself turns, somewhat controversially, upon questions of 
ideology that are themselves central to Marxian modes of critique and have more recently fed 
strongly into methods of discourse analysis (see Thompson, 1984 esp. ch.3 and Eagleton 2007 ch.7, 
Frow, 1986 p.61-7) This connection will be further explored in chapter 2  but first it is necessary to 
further clarify the important distinction in Lukes’ analysis between real and perceived interests.  
Having done so, I will reflect upon the epistemological, ontological and methodological 
ramifications of this welcome extension to the behavioural, liberal and rationalist conception of 
political power and agency and demonstrate the similar limitations which have dogged neoliberal 
and rationalist institutionalism. 
 
Real and perceived interests 
 
Interests are central to both political analysis and to normative political discourse.  The pursuit and 
satisfaction of interests is a key goal of democratic life and an account of political interests is an 
essential component of any understanding of power.  This point can be illustrated by the reference 
to interests in common political parlance such as: the national interest, mutual interests, interest 
groups, class interests and public vs. private interests.  In addition, any consideration of processes 
of social change and political transformation are likely to hang heavy for all those involved due to 
whether their interests are either served by the status quo or by some alternative set of institutional 
arrangements or socio-economic ‘structure’.  In short, to exert agency, to act politically, is to pursue 
interests either individually, but more commonly, collectively. 
                                                          
project begins to unravel as it becomes increasingly clear that two rather different approaches to power are 
possible and in many ways incommensurable. 
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Lukes defines his concept of power rather simplistically at the outset by stating that “A exercises 
power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (2005: 37).  In doing so, and 
drawing on the work of both Balbus (1971) and Connelly (1972, 1983), he qualifies the statement 
somewhat, recognising that the notion of interests is “irreducibly evaluative” (2005: 37) and as 
such, discussion of them “provides a licence for the making of normative judgements of a moral 
and political character” (2005:37).  Indeed, our subjective moral and political positions and 
priorities are likely to place considerable influence upon how and what we might conceive to be in 
our own or someone else’s interest.  In this way he criticises and goes beyond the rather simplistic 
liberal pluralist accounts of interests whereby individuals are assumed to associate these directly 
with their policy preferences (Truman, 1951; Polsby, 1959; Shubert, 1960) and utilitarian 
conceptions of interests as ‘want-regarding’ such as those of Barry (1965) (and dismissed by 
Connelly (1972: 53-59)).  I will return below to a more detailed criticism of these liberal ‘rational-
choice’ accounts of interests and decision-making as they have been applied in much of the 
dominant literatures of IR.   Despite the above acknowledgment by Lukes of the ‘open-textured’15 
nature of agents’ interests, he persists in an attempt to make an analytical distinction between real 
and perceived interests.  Again, drawing on Connelly, Lukes attempts to clarify by suggesting the 
radical view he expounds that people’s preferences may themselves be a product of a system which 
works against their real interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and 
prefer “were they able to make the choice” (p.38), given the appropriate or complete information.   
This moves the debate on considerably as a power relationship here consists of more than simply 
A’s ability to get B to do something they would not otherwise do, to the already briefly mentioned 
matter of false consciousness or misperceived interests.  While most commonly associated with 
certain types of Marxian scholarship, such a conception of power might also be identified in feminist 
                                                          
15 See Connelly (1983: 64) who in turn draws upon Waismann’s ideas on verifiability. HLA Hart was an 
equally influential exponent of this constructivist view of language which probably originated in the later 
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
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understandings and analyses of patriarchy.16  What unites these various approaches to some notion 
of systemic or structural power is a critical stance which connects the theory of social analysis with 
the practice of political emancipation. (Hindess, 1996: 68-69) 
This understanding of power, for Lukes, requires (at the very least) that we try to show how B 
demonstrates behaviour which is contrary to her real interests and Connolly’s attempted resolution 
of the problem in the notion of ‘objective interests’ is clearly influential to his position.  It should 
be noted however that Connelly makes a number of clarifications to his proposal, for him then: 
The key criterion is the choice of the agent involved, but the privileged choice is one made after 
the fact, so to speak, rather than before it.  This does require investigators to make difficult 
judgements, in many situations, about the choices a person would make if he had the relevant 
experiences, but such a reference to counterfactual conditions is required by most concepts 
employed in contemporary political inquiry (for instance, power). [emphasis added] (2005: 65) 
To some extent however, this seems to skirt around the problem.  Lukes seems to be conceding the 
somewhat paradoxical point that these purportedly objectively defined interests must remain 
significantly a matter of the perception of the actors involved.  As Hay (2002: 181) notes, there is 
very little genuine objectivity within the process whereby an actor ascertains their real interests.  
Furthermore, such a judgement could only be made after the fact and under the hypothetical 
assumption that the agent in question possesses, or could ever possess, the required ‘complete 
information’.  Even given this information on the part of the agent/actor, the observer/analyst must 
still make a subjective judgement which might (and should) at best strive for some objectivity.  If, 
                                                          
16 Hindess also makes an interesting case that these recognitions of a wider social and cultural element to 
power have their foundations in Locke’s 1689 Essay on Human Understanding where Locke suggests that “It 
is easy to imagine, how by these means it comes to pass that Men worship the Idols that have been set up 
in their Minds; grow fond of Notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the Characters 
of Divinity, upon Absurdities and Errors, become zealous Votaries to Bulls and Monkeys; and contested too, 
fight and die in defence of their Opinions.” (Essay, Book I, ch.III, S26; 1957, p.83; quoted in Hindess, 
1996:75-76. emphasis in Hindess) 
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as we have seen, political agents are capable of being prevented from realising their real interests, 
what is it which prevents the observer/analyst from being similarly deceived?  Indeed, it is this very 
question which more than anything differentiates natural science from the study of social 
phenomena (Winch, 1958).   If there is no privileged ‘Archimedean point’ from which we can 
achieve some kind of pure and unbiased perspective, the very foundations for an empiricist 
‘scientific’ study of the social and political would appear to begin to fall away.  
However, despite some explicit misgivings, Lukes retains this dubious distinction in his analysis and 
poses the question of whether power can be exercised by A over B, in the real but unperceived 
interests of B, in other words, where the preferences of A and B are in conflict, but the preferences 
of A are in B’s real interests.  He suggests two possible responses: 
(1) That A might exercise ‘short term power’ over B (with an observable conflict of subjective 
interests, but that if and when B recognises his real interests the power relation ends it is self-
annihilating; or (2) that all or most forms of attempted or successful control by A over B, when B 
objects or resists, constitute a violation of B’s autonomy; that B has a real interest in his own 
autonomy; so that such an exercise of power cannot be in B’s real interests. (1974: 36-37)  
Lukes admits being tempted by the second, but in fact opts for the first of these options, insisting 
that some kind of empirical basis must be provided for the identification of real interests.  With 
such a proviso then he suggests any potential dangers may be obviated.  I am inclined to disagree 
as the second option clearly grants a stronger hand to claims for human autonomy, albeit at the 
expense of losing the coherence of the three-dimensional view.  Option one is persuasive for Lukes 
in that it corresponds to a more parsimonious account of social science and it corresponds with his 
earlier assertion that the identification of those interests ultimately always rests on empirically 
supportable and refutable hypotheses (2005: 28-29).  This would be acceptable if they were not 
also morally or normatively suspect and therefore somewhat contrary to his supposed radical view.  
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Lukes seems to be sacrificing some of his critical project to the requirements of a more empirical 
analysis, and in his defence,  there seems to be no easy way around such a trade-off.  In a radical 
and therefore critical and normative analysis, the employment of the concept of power should, I 
argue, err in the other direction in areas of such ambiguity and uncertainty.  If it does not, then the 
critical and emancipatory potential and purpose of understanding the workings of power is limited, 
if not lost.   
Furthermore, to take an actor’s own preferences or perceptions of interests at any given time or 
place is no guarantee that they are either universal or consistent.  They will vary through time, 
across cultures and an almost infinite number of variations in context.  Alternatively, in order to 
attempt to consider an actor’s interests objectively we must project an external (and therefore 
potentially arbitrary or random) notion of what we might consider to benefit and/or harm them.  
However, this must be an equally subjective consideration on the part of the observer whose 
judgement will be similarly contingent.   Furthermore, we must consider the implications of the 
‘double hermeneutic’ problem in social sciences whereby the concepts of social science themselves 
may affect the ways in which actors come to perceive their interests (Lynch 2008).  After all, “the 
concepts of the social sciences are not produced about an independently constituted subject-
matter, which continues regardless of what these concepts are.  The ‘findings’ of the social sciences 
very often enter constitutively into the world they describe” (Giddens 1987: 20). 
 There thus appears to be no way in which to firmly ground any notion of interests in any purely 
objective foundation.  This does not however mean that the notion of foundations should be 
rejected outright, or that some empirical methods might illuminate aspects of them.  A study of 
social subjects and their supposed interests and preferences should remain sceptical of these whilst 
holding on to values of plausibility and a defensible argument for the accuracy of the analysis and 
the ability to persuade others.  I will return to this important distinction below in some more detail 
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in the process of evaluating rational choice explanations for institutional change.  First I will attempt 
to find a possible route out of Lukes’ apparent conundrum. 
The process of preference forming of and among agents, collective or individual, is as much 
ideological work as it is a predictable, materially conditioned process of rational judgement.  
Preferences are shaped not only by bodily and physical criteria, as many liberal/rationalist accounts 
would have us believe.  They are also always conditioned and shaped by ideas, norms beliefs and 
prejudices—in essence, they are highly contingent.  This does not however mean that such notions 
are beyond the scope of understanding and/or even explanation.   Ideas can, as we shall see, be 
identified and examined, if perhaps not firmly quantified,17 in the visible and demonstrable form of 
discourses and narratives.  The identification and examination of these elements allows for an 
analysis of ideas and their articulation with certain political interests and strategic objectives.  What 
is required also is that we make judgements about where power exists and is exerted and attempt 
to justify these judgements through the demonstration that certain semiotic data reveal something 
of the preferences and interests of the powerful and the strategic decisions which could follow from 
these.  In such a way it may even be possible to reveal ideas as important, but by no means the 
only, causal factors in politics.  It must be stressed however that such a strategy is one of reflexive 
interpretation.  
The sheer complexity of power and its inherently contestable nature have even led some to be 
suspicious of its usefulness as a concept worthy of study and should simply be dismissed from 
political analysis (see Latour 1986; and somewhat more surprisingly, March 1966).  Such an option 
is not amenable to the present study which seeks to make an argument for the constitutive and 
productive power of ideas and the dominance of neoliberal ideology in mainstream discourses of 
global governance.  Indeed, an important element of this study argues that power has undergone 
                                                          
17 Although see Yee (1996)  
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some reorientation in the traditional location of many modern western nation states and that the 
non-state sphere has absorbed some of this power, this is key to the concept of institutional shift.  
It is not a simple case of states losing power and corporations and organisations gaining it.  Power, 
as understood here is not always a zero sum game.  What I suggest is that states continue to exert 
significant amounts of power, particularly SIACS, but in new ways and through new institutional 
forms.  It therefore follows that greater attention should be directed to the emergence and nature 
of these institutional phenomena and more responsibility and accountability should be accorded 
to them if we can argue that they are more powerful than they once were.   
Clearly, there is a great deal more that can be said but for now I suspend the discussion in 
considerable agreement with Lukes that power, rather problematically, “is at its most effective 
when it is least accessible to observation” (2005: 64) and I suggest that such a conclusion must 
render the purely empirical study of power and institutions somewhat limited.  The difficulties with 
Lukes’ approach (according to Hay 2002) stem largely from his attempt to sustain an all-
encompassing three dimensional approach which incorporates the earlier analyses of power which 
he rightly demonstrates as limited, within his own self-proclaimed three-dimensional radical view.   
While studies of the social and political world need not restrict themselves to a purely behavioural 
positivist approach based upon the notable and often beneficial advances this method has made in 
the study of the natural, non-human world, radical alternatives which implicate ideological 
structures of power in the very construction and constitution of interests take place on quite a 
different level.   The advantage of Lukes’ project might be that it could enable a more stable 
foundation for debate to develop between mainstream behavioural and studies and the more 
radical ideology critique in which Lukes is interested.  However, the very notion of such stable 
foundations is also rendered questionable by recent critical scholarship across a variety of social 
and human disciplines.  What is required, according to Hay (2002: 185-6) is a redefinition of power 
where ‘analytical questions’, regarding the identification of power, are differentiated from the 
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normative critique of the distribution and exercise of power.  The behavioural definition of power 
must be rejected and in its place Hay suggests a definition of power which emphasises:  
not only the consequences of A’s choices for the actions of, but also, and perhaps primarily, their 
effects upon the context in which the subsequent action must take place.  Power then is about 
context shaping, about the capacity of actors to redefine the parameters of what is socially, political 
and economically possible for others.  (Hay 2002:185) 
Part of the difficulty with Lukes approach then, has also perhaps been part of its appeal and a reason 
for its widespread discussion.  He seems to be attempting to shoehorn both a positivist and a post-
positivist account of power into the same analytical shoe.  The advantages of this are that the 
different sides of the debate may be more able to engage on the same ground and the hope is 
perhaps that a more unified body of research might be available to the social sciences.   On such 
shared ground then, critical perspectives can attempt to persuade behavioural and pluralist 
accounts of the error of their analysis and, as such, ‘win’ the argument.  However, the turn towards 
postmodernism by many across those disciplines in the years that followed Lukes’ ground-breaking 
work largely put paid to any such attempt, for better or worse.  Postmodernism bent the 
epistemological stick so far in the radical direction that any all-encompassing reconciliation was, 
perhaps permanently, beyond reach.   Hay’s critique of Lukes then emphasises and endorses the 
conception of power as indirect domination or ‘context-shaping’  “in which structures, institutions 
and organisations are shaped by human action in such a way as to alter the parameters of 
subsequent action” (2002:186) that Lukes highlighted.  He rejects however, the attempt to 
construct an all-encompassing ‘three-dimensional’ schema, due to the quite different purposes 
which inform the work of behaviouralist and critical analysts of power.    
It is worth recalling here then, the widely cited caveat of Robert Cox that “Theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose.” (1981:129-130 [emphasis in original]).  Here Cox is establishing 
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an important distinction between problem solving theory and critical theory.  While for problem 
solving theory the prevailing structures and relations of power and the institutional matrix in which 
these are contained are taken for granted, critical theory “calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing.” (Cox 1981: 
131).  Such an approach does not simply address specific problems in order to make the system 
function more effectively but challenges the parameters of the problematic and the foundations 
and seeks to offer a wider picture of the socio-political complex as a whole, including the theories 
which claim to explain and justify its continued operation.  Critical theory then includes and draws 
upon the various insights and perspectives of historical sociology, feminism, (neo-) Marxism, the 
critical cultural studies of the Frankfurt school, post-structuralism and postmodernism.  Some of 
these perspectives do not reject positivism outright, but simply suggest that there is a wider and 
more complex set of questions to which the study of society should be directed.  At the postmodern 
end of the spectrum, we find a complete rejection of positivism and sometimes even the very 
foundations of any supposedly emancipatory project common to much critical theory are 
themselves subject to critique and deconstruction.18 Perhaps worthy of note here is John Vasquez’s 
distinction between post-structuralism and postmodernism.  He suggests that what is at stake is 
the notion of relativism, the extent to which claims to truth or knowledge are relative to the 
claimant or objectively verifiable.  Vasquez claims that “whereas post-structuralists, particularly 
those who are inspired by Foucault, flirt with relativism, postmodernists like Lyotard and 
Baudrillard, embrace it” (1995:218).  The role of ideational variables is deeply entwined with the 
relativist controversy and I will discuss below in Chapter four how it emerged in the Marxist debates 
                                                          
18 Overviews of poststructuralist IR can be found in, for example, James DerDerian and Michael J. 
Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington 
MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker (eds.), Challenging 
Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996); Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International 
Relation.s (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); and the 1990 special issue of International Studies 
Quarterly, 34. 
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on ideology and the sociology of knowledge, both of which, I argue, connect the critical traditions 
of Marxian analysis with the fundamental tenets of contemporary constructivism. 
While not following a strident anti-foundational postmodern approach, this research is sceptical of 
a unified approach such as that attempted by Lukes where the critical and the purely empirical or 
empiricist can be effectively pursued as one in the so-called social and human sciences.  The goals 
of these crucially different projects still seem to remain simply too divergent in their ultimate goals, 
and the attempt to merge them, I suggest, is to the potential detriment of both, but particularly 
limiting to critical social theory.  Such attempts however remain very much part of the 
contemporary landscapes of Sociology, Politics and IR/IPE in the form of what has come to be 
known as social constructivism.  In IR/IPE in particular, this emergent school of thought has been 
characterised by an attempt to merge critical and mainstream perspectives.  On the part of 
traditional rationalists and empiricists, it is a response to the rising tide of the relativist challenge.  
On the part of critical theorists it has come from an understandable yet regrettable desire to reap 
the various professional benefits of engaging with the mainstream debates and thus find a wider 
audience.  While sympathising with both sides, I suggest that this new middle ground is simply too 
broad to sustain its identity as a coherent single school of thought and below I will attempt to 
explain why.    
To recap, in order to grasp the reformulation of power as suggested by Lukes and Hay (and their 
key antecedants in this matter (eg. Gramsci, the Frankfurt school and Foucault) the critical study of 
power must be understood through the play of knowledge, ideas and discourses.  This requires a 
rather different kind of ontology and method from positivism and rationalism.    Constructivism is 
amenable to such a critical account, but the approach has also been stretched over into more 
mainstream accounts of politics.  The following chapterprogramme will explore both the problems 
and potential of such an epistemology and the methodological opportunities it affords to students 
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of power, institutional change and world politics more generally.  As far as possible, these 
constructivist accounts will be compared and contrasted with their orthodox alternative of 
neoliberal institutionalism.  However, such an attempt may be hampered by the very broad nature 
of both these schools of thought.  While I acknowledge the areas where elements of these 
approaches seem to converge, the rationalist aspects of neoliberal institutionalism and the critical 
end of the constructivist spectrum will be highlighted in order to provide some sense of 
distinctiveness.  I will return to a more comprehensive discussion of the critical contributions of 
Gramsci and Foucault and their respective concepts of hegemony and discourse in later chapters.  
Before proceeding, I will briefly outline the content of the chapters to follow. 
Chapter outline 
 
This thesis presents an analysis of how ideas and ideology play a central role in politics.  It argues 
that contemporary political analysis which does not consider the role of ideas and cultural factors 
in its study will fail to sufficiently appreciate the full empirical reality of the material world.  Ideas 
and power are argued to be intimately related.  The ability to shape and influence the ideas of 
others is among the most important aspects of power.  Such approaches to the study of power and 
politics are by no means new but have nevertheless been overlooked in a vast amount of the 
literature in political analysis.  In particular, I argue that an ideational focus is indispensable for the 
kind of critical theory which informs this piece of research.  Implicit in these arguments then is the 
assumption that contemporary structures of power are undemocratic and thus problematic, and a 
key purpose of this critical political analysis is to render these problems more visible through a 
discussion of ideology and discourse.    
A second argument is that the study of politics and society must now consider the global reach of 
ideas and systems of power.  This is not to suggest that all political analysis should be global in 
scope, of course it should not.  In no way do I deny the importance and necessity of the micro-study 
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of the workings of power and resistance, but these valuable situated analyses are more meaningful 
alongside or within broader historical and global considerations of the political.  Furthermore, the 
failure to at least question the supposed disciplinary boundaries of social, political and economic 
conduct, both temporal and spatial, will restrict our ability as scholars and or activists to provide 
new and useful insights into the structures of power and potential spaces for political action and 
transformation which are the very field and purpose of political analysis in an age of global 
neoliberalism and capitalist crisis.   
The foregoing introduction has laid out some of the key preceding literatures in Politics, Sociology, 
International Relations and International/Global Political Economy (IR/IPE) which underpin and 
influence this analysis.  It has begun to lay out the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
which inform the research.   A central assumption, which will be the focus of the initial argument, 
is the fundamentally inter-relational nature of the key objects and subjects of the research and 
analysis.  What follows will continue to elaborate the relationship between state and globality; 
between ideas/ideology, interests and power, structure and agency, political strategy and 
practice/praxis. 
Chapter two entails a discussion of various perspectives on institutional change in the academic 
field of IR/IPE.  It looks at Institutionalism more generally and the way this field of study has been 
treated in IR/IPE from the perspective known as neoliberal institutionalism.  I criticise this 
perspective along with the rationalist assumptions upon which it is based. 
Chapter three continues that discussion in relation to the ‘new institutionalisms’ imported from 
other disciplines such as History and Sociology and develops the argument for a relational approach 
to power and institutions in global governance.  This discussion is carried out through an 
examination of the structure and agency debates which I argue cannot be ‘resolved’ as such but 
36 
 
that these aspects of the social and political world are crucial for the adequate understanding of 
historical developments and institutional change. 
Chapter four continues with the theme of historical approaches in an argument which suggests that 
ideology is a crucial element for the understanding of relations of power at any given conjuncture.  
The Marxist approach to ideology is scrutinised and, while found to be problematic in parts, its 
subsequent refinement in the work of others such as Lukacs, Mannheim and in particular Antonio 
Gramsci and his concept of cultural hegemony, represents a useful set of tools by which to 
understand the processes of social change in the forms of government and governance through the 
twentieth century. 
Chapter five returns briefly to the state as the central institution of world politics and re-examines 
the class relations therein.  It discusses the relationship between class power and the state and the 
extent to which the state is ‘relatively autonomous’. 
Chapter six discusses how discourse theory extends the concept of ideology and explains how a 
critical discourse-historical analysis can shed light upon the political saliency of ideas and the 
relative legitimacy authority of political institutions.  It can demonstrate the contingency of power 
and how forms of representation and signification are open to transformation.  The chapter also 
argues that such an analysis is particularly suited to providing a critical understanding and of the 
informational nature of ‘late’ capitalism.  
Chapter seven uses a critical discourse-historical method to trace the process by which neoliberal 
ideas emerged to become dominant among a global elite or ‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC).  It 
will expose the roots of neoliberalism in the neoclassical and marginalist economics of the late 
nineteenth century.  It identifies the key thinkers and texts which came to define the project from 
the mid-20th century until the present day.  In particular it will examine the social theory and ideas 
of F. A. Hayek who came to be regarded as perhaps the most influential of the neoliberal 
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ideologues. The second part of the chapter will consist of a critical discourse analysis case-study of 
The Economist.  I argue that The Economist is a publication of vital importance to the TCC as a mass 
conduit for the dissemination of neoliberal ideas and ideology.  The chapter examines and discusses 
the representations and terminology which articulate and express a dominant neoliberal discourse 
among its influential readership.  In particular it examines the way in which key terms of reference 
to globalization are deployed such as privatization, harmonization and standardization.  In addition 
it examines the way in which critical voices and resistance to neoliberal globalization are 
represented and delegitimized. 
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Ch 2. From Neoliberal to Constructivist Institutionalism 
IR: A ‘Battle’ for the Middle Ground? 
 
The discipline of IR is often presented as comprising three paradigms which consist of variations of 
realism, pluralism and radicalism which was IR’s self-conscious attempt to put its own gloss on the 
wider conservative vs. liberal vs. Marxist account.19  While such a typology confuses as much as it 
reveals, it is a useful reference point by which to understand the way in which constructivism has 
engaged with the various themes of IR and IPE.  To some extent, the constructivist research 
programme(s) has been a casualty of such a three way typology, to the extent it has been drawn 
into and stretched across the debates between the positivism of the mainstream and post-
positivism of critical perspectives.  The resultant stretching of the constructivist approach has, I 
argue, dulled its critical edge and thus limited part of its particular appeal.  In what follows I will 
attempt to regain some of that edge while showing that constructivism represents some very useful 
theoretical insights for research across the transdisciplinary field of IR/IPE. 
Even in the notoriously traditionalist and conservative discipline of IR, the scepticism towards 
positivist foundationalism and the turn to ideational variables has begun to make notable inroads 
into the mainstream on the back of a constructivist research programme.  As I have suggested, 
ideas, values, norms and beliefs are crucial for understanding the way in which both agents’ 
interests and the social institutions in which those interests are expressed are constituted, and 
constructivism has emphasised this in IR/IPE.  This is on the whole a more complex and nuanced 
approach than traditional perspectives in the social sciences and some consideration must be given 
                                                          
19 See Smith, S (1995) ‘Self-images of a discipline’ in International Relations theory and Beyond 
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to the epistemological and ontological frameworks in which these cultural and ideational variables 
operate.  To borrow a phrase from Risse-Kappen’s (1994) well known essay, “Ideas do not float 
freely”, they must be considered and analysed in relation to the material aspects of the world which 
they both reflect and constitute.  
The sources of social constructivism and the reasons for its supposed emergence as a new ‘middle 
ground’ in IR are many and varied and have engendered some considerable disagreement and 
controversy as I will discuss below.  Less controversial is that it is now considered to represent the 
main challenge to the rationalist orthodoxy of neoliberal institutionalism and other related 
positivist accounts of politics (Adler 1997).  As noted in the initial discussion of power and interests 
above, an important distinction, or perhaps even division, between mainstream and critical 
approaches, has been that between theories which seek to describe the world as it is, and those 
normative perspectives which make claims about how the world could or should be.  To a certain 
extent, this division seems to hold even within constructivist analysis, as it is possible to distinguish 
between conventional and critical perspectives or what Parsons (2010) describes as the modern 
and postmodern approaches.  Ruggie (1998:35) has even suggested a third category of 
constructivism between the modern and postmodern variants.  I suggest that such demarcations 
are perhaps unnecessarily rigid (indeed Parsons acknowledges that other lines could be drawn) and 
a less fixed association of relatively ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions suffices to account for the diversity of 
perspectives within constructivism.  I am also sympathetic to Rengger’s (2000) concern that certain 
strands of postmodernism are quite different from the defining aspects of constructivism despite 
their unmistakable role in developing some of the key insights. 
It might be said that the novel ambition of constructivism in IR is that it attempts to describe and 
explain how the world came to be as it is, to mean what it does, whilst maintaining a 
critical/normative component which holds open the possibility for social transformation and 
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therefore emancipation.  It is this second aspect that suggests a conception of constructivism 
distinct from the strictly modern and postmodern variations, and it is this which I aim to explore, 
develop and apply.   This ambitiously broad research programme might be said to account for both 
the many criticisms which constructivism has drawn from a range of other perspectives, but also 
for the success with which it has engaged with mainstream debates.  I suggest this engagement is 
what distinguishes critical constructivist scholarship from the radical interpretivism associated with 
post-structural and postmodernists such as Ashley, Walker Campbell and Shapiro   As such, the 
definition of constructivism used here is bracketed to exclude the anti-foundationalism which 
characterises some, but by no means all, forms of postmodernism.  Critics from this radical side of 
the spectrum argue that the shortcomings of constructivism lie in its watering down of the critical 
project through an abiding, and in their opinion unwarranted, concern for materiality.  Such radical 
interpretivists tend to: 
object to the exclusion of challenging and thought-provoking questions about politics and the 
political. On the other hand, it is precisely a certain unproblematic acceptance of reality which has 
made the constructivist ‘success story’ possible. ‘Taking reality into account’ is one of the supposed 
virtues of constructivism. (Zehfuss, 2004:250) 
Other radical interpretivists criticise constructivism as an example of mainstream/’malestream’ IR 
incorporating ‘acceptable’ elements of ideational theories in order to appear more pluralised and 
representative of a diverse range of approaches, while in reality fixing boundaries in order to 
exclude important critical political projects which refuse to play by their ‘scientific’ rules (Weber, 
1999; Walker, 2000).  While sympathetic to such concerns, I suggest they are either somewhat 
overstated or unwarranted.  Nevertheless, critical approaches, while maintaining some minimal 
foundations required for an emancipatory politics, need to remain wary of becoming hostages to 
the supposed fortunes of mainstream acceptance and engagement.   
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There are sufficient spaces in the constructivist research programme to offer opportunities for 
critical, normative and emancipatory goals which do not suffer the self-defeating consequences 
which follow from much radical interpretivism and post-modern approaches.20  At the other 
(mainstream) end of the spectrum, caution should also prevail in order to preserve the critical and 
reflexive edge of constructivist scholarship.  The supposed dangers of incorporation into dominant 
functionalist and/or rationalist research programmes stem in part from constructivism’s late 
emergence in IR alongside other new approaches.   The arrival of these new theoretical challenges 
to the orthodoxy of neorealism in IR has been described by some as the ‘inter-paradigm’ or ‘third 
great debate’ in IR.21  Crucial to these debates was the end of the Cold War and the apparent 
proliferation of numerous non-state actors or ‘institutions’ in world politics and the increased 
salience of ‘regimes’ of global governance.   
 
End of the Cold War and the Third Debate 
 
It has been a peculiar feature of IR to provide an account of its theoretical evolution as proceeding 
in a series of ‘great debates’.  This is perhaps due to the fact that the discipline is more prone than 
most to respond to historical transformations in its objects of analysis with a reorientation of its 
theoretical priorities.  I do not intend to discuss the so-called great debates in detail here but the 
constructivist turn in IR/IPE is better understood in relation to the various geo-political 
transformations which marked the closing decades of the last century.   Neoliberalism challenged 
the dominance of neorealism by highlighting the increased cooperation and interdependence 
which they observed among states.  While adhering to many of the most fundamental assumptions 
                                                          
20 For a more detailed discussion of some drawbacks of these approaches see Linklater 1998:66-71 and Hay, 
2002, chapter 7) 
21 For discussion of these debates in IR see Banks 1985, Lapid 1989, Vasquez 1995 and Waever 1996, and 
for a somewhat contrary view, Narveson 2001. 
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of neorealism, neoliberalism attempted to provide an account of world politics which could more 
readily explain these apparent changes.   
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongoing process of European 
unification rendered the static theories of neorealism increasingly vulnerable to criticism, but the 
distinction between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalist challenges became more a question 
of which aspects of world politics were the object of analysis than any serious dispute over 
paradigmatic issues.  In fact there is less distance between the competing camps in the so-called 
neo-neo debate than is often claimed by both sides (Jervis, 1999: 43).  It is a point conceded by 
Keohane and Martin that “for better or for worse institutional theory is a half sibling of neorealism” 
(1999: 3).  Indeed, both demonstrate a rationalist bias which downplays, and even eradicates the 
constitutive role of ideas in the construction of interests and the shaping of institutional forms, 
“neither neorealists nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of 
theorists believe that there is an international political reality” (Keohane 1989: 7-8).  Moreover, 
neorealists and neoliberals also share a broad commitment to produce research which is 
considered relevant to the policy-making of statespersons.  Its research objects are the realm of 
‘high politics’, diplomacy, foreign policy, statecraft and it is therefore almost devoid of any 
substantial critique of the nature of the system itself. 
Given the insubstantial differences between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, the most 
notable outcome of the inter-paradigm (or third) debate then, has been the emergence of a 
positivist/post-positivist divide.  Keohane recognised the centrality of this two way divide in his 
1988 presidential address to the International Studies Association: ‘International Institutions: Two 
Approaches’.  This ‘reflectivist’ challenge came from a range of subaltern perspectives including 
critical theory, post-structuralism, postmodernism, feminism, historical sociology, post-colonialism 
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and neo-Gramscian Marxism. These literatures also conveyed between them the insights which 
came to be consolidated as constructivism in IR (Smith 1995: 24-30).  
The positivist/post-positivist divide is by no means an attribute particular to the study of world 
politics.  Indeed, it is sometimes noted that IR was perhaps the last bastion of positivist approaches 
to be assailed by the post-positivist onslaught (Hoffman, 1987).22  However, the slightly more basic 
argument between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’ in IR goes back to the debates of the mid 
twentieth century between realism and idealism.  In that long running debate, it was perhaps the 
established idealists of the 1930s, arguably the very founders of the discipline of IR, who bore the 
burden of critique and revision of their theories, indeed, it might be said, their outright rejection.   
The work and normative commitments of these largely liberally oriented scholars survived the 
decades of realist and neo-realist dominance throughout the Cold War, most notably in the rather 
niche form of what is often referred to as the English School of IR (Rengger 2000:81).  They re-
emerged largely intact to contribute significantly to the criticisms directed at mainstream positivist 
IR which stood shell-shocked and vulnerable as a result of the tectonic shift in world politics that 
was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  The failure of mainstream 
theories of IR to be able to account for, let alone predict, this monumental transformation in their 
object of study shed doubt upon their claims for ‘scientific’ status and the supposed scientific 
credentials of their accounts of world politics.  My point here is that a latent liberalism in IR fed not 
only into the neo-institutionalist schools but also into the very different critical and cosmopolitan 
reappraisals of what might constitute a more just world order or international society.23 
                                                          
22 It has been noted by Drainville, A. (2001) that “IR is a field where critical theories go to die.” (Comment 
made in response to a paper presented at the BISA Marxist working group conference, Sussex University 
2001.) 
23 The work of Martin Wight was an early call for a social theory of world politics which preceded those of 
Wendt.  In the seminal text of the English school Diplomatic Investigations, Butterfield and Wight note a 
specific slant of the British tradition in which has “probably been more concerned with the historical than 
the contemporary, with the normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, 
with principles than policy” (1966: 12) See also the sophisticated contributions of Linklater, Booth and 
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In order to make a case for the critical interpretivist epistemology which underpins this research, it 
is necessary to show why a rationalist account is of limited use for such a study.  These rationalist 
accounts are evident, even predominant, in both mainstream approaches of neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism.  I do not engage with neorealism here as it says little of consequence on 
the subject of global governance, regime theory and institutional analysis.  It is more pertinent to 
make some reference to the various new institutionalist schools in politics and IR/IPE and how some 
of these have engaged with what might be regarded as more sociological, historical and critical 
approaches.  These approaches have moved ideas and ideology to the forefront of their analysis.  
 
Ideas and interests 
 
I will suggest in the following chapter how such historically contingent and socially constructed 
ideas and institutions are important for understanding the relationship between structure and 
agency.  Indeed, perhaps above all else it has been the scope and extent of institutional 
transformation which has swept through domestic and international politics since the 1960s that 
has, in turn, transformed the study of politics and IR/IPE.   
However, the fundamental role which ideas and ideology have played in the nature of these 
transformations has been almost entirely, but not completely, overlooked by many neoliberal 
institutionalists.  Some neoliberal institutionalists such as Keohane pay some lip service to ideas 
and interpretation, acknowledging that “much behaviour is recognised by participants as reflecting 
established rules, norms and conventions, and meaning is interpreted in light of these 
understandings” (1989: 1).  Indeed, Keohane made some concessions to what he terms the 
                                                          
Suganami.  These English School theorists can also be shown to connect with elements of historical 
sociology (Hobden 2002 pp51-53 
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reflectivist approach but remains sceptical and suggests that these “will remain on the margins of 
the field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of whom explicitly 
or implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic premises’’ (Keohane 1989: 173).  In order 
to make a case for more culturally oriented interpretivist accounts of world politics, it is therefore 
necessary to expose the shortcomings of the rationalist approaches which continue to dominate 
the field. 
Even where ideas have been considered, the positivist, materialist and rationalist bias has in many 
ways limited their use and efficacy in a way that has not so hindered more critical forms of 
constructivist theorising.   Much analysis which goes under the label of constructivism has been 
reluctant to abandon the foundational basis for knowledge in the study of the social and human 
worlds, perhaps in a well-intentioned effort to engage more fully with the mainstream/malestream.  
As a result it is difficult to regard constructivism as a coherent whole, as representing a significant 
challenge to orthodox, positivist foundationalism as much of its insight has been absorbed within 
that corpus. 
The concept of interests, traditionally the national variety, have long been a fundamental aspect of 
IR across the epistemological and methodological divides.  Indeed, it has been celebrated by realist 
champions as "the main signpost that helps political realism through the landscape of international 
politics," (Morgenthau, 1978:5).  Others also see the varied approach to interests as a key 
determinant of constructivist and non-constructivist approaches.  Goldstein (2005: 126) for 
example suggests that the difference between constructivism and other approaches is that 
constructivists are concerned with the construction of interests while other approaches see them 
as fixed and given.  The case here is overstated though.  Many non-constructivists are interested in 
how actors come to hold the interests which shape their decision-making (eg. Moravsic, 1999). 
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Neoliberal institutionalism 
 
Concurrent to the gradual awakening of IR to critical and constructivist currents in Social Theory 
through the 1980s and 90s, neoliberal institutionalism became the major alternative to neorealism, 
as illustrated in the interminable ‘neo-neo debates’.  As a result there is sometimes confusion 
between what constitutes the so-called ‘third debate’ in IR, whether it is a debate between 
positivist and post positivist (constructivist) accounts of world politics or simply a narrower debate 
between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.  Illustrative of this confusion, some scholars 
have attempted to show that there is in fact little difference between neoliberal institutionalism 
and constructivism.  Sterling-Folker (2000) suggests that there is a common functionalism shared 
between liberal theories of IR and constructivism.   
In each case an exogenous interest is posited and what follows is a story about the social 
construction of institutional preferences derived from a functional-institutional logic. This 
necessarily leads constructivist accounts onto the same post hoc explanatory and predictive track 
as functionalism. (108) 
The reasons behind Stirling-Folker’s argument are twofold.  Firstly, the examples of constructivism 
which she chooses (eg. Wendt, Ruggie, Katzenstein) reside squarely in what Hopf (1998) would 
identify as the conventional end of the constructivist spectrum and represent a form of 
constructivist scholarship more common to the US, a decidedly ‘thin’ variant.   In fact, despite 
Wendt’s widely cited ‘constructivist’ challenge to the mainstream, “by any conventional definition 
of constructivism, [he] is no constructivist” (Hay 2002: 199; and see also Smith 2000).  Wendt’s 
position can be demonstrated as both ontologically realist and even at times (epistemologically) 
positivist.  Secondly, the version of neoliberal institutionalism considered is a rather sophisticated 
one which seems to have incorporated some insights from more interpretivist approaches.  Indeed, 
the work of March and Olsen (1998) features heavily in Sterling-Folker’s account as indicative of 
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the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism.  However, their own account which combines a 
rationalist ‘logic of consequences’ with a more normatively based ‘logic of appropriateness’ (which 
as they stress weighs more heavily in their work) is a more nuanced, sophisticated and contingency-
based approach than that which might be said to characterise most neoliberal and rationalist forms 
of institutionalism (Lowndes, 2010: 66).   
This conflation of conventional or ‘thin’ constructivism with neoliberal institutionalism also stems 
partly from attempts by some neoliberal institutionalists to incorporate a role for ideas into their 
explanations of world politics, but they have done so in a quite limited fashion.  Drawing rather 
narrowly upon Weberian perspectives, where material and ideal interests rather than ideas 
themselves are considered to determine human conduct, “yet, very frequently the ‘world images’ 
that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action 
has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1948: 280).  In essence 
then, neoliberal institutionalism, like neorealism considers the behaviour of agents, individual or 
collective, to be predominantly determined by exogenous material factors and ideational 
considerations are at best minimal (see also Adler, 1997: 322).  The result remains a firmly 
rationalist account of institutional design and change, despite its notable improvement on 
neorealism in terms of its ontological concession to non-state actors and the beliefs held by 
individuals.  However, the way in which individuals beliefs can affect policy preferences and 
outcomes are explained as resulting from the rationally guided and economically driven choices of 
individuals (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 3). 
In outlining and developing my own approach I will challenge this position by suggesting that a form 
of constructivism which is able to stand outside, and thereby challenge, the rationalist assumptions 
of the mainstream institutionalist approaches must express more explicitly its critical and 
normative components.  This should acknowledge that much scholarship which has gone under the 
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name of constructivism (and has been largely responsible for its success as a formidable challenge 
to mainstream IR/IPE) has retained residues of rationalist and positivist foundations.   Before 
outlining a fuller account of critical constructivism, we need a clearer picture of the positivist and 
rationalist accounts of world politics against which it is contrasted, particularly those which claim 
to explain the institutional frameworks that structure and are structured by those processes. 
It should be clarified here that neoliberal institutionalism is only one facet (albeit a defining one) of 
the academic approach in IR generally known as neoliberalism (Sterling-Folker 2010).  I use the term 
neoliberal institutionalism for two important reasons.  Firstly, to emphasise the focus upon the 
institutional frameworks which undergird processes, practices and organisations of global 
governance and governmentality.  Secondly, I wish to avoid confusion between neoliberalism as an 
academic approach in IR and neoliberalism as a set of practical policy preferences and proposals 
that are seen to represent a dominant ideology and discourse regarding globalisation and how 
societies must respond to them.  The former then is a more analytical category which seeks to 
describe and explain aspects of world politics, which it does through a predominantly rational 
institutionalist perspective.  The latter is a more normative collection of ideas and policy 
prescriptions which not only attempt to describe how individuals and  societies function at a basic 
level, but how these fundamental  assumptions transpose certain necessary conditions for the 
maximisation of economic and political freedom for individuals.   As one might expect however, the 
differences hold only up to a point.  I present a brief outline of neoliberal institutionalism below 
and the connections which can be identified with neoliberal policies more generally, while a 
separate and more detailed account of the emergence of neoliberal ideology is presented in 
chapter six.  Despite these important distinctions then, both ‘neoliberalisms’ share a root in the 
neoclassical economics of the 19th century marginalists and the rational choice perspective which 
has come to dominate political science and IR/IPE. 
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Neoliberal institutionalism has been possibly the most widespread academic response in the field 
of IR/IPE to political globalisation and the growth of global governance, particularly in the US.  It 
has become popular partly as a response to the declining popularity of neorealism, whose theories 
had some difficulty in accounting for the apparent rise in cooperation and collaboration between 
states which appeared to show that international society was becoming less anarchic.   While 
neorealists regard anarchy as an unchanging condition that defines the international environment 
and which all agents in the system are subject,  neoliberal institutionalists have drawn attention to 
processes of change in the international environment and “see anarchy as a vacuum that is 
gradually being filled with human-created processes and institutions” (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 119).   
Of particular note is the propensity of the most powerful and wealthy states in advanced capitalist 
societies (SIACS) to be some of the most enthusiastic proponents of greater cooperation and the 
creation of more concrete and powerful regimes, institutions and organisations through which to 
coordinate foreign policy-making and respond collectively to issues and problems which have 
appeared increasingly transnational in scope.   Peripheral and postcolonial states have been less 
instrumental in the establishment of institutions of global governance but are no less, and perhaps 
even more, subject to them. 
The institutional arrangements now widely referred to as global governance emerged almost 
exclusively since the end of WWII.  The overarching power of the US in the post-war system allowed 
it to shape the international system significantly in its own interests which were perceived to be a 
free trade, capitalist system which would provide international markets for the export of US 
manufactures.  As a result of the boom in industrial production during the war, the US had a surplus 
manufacturing capacity which needed an ever growing number of consumers in order to survive.  
Its preponderance of economic power was matched by an overwhelming military power and as a 
result of this superpower status it was able and more than willing to assume the role of a global 
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hegemon.  This came to be known in IR theory as hegemonic stability theory and marked an early 
challenge to the dominant status of neorealist explanations of world politics. 
Following World War Two, the establishment of the United Nations (UN) was, initially at least,  a 
normative set of relatively loose institutional arrangements while the Bretton Woods Institutions  
were more formal and, along with the Marshall Plan, had a more direct, immediate and concrete 
effect on the foreign policy and behaviour of states.  In recent decades, even with the relative 
decline in the power of the US, these institutional arrangements or ‘regimes’ have come to work 
more closely together across a range of issues in world politics.  Environmental issues such as acid 
rain, damage to the ozone layer and climate change are cited as early stimuli to such enhanced 
coordination and cooperation.   Organised crime, human rights, security and ‘terrorism’ have since 
been given prominence among neoliberal institutionalists and regime theorists.  As I will attempt 
to show however, the emergence of these institutions and regimes would not have been likely, or 
even possible, without the earlier and more significant institutionalisation of worldwide economic 
interests among and between increasingly globalised capitalist elites and class fractions (van der 
Pijl 1998; Gill 2004).  Neoliberal institutionalism can be seen then as the need for realists to revise 
their theories to account for the emergence of a liberal trading order and the multiple and complex 
legal regimes which are necessary to secure that order. 
Global governance now represents an almost  seamless web in which aspects of policy-making 
decisions over a range of ‘problems’ such as development, environment, security, human rights, 
crime, trade, finance , are relinquished by states.  The transfer, or at least extension, of this policy 
formulation and regulation to transnational institutions is matched by the increased role for private 
institutions both within and beyond the state.  States remain powerful actors but the institutional 
arrangements within them are transformed in the process of promoting globalisation (Sorenson 
2006). In particular, formerly public and democratically accountable bodies are transferred to the 
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private sector.  International accords such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
limits states abilities to control who can bid for contracts to run formerly public services.  Outside 
the state, the expansion of private authority is most visible in the proliferation of Non-governmental 
organisations, what has come to be known as Global Civil Society (GCS).  This activity is couched in 
euphemisms such as deregulation, harmonisation, and cooperation.  In reality, regulation has 
shifted to private authority and the discipline of capital, cooperation is between state and corporate 
elites, and any kind of global harmony seems in very short supply.  In particular, many people have 
noted the democratic deficit which results from these institutional transformations, both between 
and within states (Beder 2010).  Indeed, Moravcsik poses this as “the central question in 
contemporary world politics” (2004: 336).  Sufficient regulation is considered to be provided by 
technical experts and managers in the political realm and by the supposed natural equilibrium that 
is argued to result from the so-called ‘self-regulating market’.  Any kind of substantive, let alone 
deliberative democratic governance is simply not on the neoliberal agenda.   Indeed, Harvey notes 
that: 
Neoliberal  theorists are profoundly suspicious of democracy.  Governance by majority rule is seen 
as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties. Democracy is viewed as a luxury 
only possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle class presence to 
guarantee political stability.  Neoliberals therefore tend to favour governance by experts and elites.  
A strong preference exists for government by executive order and by judicial decision rather than 
democratic and parliamentary decision-making. Neoliberals prefer to insulate key institutions, such 
as the central bank, from democratic pressures. (2007: 66) 
As an illustration, the UK in recent decades has seen a growth in the power of the executive in 
relation to Parliament, begun with Thatcher and continued with the Blair/Brown administrations.  
One of the first policies to be implemented by the Blair government after their election in 1997 was 
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to hand over control of interest rates to an independent Bank of England.  The policies followed by 
New Labour from 1997 differed only in style from the previous conservative administrations. 
Indeed, in what remains of the democratic structures of many nation states, a perceived need to 
follow a particular set of neoliberal policies in government has rendered any meaningful choice 
between different political programmes in national elections all but redundant.  What is considered 
to matter now is the ability to respond to the perceived exigencies of global capital mobility through 
effective ‘management’ of the economy in the wider interests of capital.  In a speech to the French 
National Assembly in 1998, Tony Blair announced that “There is no right or left Politics in the 
globalised economy of today.  There is only good or bad politics.”  Policy is increasingly determined 
by private interests of global finance and business.   As the state is perceived to ‘hollow-out’ 
politically, private power is keen to fill the void.  David Rockefeller (1999: 41) wrote in Newsweek 
that business people favour “lessen[ing] the role of government”  but that this means that 
“somebody has to take government’s place, and business seems to me to be a logical entity to do 
it” (cited in Chomsky, 2000: 117) .  States as institutions of regulation may not be losing power per 
se, but the interests who wield that power appear to be narrowing in an undemocratic direction.   
In the study of Politics and IR/IPE, neoliberal institutionalism and its domestic variant rational choice 
institutionalism take these processes as its objects of analysis, subjecting them to detailed 
description and providing a wide range of sophisticated explanations for their emergence and 
development.  Rarely however, are they subjected to any critical scrutiny.  It is only the self-interests 
of states and citizens-consumers which are of concern. The analysis is not always as ‘neutral’ as it 
would like to portray.   
Neoliberal institutionalists then are variously but in general enthusiastic about the process of 
globalisation, regarding it as spreading liberal values of democracy and human rights.  Indeed, 
neoliberal institutionalism represents an important element of the hyperglobalist thesis (see Held 
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et al 1999: 3-5; Marsh et al 2006: 172-173).  Economic globalisation is seen to be inevitable and 
beneficial to all in the long run as it encourages the expansion of markets and is thus seen as crucial 
for economic growth.  The institutions of globalisation are seen to promote the spread of 
technology and knowledge around the world.  The wealthy countries and TNC’s are encouraged to 
seek investment in the poorer parts of the world thus promoting development an alleviating 
poverty (providing these states accept the neoliberal restructuring necessary).  Free trade is 
considered beneficial to the economic system in security terms based on the widespread belief that 
protectionism was a root cause of the economic crises which led to the rise of fascism in Europe 
and the outbreak of war in 1939.  Finally, as the role for government is reduced, the potential for 
the corruption of public officials is considered to be reduced.  As this theory goes, the increased 
wealth generated by the expansion of material wealth will ‘trickle down’ to those poorest 
individuals and societies at the bottom of the scale (Aghion and Bolton 1997).   However, the 
evidence for any widespread distribution of the benefits of this system of institutional 
arrangements is extremely scarce and levels of inequality have been rising across many indices for 
the last four decades of neoliberal policies (see Wade 2008: 386-403; Milanovic 2005, Navarro 
2007).  The fundamental argument of neoliberalism is that unrestricted free trade promotes 
economic growth. This much is perhaps true but the second assumption, that this ‘rising tide will 
lift all boats’, benefitting society as a whole, is demonstrably untrue.  Barker and Mander show that 
the evidence thus far indicates that “it lifts only yachts” (1994: 4).  And as Louis Pauly notes, only 
“stable growth, with its fruits shared widely is conducive to harmony.  Unstable growth, a 
concentration of wealth and an unresponsive government, conversely, cannot help but work in the 
opposite direction (1997: 15).   
This is starkly illustrated by the global financial meltdown of 2008 and subsequent global recession.  
Lysandrou (2011) shows that the underlying cause for the crisis was not the careless issue of credit 
in the form of sub-prime mortgages, nor was it the complex financial procedures which hid these 
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delinquent securities in collateralized debt obligations.  While these financial products and 
procedures eventually facilitated the crash, they were themselves a by-product of increased 
demand for yield on the part of institutional investors.  In short, there had been in the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, a massive accumulation and concentration of wealth in pension, insurance and 
mutual funds; commercial banks who had moved into the asset management business as a result 
of changes in household savings patterns; emerging market economies (eg. China) whose 
investment in newly created sovereign wealth funds was combined with their increased holdings 
of US treasuries; and finally the growth in high net worth individuals and their need to invest their 
colossal incomes with maximum yield.  The creation of new and less secure financial derivatives 
was more than anything a rational response to the demand of this over accumulation of 
unproductive capital.  Lysandrou concludes that “Marx was right. Exploitation and wealth inequality 
are usually the root cause of crises in a commodity producing system, and so also were they at the 
root of this global financial crisis.” (2011:510).  Such an argument does not excuse or ignore the 
numerous errors and failings on the part of the institutions which created and supplied these 
dangerous financial products.  But according to Lysandrou, these were merely amplifiers which 
brought the inevitable crisis to fruition in the way it did.  “The causal factors lay outside of the 
financial sector, in the growth of wealth inequality that had been allowed to reach unsupportable 
proportions by the early part of this century” (2011:511). 
As a result, there seems little doubt that neoliberal policies fail to match the claims made by the 
academic arguments.  The global neoliberal order seems to represent an increasingly volatile and 
precarious existence for the majority world.24 Considering the instability, precarity and threat to 
widespread long-term human security, we are forced to return to the question of interests.  
                                                          
24 For a good empirical analysis of the relationship between equality and social stability see Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010) The Spirit Level Also Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity without Growth demonstrates persuasively 
why a free market economy and neoliberal policies are anathema to sustainability, economically or 
ecologically. 
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Neoliberal institutionalists suggest states have entered into these arrangements in the pursuit of 
their ‘self-interests’ but it seems a number of important questions remain regarding such a claim.  
How can the powerful be trusted represent the interests of the weak?  How can long-term social 
interests be reconciled with short term individual preferences? Perhaps most importantly, how do 
actors come to formulate their interests in the first place and to what extent is such a process 
context dependent? 
As I have stated, neoliberalism explains the emergence and expansion of institutions of global 
governance and the privatisation of state institutions as a supposedly rational response by states 
and consumers to market forces and the supposedly inevitable, inexorable and thus unquestioned 
‘reality’ of globalisation.  States are assumed to respond universally in the same way as a rational 
response to this objective reality because it is considered to be in their self-interest to do so.  What 
unites neoliberal ideology and its academic analytical fig-leaf then is a belief in the notion of self-
interest as an explanatory causal mechanism, for it is both an ideology and a theoretical approach 
based on theories of rational or public choice.  We can learn a lot more about both from a discussion 
and critique of those underlying theories. 
 
Rationalism in the Social Sciences and IR 
 
Perhaps the most popular collection of theories and approaches which might be deployed in an 
attempt to explain processes of globalisation, understood  as the transformation of the state, the 
establishment of a global market society and the rising salience and power of transnational 
institutions and actors,  are grouped under the term rational or public choice theory (RPCT).  Public 
choice theory is really a subset of rational choice theory which works on the assumption that 
politicians and governments will pursue their own specific interests of seeking or staying in office 
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and extending the areas of their own vested interests (McAnulla, 2002).  This has been widely used 
to justify the neoliberal policies of deregulation, privatisation sometimes referred to as ‘rolling back 
the state’.   
As a result, it is important to consider, review and critique these approaches as adequate analytical 
and explanatory tools for understanding the rise, nature and effects of neoliberal ideology and the 
institutional consequences of their emergence to dominance.  This is due to the fact that they in 
themselves represent an important aspect of neoliberalism in that they constitute a central 
philosophical foundation of liberal (or bourgeois) social science.  It is a complex task as it might be 
possible that the growth in popularity of RPCT is part and parcel of this changing order of discourse.  
Challenging neoliberal ideology then requires a challenge to the undergirding assumptions of RPCT. 
RPCT represents an impressive theoretical edifice in the social sciences.  In the USA in particular, 
RPCT’s have grown in popularity to dominate the discipline of politics and IR/IPE.  From quite 
humble and marginal beginnings in the 1950’s, and the ground-breaking work of Kenneth Arrow 
(1951) and Antony Downs (1957), RCPT’s  of various hues have become an almost defining approach 
to Political Science.  Their influence has waned slightly in the last decade under the increased 
criticisms of post-positivist, post-structuralist and in particular constructivist analysis, but still 
retaining a powerful hold across the social sciences. During this period, their influence has also been 
strong in the UK and to a slightly lesser extent across continental Europe. 
The assumptions of rational choice theory which dominate much institutional scholarship and in 
particular neoliberal institutionalism in IR/IPE, have their origins in neo-classical economics25 and 
the 19th century Marginalist revolution associated with Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, Carl Menger, 
                                                          
25 For a discussion of neo-classical economics see 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue38/ArnspergerVaroufakis38.htm  
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and later, Ludwig von Mises.26  One of the important aspects of this school was the claim to isolate 
the scientific study of economics from the philosophy of classical political economy.  The liberal 
political element, they argued, should be jettisoned in order to establish the study of economics as 
a purely neutral and objective pursuit in the fashion of the natural sciences.  This myth of economics 
as devoid of politics is mirrored by the assumptions of RPCT in politics and IR/IPE,  whereby society 
as a collective agent is removed from the analysis of individual self-interested action, calculating 
and acting only upon perceived assessments of utility.  The assumption of utility maximisation, 
central to RPCT, elicits a theory of action or agency which is entirely devoid of contextual 
considerations in so far as the agent is completely removed from the social relations in which she 
is embedded. 
This is a rather curious assumption as it is difficult to think empirically about how humans might 
possibly come to have a sense of themselves in isolation of any social context.  Our judgment of 
what is in our interest, what is therefore rational, must to a considerable extent depend on some 
expectation or calculation of how others will respond to our action.  I will return to this conundrum 
in the criticisms below, following a brief definition of the core elements of RPCT. 
Andrew Hindmoor (2006a) identifies five guiding principles or assumptions of RPCT: 
Methodological individualism, the use of deductive models, rationality, self-interest and 
subjectivism.  I will address these in turn and provide some reasons why they are suspect or limited 
in their claims. 
Methodological individualism.  At the root of RPCT’s events and processes and outcomes are 
explained in terms of the beliefs and interactions of individual actors.  According to Almond (1991) 
this “argues that all social phenomena are derivable from or can be factored into, the properties 
                                                          
26 Mises in Particular was to have a profound impact on the thinking of Hayek and the neoliberal revolution 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 7. 
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and behaviour of individuals” (1991: 38).  While it is recognised that structures may determine the 
range of opportunities available to individuals, social and political outcomes are explained entirely 
in terms of agents choices.  It is therefore a form of intentionalism (McAnulla, 2002: 276-277). 
RPCT does not really have a well-developed theory of the relationship between structures and 
agents.  It is most often assumed to be an atomistic theory of human behaviour due to its 
methodological individualism.  However, Hay (2002: 103-104) notes that there is in fact a quite rigid 
and indeed necessary structuralism inherent in RPCT, a kind of radical determinism, but not one 
which is external as such.  In any given or prescribed circumstance, only one course of action is 
considered possible within a specific set of preferences.  As a result, the agent is both free to 
choose, but constrained by the assumption of supposedly internal rationality.   In fact, as Watson 
notes, “the choices described by rational choice theory are not really choices at all in the literal 
sense of the word because they do not follow a process of reflection about how best to orient 
behaviour in the context of social relationships in which is contemplated” (2008: 58).  It might be 
said that RPCT demonstrates the most problematic aspects of both intentionalism and structuralism 
asa result of its attempt to circumvent the very difficult questions of how these aspects of society 
are related. 
The denial or radical restriction of agency means that the supposed correlation between free 
markets and free autonomous individuals is rendered somewhat problematic.  The assumption that 
a truly democratic society of ‘free’  individuals is only possible with a free market capitalist 
economy, as runs the mainstream neoliberal justification for ‘deregulation’ and privatisation, 
becomes highly suspect.  The paradox is explicitly celebrated by the neoliberal theorist F.A. Hayek 
himself: “freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a 
change upon us” (1944: 157).  The articulation of a theoretical and a normative commitment to 
individualim is thus revealed at the root of RPCT. 
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Deductive models. Rather than gathering information about processes, events etcetera and 
identifying interesting correlations and patterns therein as an inductive process, deductive models, 
as used in RPCT, make assumptions about the way in which actors will behave in a given situation 
and then uses largely quantitative data to deductively ascertain the accuracy of their models.  It is 
this aspect which most effectively reveals the attempt by RPCT’s to mirror the methods of the 
natural sciences and to attain credibility through the ability to make predictions about social and 
political outcomes.  Some of the most popular means by which these models are constructed are 
through various structured games such as the prisoner’s dilemma.  The purpose of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game is to demonstrate why egotistic and rational utility-maximising actors will tend to 
cooperate in conditions of uncertainty.  Its predictive power is impressive and these games 
undoubtedly represent a valuable contribution to the study of politics and IR/IPE.  However, this 
can be seen as problematic on a number of levels.   
Firstly, there is little attention given to the reasons why actors will behave in a certain way given a 
particular set of given circumstances beyond the claim that they are simply rational and self-
interested (on which more below).  These identities are simply given and their origins are not up 
for consideration.  As a result as soon as one concedes the specific conditions and parameter of the 
game, the outcome must automatically be accepted.  According to Smith (2004), the key point 
however, is “the ability of the analysts to define a given problem as a prisoners’ dilemma game. 
Once that is said then there is no way of coming to anything other than the finding that both actors 
end up in a worse situation than they need be” (Smith 2004: 502).  Smith suggests that we consider 
also the important elements which are missing from the game, the heavily constrained and 
restrictive nature of its parameters: “the actors cannot communicate; there is no shadow of the 
future; we know nothing of their prior relationship; we do not know if they are guilty; we do not 
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know if they know they are in a prisoners’ dilemma” (2004: 502).27  Smith’s final criticism is the 
recognition that in following the deductive methods of the natural sciences, the analyst claims to 
observe the social world in which she is embedded from a completely neutral ‘Archimedean point’.  
There is no concession to the possibility that the analysts own prejudice or prior experiences might 
affect the way that the game is constructed and the results are interpreted.  This desire to escape 
or deny the effects social and political milieu in which all humans are embedded is another aspect 
of RPCT which connects it to liberal and neoliberal assumptions about politics and the world.28  
These ideologies are also inherently “committed to finding an analytically external standpoint from 
which to evaluate society as a whole” (Grafstein, 1990: 177). 
Rationality. As one might expect, the assumption of rationality lies at the heart of RPCT.  As noted 
above, the deductive methodology on which RPCT is based assumes that all human beings act 
rationally, but what does this mean exactly, how can such a claim be justified?  According to 
Hindmoor (2006a: 181), RPCT is based on a concept of instrumental rationality in which “actions 
are judged as being rational to the extent that they constitute the best way of achieving some goal”.  
Hindmoor in fact identifies two slightly different approaches to the concept of rationality.  The first 
‘axiomatic approach’, is rooted in a psychological behaviourism and is therefore more firmly in line 
with the prescriptions of neo-classical economics.  As such this is a more instrumental approach 
which, despite being more accurate in its predictions, is less accurate in the realism of their 
                                                          
27 It should be noted that games have also been developed to disprove many assumptions of RPCT (eg 
Camerer and Thaler 1995) and see below. 
28 However, some rational choice theorists Such as Adam Pzeworski (1986) and Jon Elster (1985) have 
applied similar methods in Marxian analyses of politics.  Elster claims that “Marxist theory will prove 
incapable of fruitful development without an explicit espousal of methodological individualism” (1982: 124)  
It is worth noting however that Elster’s position appears to have shifted away from some of the 
fundamentals of RPCT (1993):  “I now believe that rational-choice theory has less explanatory power than I 
used to think. Do real people act on the calculations that make up many pages of mathematical appendixes 
in leading journals? I do not think so. ... There is no general nonintentional mechanism that can simulate or 
mimic rationality. ... At the same time, the empirical support ... tends to be quite weak” (2007: 5, 25ff). G.A. 
Cohen’s Marxism also demonstrates a fundamentally individualist bias but is perhaps not strictly speaking a 
rational choice approach.  
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assumptions.  An illustration of this trade-off is the work of neoliberal economist Milton Friedman 
who claimed that “the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its 
predictions with experience. […] Factual evidence can never “prove” a hypothesis, it can only fail to 
disprove it, which is what we mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis has been 
‘confirmed’ by experience” (Friedman 1953: 7-8).  The quote demonstrates once again how RPCT 
draws significantly from neoliberal economic theory and the radical level of theoretical abstraction 
which characterises this approach.  Indeed, the main basis for Green and Shapiro’s detailed 
criticisms are that despite its supposed scientific credibility:  
 The weaknesses of rational choice scholarship are rooted in the characteristic aspiration of rational 
choice theories to come up with universal theories of politics.  This aspiration leads many rational 
choice theorists to pursue ever more subtle forms of theory elaboration with little attention to how 
these theories might be operationalized and tested–even in principle.  When systematic empirical 
work is attempted by rational choice theorists it is marred by a series of characteristic lapses that 
are traceable to the universalist ambitions that rational choice theorists mistakenly regard as the 
hallmark of good scientific practice.  These pathologies manifest themselves at each stage of theory 
elaboration and empirical testing. (1994:6) 
I do not mean to suggest that empirical methods are always and everywhere a byword for good 
political or social research, indeed, empiricist methods can bend the stick too far in the other 
direction of a theoretical deficit and the fundamental assumption of this thesis is that the meaning 
of ‘reality’ is ideationally and discursively constituted and shaped.  The importance of Green and 
Shapiro’s criticisms however, is that they do not just highlight those aspects of politics which RPCT 
explicitly ignores or discounts, such as ideas, norms, values, beliefs, discourses   In fact they 
demonstrate that RPCT’s are found to be substantially lacking in areas which they claim as their 
strengths.  Again according to Green and Shapiro, “they have either failed on their own terms or 
garnered theoretical support for propositions that, on reflection, can only be characterised as 
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banal: they do little more than restate existing knowledge in rational choice terminology” (1994: 
6). 
In response to the radical instrumentalism which characterises much RPCT and which Green and 
Shapiro target in their critical analysis, Hindmoor identifies an ‘optimising approach’ (2006: 191).  
This approach to rationality involves a more nuanced and qualified analysis which considers more 
carefully the processes of deliberation and reason which precede any particular action.  Drawing 
on the work of Searle (1995, 2001) and Sen (2003), Hindmoor suggests that it is humans’ capacity 
to deliberate and reason which permits them to act in optimal ways.  However, the supposed costs 
in time and effort and in some cases emotional stress and mental anguish lead them to regard this 
process as something they wish to limit or economize, at least in some cases.  As a result it becomes 
possible to see why humans may sometimes act in sub-optimal ways as they do not always fully 
consider the full ramifications of their choices or actions.   According to Hindmoor then “people will 
only invest in the exercise of deliberative rationality up to that point where the marginal benefits 
of doing so are greater than the marginal costs (2006: 192).  Beyond this, any further deliberation 
becomes sub-optimal even assuming that doing so might lead them to act in a more optimal 
manner.  Hindmoor summarises his argument thus: “Rational people will not always act in optimal 
ways because doing so will require a sub-optimal investment in deliberation” (2006: 192).  
Rationality then for Hindmoor is a substantially ‘bounded’ concept.  This concept deserves a brief 
summary. 
According to Monroe (1991: 6), bounded rationality accepts the assumptions of individuals’ self-
interestedly and consciously pursuing goals common to all RPCT.  The concept of rationality 
however is subjected to some careful qualifications in response to the various ways which actors 
may often not appear to act rationally.  In this account, greater emphasis is placed upon constraints 
which stem from both the external context and the computational capacities of the actor.  
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Behaviour then, is seen to be more adaptive.  Actors are seen to possess limited information and 
are often uncertain about the consequences of particular courses of action. Actors are considered 
as ‘satisficers’ in that they reach decisions once a satisfactory alternative is found.  Such an 
alternative need only satisfy some minimum requirement and not necessarily the supposed optimal 
outcome. Substantial supplemental knowledge of the actor is needed in order to make any 
predictions about behaviour, in particular, information regarding the actor’s goals and their 
conceptual orientation to the world.  Finally, considerable emphasis is placed on the process of 
decision-making rather than the expected outcomes as discussed in Hindmoor’s deliberative 
approach above.  According to March and Olsen “theories of bounded rationality and ambiguity 
have resulted in significant modifications in the classical theory of rational instrumental action; but 
like the theories they criticize, they assume, for the most part, a logic of consequences” (1998: 950).  
The broader point is that RPCT is persuasive only as far as it qualifies and limits the extent of 
determinacy which it affords to the crude assumptions of rational, self-interested individuals as the 
sole explanatory factor in its theoretical toolbox.  Nevertheless it attempts to retain a positivist and 
objectivist analysis which becomes increasingly difficult to sustain as the models are held up to real 
world situations. 
As a result, while this bounded notion of rationality certainly makes the concept seem more 
plausible for political analysis, it also concedes significant ground to structural and ideational 
variables.  A process of deliberation is difficult to comprehend other than as individuals negotiating 
and manoeuvring strategically within a set of material and ideational structures.  These can only be 
the result of the actions and beliefs of other individuals therefore there must be some implicit 
concession to a dialectical notion of structure and agency.  The necessary qualifications which are 
made in order to make RPCT more plausible can be seen to undermine the fundamental 
assumptions of the approach.  
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It is certainly reasonable to suggest that at least most people act rationally most of the time.  
However, what is considered to be a particular rational act in a given empirical situation is highly 
context specific.  It is always, to employ a somewhat loaded term, relative.  This is not to make the 
claim then that all possible positions or interests are relative, but that a credible account must 
couch claims for rationality carefully within a highly contingent historical, spatial, and psychological 
continuum.  No account of politics can proceed in the complete absence of the notion of rationality, 
all thinking individuals make everyday judgements on the basis of the understanding that people 
act in what we assume to be more or less rational ways.  If we did not assume this then we would 
be quite different creatures.  This is a key point.  In all kinds of ways, people are very different.  If 
we travel to other places or read about people in history, we are often surprised or even disturbed 
by the diversity of human nature.  There is indeed some kernel of rationality, but the interesting 
and important questions, I argue, relate to how different notions and constructions of rationality 
and the behaviour which results are constituted through a diversity of ideas and discourses.   
Self-interests.  The concept of interests is perhaps the most complex and controversial of the key 
principles of RPCT and a full discussion of the key political concept of interests in general is far 
beyond the remit of this work.29  It is deeply connected with all the above principles but also, as 
discussed in chapter one, with the concept of power.  Any discussion of interests in the absence of 
a consideration of the exercise of power is to severely limit such a discussion.  If, as I argue, that 
power is unevenly distributed and that some concentrations of power might be able to affect how 
others come to perceive their interests, then an abstract or neutral conception of self- interest is 
problematic.  It may be in the perceived interests of some agents with greater material or 
                                                          
29 For an excellent critical discussion see Connelly, (1983: Ch. 2) and for a well reasoned argument for the 
identification of preferences and objective interests in relation to a Lukesian concept of political power, see 
Dowding 1991: Ch. 3 
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ideological resources to attempt to persuade or constrain the perceived interests of subordinate 
individuals in order maintain their social, cultural, economic and political advantage. 
Moreover, even in hypothetical contexts of informational (but not quite material) parity, the 
assumption of self-interest can be shown to be quite limited.  In the ultimatum game, two people, 
a proposer and a responder (P and R), are allotted a sum of money.  In the game, P is given the 
initial task of offering a share of the money to R and R is aware of the percentage offered.  If R 
accepts this share then P is granted the remaining share of the money.  If R rejects the offer, neither 
player receives anything.  If players were self-interested maximizers, as assumed in most accounts 
of RPCT (and that both players calculated on the basis of this assumption about the other player), 
then we would expect all or most P’s to offer a minimum one per cent and for R’s to accept the 
offer.  In fact, when the game is played, “offers typically average about 30-40 per cent of the total, 
with a 50-50 split often the mode.  Offers of less than 20 per cent are frequently rejected” (Camerer 
and Thaler 1995: 210). 
Subjectivism (political individualism).  The migration of RPCT from economics to politics has 
introduced a normative element into this school of thought which might be seen to begin to 
undermine some of its claims to objective ‘scientific’ credibility.  Given the variously qualified and 
assumptions made about human nature and discussed above, RPCT argues that the criteria, by 
which institutions of government and governance should be judged, are the extent to which the 
satisfaction of the preferences of individuals are met.  As such, the claims of RPCT to political 
neutrality and scientific objectivity are undermined.  RPCT, like any theoretical approach to politics, 
must themselves be politically loaded.  It is this way that RPCT have become almost part and parcel 
of the neoliberal project of reducing state bureaucracy and to ‘set markets free’.   According to Hay:  
The ascendancy of a spectacular and normative neoliberalism in the late 1970s and 1980s was 
predicated on the success of the new right in mobilizing widespread perceptions of a crisis of 
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overload and ungovernability and that this narrative was, in turn, premised upon the stylized 
rationalist assumptions of public choice theory … [these assumptions] … (whether in the form of 
public choice theory, the rational expectations revolution or the hyperglobalization and structural 
dependence theses) have played a crucial role in this normalization and institutionalization of 
neoliberalism as a policy paradigm. (2004: 503-507ff, emphasis added) 
As already stated, while it is important then, to distinguish the academic approach in IR/IPE known 
as neoliberal institutionalism and its core elements of RPCT, and the policy prescriptions associated 
with a political programme widely referred to also as neoliberalism, there are clearly some common 
roots in the doctrines of neoclassical economics associated with certain aspects of traditional liberal 
political theory.  I have hinted at some of these connections above.   In light of these clear 
connections between theory and policy, Archer and Tritter ask whether “the growing influence of 
this approach in international and financial institutions such as the OECD, the World Bank and the 
IMF, is now shaping larger tracts of the world in line with the theory” (2000: 11).  There is indeed 
some considerable evidence to suggest that the widespread dissemination of the assumptions of 
individual self-interest central to neo-classical economics and RPCT has a discernible effect on how 
people subsequently respond to decision-making situations.  One key assumption of these 
doctrines is that, as supposed self-interested utility maximizers, individuals will display a strong 
tendency to ‘free ride’ in social situations where collective action is required.  It is reasonable to 
consider the extent to which students exposed to these doctrines might begin to internalise them 
as part of their consciousness and decision-making processes. 
In a series of experiments carried out by Marwell and Ames (1981) to test the free rider theory 
popular in RPCT and also in neoliberal arguments for privatisation and deregulation, members of 
the public were found to have a much greater willingness to contribute to group returns in a shared 
investment than a group of graduate economics students.  In responding to questions about their 
opinions on fairness these respondents (the economics graduates) were also unusually evasive and 
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obtrusive in their answers.  A significant number even simply ignored these questions and “those 
who did respond were much more likely to say that little or no contribution was ‘fair’.  In addition, 
the economics graduate students were about half as likely as other subjects to indicate that they 
were ‘concerned with fairness’ in making their investment decision” (Marwell and Ames 1981: 309).  
In addition, during discussions preceding the experiment, a sample of several famous economists 
were asked to provide estimates about what level of self-sacrifice the sample group might 
demonstrate in the invitation to choose between guaranteed individual returns, or potentially 
higher returns based on the possibility other group members would not ‘free ride’.  The estimates 
of these economists were significantly lower than the results of the actual experiments 
demonstrated.  While they predicted a very strong free rider effect, the results demonstrated a 
very weak effect.  Marwell and Ames conclude that: 
economists may be selected for their work by virtue of their preoccupation with the ‘rational’ 
allocation of money and goods. Or they may start behaving according to the general tenets of the 
theories they study. Confronted with a situation where others may not behave rationally, they 
nevertheless behave the way good economic theory predicts. (1981: 309) 
It is possible to see how the effect of these theories and doctrines is much wider than the academic 
community.  A more recent argument from Marglin (2008) suggests that the coherence of 
communities and individual identities has been destroyed by the growing reliance on free market 
mechanisms based on the assumptions of neoclassical economics applied to social policies: 
In adopting an extreme form of individualism, in abstracting knowledge from context, in limiting 
community to the nation, and in positing boundless consumption as the goal of life, economics [and 
RPCT] offers us no way of thinking about the human relationships that are the heart and soul of the 
community other than as instrumental to the individual pursuit of happiness.  Economics takes very 
much to heart the dictum of the nineteenth-century physicist Lord Kelvin that we know only what 
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we can measure.  Indeed, economics takes the dictum a step further, from epistemology to 
ontology; what we can’t measure—entities like community—doesn’t exist. (Marglin, 2008: 9) 
Indeed, the combined effect of the prevailing dominance of these two aspects of neoliberalism 
amounts to a kind of ‘full spectrum dominance’ across academic and policy-making circles and have 
even crept into mainstream popular public consciousness and discourses such as the valorisation 
of ‘consumer choice’ in a so-called economic democracy.30 I argue that such discourses are 
themselves an ideological mystification which deploys a very limited concept of freedom in order 
to forestall arguments for progressive social change through an attempt to represent them as 
undemocratic.  The assumptions of RPCT tend to lead to unrealistically static and rigid models of 
human behaviour which fail to account or allow for processes of historical institutional change.  It 
is not difficult to see then why those in positions of status and power find them both persuasive 
and useful. 
RPCT represents in many ways the diametric opposite to much of the argument developed in this 
thesis in that they do not sufficiently recognise how people might come to misperceive their 
interests, or at least sacrifice one set of interests for another.31  Indeed, the key problem is the 
tendency to take interests unquestionably as given, and not to inquire into their social origin or 
contextual variance.  In fact, as what follows will attempt to demonstrate, “Interests do not exist, 
but constructions of interests do” (Hay 2011:79).  Furthermore, analysis of those constructions 
                                                          
30 An early proponent of these ideas was a founding member of the neoliberal movement, Ludwig von 
Mises.  Mises (1931) who suggested that “The capitalistic market economy is a democracy in which every 
penny constitutes a vote.  The wealth of the successful businessman is the result of a consumer plebiscite. 
Wealth, once acquired, can be preserved only by those who keep on earning it anew by satisfying the 
wishes of consumers.  The capitalistic social order, therefore, is an economic democracy in the strictest 
sense of the word. In the last analysis, all decisions are dependent on the will of the people as consumers. 
Thus, whenever there is a conflict between consumers’ views and those of the business managers, market 
pressures assure that the views of the consumers win out eventually” (p.158). 
31 Although some predominantly rationalist scholars such as Douglass North (1990, chap.5) have attempted 
to introduce ideas and ideologies into their theories of institutional change.  I would suggest that represents 
an increasing disenchantment with and abandonment of those methods rather than an actual 
reformulation of them in any satisfactory sense. 
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must attend to the distribution and deployment of power in society and the means by which such 
deployment is achieved. 
Some of the most persuasive criticism of rational choice theory and the ones which perhaps inform 
this thesis most significantly are the sociologically and historically informed approaches relatively 
new to IR/IPE and institutional analysis more generally.   In order then to provide the necessary 
theoretical and political corrective to the deficiencies and dangers of rational choice theories we 
need to develop an account of politics which is sufficiently critical to counter and delegitimise its 
neoliberal ideological component.  This must combine with a social theoretical approach which 
provides an account of the way in which agents and structures constitute each other in a dialectical 
historical process.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced some of the ways in which mainstream IR/IPE has considered processes 
of institutional change.  It has noted some of the developments which have taken place in that 
discipline as a result of those changes and has argued that despite these differences, mainstream 
IR/IPE in the form of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism has continued to demonstrate a 
reliance upon the assumptions of RPCT.  The chapter has outlined the basic tenets of this body of 
theory and its connection with the institutional arrangements of the contemporary global political 
economy.  The key purpose of this discussion has been to offer some criticisms of RPCT from a 
constructivist perspective.  In so doing, I have suggested that the broad church represented by 
constructivism requires that we are more specific in our identification of the type of constructivism 
to be deployed in any analysis.  I opt for an approach from the more critical and post-positivist end 
of the spectrum as I argue that this approach is best equipped for a critique of the rationalist 
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assumptions of both mainstream IR/IPE and the policymaking associated with institutions of GEG.  
In the following chapter I continue this theoretical development of the argument by introducing 
the historical and sociological approaches associated with what has come to be termed ‘the new 
institutionalism’.  These have combined to offer a new and welcome challenge to the dominance 
of rationalist approaches to the study of political institutions. 
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Ch. 3. New Institutionalism:  Historical and Sociological Approaches 
 
In addition to the influence of RPCT, neoliberal institutionalism should also be seen in the context 
of a much broader renewed focus on the importance of institutions in politics more generally 
referred to as the ‘new institutionalism’.  March and Olsen’s (1984) article bearing the name is 
widely regarded as the watershed work for the return to a more considered and rigorous account 
of political institutions.32  They noted that while institutions had long been a central focus of the 
discipline of political science33 and also represent important elements of such influential thinkers 
as Max Weber, Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi, “Social, political, and economic institutions have become 
larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective 
life” (ibid. 1984:734). As such it is important to provide some definition of what we mean by 
institutions.  March and Olsen themselves have provided a broad yet detailed definition which is 
worth quoting here in full: 
An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of 
individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals 
                                                          
32 Although it should be acknowledged that the English school of IR had throughout the 1960s and 70s, in 
the work of Hedley Bull (1977), Charles Manning (1962), Alan James 1969), Fred Northedge (1976) stressed 
the importance of a growing institutional framework underpinning an ‘international society’.  These 
scholars stressed the remarkable extent of order in international society considering the supposedly 
anarchical nature of that environment.  It was Bull in particular who emphasised the institutional 
framework which underpinned this order.  For an outline of the combined contributions of these thinkers 
see Suganami (1983).  Tim Dunne (1995) has suggested the subjectivism of the English School, in particular 
Manning, Wight , Bull and Watson, marks them out as early ‘classical’ constructivists. See also the excellent 
review of the English school by Linklater and Suganami (2006). 
33 Traditional institutionalist approaches are associated with the comaparative study of organisational 
elements such as constitutions, parties, judiciaries legislatures etcetera, rather than the state as a whole. 
See Finer 1962, Wilson 1956,  Robson 1960, Polsby 1975. (Examples drawn from Lowndes in Marsh and 
Stoker 2010:63) also John Burgess and Weston Willoughby (mentioned in March and Olsen, 1984).  The 
institutional and constitutional expertise of some of these thinkers (eg. Max Weber, Woodrow Wilson and 
Weston W. Willoughby saw their involvement in the drafting of various constitutional documents of the 
early 20th century. 
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and changing external circumstances. There are constitutive rules and practices prescribing 
appropriate behaviour for specific actors in specific situations. There are structures of meaning, 
embedded in identities and belongings: common purposes and accounts that give direction and 
meaning to behaviour, and explain, justify, and legitimate behavioural codes. There are structures 
of resources that create capabilities for acting. Institutions empower and constrain actors 
differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of 
appropriateness. Institutions are also reinforced by third parties in enforcing rules and 
sanctioning non-compliance. (March and Olsen 2006: 3) 
Clearly and explicitly implicated in March and Olsen’s definition of institutions are structural 
phenomena and the relative autonomy which agents or actors may have within the constraints and 
opportunities provided by those structures.  Institutions are, more or less, structural phenomena 
embodying both material and ideational factors.  As a result, an analysis of the relationship between 
structure, agency, ideas and ‘the material’ are required for any understanding of institutional 
objects and processes in politics and IR/IPE.  This chapter discusses how these debates emerged 
and played out in the political disciplines and offers an account of how they might best be 
articulated in relation to each other.   
It is beyond doubt that, since March and Olsen’s initial response to these developments, institutions 
have become even more ubiquitous in social and political life, to the extent that Pierson and Skocpol 
suggest that essentially “we are all institutionalists now” (2002: 706).  This may be true, but it is 
important to recognise the immense breadth of scope which institutional approaches occupy and 
to narrow the focus here accordingly.  To describe one’s focus as ‘institutional’ is to say very little 
about that focus, we must be more specific about the ways in which we can study how institutions 
emerge, operate, interact and change.  Thelen and Steinmo (1992:7) suggested that there are 
essentially two approaches which have been assigned the label ‘the new institutionalism’, rational 
choice and historical institutionalism.  While the picture has become more complicated with a range 
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of more diverse approaches, it is useful to begin with an outline this two way distinction.34 Indeed, 
the newcomers might simply be regarded as important developments of and variations on these 
two key approaches. 
There is perhaps some irony in the fact that March and Olsen’s landmark study originally presented 
something of an early challenge to the stark reductionism of the dominant rationalist approach 
which characterised political science, considering that rational choice theorists have since come to 
assume such a large proportion of the new institutionalism.  March and Olsen themselves retain a 
distinct rationalism in their claims that analysis should combine of a ‘logic of consequences’ with a 
‘logic of appropriateness’, albeit with an emphasis on the latter (1998).  While by no means 
abandoning their penchant for rationality as an important factor, March and Olsen have perhaps 
led the way in qualifying and even diluting the thick and rigid rationality that characterises much 
rational choice institutionalism.  In particular, March (1978) was himself largely responsible for 
refining the crude assumptions of rational decision-making with the introduction of the concept of 
‘bounded rationality’ in institutional analysis.  
Fortunately, other parallel and subsequent theoretical developments have taken institutional 
approaches in less reductionist and more reflexive directions such as the sociological and historical 
approaches or ‘historical sociology’ and more recently, constructivist/discursive institutionalism 
(Schmidt 2005, 2011; Hay 2011).  Having already presented a critique of rationalist approaches, I 
now aim to develop the argument for a more critical constructivist approach which here draws in 
part on some of the contributions of historical and sociological approaches to the study of 
institutional change in IR/IPE.   
                                                          
34 Hall and Taylor identified three key streams of the New Institutionalism and by 1999,  Peters had 
managed to identify as many as seven variations.  See also Lowndes (2010:64-66) 
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To some extent though, it is perhaps erroneous to include historical sociological approaches as part 
of the new institutionalism.  Historical sociology has a long and rich history stretching back to the 
tumultuous revolutionary events of the eighteenth century which predates even the early political 
institutionalism of Weber, Wilson, Willoughby and Burgess (see Smith 1991).  However, what may 
be regarded as a ‘second wave’ of historical sociology emerged just prior and parallel to March and 
Olsen’s declaration of ‘new’ institutionalism, responding in a rather different way to a similar set of 
socio-economic and political developments.  These historical sociologists built on the rich vein of 
historical sociology developed by earlier twentieth century writers such as Bendix (1951), E.P. 
Thompson and Eisensdadt (1963).  The distinction between such so-called ‘waves’ might be seen 
as quite arbitrary and stems more from the work of writers such as Tilly, Mann, Skocpol  (largely for 
an IR audience), Anderson, Wallerstein and Polanyi (more focussed on IPE) becoming of interest to 
the increasingly interdisciplinary and heterodox  canon of those fields.   One of the main lessons of 
Historical Sociology for the study of world politics then, has been to point out that the state as 
primary actor is by no means a given, and that to consider other social and political forms such as 
classes and empires is to provide a richer and more accurate account of the evolution, development 
and transformation of political institutions through history.   
Many, but not all, of these historical sociologists, from both ‘waves’ displayed an attachment to the 
critical traditions of historical materialism (Comninel 2003).  While these intellectual debts were 
not always explicit, they represent a nuanced and reflexive Marxism largely devoid  of the 
economism which dogged some other examples of Marxist analysis.  Having said this, there is a 
latent tendency toward structuralism which comes with this historical materialist backstory 
(Hobson 2002: 24) and is also evident in many accounts of sociological and historical 
institutionalism. (Hay 2002:105).   
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There are also some connections to be recognised here with the French Annales School and the 
work of Braudel and Bloch and the Durkheimian tradition (Burke 2003).   In many ways then, 
historical sociology represents a long and seamless tradition of sociological (and often critical) 
analysis of large scale historical change which contains valuable methodological resources for the 
study of the institutional transformations associated with contemporary globalisation.   While often 
structural in orientation, the sociological slant of this work has also helped draw attention to the 
significantly socialised nature of transnational social and political institutions, both transnational 
and domestic and “have served to highlight the importance of socially constructed norms, the social 
processes inherent in identity formation, culture and ideology, intersubjective understandings, and 
social structures in the study and practice of world politics” (Lawson 2006: 398).   
Not only then has neo-Weberian historical sociology and constructivism helped re-introduce ideas 
and ideology into the mainstream debates of IR/IPE (Reus-Smit 2002) but in its call to ‘bring the 
state back in’ to analysis of world politics, it has made explicit the need for an account of the 
relationship between structure and agency (Hobson 2002).  Such debates have emerged largely as 
an element of the constructivist turn since Wendt’s (1989) seminal Social Theory of International 
Politics.35   As we have seen, such concerns have been largely absent from the dominant accounts 
of world politics (neorealism and neoliberalism) as indeed they have from all rationalist accounts 
of social and political science.  However if we are to understand the complex nature of the relations 
of power between the state and globality, then the structure agency debates provide us with some 
considerable leverage.  Indeed, our understanding of institutional change is dependent on, perhaps 
even definitive of, the relations of structure and agency in society.  As Thelen and Steinmo claim, 
                                                          
35 This greatly expanded and clarified his ideas on structure and agency in IR initially discussed in Wendt 
(1987)  
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institutional analysis […] allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects 
and as agents of history. The institutions that are at the centre of historical institutionalist analysis 
[…] can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are themselves also 
the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies of political conflict and 
of choice. (1992: 10) 
In what follows I reiterate and further develop the critical and relational conception of power 
alluded to in chapter one, before outlining an account of structure and agency which helps 
elaborate that relational, structural and productive conception of power and its implications for 
human agency. 
 
A ‘Relational’ Approach 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis is concerned primarily with the role of ideational factors 
in relation to structures of domination and the legitimation of changing distributions of power and 
authority in the global political system; how ideas constitute things or ‘reality’ by patterning them 
with layers of meaning.  As such it is situated primarily in a debate around idealism and materialism.  
As Hall argues, “ideas have real power in the world but they do not acquire political force 
independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there” (1989: 390).  
Hall’s quote is reminiscent of Marx’s famous dictum that “men make their own history, but they do 
not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past” ([1851] in 
McLellan 1977: 300).36  The similarity of these dialectical positions illustrates how the 
                                                          
36 The famous quote from Marx is more fairly attributable to earlier writers: “Montesquieu says that 
institutions mould men… This is true but it is also the fact that men make institutions” (Saint Simon in 
Suganami 1999: 376)  
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idealism/materialism relationship is itself intimately related to the broader ontological concern of 
the relative importance of structural and agential explanations for, and understandings of,  
processes of socio-historical change.  Indeed, following Hay (2002: 209-210), I suggest that the 
importance of ideational factors and interpretive processes can be demonstrated by highlighting 
how they contribute to and help us understand the broader structure and agency relationship.  They 
represent a vital element of the internal relations of power through which structures and agents 
mutually constitute and (re-)configure each other through history.  The process is fundamental to 
an understanding of social, political, economic and cultural change.  These ideas are expressed and 
realised in discourses and practices which authorise and legitimate, constrain and enable, particular 
ways of speaking and acting.  Analysis of discourses can reveal the various proscriptions and 
permissions whereby some ideas gain currency and others are closed off.  Indeed, according to 
Marsh: 
The explanatory power lies with the consciousness of agents and the relative strategic, that is to 
a large extent discursive, context.  As such we need to identify the contesting, and particularly the 
dominant, discourse(s), which shape, but of course don’t determine, the context and therefore 
the outcome. (2010: 219)  
In short, to what extent are ideas, which, I argue, must in some way precede and constitute social 
and political action, themselves at least partly the result of existing material and discursive contexts 
and structures of knowledge?  In posing this question, we are assuming and alluding to a particular 
conceptualisation of power which is itself structural and productive in nature and is articulated 
within prevailing paradigms of knowledge and belief.  This is related to what Foucault (1980:196-
198) referred to as ‘epistemes’, that is:  
the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which 
are possible those that will be acceptable within […] a field of scientificity, and which it is possible 
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to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not 
of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific. 
(Foucault 1980: 197)  
Structures are not necessarily material then.  In fact, as Adler and Bernstein (2005: 295-6) argue, it 
is the structures of background knowledge, the epistemes through which actors construe their 
reality and classify nature and society, which represent some of the most powerful and important 
structures.  These structures are not however all encompassing or determining, and should be 
regarded as relatively open fields in which possibilities for agency and transformation remain ever-
present, albeit to varying degrees depending on the historical conjuncture of social relations.  
“Thus, even when resistance may appear futile or learning slow, the possibility of agency within, or 
in opposition to, global governance is always present, even if delimited by a prevailing episteme” 
(Adler and Bernstein 2005: 296). 
When agents, structures and ideas are so inextricably intertwined, the difficulty lies in trying to 
disentangle them in order to identify opportunities and strategies for progressive agency, 
transformation and even emancipation for marginalised, subordinated and disenfranchised groups 
and societies.  Attempts to simplify these internally related objects by ascribing mono-causal, 
unidirectional conditions, while tempting, will likely fail to understand the complexity and 
contingency of those relationships and limit the possibilities for understanding and thereby 
transforming them.  Further problems arise when we consider that some of these institutions, such 
as states, organisations or classes, might be regarded as both agents and structures, depending on 
the so-called ‘level of analysis’.  In an effort to move beyond the problem of levels of analysis, and 
in order to comprehend the state/globality relation under conditions of neoliberal hegemony, these 
categories must remain open to structural and agential conceptions.  They may act agentially, 
within broader structures and institutions, and they may impose their own structural or mechanical 
constraints and opportunities on the agency of smaller units and individuals. As Hay makes clear, 
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“it is in the dynamic relationship between levels of analysis and spatial scales that processes such 
as globalisation must be sought” (2001, n.p. emphasis added). 
In this section then, we are moving tentatively from epistemological concerns of what constitutes 
acceptable or plausible grounds for making knowledge claims, to the more ontological matter of 
which elements of society and politics should represent the focus of study, how to classify them 
and how are they are related within the entire system of global social relations.  The distinctions 
only hold up to a point, as ontological and epistemological commitments are sometimes difficult to 
separate entirely (Smith 1996: 19; Dixon and Jones 1998: 250; Gregory 2000: 226; see also Bates 
and Jenkins 2007).   
As I have already indicated, appreciation of the structure-agency-ideas nexus requires some further 
clarification of the notion of power introduced in chapter one.  In distinction from the more overt 
external expressions of power characterised by direct compulsory or even institutional forms of 
power, structural power then refers to “the constitutive, internal relations of structural positions” 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005:18) which define the nature, character and therefore the perceived array 
of opportunities and constraints of human agents in the socio-political milieu. It is responsible for 
producing the capacities and interests of various subject positions in relation to each other.  
Importantly also, these relations also represent differential capacities for action held by the agents 
positions.  It refers not simply to the institutional rules, norms and procedures which constrain the 
ability of agents to act in a certain way, although these are often closely related to or even regarded 
as aspects of structural power.  More crucially, structural power alludes to a more hidden or internal 
relation which is directly constitutive of agents, so that one particular position in the social structure 
is occupied solely in relation to that of another position.  Bhaskar illustrates this point with examples 
in the following manner: 
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A relation RAB may be defined as internal if an only if A would not be what it essentially is unless B 
is related to it in the way that it is. RAB is symmetrically internal if the same applies also to B. (A 
and B may designate universals or particulars, concepts or things, including relations.) The relation 
bourgeoisie-proletariat is symmetrically internal; traffic warden-state, asymmetrically internal; 
passing motorist-policeman not (in general) internal at all. (2005[1979]: 46)  
Perhaps the best known examples of such structurally defined positions are those of master/slave 
or capital/labour relations. Such a perspective entails the mutual constitution of social agents in 
which they are directly and internally related to one another, each aspect can only exist in relation 
to the other. Their interests, subjectivities and capacities to act are conditioned by the social 
positions which they occupy.  We can thus identify two ways in which such agents' conditions of 
existence are shaped by structural forms of power. Firstly, rather than generating equitable social 
privileges, differential advantages and capacities are allocated to particular positions as illustrated 
in the examples given above of master/slave and capital/labour relations. Secondly, it is not simply 
the capacities of agents which are constituted by the social structure; it is also their subjective 
interests, preferences and self-understandings.  Consequently, structural power is able, in many 
instances, to conceal from agents their own domination in an unequal pattern of social relations.  
To the extent that this is so, the consciousness of agents and their dispositions for action tend to 
reproduce and even extend such unequal relations of power.  Steven Lukes asks of such internally 
structured relations:  
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people to whatever degree, 
from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that 
they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no 
alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial? (2005[1974]: 28) 
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Such structural aspects of power are clearly implicated, then, in the processes whereby a certain 
political and cultural system, informed and authorised by a particular set of ideas and norms, is 
legitimated and reproduced in order to foreclose possibilities for its potential subversion and 
transformation. 
Closely related, and in some sense perhaps extending from structural power, is the notion of 
productive power identified in Barnett and Duvall's four way taxonomy (2005).  While both of these 
types of power are concerned with the social production of agents' capacities and constraints, and 
the ways in which these shape the subjectivity, consciousness and corollorative interests of those 
agents, productive power entails less direct and more diffuse and generalised social processes. 
Rather than an internal relation of mutual constitution between positions of super- and sub-
ordination as defined by structural power; productive power, by contrast, represents:  
the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge, 
belief and discursive practices of broad and general social scope. Conceptually, the move is away 
from structures, per se, to systems of signification and meaning (which are structured, but not 
themselves purely material structures), and to networks of social forces perpetually shaping one 
another. (Barnett and Duvall, 2005:20)   
Consider, for example, the money relation.  It is in reality little more than a system of belief so 
deeply entrenched and widespread that the material and psychological costs of extricating oneself 
from this particular episteme appear too great for most individuals to conceive (see de Goede 2005: 
165-169).   Another example is the social construction of sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996) 
where the legitimate right to exert physical force and violence is sanctioned by nothing more than 
an intersubjective agreement of mutual recognition.  These can be seen as something more than 
structures in that they actively produce or generate ‘practices’ and forms of individual and social 
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behaviour and general understandings of it which come represent conventional wisdoms and 
‘common-sense’. 
In the sense that this type of power extends beyond the structural form it may therefore be referred 
to as ‘post-structural’.  Rather than an alternative, it is possible to regard the more diffuse effects 
of productive power as extending, complementing and stretching out from the internal workings 
of structural power.  As I will attempt to show through the following chapters, while the global 
capitalist relations of production continue to represent an internal constitutive structuring of 
subjects, as understood in Marxian analysis, we need also to account for and analyse the productive 
power of discourses which complement and feed back into the structural relations of capital and 
power.  Productive power accounts for a more nuanced and open understanding of ideology and 
hegemony than provided for in the narrower, internal focus of structural power relations alone.  
According to Barnett and Duvall this stems from its wider attunement to “the boundaries of all 
social identity, and the capacity and inclination for action of the socially advantaged and dis-
advantaged alike, as well as the myriad social subjects which are not constituted in binary 
hierarchical relationships” (ibid.:21).  As such, proponents of productive power are sceptical, but 
not entirely dismissive of some essential foundation at the root of the human subject. 
This thesis argues that both structural and productive accounts of understanding power are 
required for an adequate analysis of neoliberal ideology and the ways in which it constitutes, 
legitimises and justifies the exploitation, alienation and socio-economic precarity which 
characterise the current systems of global governance.  Furthermore, some attention must be 
afforded to the ways in which these forms of power are articulated and narrated in processes of 
neoliberal globalisation and attendant practices of neoliberal governmentality. 
However, before doing so, it is necessary to frame these accounts of power with an ontological and 
epistemological account that re-examines the relationship between structure and agency. These 
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debates can be used to provide important theoretical insights into the problems of conceptualising 
domination and resistance and in addition, help to clarify the closely related and slightly narrower, 
more focussed dialectic of materialism and idealism. Only after covering this ground is it possible 
to examine the historical roots, emergence and contemporary workings of neoliberal ideology and 
its various discursive practices in some more detail. 
 
Structuration and Beyond 
 
There has long been a strong desire within social theory to attempt to solve the age old ‘problem’ 
of the supposed causal relationship between structure and agency.  This desire reflects other wider, 
and equally long-standing philosophical concerns with a number of related and troublesome 
dualisms such as holism/atomism, determinism/voluntarism, objectivism/subjectivism and in 
particular as noted above, idealism/materialism.  I aim to show how these debates lie at the heart 
of a project examining processes of domination and legitimation, as well as those attendant 
processes of dissent, resistance and spaces for potential transformation. Secondly, I will suggest 
that many established ways of approaching and dealing with these dualisms, and especially how 
they have been taken up relatively recently within the discipline of IR, offers only limited scope for 
answering the kind of questions thrown up by such a project.  Indeed, answers or solutions may 
simply not be possible or realistic goals for such a question, but, I argue, their consideration, analysis 
and interpretation is unavoidable for the goal of better understanding in the social and human 
disciplines. 
While concerns over the relative merits of structure and agency based approaches have lain at the 
heart of studies in history, social theory and sociology from their very origins, Politics and IR, in their 
combined sociological, linguistic and interpretive turns, have only relatively recently taken on these 
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questions as fundamental to their attempts to understand and explain locations and distributions 
of power in societies and systems.  In the process they have inherited the ongoing debates and 
controversies in sociology which stretch back to the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. 
Positions that have been taken up on either side of the debate as either intentionalism or 
structuralism are now widely seen to be somewhat anachronistic.  The debates in Marxism during 
the 1970s between Althusserian structuralism and the more agency centred ethnomethodology of 
E. P. Thompson (McNally 1993) illustrate the sometimes caricatured extremes of this continuum.  
A related dialogue soon followed between the (initially at least) Althusserian Marxist, Nicos 
Poulantzas and the more instrumentalist Ralph Miliband over the relative autonomy of the state.  I 
will revisit this exchange briefly in chapter five in the discussion of class/state/globality relation.  
However, it was largely as a response to these debates and positions that a number of social 
theorists began to argue explicitly for a more relational understanding of structures and agents.  
Perhaps the best known of these was Anthony Giddens’ structurationist approach, but important 
contributions came also from the critical realism of Roy Baskhar (1989:89-115) and the 
morphogenetic perspective developed by Margaret Archer (1995, 2000).37 
These broadly dialectical approaches have more recently been taken up in IR/IPE as a response to 
the structuralism and intentionalism which had held sway in the neo-neo debates.  Again, the 
positions on the outer reaches of these debates received more attention and ire than the more 
balanced accounts in the middle, but Bleiker notes that 
at one end of the spectrum were neorealists who explain state identity and behaviour through a 
series of structural restraints which are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the 
international system.  At the other end we find neo-liberals who accept the existence of anarchy 
                                                          
37 While Giddens is credited with the ‘invention’ of structuration, Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) Social 
Construction of Reality initiated many of the key insights. (see Urry 1982).  It is also worth noting that 
Archers morphogenetic approach is highly indebted to Bhaskar. 
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but seek to understand the behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their 
individual attributes and their ability to engage in cooperative bargaining.  If pushed to their logical 
end point the two positions amount respectively to a structural determinism and an equally far-
fetched belief in the autonomy of rational actors.  (2000: 10)  
As IR/IPE began to open up to more sociological accounts during the 1990s the relational approach 
to these various dual positions became the main intellectual terrain on which these debates played 
out.  I do not intend to revisit these debates here in any great detail, but review and draw on them 
in order to show how the strategic relational approach, drawing on some neo-Marxian/Gramscian 
and post-structuralist insights, presents some of the most plausible and persuasive analysis of this 
complex problem.  
I proceed then, in a direction that attempts to depart from the deeply entrenched western practice 
of viewing the world in starkly dualistic terms.  Such a predilection with binary terminology and 
categorisation represents a common and perhaps curious trait in western social science and theory.  
A relational account of the mutual constitution of these categories can go some way to dissolve 
these dualisms and open up new directions by which they might be approached.  Herein, however, 
my concerns are more specific and look toward extending the parameters within which the 
structure-agency debate (and its supposed 'solution' in structuration theory and morphogenesis) 
has been examined.  The aim is to suggest how critical discursive approaches warrant further 
consideration in these debates and can help develop the constructivist research programme in 
critical and progressive directions. 
This departure is also evident in my attempt to extend an examination of the debate in a post-
positivist and sometimes post-structuralist direction (following the work done by Doty, 1997, 
Suganami 1999 and Bleiker 2000).  Doing so involves beginning to supplant the sometimes overly 
abstract concepts of structure/agency with the more concrete phenomena of discourses and 
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practices, relating these instead to a concept of agency that is neither completely determined by 
exogenous factors, nor entirely free-willed and autonomous.  In short, following Hay (2002) and 
Jessop (2001), the purpose is to restore some of the potential for ‘conscious, reflexive and strategic 
‘ agents which has been lost in much of the institutionalist accounts of politics. Roland Bleiker has 
suggested that: 
A move toward a discursive and transversal understanding of social change makes room for various 
new ways of locating human agency in global politics. Agency is now no longer limited to the actions 
of statesmen or to great revolutionary events, but also takes place in countless daily and often 
mundane domains. (2000: 186) 
I briefly highlight two possible directions in which the agent structure debate might be pursued in 
such a way as to avoid the difficulties and inconsistencies encountered by approaches that currently 
appear to dominate the literature.  Both of these perspectives, neo-Gramscian and post-
structuralist, appear to permit further research based upon a critical discourse methodology in 
which their relative merits might be combined for a more fruitful analysis of neoliberal institutions 
and ideology. 
To reiterate, my intention here is by no means an attempt to resolve or explain these huge debates 
in any comprehensive manner, or to suggest that any particular approach is correct or incorrect. 
Indeed, as we shall see, the supposition that there can in fact be some resolution to this dilemma 
is a mistaken one.  As Wight points out “If ever the agent-structure problem were solved, in the 
sense of requiring no further discussion, then social theoretic activity would come to an end, and 
along with it political, economic, cultural and ethical dispute” (2006: 63).  Steven Fuller has even 
suggested that the failure to achieve any kind of acceptable resolution to the problem over more 
than 200 years of grappling with the issue across philosophy and the social disciplines suggests that 
we should simply admit defeat an proceed in other directions, he is “tempted to conclude that 
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sociologists are not smart enough to solve the problem or that the problem itself is spurious” (1998: 
104).  I disagree, and in what follows my intention is to open up more space for dialogue and 
analysis of the political, not to close off avenues for other perspectives. 
In discussions of neoliberalism, the philosophy and ideology informing the political economy of late 
capitalism and dominant representations and explanations of globalisation, it is sometimes 
asserted that we are dealing with a set of structures that appear to determine, to a large extent, 
the actions of individuals and various collectivities.  On the other hand, we are witnessing acts of 
political agency which enact, constitute and maintain those structures, in addition to those which 
are explicit in their opposition and resistance to neoliberalism and the trends it sets in motion. 
These oppositional forms of agency, or 'movements' as they are widely called, are similarly explicit 
in their desire for alternative structures and 'discursive formations' with which to replace them.  It 
would seem impossible to consider and discuss these socio-historical processes of political conflict 
and contestation without some recourse to categories of structure and agency. 
In a brief review and critique of ongoing debates on structure and agency, it will be suggested that 
many of these readings fail to sufficiently incorporate ideas, ideology and questions of culture into 
their analyses.  I argue that the institutional transformations associated with globalisation can be 
understood as competing sets of discourse and respective patterns of strategic conduct, agency 
and practice.  Analysis of these can help to reveal the uneven power relations of class, state and 
globality.  
 
Structuration 
 
Among many others, Alexander Wendt (1987) and Philip Cerny (2000) have, each in their own way, 
drawn upon Giddens theory of structuration in order to come to terms with the so-called 'Gordian 
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Knot' or 'aporia' of structure and agency in IR.  Structuration was originally conceived though, as an 
attempt to resolve these debates within the human sciences more generally and in particular 
through the sociology of Anthony Giddens.  While some attention is warranted then, Giddens 
complex theory of structuration is far too elaborate to provide a full exposition here.  It is also 
important to recognise that, despite its alleged drawbacks, it moved the structure-agency debates 
within social theory forward in a number of important ways. It is well summed up in brief by Giddens 
himself in the following way: 
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a 
dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of duality of structure, the structural 
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organise. (1986: 25) 
When Giddens talks about the duality of structure (and less explicitly agency) he refers to structural 
properties as having both constraining and enabling effects on agents which are both the medium 
and the outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors.  As we shall see 
however, such a definition fails to account sufficiently for the differentiation between various types 
of structural properties and so does not allow for a full appreciation of the fact that in certain 
historical periods, structures might be more enabling than they are constraining (and vice versa). 
To some extent though, I concur (with Cerny, 2000) that the structure agency debate, still heavily 
dominated by Giddens theory of structuration, is a helpful conceptual lens through which to begin 
examining  how agents constitute structures having been themselves considerably constituted by 
prior structural and cultural conditions.  Structurationism marked a welcome step forward from 
theories that privileged one element of analysis at the expense of discounting the other.   In his 
approach Giddens also recognises and makes explicit the importance of ideological and discursive 
elements of the structure agency relationship, arguing that “the reification of social relations, or 
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the discursive naturalisation of the historically contingent circumstances and products of human 
action is one of the main dimensions of ideology in social life” (Giddens 1984: 25-26).  The discursive 
slant to structures is discernible in Giddens earlier work where, developing his theory, he presents 
an account of structure which is distinct from ‘system’ in that it consists primarily of ‘rules (and 
resources)’.  According to Giddens, it can be partly understood in terms of Saussurean structural 
linguistics (1976: 118-122) where rules play a similar role to langue in relation to agency, which  can 
be conceived of as being akin to parole as an enactment of these rules in space and time (see also 
Sewell 1992: 6-7).   
Central to Giddens theory is his concept of the ‘duality of structure’ as both “the medium and the 
outcome of the conduct it recursively organises; the structural properties of social systems do not 
exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction” (1984: 
374).  Giddens uses the analogy of a coin to illustrate his conception whereby structure and agency 
are two sides of the same coin.  Hay (2001, 2002) challenges Giddens approach by suggesting that 
this analogy reveals a weakness in structurationism in that it is only possible to view one aspect of 
the duality at any one time.  As a result the ‘duality of structure’ may in fact replicate the analytical 
dualism which Giddens is trying to overcome.  This apparent paradox is illustrated in the 
‘methodological bracketing’ adopted by Giddens (1984: 281-293).  According to this, capturing the 
agential/strategic and structural/institutional simultaneously is not feasible in any given instance.  
As a result when we engage in social or political analysis in any given situation we must decide for 
that case which side of the ‘coin’ should be bracketed off.  According to Hay, “the unfortunate 
consequence is a simple alternation between structuralist and intentionalist accounts which belie 
the sophistication of the structuralist ontology” (2002:120). 
Despite the considerable advances made by this approach then, it is not entirely without its 
problems. These problems emerge not only with the application of structuration theory to the 
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disciplinary and often state-centric rigidities of IR (which is perhaps more of a problem with the 
dominant state-centric assumptions latent to that discipline) but also reside within the application 
of structuration as a supposed solution to the structure-agency problem within social theory 
generally.  Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to conceive of discussing contemporary problems 
and processes of class, state and globality without some reference to structures and structuration.  
Indeed, it has been noted that “theories of globalisation have tended to privilege structural 
explanations of change” (Cerny, 2000: 436). That is to say, aspects generally assumed to represent 
processes of globalisation such as post-Fordist production techniques, global financial architecture, 
and proliferating and expanding networks of information and communications technology are seen 
as driving forward or 'determining' novel types of human consciousness and behaviour, including 
new forms of resistance.  Unsurprisingly, this inherent structuralism and materialism also appears 
to be the case for a good deal of IR literature more generally (Doty 1997: 372).  Indeed, as we have 
seen, notwithstanding the welcome incursions from a variety of constructivist analyses, traditional 
realist and Marxian assumptions continue to adhere to a focus upon structural and material 
conditions, often at the expense of sufficient consideration of ideational and agential factors. 
My intention here, following a very brief foray into Giddens' reception and application within the 
discipline if IR, is to highlight some of these shortcomings and to suggest a way in which 
structuration theory might be enhanced through a greater appreciation of ideology, narratives and 
the application of critical historical and discursive analyses of the debates that surround processes 
of globalisation and their attendant sites of resistive democratic agency.  Some of the criticisms 
stem from a post-structuralist position, although a number of caveats will be made in order to 
preserve a significant normative potential for the role of agency in world politics.  Many of these 
criticisms are shared by those of a neo-Gramscian persuasion, although they have extended the 
debate in a slightly different (though no less valid) direction (Bieler and Morton 2001). 
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Alexander Wendt (1987) has clearly found Giddens’ theory attractive and has attempted, 
somewhat problematically, to apply it to his own project of defending scientific realism and the 
state-centric approach to International Relations theory while moving cautiously in a constructivist 
direction.38  Such an endeavour entails a recognition that, firstly “human beings are purposeful 
actors whose actions help to reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and secondly, 
that society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interaction between these 
purposeful actors” (Wendt 1987: 337-338).  
The main purpose of Wendt's position appears to be a recognition of how unobservable 
phenomena such as structures, can have causal impacts and can therefore be treated as 
ontologically relevant or ‘real’ and therefore causally significant within scientific realism. Wendt, 
and some other conventional or modern constructivists, seek to achieve their objective primarily 
through a process of 'bracketing' similar to that laid out by Giddens (Wendt 1987: 364-365).  The 
method involves his taking “social structures and agents in turn as temporarily given in order to 
examine the explanatory effects of the other” (364-365).  This element of structuration theory, it 
will be argued below, displays a number of drawbacks in relation to any attempt to 'resolve' the 
agent structure debate. 
While appreciating at least some of the movements in mainstream IR theory that have followed 
from Wendt’s interventions, I argue that his over-reliance on  structuration provides too narrow an 
account of global politics than is required to effectively scrutinise processes of globalisation and 
institutional transformation, not to mention the increasingly transversal forms of resistance and 
dissent.  While by no means exhausting the range of alternative perspectives to these debates, and 
not without its own shortcomings, post-structuralism offers cogent criticisms and an opportunity 
                                                          
38 For a wide ranging discussion of Wendt’s social theory see the Forum on Social Theory of International 
Politics and especially for a critique, in that forum Steve Smith (2000) ‘Wendt’s World’ Review of 
International Studies 26 (1): 151-163. 
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to extend the debate through a more critical focus upon discourse-practice relationship.  I introduce 
these perspectives here largely in terms of their criticism of existing positions in the structure and 
agency debate and how, partly in combination with historicist neo-Gramscian strains of historical 
materialism, they have helped to inform the strategic-relational approach developed by Jessop and 
Hay. 
 
Post-structural positions and discursive directions 
 
Post-structuralists represent an interesting contribution to the debate over structures and agents 
due to their scepticism toward the ontological basis on which many of the mainstream arguments 
rest.   From this perspective “there is no point in trying to establish the ‘real’ relationship between 
structure and agency.  Any understanding of the issue is viewed as one constructed in the language 
and discourse we use” (McAnulla 2002:282).  As a result, some post-structuralists have dismissed 
the problem as ultimately undecideable (Ashley 1989) which has in turn led others to conclude the 
issues lie beyond the scope of post-structuralist concerns (Carlsnaes 1992: 244).  In a critical 
response to this assertion and a critique of the apparent 'gaps, silences and foreclosures' evident 
within the established treatment of the agency-structure problem, Doty (1997) subjects these 
various accounts to a post-structuralist reading.   Her reasons for doing so are that “the solutions 
that have been proposed to this problem appear to either end up reverting to a structural 
determinism, or alternatively, to an understanding of agents which presumes pre-given 
autonomous individuals” (ibid.: 366).  Both of which seem to leave us very little further on than 
where we started in the first place with a choice between structuralism and intentionalism.  In 
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response to these drawbacks, some interesting questions are raised by a post-structuralist 
perspective as to the role of discourse within a process of social change. 39   
According to Doty, the conflation of agents and structures, as is the case with Wendt, following 
Giddens, results, in an inability to carry out satisfactory empirical research (1997: 369).  In response, 
Carlsnaes (1992), following  Archer (1990, 1995), attempts to overcome this conflation by adopting 
a morphogenetic account which introduces a temporal element into the interaction between 
structures and agency.  This approach emphasises the sequential process of structuring over time, 
suggesting that actions or agency are both pre-dated and post-dated by structures (Carlsnaes 1992: 
259). Margaret Archer summarises her account of morphogenesis in the following way: 
Action is ceaseless and essential both to the continuation and further elaboration of the system, 
but subsequent interaction will be different from earlier action because conditioned by the 
structural consequences of that prior action. Hence the morphogenetic perspective is not only 
dualistic but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of structural conditioning/social 
interaction/structural elaboration, thus unravelling the dialectical interplay between structure and 
action. (Archer 1990: 76)  
However, for Doty this does not appear to resolve the agent-structure problem in any meaningful 
or satisfactory way.  As noted by Hollis and Smith (1994: 250), it simply introduces another variable, 
that of time, into the debate.  While (as noted by neo-Gramscian perspectives) the temporal 
element is something that should necessarily be considered in a study of historical social change, 
                                                          
39 Hidemi Suganami (1999), while hardly a post-structuralist, has however indicated that his approach to the 
debate has itself been influenced by the notion suggested that questions of social change are inherent 
(perhaps even central) within debates on structure and agency. He poses the question: “How does one type 
of social structure (with its distinctive agent-structure relationship) move to another type (with a different 
sort of agent-structure relationship)?” (366) Although stating that no substantive answer can be given in the 
abstract he states that “What is clear is that its answer will take a narrative form… without narratives, we 
signify nothing.” (381) 
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Doty argues that at any one time, one must still focus upon either the action of agents, the 
structures that permitted those actions or on the structures resulting from such actions (1997: 374).  
In a similar vein, Wendt's suggestion that whilst undertaking historical analysis, structure should be 
bracketed, and during structural analysis, history should be bracketed (1987:364-5) again draws 
significantly upon the work of Giddens and his analytic strategy of bracketing.  Such a strategy is 
open to similar criticisms as that of morphogenesis.  Both approaches must at any one time give 
ontological primacy, and hence explanatory priority, to either agents or structures, thereby 
effectively repeating at least some of the problems which they criticise in accounts that favour 
either structures or agency exclusively in explanatory accounts of social change. 
Critiquing the work of Carlsnaes (1992), Dessler (1989) and Bhaskar (1975), Doty attempts to show 
that the separation between agents and structures is insufficiently maintained, illustrating an 
“incompatibility between structuration theory and its philosophical base (as presented by Wendt 
at least), scientific realism” (1997: 369).  Wendt’s scientific realism owes more than a little to the 
critical realism of Bhaskar.  Bhaskar argues that the generative mechanisms that create structures, 
at least according to scientific realism, are ‘intransitive objects of scientific enquiry' and 'are quite 
independent of men – as thinkers, causal agents and perceivers” (1975, cited in Doty 1997:370).  
Therefore, for this project at least, which argues that ideational factors are at least partly 
constitutive of structures, such an epistemological foundation is less than appropriate as there 
remains limited scope for the role of agency within structuration theory or indeed morphogenesis. 
Furthermore, in seeking to “transcend the subject-object dualism” (Giddens 1986:120), Giddens 
and Wendt appear to perpetuate it.  Doty suggests that “by underpinning structuration theory with 
a scientific realist philosophy of science, Wendt ultimately falls back into a positivist mode of 
analysis which posits a radical separation between subject and object” (1997:370).  However, some 
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preliminary criticisms can be made here before proceeding with an analysis of her post-structural 
reading of agency and structure. 
As already suggested, post-structuralism has been accused of having nothing to offer in the 
structure agency debates as its general position is that the problem is undecidable, that it 
represents an ‘aporia’.  Doty maintains, however, that the undecidability inheres instead within the 
limited conceptual lenses that have been used to explore the problem.  The 'metaphysical 
commitment' on the part of the scholars mentioned above, to conclude the issue in a decisive 
manner (and in the process, according to Doty, further displaying its undecidability) forecloses 
some important possibilities which she seeks to pursue. “Subjecting the agent-structure 
problematique to a poststructural gaze enables us to push further the undecidability issue already 
raised by the literature itself.  Despite the failures of the proposed solutions […] there are important 
openings that can be further pursued” (Doty 1997: 375).   I suggest these openings lead us 
interestingly, but not unproblematically, into the territory of discourse and the ideational contexts 
of meaning within which agency and/or practice manifest themselves. 
Doty does not claim to be able to resolve the paradoxes of the debate highlighted above, but aims 
to press them further through an examination of the concept of practice(s). She links practice 
closely with the concept of agency in a way not altogether different from other agency-structure 
theorists.  She does however move a little further in giving analytic priority to the concept of 
practice as it represents “the very thing which drives the agency structure debate” (1997: 376).  
Furthermore, Doty opts for a more radical and decentred conception of practice, informed by post-
structuralists such as Derrida, where it is understood to be inextricably connected to the production 
of meaning(s).  Stuart Hall supports such a perspective, suggesting that “since all social practices 
entail meaning and meanings shape and influence what we do—our conduct—all practices have a 
discursive aspect” (1992:291). 
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According to Doty, this connection has been insufficiently examined, even by authors who do 
explicity refer to practice, albeit in a rather restricted and conservative fashion (Dessler 1989: 454; 
Wendt 1992: 401).  In contrast, Doty’s call for a decentring of practice requires “an appreciation of 
the intrinsically ambiguous and open-ended nature of practice” (1997: 376).  Hence she rejects 
attempts to pinpoint some determinable centre in which to locate a concrete source and meaning 
of practices such as generative structural principles or an unproblematically given subject.  Such a 
process of decentring practices requires “a questioning of how meanings are constructed and 
imposed, and this necessarily involves the issue of power” (1997: 376; see also Ashley 1989).  
Generally speaking then, practices are embedded within discourse(s) and as such, particular 
meanings become attributed or signified.  However, practices are not automatically produced by 
discourse; there is no causal relationship of an instrumental or mechanical nature.  Nor, according 
to Doty, is there such a link between practice and the reproduction of a particular discourse.  
Instead there exists a significant dimension of indeterminacy within these processes of signification.  
Hence Doty states that “practices cannot be essentialised” (1997: 377) in the same way that 
structure and agency appear to have been within the debates.  Furthermore, “practices, because 
of their inextricable link with meaning, have an autonomy which cannot be reduced to either the 
intentions, will, motivations or interpretations of choice-making subjects or to the constraining and 
enabling mechanisms of objective but socially constructed structures”(ibid.). 
Post-structuralists such as Derrida (on whom Doty draws heavily) have drawn on the arbitrariness 
of the linguistic sign, an aspect of Saussure's work that appears to have been overlooked by 
structurationists, despite the residual linguistic tenor of Giddens’ approach.  Although some IR 
structurationists such as Wendt (1987:355) have drawn implicitly on the generative properties of 
linguistic structures developed by Saussure, this has been in a quite limited way.   For Doty, 
following  Saussure, the value or meaning of a sign is determined “by its differential relationship to 
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other signs […] Signs always refer to other signs” (Doty: 378). This leads post-structuralists to 
question how meaning (and thus what primarily constitutes an ideational  structure) is determined, 
considering the potentially infinite number of practices, how is such a play of differences “limited 
and made systematically intelligible” (1997:378).  Derrida attempts to address this question by 
suggesting that all structures contain an organising centre: 
The function of this centre [is] not only to orient, balance, and organise the structure--one 
cannot in fact conceive of an unorganised structure--but above all to make sure that the 
organising principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. 
(Derrida 1978:278) 
This centre is brought about and maintained by way of disciplining practices that effectively 
marginalise any attempt to realise alternative structures with different patterns of enablement and 
limitation.  
Questions of the structuring of structure are highly complex in determinate and constraints of space 
prevent an adequate exposition here of how this relates to ideological power and discursive 
practice Later chapters will take up parts of this argument in some more detail.  To summarise 
though, it is not difficult to recognise how relations of power bear heavily upon the process of 
'structuring structure' and the supposed necessity for powerful groups and interests of maintaining 
a centre.  Recognising the element of force or violence entailed in such a process, Doty notes that 
“[b]ecause any system or structure of meaning exists at the expense of alternative possibilities, its 
construction involves practices that silence or marginalise those alternatives” (1997:378).  These 
points appear somewhat reminiscent of Gramsci's 'war of position' in the formation of historic blocs 
and the pursuit of hegemonic change.  It might appear that Doty’s work is not so far removed from 
or beyond neo-Marxist understandings of ideology, but simply more alert to the potential 
structuralism in Marxian modes of analysis.  
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While Doty appears to offer a number of valid criticisms of established approaches to the agent-
structure problem, her post-structural ventures appear to require some further clarification. With 
such a heavy focus upon the role of practices within the relationship between structure and agency, 
it is somewhat puzzling that she does not provide a more concrete explanation of them or indeed 
how they come about. For Doty, it appears sufficient to present them as indeterminate and 
decentred.   Indeed, Margaret Archer (2000) engages more fully with the concept of practice and 
connects it to language by emphasising that practices are those things about which language 
formed (155-159).  Consciousness is always to be conscious of something.  Even if its referent is to 
an internal bodily state, this has an ontological status independent of the ideas we hold about it” 
(Archer 2000: 154).  Such a realist position, albeit a critical one, would seem to limit the possibility 
of our having ideas about alternative circumstances or practices not yet apparent or realised.   
One of the central claims of critical constructivism is the need to avoid closing off avenues for the 
further analysis of social phenomena and alternative conditions or contexts.  The necessarily 
temporal and spatial ‘unboundedness’ of such things as society, economy and culture make them 
resistant to such closure and analysis of them should recognise and emphasize this.  
Notwithstanding these important caveats, the categories of structure and agency demand 
attention in an exploration of the processes and effects of neoliberal globalisation and the myriad 
forms of resistance that have arisen to challenge it.  While some postmodern approaches reject the 
reality of these categories altogether, Doty’s cautious and ‘bounded’ relativism represents an 
interesting and in sometimes informative intervention. 
However, Doty’s post-structural interventions are not without their own difficulties as identified by 
Colin Wight.  Wight suggests that many of the flaws in Doty’s position flow from her misreading of 
previous writers on the subject of structure and agency.  This is quite possible but difficult to 
ascertain, as the nature of the debate means that the interpretation of the interpreters themselves 
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could lead into an endless spiral in the search for a ‘true’ reading of any particular analysis.  
Nevertheless, Wight makes two points of criticism which are more persuasive.  First he suggests 
that Doty’s attempt to locate agency in the ‘indeterminacy of practices’ means that “indeterminacy 
is always made determinate” (1999: 135).  For Wight, this results in an overdeterminate account of 
agency which is both reductive and “verging on the mechanistic” (135).  Secondly, rather than 
addressing  the agent structure problem, Doty avoids it by simply replacing those categories with 
that of the play of practice(s).  Unobservable elements such as structures and agents are not really 
considered in Doty’s account.  Wight suggests that such a theoretical celebration of only that which 
can be observed—practices, results in a form of “radical behaviouralism, albeit in a linguistic form” 
(Wight 1999:135). 
Fairclough, who also refers to social practices in this context is helpful here as he provides some 
definition of social practices which is lacking in Doty’s account. 
coherent accounts of the relationship between social structures and social events depend upon 
mediating categories, for which I shall use the term ‘social practices’, meaning more or less stable 
and durable forms of social activity, which are articulated together to constitute social fields, 
institutions, and organizations. There is a semiotic dimension at each of these levels. Languages 
(as well as other semiotic systems) are a particular type of social structure. (Fairclough n.d.:2) 
Texts and discourses are also, quite obviously, the key medium for expression of ideas and ideology 
so in order to ascertain the meaning of social practices, we must interrogate and interpret the 
discourses associated with them.  
Doty’s work is helpful in identifying and pursuing the concept of practice but it fails to specify 
sufficiently what practices actually are and how or in what ways they are distinct from agency.  A 
critical analysis which seeks to identify the agency or practice of powerful groups in order to contest 
it requires an account more grounded in the concrete social relations of contemporary neoliberal 
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capitalism.  In addition, her account does not engage with the role of ideas and ideology and their 
relation to structures and practices of power, despite her insistence of the importance of power.  
Critical constructivism finds aspects of post-structuralism persuasive but attempts to deploy them 
in a more politically oriented and emancipatory direction.  Practices may indeed warrant some 
‘decentring’ but they also need to be understood in relation to the ideas and ideologies which 
motivate and shape them.  Perhaps a more effective focus would be to consider not simply practice 
but the more ideationally infused concept of praxis as developed in the Gramscian tradition. 
 
Marx, Gramsci and Cox 
It is rare to encounter any account of structure and agency, Marxist or otherwise, without some 
reference to Marx's famous statement about men making history and vice versa.  In fact our current 
thinking rarely takes us far beyond this truism.  Marx was obviously aware of the important 
relationship between political agency and the structuring effect that history had upon the 
possibilities for that agency.  Furthermore, it seems clear that he was keen to carefully qualify the 
structuralism and determinism of which he is consistently accused by his detractors.  What might 
also be suggested in the light of his statement on the matter is that the basic premise from which 
Giddens draws his theory of structuration is almost as old as social theory itself.  Despite this, it is 
fair to say that classical Marxist social theory has been in decline across the social sciences for some 
time.  In IR/IPE, the valuable neo-Marxist 'World Systems' analysis of Wallerstein and dependency 
theory of Frank (among others) have come under criticism for their structural bias. Indeed, Marxist 
inspired analyses in general appear to have been replaced by the social constructivism as the main 
rival to Realism and Liberalism in IR. This is despite the fact that, as pointed out by Teschke and 
Heine:  
101 
 
Constructivism has failed to produce a systematic critique of historical materialism in general and 
of Marx-inspired IR literature in particular. Rather, it has tended to trivialise or caricature Marxist 
theorems in fleeting remarks, while simultaneously incorporating many of their best insights into 
its core theoretical repertory. (2002: 167) 
In response to this, I reiterate the point that constructivism is such a broad church that it is 
necessary to specify and qualify the denomination under scrutiny.  Teschke and Heine explicitly aim 
their criticism at Wendt and Ruggie (whom they consider as exemplars of constructivism) and thus 
fail to sufficiently consider the potential arguments and merits of a critical constructivism, whose 
insights derive more from the ‘post-Marxism’ of Gramsci, Foucault and Habermas and as a result 
attend more to practices and processes of conflict, repression, exploitation and relations of 
domination/resistance inherent in state and global capitalist relations of production.  This strain of 
constructivism represents a more suitable candidate for the inheritance and further developments 
of Marxian insights. 
Critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations 
of power. […] powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction. The task 
[…] is both to unmask these ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of 
alternative worlds. Critical constructivists thus see a weaker autonomous role for ideas than do 
other constructivists because ideas are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power. 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398) 
Indeed, there is much to be said for the compatibility between critical constructivism and the more 
sophisticated accounts of Marxism that transcend the structuralism which has hindered some 
accounts of Marx’s varied and voluminous works.  While the careful consideration and clarification 
of Marx's ideas is necessary, I suggest his critical intellectual legacy remains invaluable to any 
discussion of resistive agency and dissent within capitalist social and ideational structures and 
relations.  An especially rich development (and substantial re-working) of his ideas was pursued by 
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Antonio Gramsci.  Gramsci further developed a Marxist perspective to focus in particular on an 
enlarged conception of ideology or more specifically 'hegemony'.  I will examine this aspect of Marx 
and Gramsci’s work further in the following chapter, but the broader rejection of economism in 
recent Marxian scholarship permits an application of some of Gramsci’s ideas in particular which 
can shed light on the structure/agency problematic. 
The bulk of Gramsci's work must be understood in relation to the particular era in which he was 
writing and as such can now appear rather state-centric in an era of global capitalist relations. 
However, in terms of distinguishing historical materialism from historical economism, his 
contribution to the revalidation of Marxian perspectives has been enormous.   In particular his 
conception of hegemony, discussed in more detail in the following chapter, provides an enhanced 
role for cultural and ideational factors in understanding the structure-agency relationship. 
In International Relations, Gramsci's ideas were first and most fruitfully developed and applied by 
Robert Cox.  Cox has extrapolated Gramsci's notion of hegemony (distinct from that found in realist 
IR literature) which he considers to be particularly valuable, and applied it to his analysis of the 
global system.  The concept of hegemony and its construction through a war of position and the 
formation of an historic bloc is both relevant and useful to the task of better understanding the 
relationship between structure and agency.  According to Cox, “the historic bloc is the term applied 
to the particular configuration of social classes and ideology that gives content to an historical 
state” (1987: 409).  Applied to contemporary concerns such a historical state must be considered 
as existing beyond the boundaries of the modern nation-state. 
In Cox's social ontology of historical structures, drawn from the work of Gramsci and further 
elaborated by Bieler and Morton (2001), primacy is accorded to the social relations of production. 
This does not entail any kind of stark economism though, as Cox points out: 
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Production… is to be understood in the broadest sense. It is not confined to the production of 
physical goods used or consumed. It covers also the production and reproduction of knowledge and 
of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical 
goods. (1989: 39) 
The social relations of production, viewed in this broad sense permit a reading of the processes of 
globalisation and the ideological structures of neoliberalism as open and fluid rather than static, 
actively created by the ideas and practice, or praxis,  of humans themselves and not merely the 
cold, immutable and inevitable structures of history.  This allows us to conceive of them as politically 
contestable and amenable to transformation.  Furthermore, the importance of the production and 
reproduction of knowledge via contested narratives permits (and perhaps even requires) the 
application of a critical discourse analysis into a historical materialist research agenda.  In addition, 
the centrality of ideas to Cox’s work illustrates the compatibility of Gramscian insights and 
categories with a critical constructivist approach.   These ideas, Cox argues, interact in a three-way 
relationship with institutions and material capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 1. From Cox 1996: 98) 
 
Ideas 
Material capabilities Institutions 
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Cox broadly identifies two kinds of ideas, intersubjective meanings and collective images.  The 
former are a more widely and deeply established category such as sovereignty or capital.  “These 
notions, although durable over long periods of time are historically conditioned.  The realities of 
world politics have not always been represented in precisely this way and may not be in the future” 
(1996: 98).  These ideational structures are contingent and Cox stresses the possibility of tracing 
their origins and detecting signs of their weakening.  The second category of ideas, collective images 
of social order, may differ across various social groups such as nations or classes, “these are 
differing views as to both the nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations” (1996: 99). 
While intersubjective meanings represent the widely held ‘common sense’ and broadly shared 
understandings of world politics—a dominant ideology, collective images may be several and exist 
in opposition.  For Cox, “the clash of rival collective images provides evidence for the potential for 
alternative paths of development and raises questions as to the possible material and institutional 
basis for the emergence of an alternative structure” (1996: 99).  Both structure and agency then, 
contain important ideational elements which depending on the relative balance of forces, enable 
or constrain opportunities for stasis or transformation. 
Cox argues that there is a close connection between Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and processes 
of institutionalisation.  Institutions, he argues, represent means of addressing conflicts in order to 
minimise the need to use force.   
There is an enforcement potential in the in the material power relations underlying any structure, 
in that the strong can destroy the weak if necessary.  But force will not have to be used in order 
to ensure the dominance of the strong to the extent that the weak accept the prevailing power 
relations as legitimate.  This the weak may do if the strong see their mission as hegemonic and 
not merely dominant or dictatorial, that is if they are willing to make concessions that will secure 
the weak’s acquiescence in their leadership and if they can express this leadership in terms of 
universal or general interests, rather than just serving their own particular interests. (1996: 99) 
105 
 
Such a hegemonic strategy is most effective when anchored in institutional frameworks, material 
and ideational as they serve the twin purpose of universalising policy of intersubjective meanings 
and representing the diverse interests of collective images. 
In some ways it could be said that the historicist method of defining structure differs only slightly 
from that of structurationist accounts. It seems, however, to provide a more nuanced and open 
approach that is particularly receptive to historically contingent processes of social change and as 
such offers an enhanced potential for the role of agency in world politics and a greater 
consideration of its role in IR theory.  Indeed, historicist epistemology is receptive to the notion that 
even 'deep' structures such as those of feudalism and capitalism, what Giddens conceived as system 
rather than structure, are receptive to change, although they acknowledge that these are by their 
very nature, more enduring and entrenched than 'meso' structures such as Fordism or post-Fordism 
which might be seen as different orders of discourse within the episteme of capitalism. Beiler and 
Morton (2001) differentiate between macro, meso and micro structures in their Coxian analysis of 
agency-structure, suggesting that the deeper the structure, the more difficult it is to conceive of 
transforming it. 
While acknowledging that human agency is indeed structured on a number of levels, Bieler and 
Morton reject the notion of determinism.  Along with Colin Wight (1999), they argue that '[b]eing 
embedded in historical structures, however, does not imply that agency is necessarily determined. 
Rather, structures shape, constrain and even enable social forces who always have several different 
possible courses of action at their disposal” (2001: 25).  I argue that this represents a significant 
addition to, if not necessarily an advance upon the structurationist and some of the overly structural 
constructivist accounts of structure and agency relationships.  It also serves as a useful corrective 
to some of the problems with post-structural approaches in that the agents of domination and 
resistance such as classes and social movements are more easily identified. 
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A Strategic Relational Approach 
 
Hay and Jessop have combined and developed insights from both Marxism and critical realism in 
what they term a strategic relational approach.   This represents an ambitious yet persuasive move 
forward from what they consider to be the limitations of structuration and its variants.  The 
approach rests on an important ontological distinction whereby structure and agency can only be 
considered as independent phenomena in an analytical sense.  Unlike Archer who considers them 
to exist in separate temporal domains where agency is conditioned by pre-existing structures, a 
purely analytical distinction allows for the simultaneous presence of agency and structure in any 
particular situation.  The necessarily relational nature of these categories means that neither can 
have any real existence in isolation from the other.  Drawing on Giddens’ coin analogy, Hay suggests 
that rather than representing two sides of the same coin, where only one side may be considered 
at any one time, structure and agency are more like “the two metals in the alloy from which the 
coin is moulded […] we cannot see either metal in the alloy by looking at the coin, but we can see 
the product of their fusion” (Hay 1999: 200).  As such, any attempt to separate them is a purely 
abstract and theoretical move and should not be taken to reify their ontological or practical 
existence as distinct phenomenon.    Social processes and institutions are not then simply the sum 
of structure and agency but a result of their complex interaction.  Our attention therefore should 
not be directed at the theoretical abstractions of structure and agency but their dialectical 
relationship in concrete contexts of political action.  Some of the difficulty with the approaches 
outlined above then is due to the terms of the debate themselves which imply an ontological 
distinction where actually only an analytical one is possible.   
In response, Jessop tries to develop a new conceptual language through which to understand the 
relational and dialectical nature of agency and structure in ongoing temporally and spatially 
situated social and institutional processes.   Beginning with the problematic conceptual dualism of 
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structure and agency (see the first row in figure 2), Jessop develops a situated process based 
account whereby agency is brought into structure and vice versa.   The second row represents 
Giddens structuralist account.  Jessop then moves the process onwards bring the socialised agents 
back into a context of strategic selectivity and here the strategic- relational aspects of specific 
conjunctures are illustrated in the third row.  Strategically calculating actors in a dialectical relation 
to a strategically selective structure.  This provides a more effective picture of the ways in which 
agents appropriate their particular situated context and how that environment circumscribes the 
parameters of their selection of available actions. 
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Figure 2. Schematic for the strategic 
relational approach to structure and 
agency.    (From Jessop 2001:1224) 
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The elements of Giddens approach which Jessop considers to be admissible (top two rows) are 
preserved in the lower levels.  As a result:  
the concepts that appear under the agency column in the third row draw attention to the 
possibility of reflection on the part of individual and collective actors about the strategic 
selectivities inscribed within structures so that they come to orient their strategies and tactics in 
the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their `feel for the game'. 
(ibid.:1225) 
This allows for an extension whereby agents can reflect, recursively reformulating their identities 
within the new strategically selective context.  The major advance of this ‘radical methodological 
relationalism’, which may seem obvious but is overlooked or obscured in the process of bracketing 
or morphogenesis, is that the context or environment is itself ‘strategically selective’.  That is, 
certain strategies are favoured over others as ways of achieving particular preferences.  In a similar 
fashion, the structural column illustrates the way in which particular structural configurations tend 
to “reinforce selectively specific forms of action, tactics, or strategies and to discourage others” 
(Jessop 2001: 1224).  For instance, in a widely perceived context of unrestricted global investment 
capital movement, governments are less likely to opt for policies which place an increased burden 
on the potential investor such as high corporate taxes, support for workers’ rights, strong 
environmental regulation etcetera.  The context (either real or perceived) of capital mobility 
strategically selects the available policy options for governments. 
These concepts, when combined, suggest the possibility for structural alteration is largely 
dependent upon  
structurally inscribed strategic selectivity (and thus has path-dependent as well as path-shaping 
aspects); and that the recursive selection of strategies and tactics depends on individual, 
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collective, or organizational learning capacities and on the ` experiences' resulting from the pursuit 
of different strategies and tactics in different conjunctures. (ibid.: 1224) 
The fourth row of the schematic indicates then that transformation of the structural configuration 
is thus constrained by the way agents anticipate the “immanent necessity of their social world with 
the result that they reproduce their subjection to conditions similar to those in which they are 
placed” (ibid.: 1224; see also Bourdieu 1988: 783).  Jessop notes that this level is also reminiscent 
of Storper’s “circular relation between conventions and institutions” (1998: 269). 
As this relationship coevolves through history these relatively undisturbed configurations can 
display a relatively stable order or ‘structured coherence.  We can see evidence for this in the post-
war Keynesian consensus or the contemporary order of discourse illustrated by neoliberal 
consensus since the 1980’s.  Both the historical record and Jessop’s strategic-relational approach 
demonstrate that despite periods of stability and coherence, periodical crisis can result in the 
establishment of new orders of discourse.  
While I agree that the strategic relational approach represents the most persuasive way in which 
to understand the relationship between the strategies of political agents and their institutional 
settings and contexts, the narrower issue of how and why those strategic actors come to choose 
one course of action over another remains.  While much of the discussion in this and previous 
chapters points toward the assumption that we cannot make general predictions about how actors 
will behave in any situation, the remaining task is to attempt a better interpretation and 
understanding of how and why actors make certain decisions in specific times and places.  I suggest 
that a critical and discursive constructivism builds on the strategic relational approach and points 
towards some methodological opportunities whereby discourse analysis can reveal more about the 
strategic selectivity of contexts and the interests which situated actors perceive to be their own.   
In the strategic-relational approach, agents are considered to be conscious, reflexive and strategic.  
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They demonstrate intentionality in that they can be seen to act purposefully through combined 
attempts to realise their preferences and intentions.  However, as noted by Hay “they may also act 
intuitively and/or out of habit” (2002: 131).  I suggest that such intuitions or habits are discernible 
through a closer examination of prevailing ideational frames and ideologies and that critical and 
constructivist inflected discursive analyses can be developed to reveal more about these. 
Indeed, Hay (2002) emphasises the similarities between structure and agency and the ideational 
and the material.  An acceptance of the strategic relational view of structure and agency, a similarly 
dialectical view of the relationship between the ideational and the material almost inevitably 
follows” (2002: 209). 
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Figure 3. Strategic relational approach to ideational and material factors. (From Hay 2002: 209)  
 
 
As with the SRA for structure and agency, the strategically selective context comes to imply the 
benefit or preference of certain strategies over alternative ones.  Moreover, agents’ knowledge of 
the selectivity of the context they inhabit is both necessarily limited and unreliable.  As a result they 
have only past experiences from which to gauge the likely outcomes of particular choices but in the 
same process their previous actions and those of others may have altered the strategically selective 
context.  
 
Constructivism 
 
While constructivism might be regarded as having its oldest roots in the soil of philosohphical 
idealism of thinkers such as Kant, Hume, Hegel and Berkeley who all argued, albeit in quite different 
ways, that beliefs, experience and historical context were central to the constitution of knowledge, 
constructivism per se is more accurately seen as a product of sociological perspectives developed 
during the last century in response to the problem of ideology inherited from Marxism.  The older 
school of philosophical idealism maintained an individualist epistemology which was not well 
equipped to consider the social dimension of the construction of knowledge with which we are 
concerned here.  Max Weber’s denial of the existence of a social objectivity outside the discourse 
of science is an important reference point (Hoenisch  2006).   
More significant though for constructivism specifically, is the contribution of Karl Mannheim and 
his development of the ‘sociology of knowledge’ (Delanty, 1997).  Mannheim was interested in 
rescuing the concept of ideology from its negative connotations which it had absorbed in the 
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writings of Marx and Engels.  He was by no means the first to make such an attempt and others 
involved in this project are discussed in more detail below.40  It is important to note here however 
that constructivism has a deep connection with Marxist and neo-Marxist social theory.  In 
particular, Mannheim was himself profoundly influenced by the work of Lukacs with whom he had 
studied at the University of Budapest.  Like Lukacs he challenged the ahistorical positivist outlook 
which he regarded as unsatisfactory and emphasised that all knowledge is situated within history 
and represents in itself a key element of the socio-historical process which it seeks, in turn, to 
comprehend.  Mannheim’s constructivist insights reject much of the individualism characteristic of 
philosophical idealism and more importantly, he was above all responsible for the key qualification 
of the relativism which may develop from historicist positions.  Mannheim contended that in fact 
what is intelligible in history can be formulated only with reference to problems and conceptual 
constructions which themselves arise in the flux of historical experience.  Once we recognise that 
all knowledge is relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position 
of the observer, we are faced once more with the task of discriminating what is true and what is 
false in such knowledge […] We must constantly ask ourselves how it comes about that a given 
type of social situation, gives rise to a given interpretation.  Thus, the ideological element in 
human thought, viewed at this level, is always bound up with the existing life situation of the 
thinker. (1936: 71) 
Like Marx then, Mannheim also maintained that a society’s cultural and belief system was heavily 
structured by the thoughts of a dominant group and he contrasted this Ideology with the Utopia 
which reflected the aspiration of those struggling to bring about progressive social change (Delanty 
                                                          
40 The combination of a constructivist focus on ideas and Marxist considerations of ideology might at first 
appear incommensurable.  Marx and Engels most notable contribution was to turn the idealist philosophy 
of the young Hegelians on its head and treat ideas as epiphenomenal or ‘superstructural’  to the materiality 
of economic interests.   While in the works of Marx and Engels such a materialism appears undeniably 
dominant, it is not always consistent and there are elements to the earlier manuscripts where a much more 
significant role is afforded to the role of ideas.  A much fuller discussion of these debates forms much of 
chapter 4. 
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1997: 114; Gupta, 2002: 185-196; Thompson 1990: 47-52).  Mannheim’s historicism and the Marxist 
concept of ideology from which it draws heavily is discussed in more detail and historical context in 
the following chapter.  Before proceeding I will briefly outline the more critical elements of 
constructivist thought and give an example of how it illustrates contemporary ideal/material 
relational issues in world politics, the ways in which ideas constitute institutions and vice versa.  
A second antecedent to constructivism, one which situates it more firmly in the critical domain, is 
the work of Frankfurt scholars such as Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno.  More recently, the work 
of Habermas, also associated with this school, has blended its critical elements with more 
concretely political developments calling for a dialogic or discursive democracy.  Checkel (2001: 
579) among others has noted the connections between Habermasian ‘communicative action’ and 
the constructivist research agenda.  In addition, the relational tradition stretching back to Marx 
through Mannheim and the Frankfurt school establishes a rich critical theoretical seam for 
constructivism to mine for intellectual resources.   
As I have already noted, while some aspects of constructivist thought have been incorporated into 
the mainstream, I suggest that its strong critical heritage, in the vein of analysing cultural 
domination and ideology critique can help establish its credentials as a fundamentally critical 
approach for the understanding of neoliberal globalisation.  As Linklater notes, “Critical theory 
invites observers to reflect upon the social construction and effects of knowledge and to consider 
how claims about neutrality can conceal the role knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory 
social arrangements” (1996: 279).  Increasingly, processes and discourses of globalisation have 
been associated with such ‘unsatisfactory social arrangements’.  As such, a critically informed and 
methodologically discursive constructivism is well equipped to address the ‘problem’ of neoliberal 
globalisation. 
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Critical/discursive constructivism and globalisation 
 
Globalisation certainly consists of myriad material, and in particular technological, objects and 
processes.  Interestingly though, the vast majority of these objective facts are simply the socially 
and culturally inert media by which ‘objects’ of communication (ideas, values, culture, norms, 
beliefs, ) are transmitted and disseminated in the semiotic  forms of discourse and text.  When we 
think of the materiality of globalisation, the things we are able to touch and see, we tend to imagine 
various systems of communication technology.  The emergence and expansion of this technology 
also seems to be coincidental with the most common historical alignment of the ‘when’ of 
globalisation, often considered to be since the emergence of worldwide capitalist regimes of 
accumulation which emerged in the late 16th century (Wallerstein 1974).41  We are generally 
considered to have become more ’global’ largely in relation to the extent of the speed and extent 
of our communicative abilities.  Hence globalisation has been described as the compression of 
space and time (Harvey 1989).  This is not to posit a technological determinist argument but merely 
to acknowledge that globalisation is largely coterminous with the communications revolution.   
Admittedly, environmental conditions such as climate and disease are, and have of course always 
been, global or transnationally existent, disregarding any social borders but our knowledge of them 
as such has only been possible along with an ability to communicate and comprehend their 
simultaneous existence to humanity as a single society.  What is global about globalisation is, more 
than anything, ideas and culture.  These social facts should therefore be at the centre of the 
interpretation of globalisation.  As discussed above, discourses of political globalisation are now 
however, more commonly associated with a supposed limited for states to determine their own 
                                                          
41 Although for an alternative account see the debate in the edited volume by Frank and Gills (1993).  This 
period saw the invention of the Gutenburg printing press and the conquest by Europeans of the Americas, 
made possible by technological developments and neccesited by the desire for large quantities of base 
metals in order to circulate currency on a mass scale.  See Boyer-Xambeu, M.,Deleplace, G. and Lucien 
Gillard, L. (1994). 
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social and economic policies.  This suggests a material force or capability which impinges on the 
democratic sovereignty of the modern state.  Constructivism offers an alternative way of 
understanding this widespread assumption central to the hyper-globalisation thesis. 
Hay (2002) has developed a critical constructivist approach which deploys a discursive analysis to 
attempt an understanding of how states can be seen to respond to ideas and discourses about 
globalisation as much as its supposed real or material constraints presented by that process. 
Assumptions of global capital mobility take centre stage in the discourses of neoliberal 
governments.  According to both the often critical hyperglobalisation thesis and the normative 
neoliberal prescriptions of neoliberal open economy macroeconomics: 
Sandwiched between the constraints of global financial markets and the exit options of mobile 
productive capital, national governments across the world have been forced to adopt increasingly 
similar (neoliberal) economic strategies which promote financial discipline, deregulation and 
prudent economic management.  As global competition intensifies governments are increasingly 
unable to maintain existing levels of social protection or welfare state programmes without 
undermining the competitive position of domestic business and deterring much needed foreign 
direct investment. (Held and McGrew 2002: 55) 
As a result of these assumptions, in an era of globalisation states engage in tax competition with 
each other in order to compete for foreign direct investment.  Governments do not attempt to hide 
this competition but are explicit about its necessity and even celebrate it.  It has been a defining 
aspect of various governments in the UK since the 1980s including Labour who in a White Paper 
declared “In the global economy of today we cannot compete in the old way. Capital is mobile” (DTI 
1998).  In 2000, responding to its perceived disadvantage to the US which had slashed its corporate 
tax and was thus attracting Canadian businesses to migrate south, cut its own corporate rate from 
28% to 20%.  The response of the corporate lobbying group Business Council on National Issues was 
to describe the cut as “timid” (ibid.: 55) 
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Since the mid-1990s OECD countries have seen a 3.5% reduction in corporate tax and overall tax 
rates on large US MNC’s operating in developing countries has fallen from 54% in 1983 to 28% in 
1996 (Held and McGrew 2002: 55).  The consequences of this shift in taxation  is that the burden 
falls more heavily on those who are less mobile than large corporations and financial interests such 
as citizens and smaller enterprises. 
So the argument persists that if states do not engage in ongoing corporate tax reductions they will 
be penalised by capital flight and a decrease in net tax revenue.  It is part of a deregulatory race to 
the bottom which also includes governments reducing environmental standards and labour/trades 
union rights which might also disincentivize foreign direct investment (FDI) (Brecher and Costello 
2000: 6-10). 
In order to demonstrate how it is ideas and discourses regarding globalisation which are the most 
significant areas of focus for a constructivist analysis, Hay (2002) envisages a hypothetical42 
situation which acknowledges the accuracy of these assumptions, that capital mobility causes tax 
competition between states seeking investment.  The cost of attempts to raise corporate taxation 
to fund education health and welfare is assumed to be immediate capital flight and a loss in net 
revenues.   
Discursive power and the role of belief is crucial here for the following reasons.  See figure 3 below 
(p.120). If governments believe the hyperglobalisation discourse to be true and cut taxes 
accordingly then FDI will remain (scenario 1).  If they believe the discourse to be false when it were 
in fact correct, then they would not cut taxes and FDI would exit (scenario 2).  On the other hand, 
if the hyperglobalisation discourse is false, simply a hollow threat on the part of MNC’s,  but 
governments believed it to be true, the result would be the same as scenario 1, taxes would be cut 
                                                          
42 Hay (2001), along with other writers (Cooke and Noble 1998; Swank 2001) argues that in fact these 
assumptions are highly implausible. 
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and FDI would remain (scenario 3).  Crucially however, if the threat of capital flight is merely just 
that, at hollow ruse with no basis in reality, and government was to call the bluff of investors then 
the falsity of the discourse would be revealed.  In scenario 4 then, taxes would not be cut yet FDI 
would remain. 
This example demonstrates then, how the logic of inevitability which largely circumscribes debates 
around globalisation is significantly constructed through dominant discourses.  Globalisation is 
significantly a social construction which may be revealed as such through a careful analysis of the 
discourses which work to uphold its lgitimacy.  According to Hay, the discursive construction of 
globalisation may play a crucial independent role in the generation of the effects invariably 
attributed to globalisation and invariably held to indicate its logic of inevitability” (2002:204).  It 
illustrates the importance of making a careful distinction “between the effects of globalisation and 
the effects of dominant discourse of globalisation that might be challenged and resisted” (ibid.).  
Indeed, neoliberal discourses of globalisation will be developed in chapters six and seven, before 
doing so we must develop the important arguments which link ideology and discourse (chapter 
four) and show why the methodological resources of critical discourse analysis are particulary 
suitable for an analysis of aspects of late capitalism (chapter 6). 
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Fig. 3 from Hay 2002: 203 
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Ch. 4 Dominant Ideologies and the Concept of Hegemony  
Introduction 
Having discussed in the previous chapter the rather abstract notions of structure and agency in 
relation to political and socio-economic change, social science and World Politics/IPE in particular, 
my argument here proceeds to discuss more concrete and recognisable objects of analysis and 
normative lines of inquiry.  What follows remains largely at the theoretical level but works toward 
developing an account of the more ontologically solid concerns associated with Marxian political 
analysis such as class and state.  As suggested in the previous chapters, the analysis is honed to the 
identification of a dominant transnational class and the neoliberal/global state and how these 
(structures/agents) are becoming enmeshed with the power of neoliberal ideas and the discursive 
construction of consciousness, common sense, subjectivity and/or 'knowledge'.  As such it works 
toward introducing some theoretical/practical ‘praxeological’ and methodological links and 
distinctions between the connected concepts of ideology and discourse to be further developed in 
chapter six.  
In the development of this argument I will also extend Gramsci's key concept of hegemony in the 
light of more recent work of neo-Gramscian scholars in the direction of transnational classes 
(Overbeek 1993; Sklair 2000; Van der Pijl 1998), re-ordered relations of capital and forms of 
governance and state emerging at the global level (Robinson 2001, 2005; Shaw 2000; Hardt and 
Negri 2000) since the international restructuring and rescaling of the 1970s and the end of the Cold 
War.43 This has been recognized variously and sometimes a little crudely as a shift from Fordism to 
                                                          
43 Robert Cox was probably the first to bring the insights of Gramsci to the the attention of mainstream 
IR/IPE See Cox 1979, and also Gill, Gill and Law, Morton, Rupert, 1998; Sklair, 2001. There is also 
considerable overlap here with the Amsterdam School and the French Regulationist or Annales School. 
More recently the work of Polanyi has found a place in this canon (Mittleman and Chin; Burawoy), It is 
perhaps amiss to speak of ‘schools’ at all but I wish to highlight the interwoven and overlapping lines of 
enquiry which these apply to IR/IPE and World Politics. 
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post-Fordism and from Keynesianism to a post-Keynesian neoliberal ‘new right’ since the 1970s 
(Harvey 1990) and the supposed triumph of liberal capitalism with the collapse of Marxism-
Leninism and the Soviet bloc and its satellite states (Fukuyama 1991; Little 1995).  The focus on 
transformation is intended to point towards the significance of crisis periods in which the potential 
for new ideas and values to take root is enhanced.  
In this chapter I will outline some of the theoretical and historical roots of this approach in the 
Marxian conceptions of ideology and how various subsequent critiques, refinements and 
elaborations in the vein of ‘Western Marxism’ have led to significant developments in our 
understanding of ideology and, more importantly, the performativity of ideational factors in 
relation to forms of political power.  Such an analysis contributes to contemporary debates on 
power relations and political struggle through a reconsideration of the debates around ‘the relative 
autonomy of the state’, (specifically, Jessop's 'strategic relational approach' (2007) and how these 
can shed light on new transnational regimes, institutions of global governance and emergent 
discourses and practices of neoliberal governmentality. 
In this and subsequent chapters however, I will attempt to integrate these theoretical debates and 
developments (new forms of class and state institutions) with the historical contexts and processes 
in which they continue to play out.  As such, the arguments follow partly from the assertion of Kees 
van der Pijl that 
only when the space in which economy and politics interact is extended to cover entire historical 
eras and larger-than-national complexes of states and society, can the cohesion underlying such 
interaction be defined in terms of the rise and decline of social classes. (1998:3)   
Just what exactly might count as an appropriate temporal bracketing for tracing this process is 
obviously a matter of considerable importance and so debate around such an exercise has been 
wide ranging.  As Bentley notes, “periodisation ranks among the more elusive tasks of historical 
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scholarship” (1996: 749).  Without wishing to revise such worthwhile debates at length, a historical 
periodization of some kind must inevitably take place and the two main considerations would 
appear to be that it should be: a) brief enough to allow for an effective focus on key events and b), 
sufficiently broad in order to provide the necessary context for a better understanding of how such 
events are connected and constituted through other processes and events.  As such, the approach 
followed herein is influenced in part by the work of Fernand Braudel and his 'three levels' approach, 
drawing a version of his second level which attempts a blend of the structural with the conjunctural 
or in Braudel's own words “the permanent and the ephemeral, the slow moving and the fast.  These 
two aspects of reality [...] are always present in everyday life, which is a constant blend of what 
changes and what endures” (1972: 353).44  I will begin by sketching out what I consider to be the 
key aspects of the period which provide the early context for the emergence of some of the 
theoretical developments which inform this study. 
History, Theory and Culture 
In order to appreciate and account for the rise to dominance of neoliberal ideas and ideology during 
the latter decades of the twentieth century, it is helpful to begin by tracing the historical contexts 
for the theoretical developments of ideological analysis that took place in the early to middle 
decades of crisis in 'the West' (1914-45) and in particular through the work of Antonio Gramsci.  I 
will proceed to outline some of these contexts briefly here before considering the work of Marx 
and Engels and the ways in which their theories of ideology were enhanced elaborated by Gramsci 
and others who subsequently took up his ideas. 
As I maintain, the significance of the changes touched upon above must be appreciated within a 
longer historical context than that since the nonetheless crucial crisis period of the 1970s (upon 
                                                          
44 See also Macfarlane, A. (1996) Fernand Braudel and Global History. pdf available at: 
http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/BRAUDEL_revised.pdf 
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which much 'neo-Gramscian' and regulationist work tends to focus)45 ranging back at least as far as 
the First World War (1914-18) and thus considering the collapse of the late nineteenth century 
liberal capitalist order and the emergence of a new Keynesian/Fordist compromise which sought to 
recover some sense of order from the chaos and ruins of 1914-45. My interpretation of this 
conjuncture also owes much to the work of Karl Polanyi and his (1944) magnum opus The Great 
Transformation which has come to prominence among the widespread attempts to account for the 
more recent return to laissez-faire ideas and principles of a self-regulating market which 
characterise the dominant ideology and practices of contemporary world politics.46  
The collapse of Polanyi's four key pillars of nineteenth century civilisation, which, he argued, led 
into the catastrophe of WWI and the subsequent political and socio-economic turmoil across 
Europe, saw the end of the unbounded optimism, certainty and confidence in the progress and 
expansion of western civilisation.  More specifically and almost universally, following the Great 
Crash of 1929, it led to a decline in the appeal of so-called 'self-regulating markets' as reliable means 
to organise production and distribution. Polanyi took these four key institutional pillars to be: the 
self-regulating market, the balance of power system, the liberal state and the international gold 
standard,  
But the fount and matrix of the system was the self-regulating market. It was this innovation 
which gave rise to a specific civilisation. The gold standard was merely an attempt to extend the 
domestic market system to the international field; the balance of power system was a 
superstructure erected upon and, partly, worked through the gold standard; the liberal state was 
                                                          
45 A good deal of regulationist and neo-gramscian historical analysis in IR/IPE focuses predominantly on the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the period following the collapse of fixed exchange rates. I 
concur that this is indeed a crucial factor and draws much attention as it marks the genesis of neoliberal 
practice in the Hayekian turn taken in the policies of the Thatcher and Reagan Governments from 1979 and 
1980 respectively. 
46 Bloch, F. provides a good critical analysis of The Great Transformation and its importance for 
understanding the role of ideas in the construction of a market society. See 'Karl Polanyi and the Writing of 
the Great Transformation' in Theory and Society, 32/3 (2003) pp. 275-306 
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itself a creation of the self-regulating market. The key to the institutional system of the 
nineteenth century lay in the laws governing market economy. (1944:3) 
Polanyi here betrays some considerable Marxist influence in his singling out of market economics 
as a key, while not explicitly determinant, factor in understanding processes of socio-historical 
change.  While not known for expressing an explicit account of the role of ideology in its negative 
Marxist formulation, Polanyi identified the disembedding of the economy in what he termed 
‘market society’ as a result of a particular set of powerful ideas associated with classical economic 
liberalism.  He argued that such a process would entail a ‘double movement’, whereby society 
would react to this disembedding in an effort to re-situate economic processes in the wider social 
and cultural milieu.  Polanyi's background in economic history and anthropology led him to this 
conclusion as much as (and perhaps more than) his Marxist influences.  His extensive research into 
various economic cultures through history, where production and exchange were found to be 
almost universally embedded within deeper social and cultural practices and institutions, led 
Polanyi and his colleagues to consider a disembedded market society, akin to the contemporary 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy, as inherently unsustainable and dangerously unstable.  In addition 
Polanyi rejected the economism, both of the neoclassical economics of von Mises but also the 
economic determinism which he saw in much of the work of Marx and stressed the importance of 
cultural factors in social change (Carlson 2006: 32).   
As such, his ideas have been usefully developed in combination with those of Gramsci, most notably 
by Birchfield (1999) and Burawoy (2003).  Despite their own reservations regarding Marx, his work 
has also informed the analysis of key neo-Marxists focusing on state forms such as Block (2003) and 
Jessop (2001, 2007).  My brief point here is that to concentrate upon a critique of the capitalist 
mode of production, or market society, need not compel one to any kind of strictly determinist 
Marxist analysis.  Indeed, Polanyi’s work is useful for the task of cleansing such doctrines of the 
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economistic fallacy which have in many instances, bedevilled them.  Block suggests that in a striking 
similarity to Gramsci, “Polanyi insisted that the working class had to win leadership of society by 
representing the interests of society as a whole.” (2003:278). 
Indeed, the secret of success lies rather in the measure in which the groups are able to 
represent - by including in their own - the interests of others than themselves. To achieve this 
inclusion they will, in effect, often have to adapt their own interests to those of the wider 
groups which they aspire to lead. (Polanyi, 1934 in Block 2003: 278) 
This notion of intellectual leadership, combined with Polanyi's sensitivity to cultural considerations 
drawn from his background in economic anthropology seems to resonate clearly with Gramsci's 
own concept of hegemony.   It seems possible that, like Gramsci, Polanyi had come under the 
influence of Marx's then only recently published Early Manuscripts and the German Ideology and it 
is likely that for him also, these were crucial to a fuller understanding and contextualisation of the 
later works of the mature Marx.  
Both thinkers (Gramsci and Polanyi) provide important and complimentary historico-political 
insights for understanding the crucial shift from Fordist to post-Fordist systems of production and 
the construction and collapse of the Keynesian 'consensus'.47  This period ran roughly from 
Roosevelt's New Deal of the 1930s in the US, through the Marshall Plan for Europe and Beveridge 
in the UK, and right up until the widespread state/capitalist crises of the 1970s and the subsequent 
entrenchment of a neoliberal global political economy or ‘regime of accumulation’.  This period 
represents the conjuncture which this thesis posts as its socio-historical backdrop and will be 
examined  further in the following chapters, providing a context for my historico-theoretical 
process-tracing and discursive analysis of neoliberalism. 
                                                          
47 Their insights are also useful for the study of political transformation more generally 
125 
 
The importance and contemporary significance of Polanyi's work is summed up in Block and Somers 
who assert his: 
account of the 1920s and 30s analyses the incompatibility of international capitalist 
arrangements with both democracy and the social reforms that had been won by the European 
working classes. This argument speaks directly to the present period in which the conflict 
between "legitimation and accumulation", "the limits of legitimacy", and the "crisis of 
democracy" have become central themes of social sciences; once again there appears to be a 
contradiction between the imperatives of the capitalist world system and the achievements of 
democratic politics. (1984:48) 
Polanyi sought to develop a post-Marxist political and theoretical position, and an explicitly anti-
capitalist socialism, which retained a strong commitment to individual freedom.  His perspective 
then was something akin to that more recently outlined by Daniel Bell (1976) in that it combined 
an unrelenting socialist economics with a rather liberal outlook on politics. This kind of 
economic/politico-theoretical marriage is also ascribed to the Gramscian R. W. Cox by Susan 
Strange in her (1988) review of his seminal Power, Production and World Order.  Due to my primary 
concerns with ideology and hegemony, this chapter is concerned more with the work of Gramsci 
but I will return later to some of the historical and anthropological arguments of Polanyi in my later 
discussion of Hayek and the historical emergence of neoliberalism through the activities of a 
transnational capitalist class/movement,  where the insights of his economic anthropology provide 
a useful foil to the positions of the early neoliberals and the Austrian school of economics. 
Rarely mentioned but acknowledged in the work of both Cox (1996:51) and Hudson (1999: 938) is 
the historicist influence upon Polanyi which also aligns him with Gramsci and those who have 
followed this line of scholarship in post-/neo-Marxist tradition of anti-capitalism.  I should say 
something of these historicist developments of the post-WWI era before proceeding further, for 
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there is some connection between this theoretical turn in the study of history and the greater 
attention given to 'superstructural' elements of society than in western Marxism than that often 
attributed to the work of Marx himself.  In short, the notion of meaning in historical analysis 
requires that at least some consideration of ideas and ideology be brought into such analyses and 
meaning as I have already intimated, is shaped by context. 
Historicism 
In terms of theoretical developments through this post-WWI era, the concept of historicism is key 
to understanding the antecedent roots of constructivist thought. It is also important in order to 
recognise the challenge to rationalism which the catastrophe of WWI had brought about in the 
intellectual circles of Europe and perhaps particularly in Germany.48 Many of the key intellectual 
and political figures of the subsequent decades would have had direct experience of the human 
carnage permitted by modern industrialised warfare.  The war also marked the disintegration of 
proletarian internationalism and the demise of the second international.  The seemingly irrational 
descent into horror and mass slaughter, which ended the so-called Belle Epoque, had the effect of 
leading history, philosophy and socio-political thought to ask new questions and offer new kinds of 
answers beyond rationalism and logical positivism.  In short, a (re)turn to historicism and a concern 
for the pivotal role of culture and meaning in social and historical analysis.  The 1917 October 
revolution in Russia and the subsequent formation of the Soviet Union also cast a long and stark 
shadow across the fields of left/radical social theory and political practice throughout what 
Hobsbawm (1994) has termed 'the short twentieth century'.  This inter-war period then is once 
again stressed as a key historical interregnum in which ideology seems to have gained a much more 
public and consciously deliberate form and essence.  It must itself be considered in the light of 
preceding events. 
                                                          
48 See Carlnaes, 1981: 172-180 on Mannheim and historicism in post-war Germany more generally 
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Particularly in Germany, but generally speaking of nineteenth century historiography, the study of 
history had been stripped of its philosophical garb and reduced to a rather crude fact-based affair 
in which cold detailed description and nothing more should be the object of history.  To derive 
meaning from such developments ran against the reigning positivist orthodoxy of science.  Thus, as 
R.G. Collingwood notes: 
This led historians to adopt two rules of method in their treatment of facts: (i) Each fact was to 
be regarded as a thing capable of being ascertained by a separate act of cognition or process of 
research, and thus the total field of the historically knowable was cut up into an infinity of minute 
facts each to be separately considered. (ii) Each fact was to be thought of as not only independent 
of all the rest but as independent of the knower, so that all subjective elements (as they were 
called) in the historians point of view had to be eliminated. (1946: 131) 
A key proponent of this approach to history was the German historian Leopold von Ranke who, 
according to E.H Carr, “piously believed that divine providence would take care of the meaning of 
history if he took care of the facts” 49 (1961:19).  Indeed, according to Carr, this liberal nineteenth 
century perspective on history bore a close affinity with the conventional wisdom of laissez-faire 
economics which also stemmed from the serenity and self-confidence of that era.  
The facts of history were themselves a demonstration of the supreme fact of a beneficent and 
apparently infinite progress toward higher things.  This was the age of innocence, and 
historians walked in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked 
and unashamed before the god of history. (ibid. 20) 
                                                          
49 Carr has been almost exclusively restricted in the realist tradition of IR to his Twenty Years Crisis which is 
invoked as a damning indictment on the liberal idealism which reigned supreme in the discipline during its 
early years but failed along with the League of Nations to provide an acceptable account of the causes of 
WWII. His work is therefore rarely considered in the critical/radical approaches which has been something 
of a considerable loss to this vein of international studies. 
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However, “the nature and outcome of the war [...] made a renewed inquiry into the meaning of 
history a seemingly ineluctable task” (Carlsnaes 1981: 173).  The importance of morals, values and 
ideas began again to be recognised by historians and social theorists in their return to an historicism 
(or ‘historism’) that would be central to Western Marxism and the cultural/ideological analyses of 
Luckacs, Gramsci, Mannheim and Goldmann (see also Carlsnaes 1981: 176-179, Larrain 1979: 77-
91 and 100-129, and somewhat critically, Poulantzas 1973: 197), all of whom granted a significant 
amount of their attention to the enhanced role for ideology that came with a move toward 
historicism in the intellectual circles of post-1918 Europe.   It is not feasible to give an account of all 
of these authors valuable contributions to the development of ideology and its analysis in left 
intellectual circles,50  instead I will focus later in the chapter on the work of Antonio Gramsci.  This 
is due in part to the more political focus of his work in comparison to many of his contemporaries 
and the wider and more lasting influence of his analysis.  
 
Expanding and Extending Ideology: The rise of mass societies and culture 
This epistemological, ontological and even methodological turn toward matters of culture, values 
and ideas in the human sciences was expressed in the emergence of what has come to be referred 
to as ‘western Marxism’.   Indeed, a study of politics and especially ideology in this period must 
almost unavoidably be one of western Marxism.   In fact, with perhaps Gramsci as the partial 
exception, 
the most constant and close concern were those [superstructures] ranking 'highest' in the 
hierarchy of distance from the economic infrastructure […] it was not the State or Law which 
                                                          
50 For an excellent overview see Anderson (1976) Considerations on Western Marxism. 
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provided the typical objects of its research.  It was culture that held the central focus of its 
attention. (Anderson 1976: 75) 
The widespread emergence of psychoanalysis and sociology beyond mere academic pursuits and 
into the realms of the corporate and political strategies of liberal and capitalist elites is a key feature 
of this period. The use of propaganda became increasingly commonplace as a tool of mass social 
control and the establishment of a public relations industry, utilising the new technologies of 
communication, in particular the moving image, gave a new impetus to the concept of ideology 
(see Gouldner, 1976; Bernays, 1923).  Ideas and culture were no longer things simply obtained more 
or less directly but could be more easily constructed, manipulated and deployed and they would 
thus became more closely connected with increasingly complex relations and distributions of 
power.   Crucially, these developments coincided and became bound up with the emerging and 
increasingly successful parliamentary (as opposed to revolutionary) challenges to free market 
liberal capitalism in the forms of Keynesian welfare economics, trade unionism and social 
democratic politics. While those on the left needed to reorient their thinking to account for these 
increasingly salient possibilities for proletarian education and emancipation within passive 
revolution, those on the economic right were left to pick up the pieces of a discredited liberalism 
which fell into crisis along with capitalism in the depression of the 1930s.  
In part, following from the aforementioned revisions in Marxism towards closer attention to 
matters of culture and the growth of literary and cultural criticism, a more recent but related 
development has been a gradual drift of the 'intellectual left' since the late 1960s from Marxist 
structuralism to post-structuralism involving, among many other things, a shift in the object of 
analysis from ideology to discourse and the role of texts and semiotics.  An understanding of 
ideology and discourse and their interrelationship is crucial and central to this thesis and is further 
developed through the next and later chapters.  Before doing so, it is pertinent to begin with an 
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initial account of how ideology relates to the key institutions of class and state as they have been 
laid out in Marxist political theory. The aim here is little more than a cursory review and 
historiography of what I consider to be some of the key positions in these debates.  I will then 
discuss how these positions and arguments shed light upon contemporary forms of state, globality 
and class fractions in order to give a contextual basis and introduction for my own analysis of 
particular aspects of neoliberal ideology and discourse. 
To recap briefly, before proceeding with an account of ideology and its supposed relation to class 
conflict and domination, this thesis is concerned with how a neoliberal political economy, a 
particularly extreme free-market variant of capitalist ideology and practice, became dominant or 
hegemonic in the core states, van der Pijl's 'Lockean heartland' (1998:64-97), of the international 
system toward the end of the twentieth century.  It seeks to understand how it has maintained 
legitimacy and, despite its failure to provide an acceptably sustainable, just or secure system of 
production, exchange and distribution, extended itself into a dominant global neoliberal political 
economy.  I should therefore attempt to justify those arguments and questions to some extent.  
Firstly, I suggest that, considering the growing prominence given to ideas and values in increasingly 
mainstream constructivist analysis, ideological analysis and its critical roots have been afforded 
insufficient attention in recent social science and especially World Politics/IPE/IR.51  Secondly, as a 
normative inquiry which draws on substantial secondary evidence to demonstrate that the 
contemporary socio-economic and political system is problematic and precarious (both unjust and 
insecure), the analysis assumes a political and value-laden stance of its own (as must any social 
analysis).  The argument is therefore articulated with an assumption that some kind of 'progressive' 
                                                          
51 A cursory glance at most introductory textbooks in IR reveals very little consideration of questions of 
ideology. Idealism in IR refers most commonly to the claims toward the possibilities of international society 
and an institutionalised world peace. The widespread debates between communitarian and cosmopolitan 
approaches to global governance largely restrict the debate to liberal terms of reference. The rise of 
constructivist analysis in mainstream IR presents a space for ideological analysis, but one which is yet to be 
adequately filled. 
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socio-historical change is desirable—a goal which is unavoidably part of the inquiry and in line then 
with the observation of Cox (1979:257) that: 
Ideological analysis is, of course, a critics weapon and one most effectively used against the 
prevailing orthodoxies which, when stripped of their putative universality become seen as 
special pleading for some historically transient but presently entrenched interests. Social science 
is never neutral. (Cox 1979: 257, my emphasis) 
The intimation here then is that social science itself contains ideological elements which need to be 
carefully considered, exposed and drawn out and as we shall see, this creates some significant 
problems for such an analysis.  Such normative commitments are however much more widespread 
and explicit now than when Cox wrote his seminal article on the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) in 1979. His work can be seen as a watershed for a critical IR/IPE52 which has flourished in 
recent decades to challenge the neglect of economic relations in IR and their impact upon 
distributions of power in the global system. New forms of exclusion, exploitation, insecurity and 
unsustainability, a condition which might be summarised as the problem of precarity, present us 
with problems which increasingly spill out of our traditionally conceived political spaces and must 
therefore be considered in the realm of global politics. 
I argue that that such systemic problems and injustices are in some way structurally linked in 
important ways to our dominant institutions and processes (and the correspondingly dominant 
explanations/understandings) of socio-economic relations of production. Further, that the always 
evolving capitalist mode of production (CMP) develops in tandem with increasingly complex and 
interesting ideological/discursive components which not only justify and reify those problematic 
                                                          
52 Cox, in turn, pays his own respects to the earlier work of Susan Strange, an earlier pioneer of economic 
perspectives in IR in her path-breaking (1970) 'International Economics and International Relations: A Case 
of Mutual Neglect', International Affairs Vol. 46:2, pp. 304-315 
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relations but also curtail the material and epistemological opportunities for resistance and 
transformation. More specifically, the persistent problem to be identified is that 
alternative/progressive social and political possibilities continue to be circumscribed and 
delegitimised within this deepening and expanding logic of capitalist development.  As such it is a 
sub-question of the classical: 'who gets what, when and why?' Such complex and long-standing 
problems are unlikely to be resolved in a single work of this nature or scope but they point towards 
the purpose of the analysis in the wider context of scholarship and critique.  
Nevertheless, I assert that some re-examination and tentative reformulation of this old problem is 
required to account for the ever-changing forms and relations of capital and state which are 
increasingly manifest at the global level. Furthermore, I reiterate that, with some notable exceptions 
mentioned above, insufficient attention has been paid in IR/IPE to the role of ideology in 
contemporary socio-historical change and the myriad institutions through which it is transmitted 
and refracted.  As suggested in the previous chapters, critical realism, discourse analysis and 
elements of post-structuralism represent some significant and useful advances upon classical 
Marxist traditions, in many ways some have broken entirely free from them. Yet, I argue, there is 
much to be retained and drawn from these traditions and an understanding of the problems of 
ideology critique in Marxian analysis which gives us some insight into those uncovered in the critical 
analysis of neoliberal discourse. 
Marx and Marxism 
Much of the most interesting and contentious work considered to lie within the Marxist tradition 
has revolved around some kind of explanation for the lack of revolutionary activity among the 
industrialised European proletariat through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.   In 
particular, the consolidation of the liberal democratic state throughout Europe and the Atlantic 
region effectively absorbed much of the socialist revolutionary fervour of the decades following 
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WWI.  Later approaches, especially from the late 1950s, had to account for the growing evidence 
that the Marxist-Leninism of Soviet communism might not hold the emancipatory promise once 
accorded to it by some activists and scholars on the political left.  The emphasis which Marx and 
Engels placed on this prediction (and the perversions of it which came to represent 'really existing 
(state) socialism' in the twentieth century) has posed some clear questions for historical 
materialism and indeed, for the project of democratic socialism itself.  I suggest that despite these 
lingering questions, and in some ways partly in response to them, their work remains important as 
a starting point from which to interrogate the working discourses of neoliberal capitalism.  
In their defence, Marx and Engels were pretty close to the action in terms of political activism and 
this aspect of their writing must be interpreted as directed at the immediate audience of 
revolutionary Europe, not the donnish comforts of academic scholarship.  As A.J.P. Taylor (1963: 
26) has noted, the revolutionary context in which Marx's ideas were formed, especially the time 
spent in Paris during 1843-44 (see also Callinicos, 1983:36) had a profound effect upon his key ideas 
(as must be the case with any historian, philosopher or social theorist).  The period in which their 
most influential ideas evolved and were expressed in The Communist Manifesto (1847), as well as 
the long unpublished German Ideology, was one in which both radical and conservatives alike 
believed revolution to be imminent in industrialised central and Western Europe.  Hardly surprising 
then that this zeitgeist, combined with the legacy of the relatively recent revolutions in the 
Americas from 1776 and, more significantly, France from 1789, led Marx and Engels to place such 
a phenomenon at the centre of their conception of history.  Their reinterpreted ideas underpinned 
the revolution of October 1917 (see Lenin 1918), which itself fed back into, and once again fuelling, 
the strong revolutionary aspects and expectations of Marxist theory.  Yet, even through the crisis 
strewn twentieth century, the international proletariat failed to successfully apprehend the means 
of production in anything like the way Marx and Engels had envisaged. This leaves us with the 
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difficult questions of what we should take from their historical materialism and how it might be 
deployed in the analysis of the contemporary context of neoliberal globalisation.  In answer to this 
I suggest that historical materialism, as originated in the works of Marx and Engels and 
reformulated by their many followers, continues to offer the richest and most compelling account 
of the relationship between capitalism as an economic system and the political and ideological 
structures and practices which evolve in conjunction with it.  
Marxism not only provides by far the most influential body of thought dedicated to the concept of 
ideology, but also connects it to an account of politics and the state which, I will argue, can be 
adapted and applied to study the institutional and relational aspects of globalisation as an emerging 
proto-global state.  Indeed, concepts of ideology in relation to class domination have been 
developed almost exclusively at the level of the western, liberal-democratic nation-state, but this 
is clearly insufficient for understanding the contemporary transnational or 'globalised' nature of 
politics.  Nevertheless, I shall argue that important insights developed at this level of the state 
provide at least an initial step upon which to gain a more coherent vision of the workings of 
structural and productive power at the global level. Before looking at Marxist debates regarding 
the state in some more detail, I will explore some of the key themes of Marx and Engels in their 
treatment of ideology.  Yet, as these are both aspects of what Marx termed 'superstructures', their 
discussion in his works overlap considerably and as such must do so here. 
Marx did not invent the concept of ideology, he inherited the term from Antoine Destutt de Tracy 
(Kennedy 1979) and revitalised it in the course of his own project and as we shall see, much of his 
approach to ideas/idealism/ideologies stand as a rejoinder to how such categories were deployed 
in Hegelian thought.  Nor was the category of social class one formulated by Marx and Engels.  Their 
lasting, and in almost every sense revolutionary, contribution, was to combine these concepts and 
to embed them in a theory of historical and dialectical materialism in which the social relations of 
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production are the primary focus. Such a politically bold and intellectually complex project 
unsurprisingly threw up many problems and inconsistencies in their work and few, if any, of these 
have been satisfactorily resolved.  Nevertheless, the analysis of these concepts in the work of these 
two thinkers has left an indelible imprint on the history and development of social science and 
political practice over the last 150 years.  
Despite my criticisms of some aspects of Marxism in the previous chapters (and those which follow 
in the present one), it nevertheless bequeaths a rich critical-theoretical heritage which should not 
be ignored in discussions of power, emancipation/social transformation and in particular, 
contemporary movements of 'anti-capitalism' and alter-globalisation. While still hailed by many as 
the anti-capitalist theorist par excellence, (see Callinicos 2003; Saad-Filho 2005), other critical voices 
have distanced themselves deliberately from his ideas for a number of reasons.  Valid critical 
engagements with capitalism and forms of domination come from feminism, postcolonialism, 
anarchism, environmentalism etcetera, all of whom present strong and well-argued critiques of 
capitalism, yet reject many, and occasionally all the central claims of Marxism, and perhaps not 
without some good reasons. These reasons notwithstanding, my own position, and the one 
underpinning this thesis, is that Marxism has so heavily influenced the emergence of concepts of 
ideology, class domination and theories of the state, that an examination of his ideas and in 
particular their subsequent development in critical/normative traditions is necessary for a sufficient 
understanding of the debates which follow regarding the discursive representation of political 
struggles over ‘globalisation’, Imperialism/Empire and/or an emergent proto-global or 
transnational capitalist state.  My concentration upon ideology and its part in class domination does 
not intend to refute such crucial critical analyses based on race, gender, ecology etcetera, but offers 
a critique parallel to these which may even serve to compliment them.  Such an approach might be 
regarded as a necessary, if obviously insufficient, contribution to a fuller understanding 
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contemporary capitalism and the possibilities for social transformation and human emancipation. 
53 
This thesis however considers and explores one aspect of Marxian thought in particular, that of 
ideology.   This is due to its theoretical link to contemporary critical and constructivist concepts; 
applications of discourse theory and the possibilities for greater understanding of social change, or 
indeed the lack of it, which lie therein.  However, as will become clear ideology, at least in Marxian 
analysis, must be related to the economic and political relations of domination and exploitation.  In 
addition, it must attend to the political institutions through which such relations of power are 
exerted and challenged, classes and state forms. As Eagleton dramatically asserts: 
The emergence of the concept of ideology, then, is no mere chapter in the history of ideas. On 
the contrary, it has the most intimate relation to revolutionary struggle and figures from the 
outset as a theoretical weapon of class warfare. It arrives on the scene inseparable from the 
material practices of the ideological state apparatuses, and is itself as a notion a theatre of 
contending ideological interests. (2007: 69) 
Understandings of how neoliberal ideology operates through various discourses, becoming 
reflected and refracted in the myriad practices and institutions of market relations and changing 
forms state, requires an account of the mutually constitutive, or dialectic, relationship between 
these complex spheres and categories.  As a critical political analysis, focusing upon processes of 
legitimation and new dimensions, distributions and dynamics of hegemony, the primary 
consideration will be the superstructural level(s) of culture/ideology and politics, and therefore as 
we shall see, might be considered by some 'purists' to move some distance from the classic texts of 
Marx and Engels.  This is not to suggest other priorities or perspectives on these questions are 
                                                          
53 For discussions of global governance and resistance from a Marxian perspective see in particular the 
contributions from Alejandro Colas and Mark Rupert in Armstrong, D., Farrell, T. and Maiguashca, B. (2003). 
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necessarily invalid, but simply to narrow the angle for this particular analysis to the political. Indeed, 
as Gramsci claimed: 
If political science means science of the State, and the State is the entire complex of practical 
and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules then it is obvious 
that all essential questions of sociology are nothing other than questions of political science 
(Gramsci, 1971:244, my emphasis). 
That tradition of critical social and political thought which originated in the work of Marx and Engels 
has since undergone significant development, constant revision and broad divergence.  Such work 
has come partly as a result of the remarkable persistence and resilience of the capitalist mode of 
production (in its various forms) despite its recurrent crises and deep contradictions.  It is also due 
in large part to the inherent inconsistencies and ambiguities in the writings of Marx and Engels.  
Perhaps the most important debate of all in this tradition has been the requirement to counter the 
ahistoricist rigidity, reductionism, economism, determinism and scientism which so many critics, 
not to mention followers and acolytes, incorrectly drew from their work.  In addition to these 
'problems', many of which remain largely unresolved,54 I suggest the significance of Marx lies largely 
in his political legacy, expressed famously in his Theses on Feuerbach [1845] and which also marks 
his gravestone: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it”  (Marx 1977: 158).  
                                                          
54 Such 'inconsistencies and ambiguities' obtain in the work of Marx and Engels in large part due to the fact 
that they identified and highlighted some of the most difficult and controversial problems of 'social science' 
and philosophy and oriented them to the emancipation of subjugated and exploited groups. They should be 
congratulated rather than castigated for this insight into the historical and dialectical 'development' of the 
human condition, despite the contradictions which are inevitably thrown up. 
138 
 
Indeed, it is the challenge to power and domination which marks out Marx from other key 
influential 'enlightenment philosophers'.  Moreover, as the closing statement of the Theses, this 
short sentence lays out a pretty clear case for the importance to Marx of the transformatory aspect 
of ideas, philosophy, ideology, in actively shaping socio-historical change.  As we shall see, this and 
other statements, concepts and formulations throw the many accusations of economism and 
determinism in the work of Marx into some considerable doubt and I will suggest that the most 
fruitful reading of Marxism takes from it a need to understand the interrelationship between ideas 
and materiality.  As such I will argue that this, as we have seen, much like the concepts of agency 
and structure, is a mutually constitutive relationship.  Rather than assuming that the socio-
economic base directly determines our forms of consciousness, I suggest a more open reading 
which attempts to evaluate the extent to which the various material forms of capitalism constrain 
or allow for what forms of consciousness are possible and how ideas, in turn, are capable of 
redefining and contributing to the altering of that materiality. 
Indeed, it is perhaps the various (mis)understandings of the base/superstructure model of society 
which have contributed to the numerous accusations of economism in Marxist theory.  The key 
point here is perhaps our understanding or interpretation of the term determinism.  Raymond 
Williams asserts that “any modern approach to a Marxist theory of culture must begin by 
considering the proposition of a determining base and a determined superstructure”(1973:3).  
While acknowledging that such a move from the more preferable 'social being determining 
consciousness’, to that more figurative terminology “with its suggestion of a definite and fixed 
spatial relationship” (ibid.:3),  has been problematic.  Williams nevertheless concedes that in the 
transition from Marx to Marxism, and in the development of mainstream Marxism itself, the 
proposition of the determining base and the determined superstructure has been commonly held 
to be the key to Marxist cultural analysis” (ibid.:3).   I concur with Williams that it remains a central 
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problem for Marxism and for some Marxists but not one that should bind us to any supposed 
orthodoxy or prohibit us from reading Marx in our own way.  If we can be sure of anything it is that 
Marx would more approve of attempts to understand and transform contemporary social and 
political relations of domination than to compete for the ground of the 'true Marxism'.  
Nevertheless, as we shall see, in discussions of ideology, Marxist or otherwise, questions of 
determinism remain a key consideration, if not an object for attempted resolution.  In what follows 
I will keep the concepts of co-determinacy and historical contingency to the fore. 
As I have argued, a critical focus upon the nature and effects of, and potential challenges to, 
neoliberal capitalist discourse necessitates some account of Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches 
to ideology even if these, alone and unaltered, may prove to be insufficient in themselves.  I have 
also suggested that the critical directions of social theory have not strayed as far from Marx as some 
might like to think.  What follows is intended to highlight some of the contentions and controversies 
within Marxism (such as determinism) only in order to account for the myriad directions in which 
that tradition has been carried, and also to clarify my own position and arguments in regard to the 
role of ideas and ideology in the processes of legitimation in the contemporary capitalist system.  
The form of capitalism with which we are now presented is obviously much altered from that of 
even three or four decades ago, let alone that of the mid/late-nineteenth century. New 'circuits' of 
capitalism and 'cultural political economy' (see Jessop, 2004; Thrift, 2001,2005; Best and Paterson 
2010) require a drastic reworking of Marxist analysis, indeed one which purists may refute as 
Marxist in any real sense.  No matter, as Burawoy notes “It is after all a theoretical tradition that 
claims ideas change with the material world which they seek to grasp and transform” (2003: 194). 
Nevertheless, I maintain that concepts of ideology, class and state, taken from and worked through 
in the Marxian tradition retain much of their usefulness and as such, a discussion of some of the 
most influential texts of Marx and Engels in this area is a pertinent starting point. 
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Marx(ism) and Ideology 
Marx and Engels’ approaches to ideology represent, initially at least, a reaction to the prevailing 
idealism which dominated the philosophical fashions of early-mid nineteenth century Europe and 
in particular Germany.  This idealism, with its origins predominantly in the work of Immanuel Kant, 
itself developed as a counteraction to the doctrines of French and especially  British empiricism, 
found in the liberal theories of Condillac, Locke, Berkeley and perhaps most importantly, Hume.55  
As Marx and Engels saw it, a profoundly misleading conception within German idealism, and in 
particular the powerful legacy of Hegel, was the attribution of an independent existence to ideas, 
thought and consciousness etcetera.  Early evidence for this scepticism can be drawn from Marx's 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1977[1844]) where he stresses that while “thought and 
being are indeed distinct, at the same time they form a unity” (Marx 1977[1844]: 91) and 
furthermore emphasises “how consistent naturalism or humanism is distinguished from both 
idealism and materialism and constitutes at the same time their unifying truth.” (ibid: 104) From 
these remarks it would seem that Marx had always intended his method to be a careful synthesis 
of materialism and idealism and indicates a clear rejection of their epistemological separation that 
would become less equivocal in his subsequent work and particularly that of his early followers.  
Indeed, such a false dichotomy between the 'real' and the 'ideal' would probably appear to Marx 
as itself almost definitive of ‘false consciousness’ – deriving from the way in which philosophers 
and social theorists tended (as some still do) to regard themselves as existing outside and 
unaffected by the social/material context and historical process. This apparently inescapable 
paradox and problem appears in any attempt to study ideology, as recognised most famously by 
Mannheim, and more succinctly by Eagleton who asks: “If ideology sets out to examine the sources 
                                                          
55 For an account of the shift from empiricism to idealism and the evolution of the term ideology see 
Hawkes, 1996, chapters 2-3 and also Carlsnaes, 1981, pp. 23 - 37 
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of human consciousness, what is to be said of the consciousness which performs this operation? 
Why should that particular mode of reason be immune from its own propositions about the 
material foundations of thought?” (2007: 69).  The problem here is not then simply one of idealism, 
but its combination with rationalism and it is this which, according to Eagleton, Marx and Engels 
are rejecting, although not without some considerable problems. 
Just as importantly perhaps, Marx rejected the idealist notion that ideas could themselves be 
considered as the root cause of social existence (Eagleton 1994:6).  In contrast to this rather peculiar 
assumption, they set out to demonstrate that in their search for 'correct' thought, the spiritualism, 
romanticism and 'idealism' of the 'young Hegelians' challenged only language and phrases rather 
than coming to proper terms with problems in the real world.  As such, according to Marx, reality 
was in fact concealed rather than revealed by such philosophy which, as a result, assumed the form 
of ideology.  The vehement attack on the premises of this prevailing 'German ideology' later became 
one of the most influential texts of twentieth century (western) Marxism. 
In their German Ideology (1977[1846]) then, Marx and Engels adapted a term which had previously 
corresponded to a neutral 'science of ideas' in the work of de Tracy, deploying it as a critical, 
negative, even pejorative description of the prevailing philosophical orthodoxy. In this work they 
laid out their materialist conception of history in which the relationship between human 
consciousness and existence was both reaffirmed and reversed.  An often cited passage begins: 
“Men are the producers of their conceptions ideas,  – real, active men as they are conditioned by a 
definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these” 
(1977: 164).  Here, as elsewhere in the German Ideology, Marx and Engels appear to already have 
in mind a particularly economic and labour oriented notion of social practice, activity or existence.  
This may have been the particular influence of Engels, who had recently witnessed at close hand 
the cutting edge technologies of industrialisation in the new factories and mills of Manchester 
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which were drawing in workers en masse and increasingly dividing their forms of labour into 
evermore specialised tasks.  The passage proceeds to highlight the distortions through which 
ideology naturalises and de-historicises human consciousness which, they maintain, 
can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life 
process.  If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion 
of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. (ibid.: 164) 
By this analogy, they refer negatively to ideology as a sort of inverted mirror image of the real or 
material world which, under capitalism, is itself further subject to dehumanising and alienating 
social relations. They go on: 
In direct contrast to German Philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, we ascend from 
earth to heaven. This is to say we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor 
from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, and conceived, in order to arrive at men in the 
flesh. We set out from real, live men and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate 
the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms 
formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process... 
Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of 
consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence... Life is not determined 
by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (1977: 164) 
In this last sentence we see a source of some controversy which recurs elsewhere in their work – 
this is the question of determination.  While there are clear connections between what humans do 
in the world and their consciousness of it, a one way 'deterministic' account which has been drawn 
from this and other passages leads to charges of economism by many critics. Williams provides 
some defence of the term in his suggestion that in its secular sense we should think of 
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determination as a notion of “setting limits, exerting pressures” rather than one of total control 
(1973: 4). There is much more in the work of Marx and Engels themselves to throw such 
reductionism into question.  I have already shown in the previous chapter that Marx was perfectly 
aware of the mutually constitutive relationship between objective structures and the subjective 
actions of agents which feed back into those structures.  
Similar confusion stems from later key texts which further address these questions and introduce 
Marx's notion of base and superstructure into the equation.  Crucially, and as I have suggested, 
perhaps mistakenly, their writings have here also been interpreted by many as suggesting that not 
just human consciousness, but also legal and political forms of state are somehow 'determined' 
entirely by its material conditions of economic production and exchange.  This has been most 
frequently explained in terms of the base/superstructure model in which the nature of the 
economic base determines the socio-cultural, legal and political superstructure.  All too exclusively, 
this 'classical' exposition of the materialist conception of history has been culled from the Preface 
to A Critique of Political Economy [1859] which reads: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are 
independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the 
development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and 
intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social 
existence that determines their consciousness. (1977: 389) 
It is worthy of note here that Marx does not clearly explicate the connection between “the real 
[socio-economic] foundation” and the “legal and political superstructure” and “forms of social 
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consciousness” in any definite sense.  Terms such as “on which arise” and “to which correspond” 
could easily be far less ambiguous and Marx is certainly not averse to plain speaking elsewhere 
when he wishes a point to be absolutely clear.  His ambivalence on these issues might suggest at 
least that he was less than certain about some aspects of determinism, nevertheless, the 
relationship between these three levels (socio-economic, legal-political and cultural/intellectual) 
remains a crucial one for discussions of ideology and social/political theory.  The imprint which this 
has left upon subsequent Marxian and critical analysis has been the interminable debates 
surrounding the 'relative autonomy' of these superstructural elements.  
Before proceeding to discuss these key debates, we need to press further on the notion of how 
Marx connects his conception of ideology to the political categories of class and state, for it is this 
aspect which concerns us most for this particular project. If the course of history is directed by 
people's ideas, as assumed by the 'young Hegelians', then it is possible for society to be changed 
by challenging 'false' ideas with 'real' ones. In contrast, Marx and Engels regard such social illusions 
as being contained within real economic contradictions and the former can only be vanquished 
through the material actions of combating the latter. This approach then fuses the materialist 
theory of ideology with a revolutionary politics.  
It is with the above examples of the non-reductionist elements of Marxism in mind that I proceed 
to discuss how ideology can be seen as a vital element of understanding political conflict and class 
struggle and that it plays an active role in the processes of historical change and social 
transformation.  The concept of class has perhaps been even more central than ideology to the 
Marxist traditions of theory and activism throughout its history, and yet they must be understood 
in relation to each other in order to gain any understanding of how capitalism has survived as a 
dominant and now global economic system.  This fusion receives its clearest and most powerful 
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exposition in Marx and Engels' frequently quoted passage from The German Ideology56  and due to 
its key status in Marxist thought is worth quoting here at some length: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: ie, the class which is the ruling 
material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has 
the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means 
of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the 
means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships 
grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, 
therefore, the ideas of its dominance.  The individuals composing the ruling class possess 
among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a 
class and determine the extent and the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that 
they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers 
of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas 
are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (1977:176)  
Here, the concepts of class struggle and ideological power are clearly interwoven and can be read 
as giving considerable importance to this relationship, a hint upon which many twentieth century 
'western' Marxists were to pick up.  But again, it is possible to draw at least two apparently 
contrasting interpretations from the above passage.  In one sense it could suggest that the 
command which the ruling class exercises over the apparatus of intellectual production prevents 
any notion of a subordinate culture, all classes then are subsumed within the dominant bourgeois 
                                                          
56 Although written in 1845-6, The German Ideology was not published until 1932. This may partly account 
for the lack of careful attention paid to the role of ideology in much Marxist analysis in the years preceding 
its publication. A notable exception to this lacuna is Georg Lukacs, whose History and Class Consciousness 
played an important role in developing a non-pejorative account of ideology that would also be influential 
upon Gramsci and his concept of hegemony. Lukacs regarded Marxism as the ideological expression of the 
proletariat and, according to Eagleton “this is at least one reason why the widespread view that ideology for 
him [Lukacs] is synonymous with false consciousness is simply mistaken” (2007: 94-95). 
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ideology.  Less strongly, it might instead be interpreted as saying that due to the lack of institutions 
able to give expression to a culture/ideology of subordinate classes, their ideology is muted and 
therefore only the ideology of the ruling class might gain widespread dissemination and dominance.  
It is then possible to discern both strong and weak interpretations in the wider text of The German 
Ideology.  Despite this ambivalence, we can draw some conclusions from Marx and Engel's other 
work which I think suggests a tendency toward the latter.  For now, it is fair to say that for Marx 
and Engels, the notion of class struggle and politics generally entails an ideological aspect which 
can be seen to be equally important as the economic and political spheres or 'levels' of production 
and state.  The emphasis found elsewhere on the hierarchical and determinist relationship between 
them seems reduced here.  
Much of the confusion and contradiction regarding the concept of ideology in the German Ideology 
stems however from its treatment of ideology as both any form of socially determined thought, 
and something specific to the workings of the capitalist mode of production.  Such confusion is 
perhaps exacerbated by an expansion of this later formulation of ideology in the later works and 
Capital.   Eagleton suggests there are in fact three versions of ideology to be found in the texts 
discussed above: 
Ideology can denote illusory or socially disconnected beliefs which see themselves as the ground 
of history, and which by distracting men and women from their actual social conditions (including 
the social determinants of their ideas), serve to sustain an oppressive political power … 
Alternatively, Ideology can signify those ideas which directly express the material interests of the 
dominant social class, and which are useful in promoting its rule. … Finally, ideology can be 
stretched to encompass all of the conceptual forms in which the class struggle as whole is fought 
out, which would presumably include the valid consciousness of politically revolutionary forces. 
(2007:83-84) 
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It may not be possible to reconcile these various meanings ascribed to the term ideology by Marx 
and Engels and therefore we can only draw out our own particular interpretations that are most 
suited to the specific arguments we are making.  I do not wish to suggest that there is any one 'true' 
notion of ideology in their corpus of work but merely a few very useful theoretical tools for 
understanding the role of ideas and ideology for class domination in a capitalist society.  This thesis 
seeks to examine processes of legitimation that might help maintain the unjust and alienating social 
relations characteristic of the global capitalist system of production.  Bourgeois or capitalist 
ideology serves to smooth over, mystify and thus conceal the class antagonisms and contending 
interests which come to define such arrangements.  It is the sharp critical edge of this 'pragmatic' 
reading of ideology that I wish to retain but not at the expense of losing the other 'epistemological' 
notions altogether.  So, while this dissimulative or negative version is only one, elements of which 
I shall carry over to the critical discourse analysis of neoliberal capitalism, it is also necessary here 
to explore how other versions have been developed in subsequent 'Marxisms' in order to account 
for the ideological nature of class struggle through the crisis strewn twentieth century. 
Alienation 
It is the concept of alienation first outlined in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) 
which carries Marx 'early' thoughts on ideology through to his 'mature' considerations of it in 
Capital (1867). It is therefore deserving of some mention before briefly outlining the account of 
ideology contained within those later considerations and how these came to influence subsequent 
Marxist theory and practice. 
Marx's materialism was influenced by the work of Feuerbach whose own appropriation of Hegels 
notion of alienation was also taken up and advanced by Marx. Distinct from Feuerbach's inward, 
'spiritual' resolution of this problem, “Marx contends that the only solution to the problem of self-
alienation is to turn outwards towards the world and thus to an assault on the structures of the 
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existing state and society, since these are fundamentally responsible for man's life situation and 
thus for existing human self-alienation” (Carlsnaes, 1981: 41).  Marx then, attempts to go beyond 
Feuerbach's universal notion of alienation, concentrating on the actions of humans in their concrete 
socio-historical existence.  Humans find themselves alienated, both from each other and from their 
environment, due to their alienation from their own creations in certain social conditions which, in 
modernity, are those of capitalism.  In such circumstances:  
human powers, products and processes escape from the control of human subjects and come to 
assume an apparently autonomous existence. Estranged in this way from their agents, such 
phenomena then come to exert an imperious power over them, so that men and women submit 
to what are in fact products of their own activity as though they are an alien force. (Eagleton, 
1991: 70)  
When such social phenomena become unrecognisable as the products of human endeavour, it is 
then possible to regard them as 'material' and as such, accept their existence as natural and 
inevitable.  Alienation then is closely linked to the concept of reification which Lukacs, later extends 
from its initial role in Marx's doctrine of commodity fetishism (ibid. 97) to suggest that “as the 
process [of capitalist development] advanced and forms became more complex and less direct, it 
became increasingly difficult and rare to find anyone penetrating the veil of reification  (1971: 86).57  
This relationship between ideology and alienation which Lukacs recognises as deepening in the 
early decades of the twentieth century is most fully developed by Marx himself in the first part of 
Das Kapital, entitled 'Commodities and Money'.  
Ideology in Capital 
Capital presents a more complex and nuanced approach to ideology which addresses some of the 
concerns expressed above (and at the same time throwing up some others). According to Callinicos 
                                                          
57 For an up to date and detailed account of the concept of reification see Honneth (2008). 
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(1983:128-130), Marx's account of commodity fetishism in Capital represents his only detailed 
account of how the supposed tensions between the pragmatic and epistemological.   It develops a 
more structural account in that it demonstrates how the very structure of capitalism produces its 
own misperceptions.  
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's 
labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; 
because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them 
as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour 
[…] It is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form 
of a relation between things. [… ] To find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-
enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain 
appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into a relation both with one 
another and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of 
men's hands. (1977: 436) 
This complex work develops the notion of ideology in a rather more internal and structural sense.  
According to Geras, “it analyses the mechanisms by which capitalist society necessarily appears to 
its agents as something other than it really is” (1971: 71).  It thus still serves to conceal the 
essentially social character of labour and therefore retains the negative connotations found in the 
earlier works.  However, ideology is no longer simply associated with the misleading 'intellectual' 
discourses of the ruling class but inheres within, and stems from, the nature of the interchange of 
produced goods in a 'free market' which thereby appear as natural and unalterable. 
The final pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface, in their real existence and 
consequently in the conceptions by which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to 
understand them, is very much different from, and indeed quite the reverse of, their inner but 
concealed essential pattern and the conception corresponding to it. (Marx, 1972: vol 3.:209)  
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The focus here then is more upon the means by which ideology emanates not so much from the 
bourgeois class, as suggested in parts of the German Ideology, but from bourgeois society itself. 
Furthermore, since ideology here is considered to be reflecting material reality (albeit partial) and 
acting as a real force in itself, the sense in which it is an illusory phenomenon is considerably 
diminished. In Capital then, Marx no longer claims that under capitalism commodities merely 
appear to have a hold over social relations; he argues that they actually do. Ideology here then is 
not so much a case of reality being inverted in people’s minds as it is of their consciousness 
reflecting a real material inversion. The concept of Ideology is thus shifted from the superstructure 
closer to, and even within the economic base.  At the very least it indicates a peculiarly close 
relationship between the two which is not evident in any earlier discussion. If this is indeed the case 
then we need, as Etienne Balibar suggests “to think both the real and the imaginary within ideology” 
(1988:168) instead of dichotomising these realms and seeing them as merely external to each 
other. 
As Callinicos notes, the concept of ideology in Capital is closely connected to the labour theory of 
value (1983:129; see also Rubin, 1972). An example of the centrality of this recurring theme of the 
labour market and its key relation to ideological power is demonstrated in another much quoted 
excerpt from later in Capital.  
The consumption of labour power is completed as in the case of every other commodity outside 
the limits of the market or the sphere of circulation. Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the 
possessor of labour power we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere … and follow 
them both into the hidden abode of production … Here we shall see at last force the secret of 
profit-making.  
This sphere that we are deserting, within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour goes 
on is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property 
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and Bentham.  Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour power, 
are constrained only by their own free will.  They contract as free agents, and the agreement 
they come to is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality 
because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and 
they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property because each disposes only of what is his own. 
And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. (1977: 454-5) 
The account which Marx presents here encapsulates the important role of a liberal political 
philosophy and ideology in capitalist society.  The inequality and exploitation that are inherent 
within capitalist relations of production are hidden by a narrative of free trade and exchange in the 
sphere of circulation. Focus upon these surface narratives gives rise to the liberal discourse of 
individual freedom, equality and even democracy.  Seen in this way, the possibilities for 
emancipation appear increasingly remote as the system proceeds to further atomise social and 
productive processes in the ever-expanding and deepening division of labour. 
An especially interesting and persuasive account of ideology in Marx's Capital is provided by John 
Mepham (1979).  Following his argument regarding the unsatisfactory nature of the early Marx's 
exposition of ideology in comparison with more substantial one provided in Capital, Mepham draws 
an analogy between the ideological aspects of the value form of money as expressed by Marx in 
Capital and the production of meaning in linguistic and sign systems.  Mepham states that “The 
conditions for the production of ideology are the conditions for the production of a language...” 
(1994: 227) These “systematically generative interconnections” are suggested by Marx: 
Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products, by that very act, we also 
equate as human labour the different kinds of labour expended upon them. We are not aware of 
this, nevertheless we do it. Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it 
is. It is value rather that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to 
152 
 
decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products [that is, the value-
form]; for to stamp an object of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language. 
(Marx, quoted in Mepham, 1979: 227) 
Drawing on this analogy, between systems of signification and the structural abstraction/ 
mystification of the value form in capitalist society, Mepham writes: 
The puzzle of money is especially like the puzzle of language. Each element, taken by itself (a 
word, a coin) seems to have the power to function in an efficacious act (of reference, of 
exchange) by virtue of having a particular property (a meaning, a value). In each case the puzzle 
derives from the contrast between the efficacy of the element on the one hand and the 
arbitrariness of its substance (sounds, inscriptions, bits of metal or paper) on the other. (1994: 
228) 
Mepham thus identifies one of the key initial moves towards the study of discourse as a means for 
understanding ideology and its legitimating role in capitalism.  Mepham’s account of ideology in 
capital introduces themes which I will discuss further in in Chapter six which touching on the 
writings of  Volosinov continues to plot a trajectory in critical thought and historiography from 
Marxist notions of ideology to post-Marxist attention to discourse and the deployment of a critical 
discourse analysis of neoliberalism.  
Before doing so, I will return to the more immediate successors to Marx in the early twentieth 
century. In doing so we should remind ourselves that The German Ideology, which contains perhaps 
now the most rehearsed account of the role of ideology in structures and processes of class 
domination, remained unpublished until the mid-1920s and therefore played no part in the Marxist 
canon until after the First World War, the 1917 October Revolution and the Wall Street Crash. The 
key influence upon the approach to ideology taken by the Second International was provided chiefly 
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by the later works of Marx and Engels.  Subsequent developments had a wider canon of their work 
and ideas from which to draw. 
Ideology after Marx  
Considering the rich and complex nature of the work of Marx, it has long been regarded as a matter 
of some regret that following his death, Marxism fell into a period of intellectual stagnation in which 
the more nuanced and valuable aspects of his oeuvre were sacrificed to a rather stale and 
mechanical determinism (Eagleton, 1994:31) This positivist and economistic inheritance certainly 
owes something to aspects of Marx's ambivalent treatment of ideology and the model of base and 
superstructure in which it resides. However, the orthodoxies of Marxism-Leninism also became 
even more stringent after the 1917 October revolution and continued to be perverted in that rather 
stultifying direction under the doctrines of Stalinism.  Until his death in 1895, Engels struggled 
against the early moves in this economistic oversimplification of Marxism as shown in his 1890 
letter to Bloch where he writes: 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history 
is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx nor I have ever asserted more than 
this. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic factor is the only determining 
one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. (from Scanlan 
1973: 12) 
I do not wish to revisit these debates here58 but rather pursue the slightly later 'historicist' legacy of 
Marx and Engels's notions of ideology associated with the early work of Lukacs and in particular, 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony.  However, in order to comprehend the account of ideology 
                                                          
58 On this see also I. Lasher (trans.), 1975, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Selected Correspondence Progress 
Publishers: Moscow, in which see the letters to C. Schmidt, 5th Aug 1890, (p.292) and 27th Oct 1890, 
(p.402); also letter to Mehring, 14th July 1893, (p.435) and letter to Borgius, 25th Jan 1894, “What these 
gentlemen all lack is dialectics. They always see only cause here, effect there … This is an empty 
abstraction.” (442). 
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provided by Lukacs, it is necessary to turn briefly to the employment of the term by Lenin. While 
Lenin's reputation may have come to be unfairly tarnished by the developments in Russia after 
1917, his influence on the corpus of Marxism should not be underestimated.  Lenin, along with 
others such as Labriola, Plekhanov, Kautsky and Bernstein, began to strip the concept of ideology 
of its necessarily negative and pejorative connotations found in much of the work of Marx and 
Engels. Bernstein even went so far as to suggest that Marxism itself could be considered as an 
ideology as he simply identified the term with any set of ideals, a move with which none of his 
critics, including Plekhanov and Lenin, took issue (Larrain 1988:53). It was amid this 'loosening' of 
the term then that Lenin came to ascribe an ideological position to the proletariat as well as the 
bourgeoisie. Thus in his famous (1902) pamphlet What is to be done? He asserts that: 
the only choice is – either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind 
has not created a 'third' ideology and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can 
never be a non-class or an above-class ideology) hence to belittle the socialist ideology in any 
way to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen the bourgeois ideology 
(Lenin  1970: 89-90). 
For Lenin however, socialist ideology was distinct from proletarian consciousness.  Earlier in What 
is to be done?  he states that “the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop 
only trade union consciousness” (80).  The fomentation of socialist ideology required its 
introduction, he believed, by professional revolutionaries with a superior grasp of political reality 
so that class political consciousness “could only be brought to the workers only from the outside” 
(80).  The absence of such a political consciousness developed by the external leadership of 
intellectuals from outside would leave the proletariat susceptible to bourgeois ideology, of which, 
according to Lenin, trade-unionism was a part.  This susceptibility, Lenin argues, is due largely to 
the much longer history and greater development of bourgeois ideology in which it has risen to the 
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status of a ruling ideology.  Furthermore “it possesses immeasurably more means for being spread” 
(90-91) and thus appears as the natural way of looking at things, a kind of common sense.  
Lenin's high political status in the communist movement, especially after 1917, provided this new 
broader, neutral conception of ideology with significant intellectual currency and it was particularly 
influential on the early ideas and work of Lukacs, in particular his magisterial History and Class 
Consciousness (1971[1922], hereafter HCC).  There has been some considerable disagreement over 
whether Lukacs equated ideology primarily with false consciousness or if he in fact assumed Lenin's 
more neutral deployment of the term. Lucien Goldmann's analysis of Lukacs' early work appears to 
demonstrate a reading in favour of the former case.  Asserting that in his early essays “the falseness 
or truth of consciousness, its ideological or non-ideological character, are determined by its 
relationship with production returns” (1977: 55).  Goldmann claims that in “History and Class 
consciousness, the ideological element of these different types of consciousness would consist in 
misunderstanding the economic relation”.  This displays an explicit assumption by Goldmann that 
Lukacs' understanding of ideological consciousness remains essentially negative as in the work of 
Marx and Engels.  Many other writers have since also followed this rather restrictive interpretation 
of Lukacs59 but as Eagleton notes, “the widespread notion that ideology for him is synonymous with 
false consciousness is simply mistaken.” (1991:95).  Eagleton bases this claim on the recognition 
that Lukacs retained a notion of Marxism as “the ideological expression of the proletariat in its 
efforts to liberate itself (Lukacs, 1968 :258-259) and also that historical materialism represents “the 
ideology of the embattled proletariat” (228).  Nevertheless, while it is fair to say that the retention 
of an almost exclusively Marxist frame of reference by Lukacs in HCC does imbue his use of the term 
with a primarily critical and pejorative edge when discussing bourgeois ideology, it seems clear that 
Lukacs was also happy with using the term as it had been expanded in the work of Lenin. 
                                                          
59 For a discussion and more examples see Larrain (1977: 57-60) 
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Indeed, Larrain suggests that Lukacs' draws his primary conception of ideology from Lenin and that 
in his view HCC is, among other things, “a brilliant philosophical commentary on, and justification 
of What is to be done?” (1988:55).  There are certainly some similarities, the most striking of which 
refers to the distinction noted above between a limited spontaneous proletarian consciousness 
which expresses itself in trade-unionism and a theoretical or 'scientific' form of revolutionary 
consciousness introduced from outside.  A similar distinction is presented by Lukacs, who seems to 
recognise in the former “the psychologically describable and explicable ideas which men form 
about their situation in life” while in the latter “the appropriate and rational reactions 'imputed' to 
a particular typical position in the process of production” (1971:51).  However, Larrain notes that 
such a Leninist filiation may stem at least in part from Lukacs' desire to appear more orthodox than 
his natural intellectual inclination (see Larrain 1988, note 15).  Indeed, Stedman-Jones (1971: 28) 
also reminds us that Lukacs renounced the text following its condemnation by the Comintern and 
retreated from an active political role. 
Despite this, and perhaps in large part because of it, Lukacs' contribution to the development of 
the concept of ideology in HCC, and the increasing attention paid to matters of culture in 
subsequent scholarship, has been hugely influential in what has come to be known as western 
Marxism.  In addition, as Eagleton suggests, his “writings on class-consciousness rank among the 
richest, most original documents of twentieth century Marxism” (1991:99). It is therefore with 
some regret that constraints of space prevent a more thorough examination of his work and he is 
considered here and briefly in what follows as primarily a key vehicle for highlighting the notion of 
reification and also as a theoretical and historiographical bridge to the more explicitly political work 
of his colleague, Antonio Gramsci. 
Aside from the connections with Lenin's discussions on ideology, the key text of Lukacs for this 
purpose is still his HCC which takes as its primary source, the first chapter of Marx's Capital  which 
157 
 
he said “contains within itself the whole of historical materialism and the whole self-knowledge of 
the proletariat seen as the knowledge of capitalist society” (1971:170). As indicated in the above 
discussion of Capital, the fetishism of commodity exchange presupposes the existence of the value 
of an object in the form of another commodity.  While that value is clearly not materially present, 
it is nevertheless actually present.  In such a way, commodity exchange is based on the ability of a 
symbol, figure or, as noted in Mepham, a sign, to become real.  This all depends upon the 
introduction of a common denominator, such as money, which is able to indicate the value of 
objects that are materially distinct, but as though they are the same.  Such an illusion of equivalence 
is achieved through the medium of human labour which is commodified, in short, the 
transformation of interpersonal, human relations, into relations between commodities. Thus the 
world of things comes to rule human beings by way of objective laws which appear independent of 
them “human beings thus become objects, passive spectators of a process which structures their 
lives for them” (McLellan 1995: 23).  
This process of abstraction and the objectification of human activity requires a particular kind of 
bourgeois ideology or false consciousness.  Lukacs refers to this specific aspect of bourgeois 
ideology as reification and identifies it as “the central structural problem of capitalist society in all 
aspects” (1971: 83). It “requires that society should learn to satisfy all its needs in terms of 
commodity exchange” (91) and as such “the basic structure of reification can be found in all the 
social forms of modern capitalism” (171).  Lukacs holds that it represents “the necessary immediate 
reality of every person [and as such every class] living in capitalist society” (197).  However, while 
for the bourgeoisie, such a state of alienated affairs is seen to be acceptable and suitable to their 
class interests, for the proletariat it represents an ideological barrier to their emancipation.  More 
importantly, it also contained the seeds from which their own true or 'ascribed' consciousness 
would flower.  It is, for Lukacs, a class uniquely positioned, both subjectively and historically, to 
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recognise the interests of the whole.  This “moment of revolutionary recognition arrives when the 
working class acknowledges this alienated world as its own confiscated creation, reclaiming it 
through political praxis” (Eagleton, 1991: 98).  Indeed, Lukcas warns against any suggestion of 
historical inevitability of revolution as espoused in large parts of the Second International and in 
the last passage of Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, (the main part and central 
argument of HCC) he reminds us: 
History is at its least automatic when it is the consciousness of the proletariat that is at issue. The 
truth that the old intuitive, mechanistic materialism could not grasp turns out to be doubly true 
for the proletariat, namely that it can be transformed and liberated only by its own actions, and 
that 'the educator must be educated'. The objective economic evolution could do no more than 
create the position of the proletariat in the production process. It was this position which 
determined its point of view. But the objective evolution could only give the proletariat the 
opportunity and the necessity to change society. Any transformation can only come about as the 
product of the – free – action of the proletariat itself. (208-9) 
Lukacs also saw in the process of reification the philosophical tendency to separate the ideal from 
the material.  This relationship between thought and existence, Lukacs notes, had already been 
identified as a concern of Marx and Engels in stating their own separation from Hegel's notion of 
how the “spirit alienates itself in the material world” (Hawkes, 1996: 110). He notes that Marx and 
Engels “comprehend the concepts in our heads once more materialistically – as reflections of this 
or that stage of the absolute concept” (in Lukacs, 1971: 199).  Lukacs agrees with their subsequent 
clarification and caveat that “the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made 
things, but a complex of processes” (in Lukacs, 1971:200) but asks “if there are no things, what is 
'reflected' in thought?” (1971: 200) Such 'reflection theories' are, for Lukacs, deeply suspect 
whichever way around the duality is conceived “it is immaterial whether things are to be regarded 
as reflections of concepts or whether concepts are reflections of things” (1971: 200) What counts 
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for Lukacs is the need for the essential unity of the ideal and the material to be recognised in the 
consciousness of the proletariat. 
Thus thought and existence are not identical in the sense that they 'correspond' to each other, 
or 'reflect' each other, that they 'run parallel' to each other or 'coincide' with each other (all 
expressions that conceal a rigid duality. Their identity is that they are aspects of one and the 
same real historical and dialectical process. (1971:204) 
Writing some decades after Marx had developed this ground-breaking analysis of ideology in 
Capital, Lukacs had the 'benefit' of witnessing the further and deeper complexity and specialisation 
of the industrialised labour process and the concomitantly more pronounced alienation and 
atomisation of society.  Alongside the rapid emergence and expansion of new technologies of mass 
communication,60 this development was an important inspiration for, and central element of, his 
conception of alienation and critique of reification.  He regarded this atomisation as preventing 
bourgeois and proletarian classes alike from realising the relational aspect of identity and from 
seeing the wholeness or 'totality' of human existence. However, he believed the recognition of the 
totality by the proletariat to be not only immanent in their unique historical subjectivity, but also 
imminent in that reification appeared close to its apogee and subsequent demise.   
For Lukacs then, the solution to overcoming this reified consciousness is a recognition of the social 
'totality' – a resolution of what he saw in the division of labour as “the destruction of every image 
of the whole” (1971:103). This would be achieved through the reunification of subject and object, 
that had been, in Eagleton's words, “torn grievously asunder by the effects of reification” (1991: 
98), on the part of the proletariat.  Appearing again to draw loosely on the work of Lenin, this is 
made possible through the attainment of some true or ascribed class consciousness (as opposed to 
                                                          
60 For an exemplary discussion and analysis of the importance of these technological developments for the 
analysis of cultural and ideological forms and processes see Thompson (1990) esp. chapter 4 and 5. 
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the empirically given or partial psychological consciousness which he equates with false 
consciousness).  In distinction from Lenin though, there is less emphasis that this is the role of an 
external party or intelligentsia by Lukacs.  
As such, Lukacs employs Hegel's notion of totality and the 'Absolute Idea' but this is purchased at 
the price of incorporating more than a little Hegelian idealism for which he has been criticised.  Also, 
his uncritical adoption of the later Marx's insistence that the commodity form represents the secret 
essence of all ideological consciousness in capitalist society leaves his account open to similar 
accusations of economism.61  For Larrain, the most compelling criticism of Lukacs is that he 
consistently overrates the role of ideology and ideological struggle to the point where they seem 
to substitute for real political practice and real class struggle” (1983:77). Indeed, in Lukacs' attempt 
to counter what he saw as the determinist elements of Marx's materialism he bent the stick too far 
in the other direction, a mistake which he would himself much later come to acknowledge in the 
preface of the 1967 edition of HCC. 
In defence of Lukacs, he was formulating these ideas in the years immediately following the First 
World War and the October Revolution in Russia.  Capitalism had never seemed so vulnerable (nor 
has it since) and the proletariat appeared to be on the very brink of fulfilling the role which Marx 
and Engels had laid out for it over 70 years earlier.  In such periods of crisis, Lukacs’ work serves as 
a timely reminder not to underestimate the extraordinary adaptability of capitalist social relations 
and the centrality of power of ideology and reification in this ability to respond flexibly to crisis and 
transformation with new developments and reinventions of itself. 
                                                          
61 For a more detailed discussion of Lukacs critics and a response to them see Larrain, (1983) 
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Gramsci 
Writing some years later, and from the considerably less comfortable circumstances of a fascist gaol 
in Mussolini's Italy, Lukacs’ fellow Communist Party member, Antonio Gramsci, unsurprisingly saw 
things a little differently and somewhat less optimistically.  The formation of the Factory Councils 
movement in Turin, in which Gramsci had been heavily involved, had been defeated in 1920 and 
this experience had shaped the ideas which he would put to paper in the following years.  
Largely as a result of this dire context in which he wrote them, It is widely acknowledged, indeed 
even a commonplace, that his most substantial political works, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (1971) (hereafter SPN), and the concepts outlined and discussed therein provide some 
difficulties of interpretation.  Joseph Femia notes that what we are left with “is an unfinished work, 
replete with elliptical passages, disorders, apparent contradictions, and esoteric allusions, a 
labyrinth of ideas that—for all their suggestiveness—are often opaque and undeveloped” (1979: 
472). These difficulties may partly account for the huge amount of scholarly comment, 
disagreement and controversy accorded them.  Such attention is however warranted due to the 
extremely rich and nuanced account of ideology, power and social change contained beneath the 
“surface pandemonium” (ibid.:472).  Despite the inevitable controversies which stem from these 
difficult aspects of Gramsci's writing, his work provides an invaluable insight into the ways in which 
ideas become embedded in society and how new ideas might emerge to challenge their dominance.  
As such, the work of Gramsci has had a huge impact on Marxian thought and left intellectual circles 
generally, particularly in relation to the growth of interest since the 1960s in matters of culture and 
ideology.  Gramsci's key contribution to these debates has been the concept hegemony which has 
become undeniably central to any sophisticated consideration of the workings of power.  Indeed, 
the first footnote in Steven Lukes seminal work Power is a reference to the concept as eluded and 
developed by Gramsci.  Lukes summarises the basis of Gramsci's project succinctly in the simple 
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question “how is consent to capitalist exploitation secured under contemporary conditions, in 
particular democratic ones?” (2005:7). The question remains as relevant today as in the time of 
Gramsci's writing.  My intention here is to present an overview of his concept of hegemony in 
relation to his considerations of state and civil society as they were derived from the work of Marx 
and Engels.  Having done so, I will attempt to use these insights to explore some of the ideological 
underpinnings of the contemporary global neoliberal regime and institutional matrix.  This will 
involve a critique of liberal accounts of global governance, global civil society and global citizenship 
which lack sufficient consideration and hence understanding of class politics such as is provided by 
Marxian theories of the state.  
As I have suggested, the key theoretical contribution of Gramsci, at least with respect to ideology 
and class domination, has been his concept of hegemony.  It is not to be confused with the 
application of the term in much IR literature where it is used, mostly by realists, to define the 
overarching power of one particular state in the international system such as the US in the 30-40 
yers following WWII.  This refers to the Greek origins of hegemony or hegemonia which referred to 
the dominance or leadership of a particular city-state. However, the term was also used by Lenin 
to describe the political leadership of the working class and this is from where Gramsci inherited 
the term and developed it significantly into a more complex system of political analysis and 
strategy.  In Lenin's Two Tactics of Social Democracy, hegemony or gegemoniya, assumes a largely 
strategic and instrumental meaning whereby the proletariat should assume a leading role against 
Tsarist absolutism due to the undeveloped nature of the Russian bourgeoisie.  So while Gramsci 
credits 'Ilich' with “the concept and the fact of hegemony” (1971:381), he develops it almost beyond 
recognition to incorporate a significant cultural emphasis and applies it to the complex 
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phenomenon of bourgeois rule in stable capitalist societies.62 In his initial treatments of the term 
though, he demonstrates a Leninist slant as can be shown in Some Aspects of the Southern Question 
where Gramsci discusses the need to abandon what he called the corporatism (factionism) of the 
subordinate classes.  This was necessary to win over the Southern intellectuals in order to influence 
the mass of the peasantry (see Mouffe, 1979:178-179). Demonstrating his initial association of 
hegemony with intellectual leadership, Gramsci writes: 
The Turin communists posed concretely the question of the 'hegemony of the proletariat': ie. Of 
the social basis of the proletarian dictatorship and the workers' State. The proletariat can become 
the leading and the dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of alliances 
which allows it to mobilise the majority of the working population against capitalism and the 
bourgeois State.  In Italy, in the real class relations which exist there, this means the extent that 
it succeeds in gaining the consent of the broad peasant masses.  (1978: 443) 
Similar problems of factionalism and leadership are almost a defining aspect of contemporary 
transnational anti-capitalist politics as can be seen in the multiple divisions that characterise the 
Global Justice Movement and which generates much of the most intense debate within the world 
and European social forums.  Issues of intellectual direction; industrial workers in the 'North' and 
peasant farmers in the 'South'; urban working classes and indigenous peoples; the secular and the 
religious to mention just a few of many, these persistent divisions within the exploited subordinate 
classes and our inability to transcend them were problems familiar to Gramsci and ones to which 
his ideas were primarily directed. Even in this early and somewhat 'Leninist' manifestation then, 
hegemony and the problems which it aims to address are shown to be as relevant today as in 
Gramsci's time. There exists no concrete strategic concept which has yet surpassed Gramsci's 
                                                          
62 Perry Anderson (1977) provides a detailed discussion of these roots of the term in Russian revolutionary 
thought in ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci’, New Left Review 100 pp. 15-18. 
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formulation for the purpose of achieving an effective class consciousness for the task of social 
transformation. 
The fact that Gramsci's conception of hegemony evolved somewhat over time goes some way to 
explaining some of the inconsistencies which have been recognised in regard to the definition of 
the term.  Femia notes that while Gramsci “does, at one point in his notebooks, explicitly use the 
term as intellectual and moral leadership plus political domination … it is almost invariably clear 
from the context that he conceives it purely in terms of ideological leadership, and that he wishes 
to counter-pose it to the moment of force” (1981: 25). The counter-position of force and consent 
maps roughly onto the areas of state and civil society that Gramsci illustrates using Machiavelli's 
mythological figure of the centaur (half animal half human).  In times of crisis, the state must resort 
increasing to the use of physical force and coercion.  This does not necessarily entail a decrease in 
the operation of ideological aspects of hegemony, indeed their deployment may also be scaled up 
and the need for consensualisation increased.  However, the crisis manifests itself initially in civil 
society and reveals fissures in the system of hegemonic domination where opportunities for 
counter-hegemony are enhanced.  For Gramsci then, the concept of crisis is central to the goal of 
political transformation. 
In every country the process is different, although the content is the same.  And the content is 
the crisis of the ruling class’s hegemony which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in 
some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of 
the broad masses (war for example), or because huge masses […] have passed suddenly from a 
state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, 
albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution.  A ‘crisis of authority’ is spoken of: this 
is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the State. (Gramsci 1971: 210) 
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Here Gramsci invokes the concept of crisis, inherent in capitalist modes of production, to connect 
the concepts of hegemony and the state in an exploration of the possibilities for social and political 
transformation.  Crisis however, is to be regarded as more than merely the accumulation of various 
contradictions “but rather to a moment of transition, a moment of decisive intervention” (Hay 
1996: 253).  Before proceeding to discuss these central categories of hegemony, state and 
revolutionary strategy, an effort should be made to note in some more detail how the concept was 
extended from the Leninist version mentioned above. 
We can identify three basic stages in the development of political consciousness which lead to class 
hegemony. The 'economic-corporate' level represents the first and most elementary stage: “A 
tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer 
, but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer” (Gramsci 1971: 181).  As 
the need to organise beyond professional groups to wider social groups is recognised, a second 
level is attained where “consciousness is reached of the solidarity of interests among all the 
members of a social class – but still in the purely economic field.  Already at this juncture the 
problem of the State is posed – but only in terms of winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling 
groups”(ibid.:181).  Thus participation in administration and even legislation is permitted, but only 
within the established structures of that system.  Finally, “one becomes aware that one’s own 
corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the 
purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups 
too”(181).  For Gramsci, the specific political moment is located here, where attempts to forge a 
unity among economic, political and intellectual objectives by way of an ideological struggle is 
achieved and thereby “placing all the questions around which the struggle rages on a 'universal', 
not a corporate level, thereby creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series 
of subordinate ones” (181-2). 
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This is a key passage for understanding the development of Gramsci's concept of hegemony which 
marks a considerable move forward from the way in which it is conceived in Some Aspects of the 
Southern Question (1926).  It is no longer here then, a simple issue of political alliances, but rather 
a comprehensive fusion of political and economic concerns with intellectual and moral objectives.  
It is thus a relational understanding of the ideational and the material and a recognition of the need 
to combine our analysis of ideology with that of the state. 
The contemporary analogy here, and one which I shall develop in more detail below, is with the 
current class fractions and divisions in global civil society.  The neoliberal or capitalist class is a 
hegemonic class due to the fact that is has more successfully transcended the divisions of 
nationality, religion, ethnicity  which still characterise many elements of the subordinated classes.  
The ruling class rules effectively in its own interests as it has achieved a certain hegemonic status, 
while those who are ruled and subordinated remain disablingly factionalised, or in Gramsci's term, 
corporate.  This is not to suggest that no such factions exist within the hegemonic class, but merely 
that they are less pronounced and disabling for that strata. 
For Gramsci then, and the majority of those who have applied and adapted his work, the concept 
of hegemony serves to explain the dominance of one class over others through a consideration of 
processes of legitimation and the construction of consent.  This stems from Gramsci's recognition 
that the predominant form of power in advanced liberal democratic states derives from the 
institutions and practices that generate consent rather than coercion.  By this, he was referring to 
the proliferation of values and ideas through the expanding circuits of media, systems of mass 
education and other so-called private bodies in civil society.  Indeed, as we shall see, the 
relationship between civil society and the state is a crucial one for Gramsci and his concept of 
hegemony.  According to Boggs, “hegemony was always a matter of the degree of equilibrium that 
obtains between state and civil society” (1976:40).  Gramsci’s concentration on these aspects 
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makes his contributions invaluable for understanding ideology in contemporary capitalist societies 
and has led writers such as Texier (1979) to refer to him as the 'theorist of the superstructures'.  
In many ways, hegemony represents Gramsci's explanation for the failure of the proletarian masses 
to fulfil the revolutionary transformation in the way predicted by Marx and Engels.  It is for this 
reason that his work still commands so much attention in contemporary critical debates around 
capitalism, particularly in relation to the core institutions of the global economy (including the 
SIACS) where the superstructural apparatuses of civil society are most fully developed.  His work 
has been particularly influential in the critical tradition of IR/IPE which seeks to understand these 
institutions in order to conceive of their transformation.  
This project is rooted primarily in the work of Robert Cox, and subsequently developed by pioneers 
such as Stephen Gill and Kees van der Pijl through their respective concepts of ‘world order’ and 
the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Cox 1987, 1996; Gill 1990, 1993b, 2003; van der Pijl, 1984, 1998; 
see also Robinson 2004), and also in the application of his valuable conception of civil society to 
International/global context (Colas 2002; Lipschutz 2005).  Indeed, a recognition of potential agents 
for alternative world orders as well as ideological institutions of neoliberal hegemony, both residing 
within the broad concept of civil society, combined with repeated calls to ‘bring the state back in’ 
to global political analysis, have kept Gramsci’s ideas at the forefront of much critical analysis. 
Before briefly outlining how Gramsci's work has been put to work in IR/IPE since the 1980's, it is 
helpful to return to the work of Marx on politics and the state and the rather ambiguous legacy this 
has bequeathed to Gramsci and other neo-Marxists. In particular, the conceptual relationship of 
the economic base to cultural, legal and political superstructures upon which Gramsci placed so 
much emphasis.  
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It is worth remembering though, that Marx was, first and foremost, a theorist of capitalism and 
considerations of political forms were often secondary to this.  Furthermore, this tendency appears 
to have become more pronounced in his later writings.63  While he is most famous for predicting 
the inevitable overthrow of capitalism by the proletariat and was active in the communist 
movement, he did not lay out any kind of plan for the specific system of politics that would replace 
it.  Indeed some have suggested that politics as we understand it would end as a result of such a 
transformation. Throughout his vast body of work however, capitalism was theorised in different 
ways and in various social and political contexts. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to show how Marxism provides an account, or perhaps accounts, 
of ideology which connect in particular to the economic but also the political structures and 
practices of society.  The chapter has traced the concept of ideology in Marxism from the early 
works of Marx and Engels, through their later works and on into the treatment given to it by the 
Marxist and neo-marxists of the early twentieth century.  I have recognised the close connection 
that ideology has with the concepts of class and alienation and discussed the centrality of ideology 
(however conceived) to the maintenance of systems of rule in modern societies and in particular 
capitalist societies.  I will now proceed to discuss the political sociology of Marxism in some more 
detail, specifically, theories of the state. I will attempt to do this as far as possible in the light of the 
preceding discussion of ideology.  In so doing we are moving toward a rather structural perspective 
of politics and ideology, but one which attempts to preserve, as far as possible, sufficient space and 
potential for human agency and social transformation.  As the above suggests however, such 
progressive transformations toward more just and sustainable systems of production, exchange 
                                                          
63 We should not assume from this however that Marx considered the politics of the state unimportant as 
Das Kapital represents an unfinished work and many consider the state to have been an intended subject 
for a later volume. 
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and distribution may only become possible in the light of a more complete understanding of the 
ideological and political structures which maintain and legitimise the contemporary global system 
of neoliberal capitalism.  
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Ch. 5 State, Class and Globality 
It is fair to say that the state, while once the primary and central concept of political science and 
theory has dropped from the radar of many political commentators, at least in terms of the analysis 
of its forms and functions rather than simply its behaviour.  Indeed, many accounts of sociology, 
politics and international relations have, in recent decades, either decried or celebrated the 
supposed decline, retreat or 'withering away' of the state to make way in their analyses for 
something else called 'globalisation'.64  Despite the ubiquity of this term, its analytical usefulness 
remains somewhat of a mystery largely due to the fact that it seems to contain, entail, constitute 
or explain almost any socio-political development since the early 1980's. What many of these 
accounts fail to recognise is that these processes of globalisation have been heavily driven and 
directed by a handful of capitalist states.  In particular the group of states that represent the core 
of the capitalist world economy.65 That these states and their variously neoliberal governments 
have since invoked the supposed exigencies of a globalised market economy in order to protect and 
further entrench the interests of a dominant class, should not distract from the capitalist state as 
an important object of analysis, quite the reverse.  Indeed, this contradiction alone should direct us 
to pay closer attention to the capitalist state in contemporary world politics, not merely as the sole 
or major agent in the global system, as in mainstream realist and neorealist International Relations 
                                                          
64 See chapter 1 
65 Included in this 'core' of SIACS would be the key capitalist states of the Trilateral Commission (US, 
Western Europe and Japan) and the G7 (US, UK, France, West Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan) both of 
which emerged during the crises of the early-mid 1970's. The G7 has since grown with the expansion of 
global capitalism to include seats for Russia and what have come to be known as the 'plus five states (China, 
Brazil, Mexico, India and South Africa. The EU now also holds a seat given to the standing president of the 
European Commission. These countries and their governments also dominate other key global 
organisations such as the UNSC, WTO, IMF, World Bank and are further buttressed by longer standing 
intergovernmental institutions such as the 20(+10) states of the OECD 
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theories, but more importantly as the key institutional arbiter of power and wealth distribution 
between and amongst classes and citizens.  It is the social relations within the modern state where 
I begin this analysis, before proceeding later in the chapter to an account of how such class relations 
are extending above and beyond and to questions regarding global governance, global civil society 
and the supposed emergence of a proto-global or transnational state form.  
The most cursory glance at the historical development of the modern state will reveal that it is not 
a fixed set of institutions, apparatus, practices and procedures.  It is a set of politically, 
geographically and historically diverse and contingent relations which, much like ideology, resists 
any attempt to define it accurately.  Jessop defines the state very broadly as “a distinct ensemble 
of institutions and organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce 
collectively binding decisions on the members of society in the name of their common interest or 
general will” (1990: 341). Such a broad definition seems of little value until one considers the myriad 
forms which the state has assumed over space and time.  Indeed, we will see how an interpretation 
of Marx and Engels' ideas about politics founders on the very different nature of the state in the 
mid-nineteenth century from those forms we confront today. 
Indeed, one of the major difficulties with evaluating Marxist, or indeed any, theories of the state is 
the constantly changing nature of this 'institutional ensemble' throughout history. The increased 
scholarly attention paid to this phenomenon since the 1960's has come largely as a result of its 
considerable expansion and consolidation through the last century.  At the time when Hegel, Marx 
and Engels were writing, the state was a fairly novel form of political organisation.  The world was 
still dominated by a handful of empires which would come to fall apart in varying degrees during 
and after WWI, to be replaced by a proliferation of 'self-determining' national-states in Europe, the 
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Middle East, South America (and after WWII, Africa).66  With this extraordinary and unprecedented 
explosion of nation-states in Europe and the Ottomon Empire after WWI, greater attention had to 
be afforded to them and their interrelations by political scientists67 and sociologists and not least 
Marxists such as Gramsci, than had been the case for Marx himself. Marxian theory and political 
practice had to develop positions and strategies on the basis of rapidly emerging and changing 
political forms, much like the contemporary conjuncture of 'globalisation'. 
Following WWII, the last remnants of those empires (at least as forms of direct rule) would also fall 
away into a worldwide system of modern or 'nation'-states.  The heyday or high water mark of this 
specific form of political organisation would come in the decades between the 1930's and 1970's 
when states where considered legally and popularly ‘sovereign’  and internal intervention in society 
and the economy was also seen to be increasing without much sign of any reversal of that trend.  
In terms of Marxian political economy this was the period in which capitalism appeared to fuse 
most strongly with state forms in what came in many contexts to be called a system of state 
monopoly capitalism (stamocap).  Here the state was clearly and quite understandably seen to be 
acting “on behalf of monopoly capital in the twofold attempt to secure the political and ideological 
conditions necessary to capital accumulation and to secure various economic conditions that can 
no longer be realised through the operation of market forces” (Jessop, 1982:14).  This apparent 
fusion of state and capital led to a burgeoning interest and proliferation of critical analyses on the 
capitalist state and a renewed attention to the writings of the classical Marxists in futile attempts 
to dredge up the ‘true’ Marxist theory of the state.  As recent decades have seen a supposed ‘retreat 
of the state’, such interest has waned somewhat.  
                                                          
66 Colas (2007:4) for instance, remarks on the relative novelty of the contemporary division of the political 
world into around “200 territorially exclusive and politically independent national states.” 
67 It is noteworthy that the discipline of International Relations itself emerged largely in response to the 
new ubiquity of this political form with the firsts departments set up in Aberystwyth in 1919 and the LSE in 
1920. 
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As a result of this historical vacillation and evolution of the state form, we should not expect to find, 
in the canon of political analysis on the state, any magic theoretical bullet which pins down its 
essential nature and purpose.  Nor, despite numerous valiant attempts, do we find any succinct 
definition which is satisfactory.  In terms of what the state does, Max Weber famously points out 
that “there is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is 
no task that one could say has always been peculiar and exclusive to those associations which are 
designated as political ones: today, the state” (1948: 77). The changing nature of the state is 
currently perhaps more rapid and profound than at any time in its history and so attempting a 
theory of it is now perhaps something more of a fool’s errand than ever. Nevertheless, we cannot 
simply ignore this key phenomenon of Politics and International Relations and must attempt to 
address it in its historico-relational form. That is, to understand it as neither simply a subject nor 
object but as a set of historically contingent social power relations embodied within particular and 
historically specific sets of political institutions, “or more precisely the material condensation of 
such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a 
necessarily specific form.” (Poulantzas, 1978:128-129). This should not mean however that 
questions about how the state might act if it were a unified subject, or even what might constitute 
its unity as an object, are beyond consideration. In addition, we might ask, as Jessop does: “how do 
social actors come to act as if the state were a real subject or a simple instrument.” (2008:3) Prior 
to addressing these questions and applying them to the emergent institutional forms of the 
contemporary 'global' juncture, I will return once again to the work of Marx and Engels and their 
various scribblings on the state before moving on to continue the discuss Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony which develops a more nuanced analysis of the relation between ideology, the state and 
civil society. 
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Marx and Engels on the state. 
As had been his intention with the concept of class, Marx had planned an entire chapter on the 
state for his magnum opus Capital but died before its completion. What we are left with from him 
instead is a scattering of diverse statements and references covering nearly 40 years and 
bequeathing an ambiguity to rival and even surpass his confusing exposition of ideology. Indeed, it 
was Engels rather than Marx who first adumbrated a class theory of the state but was no more 
successful in developing this insight into a complete and coherent analysis of the capitalist state. 
Much of the disagreement and animosity surrounding the state that developed within Marxism 
during the 20th century can be attributed to this rather sporadic treatment accorded to it by Marx 
and Engels. I do not intend here to engage in a detailed analysis of their work on the State, such 
accounts already fill many shelves (see Holloway and Picciotto (eds.) 1978; Clarke (ed.) 1991; 
Jessop, 1982 ch.1; Miliband 1965. Nevertheless, some mention needs to be made of just from 
where the disagreements originate and how the different interpretations by later Marxists can be 
traced back to various formulations provided by Marx, Engels and also Lenin. I will therefore review 
some of the key components of classical Marxism on the state as a point of departure. 
The legacy of Marx in this area is unquestionably ambiguous to the extent that this has become one 
of the few uncontested claims with regard to this field of thought.  It is due in large part to the so-
called epistemological shift in his work which has led many to refer to the 'early Marx' in contrast 
to his 'mature' work.  The early work, coming before his break from the Young Hegelians 
demonstrated a remarkable level of support, at least for the idea of the state.  Hegel famously 
asserted in his theory of the state that this political form represented the final act in historical 
progression and commenting on this influential view, Marx noted that such a philosophy “looks on 
the state as the great organism in which legal, moral and political freedom must be realised and in 
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which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own 
reason” (Marx 1975a: 202) 
Marx's ideas regarding the state evolved partly in tandem with those of ideology. In his work with 
Engels from the German Ideology onwards, both were relegated to the epiphenomenal realm of 
superstructures. His early work is similarly imprinted with aspects of Hegelian philosophy as shown 
by his articles for the Rheinische Zeitung during 1842-3.  In these he still appeared to regard the 
state, at least in the abstract, as the guardian of the general interest of society and law as the 
potential embodiment of political freedom. Even in these early works however, Marx began to 
show signs of his recognition and emphasis of external pressures upon the actions of the state. In 
an article on the plight of the Moselle wine growers for instance, he suggests that “in investigating 
a situation concerning the state one is all too easily tempted to overlook the objective nature of the 
circumstances and to explain everything by the will of the persons concerned. However, there are 
circumstances which determine the actions of private persons and individual authorities and which 
are as independent of them as the method of breathing” (Marx 1975a: 337).  This suggests his 
increasing awareness of, and deep interest in, the complex interrelationship between the spheres 
of politics and economics.  For Marx then, the state must be evaluated in light of the structured 
relations of production which exert pressure upon the whole of society.  As such, political 
institutions are clearly implicated in the reproduction of the exploitative conditions for the 
extraction of surplus value.  It is possible to see then that the nature of the state was becoming for 
Marx, an important consideration but one perhaps secondary to the mode of production. 
Marx's attention to 'the objective nature of circumstances' highlights the general direction his later 
or 'mature' ideas would take and his move away from Hegelian thought which began in his Critique 
of Hegel's Doctrine of the State (1843). This work represents Marx's first detailed considerations on 
the state and despite its title, it still bears a fundamentally Hegelian hallmark. For Hegel, the 
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separation between the state and civil society is resolved by the state.  The state is understood as 
an 'ideal collective citizen' in which the general and communal interests of all its subjects will come 
to be expressed.  For Marx however, such an account is a pure mystification. While accepting the 
distinction between state and civil society, alongside Hegel's understanding of the latter as “the 
sphere of economic life in which the individual’s relations with others are governed by selfish needs 
and individual interests” (1843[1975]: 59). Marx regards these relations as essentially conflictual 
and thus denies the possibility that the state can act in the general interest.  As a prime function of 
the state is to reinforce property rights, it therefore actually works to reproduce such unequal and 
conflictual relations in civil society.  
In another major early work, On the Jewish Question (1843b), Marx argued that in abstracting from 
the differences of wealth and power in society, the state claimed to represent subjects as if they 
were equal citizens. However, such supposed equality was, according to Marx, merely formal, a 
political abstraction which retained differences in private property through their allocation to the 
private realm of civil society and their effect upon real lives was thus excluded from public debate.  
The inherently ideological nature of such arrangements were to be found, according to Marx, in the 
apparently 'natural' inequalities of wealth and power which were presupposed in that institutional 
separation of state and society (1843:36-8). Furthermore, the domination of civil society by the 
interests of capital fed into the juridical orientation of the state thus leading it toward the defence 
of private property. (see M&E, 1846: 131-2, 169-71) 
Generally, capitalism was understood by Marx as a set of contradictory relations of production 
which conditioned the whole realm of human association.  Profit or 'surplus value' is, according to 
Marx, the primary goal of capitalism and social relations are progressively subordinated to this 
imperative. However, concurrently, the exploitative and socially detrimental consequences of this 
system are obscured with the assistance of the state and his work displays a growing dissatisfaction 
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with its role. Thus in The Holy Family (1844), written with Engels, comes his first explicit 
denunciation of the state as a site of class antagonism, but first and foremost an instrument of 
bourgeois domination.  In this work they describe the 'democratic representative state' as 'the 
perfect modern state' by which Miliband asserts that they mean “the perfect modern bourgeois 
state” (1983:8).  For the early Marx, such contradictions could only be resolved through 'true 
democracy'.  “Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the 
constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely 
implicitly and in essence but in existence and in reality”. (Marx, 1975:87) 
In contrast to those who dismiss such early works of Marx as irredeemably Hegelian sucaaa2h as 
Althusser (1969: 32-4, 62-4, 249), Avineri claims that such arguments for a clear epistemological 
break cannot be sustained and posits the notion that Marx's later formulations of communism were 
already present within his notion of 'true democracy', arguing that: 
It can be shown clearly that what Marx terms 'democracy' is not fundamentally different from 
what he will later call 'communism', and that in any case this 'democracy' is based on 'man's 
communist essence’. It also follows that the decisive transition in Marx's intellectual 
development was not from radical democracy to communism, any more than it was from 
idealism to materialism. […] The Critique contains ample material to show that Marx envisages 
in 1843 a society based on the abolition of private property and on the disappearance of the 
state. Briefly, the Communist Manifesto is immanent in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right (Avineri 1968: 34; see also Coletti (1975, 41-2). 
Such a position is backed up by the distinction, made by Marx in his essay On the Jewish Question, 
between formal political emancipation and real human emancipation which he associated with 
'true democracy'. In this work, Marx defends the project of political emancipation but distinguishes 
this from full social emancipation that is only possible in a new society, in which practical need has 
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been humanised and the commercial spirit abolished. Such a qualitatively new social order can only 
be realised through the complete transcendence of bourgeois society and as such, the bourgeois, 
or liberal democratic state. The following year, in his 'Introduction' to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Law, Marx identified the proletariat as the agents of such a transformation and 
thereby laying the foundations for a class theory of the state in his emerging theory of historical 
materialism. (Miliband, 1983:7)  
Perhaps the best known and most complete formulation of this is to be found in The German 
Ideology where Marx and Engels provide a fairly systematic theory of the state as a class state. Their 
assertion that the state is “nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois 
necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their 
property and interest” (1845/6[1974]:80). Just a few years later in The Communist Manifesto 
(1848[1977]) this claim was restated in the more famous declaration that “The executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole Bourgeoisie” and 
it noted further that political power expressed through the state represents “the organised power 
of one class for oppressing another” (1977:238). 
According to Miliband, this represents the classical Marxist view of the state and the only one to be 
found in the canon of Marxism-Leninism.  However, with respect to the writings of Marx and Engels, 
it can only be seen to represent a primary view of the state as it is possible to find at least one other 
version in the classical texts although Miliband maintains that “it is inaccurate to hold this up as of 
similar status with the first” (1983:9). This primary view of the state is also subject to some 
qualifications which introduce some flexibility into this instrumental account. These qualifications 
demonstrate that Marx was keen to clarify and apply his theories in light of the contemporary 
historical evidence. In writing during the politically turbulent years of 1848-9 he notes in The Class 
struggles in France that splits in the bourgeoisie or capitalist class excluded some elements from 
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state rule while others from previously dominant landowning classes fused with a faction of the 
bourgeoisie to govern the state in their own interests, so that: 
It was not the French bourgeoisie that ruled under Louis Phillippe, but one faction of it: bankers, 
stock-exchange kings, railway kings, owners of coal and iron mines and forests, a part of the 
landed proprietors associated with them – the so-called finance aristocracy. It sat on the 
throne, it dictated laws in the chambers, it distributed public offices. (Marx, 1977:286) 
Further on in the text Marx continues in the same vein, noting how this “finance aristocracy made 
the laws, was at the head of the administration of the state, had command of all the organised 
public authorities [and] dominated public opinion through the actual state of affairs … and the non-
ruling factions of the French bourgeoisie cried: corruption” (Marx, 1977: 288-9) This may seem a 
rather trivial point as the state, still for Marx, clearly acts to secure the vested interests of wealth 
and privilege in its protection of property rights. It is a point worth making however to remind us 
how forms of class state are historically contingent social entities and not fixed abstract categories. 
It also illustrates that while the capitalist class may not always, or even ever, correspond exactly to 
the ruling class, bourgeois social relations appear to be effectively maintained by the state 
throughout.  On the other hand, fissures within the capitalist class and animosity between its 
factional elements may, in certain circumstances and periods of crisis, present opportunities for 
effective progressive resistance and the potential transformation of those social relations.  
The Brumaire 
A better known and more extreme manifestation of Marx's exceptions to his 'primary' perspective 
on the relationship between the state and the capitalist class can be found in historical examples 
of individual, authoritarian rule where the state, in exceptional circumstances, can become 
relatively autonomous, not just from the bourgeoisie, but from the ruling class however it is 
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constituted and factionalised. The most notable example of this in the work of Marx is to be found 
in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852). This striking and powerful piece of historical 
and political writing is particularly interesting for Marx's views on class and state.  
On the December 2nd 1851, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, elected President of the 2nd French 
Republic and nephew of the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, dissolved the Legislative Assembly and 
occupied the parliamentary chamber, arresting the leaders of the main political parties. The 
following year he declared himself Emperor Napoleon III.  This coup d'etat ended the parliamentary 
republican regime which many radicals and socialist had hoped would, following the democratic 
revolutions of 1848, develop into a more substantial and progressive programme of social and 
economic reform and emancipation.  In the vent however, the coup represented a final and 
crushing defeat for these ideals, all the more galling as it had mobilised a substantial section of the 
subordinate classes (peasants, army ) to this end.  Importantly though, the coup had apparently 
altered the nature and role of the state significantly: “Only under the second Bonaparte does the 
state seem to have made itself truly independent.  As against civil society, the state machine has 
consolidated its position” (1977:317). Here Marx appears to suggest that this Bonapartist state is 
independent of any specific class. However, a few lines further on he says: “And yet the state power 
is not suspended in mid-air, Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous French class at 
that, the small-holding peasants” (317).  Miliband suggests however that the use of the term 
'represent' is misleading and the peasants merely “hoped to have their interests represented … But 
this does not turn Louis Bonaparte or the state into the mere instrument of their will; at most it 
may limit the executive's freedom of action” (Miliband, 1983: 11). Indeed, according to Marx, 
Bonaparte's real loyalties and interest lay with the bourgeoisie: 
Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard 'bourgeois order'. But the strength of the 
bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself therefore, as the representative of 
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the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the 
fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. 
Consequently, he looks upon himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the 
middle class. But by protecting its material power he generates its political power anew. 
(1977:322) 
On this and other evidence, Miliband is able to claim that the Bonapartist state was “called into 
being, for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the existing social order and the 
domination of capital over labour” (1983:12). Indeed, writing later in The Civil War in France, Marx 
claims that Bonapartism had succeeded the bourgeois parliamentary Republic due to the fact “it 
was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the 
working class had not yet aquired, the faculty of ruling the nation” (1977: 541) furthermore the 
Empire came to represent: 
the most prostituted and the ultimate form of the State power which nascent middle class society 
had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which full 
grown bourgeois society had finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labour by 
capital. (ibid. 541) 
Marx clearly indicates in these works that the apparatus of the bourgeois state can never be 
directed towards progressive ends and an important aspect of the revolution is the inevitable 
destruction of this institution by the proletariat. In doing so: 
Marx implies that the state is a system of political domination whose effectiveness is to be found 
in its institutional structure as much as in the social categories, fractions or classes that control it 
… [T]he analysis of the inherent bias of the system of political representation and state 
intervention is logically prior to an examination of the social forces that manage to wield state 
power. (Jessop 1982: 27) 
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Lenin and Gramsci 
By the time Lenin came to write The State and Revolution in 1917, the capitalist state had become 
a more salient feature of political life than had been the case for most of Marx’s life.  It is thus 
unsurprising then that it played a more central role in Lenin’s work. Lenin's account of the state is 
able to trace a discernible lineage to the one provided by Marx in The Civil War in France and the 
basic theme which he outlines in The State and Revolution is of the state as “an organ of class rule, 
an organ for the oppression of one class by another” (1969:46.) Lenin's famous assertion that the 
capitalist liberal democratic state represents the 'best possible shell' for capitalism added little 
more to the assertions of Marx and Engels of its primary role as instrument for class domination. 
His own particular contribution is the notion of a violent destruction of the state in the process of 
proletarian revolution “the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent 
revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power.” (1969:46) 
However, other subsequent Marxist analysis (Kautsky, Plekhanov) failed to address questions of the 
state in any systematic or satisfactory fashion. According to Poulantzas, the reasons for this  
derived from the fact that the dominant conception of these Internationals was a deviation, 
economism, which is generally accompanied by an absence of revolutionary strategy and 
objectives—even when it takes a ‘leftist’ or Luxemburgist form. In effect, economism 
considers that other levels of social reality, including the State, are simple epiphenomena 
reducible to the economic ‘base’. Thereby a specific study of the State becomes 
superfluous. (1969: 68 NLR) 
Before proceeding to examine some of the more recent developments in Marxian state theory and 
how they might be helpful in better understanding aspects of the neoliberal ideology which 
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underpins and legitimates contemporary discourses and practices of global governance, I will briefly 
consider the debates over the relative autonomy of the capitalist state which broke out in the late 
1960's and early 70's. 
The emergence of these debates might be viewed partly as a result of the extraordinary growth of 
state power and its increased role in the everyday affairs of citizens during the period of embedded 
liberalism of the post WWII era. The explosion of neo-Marxist literature on the state appeared 
during the period where some on the Left were becoming anxious about its intrusive role in 
people’s lives and its relation to capitalist interests. With a hint of irony, the welfare state, which 
had been the brainchild and creation of centre-left social democratic parties in Europe and the US, 
increasingly appeared to many as securing the CMP. The unrest of 1968, which almost brought 
down the state in France and gave it a significant scare across a number of other countries in the 
core SIACS, drew the attention of a number of Marxist scholars.  A Marxist political science or 
political theory (as distinct from sociology and social theory) would need to develop a theory of the 
state, the prime and at that time almost exclusive location of politics. 
Miliband, Poulantzas and Relative Autonomy 
Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society (1969) draws on the basic Marxist assumption outlined 
above that the state is an instrument for the ruling class to maintain and exert their domination.  It 
served to counter and critique the prevailing wisdom of bourgeois liberal theories of the state which 
considered it to be a politically and ideologically neutral institution in politics and had been derided 
by pluralist authors such as Dahl (1965) and Easton (1953)as irrelevent to the study of politics.  
Considering that the major works of Gramsci had yet to be made available in English, the book 
marked a significant and ground-breaking move forward in the development of a Marxist theory of 
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the state.68  In addition, despite the fact Miliband had limited awareness of Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony, a significant part of the book addresses the process of legitimation and 
consensualisation through the agencies of what Gramsci recognised as civil society (Miliband 1969: 
179-264). “Obscured though it may be, the fact remains that the mass media in advanced capitalist 
societies are mainly intended to perform a highly ‘functional’ role; they too are both an expression 
of a system of domination, as a means of reinforcing it” (1969: 221). In addition to the mass media, 
Miliband also identifies other civil society institutions as party to the ideological processes carried 
through the state such as education, the church and commercial and industrial organisations. 
Early criticisms came from Poulantzas (1969) who attacked Miliband’s approach for accepting the 
liberal pluralist terms of the debate and failing to recognise what Poulantzas regards as the 
objective structural reality of the state and social classes.  For Poulantzas, and other Althusserian 
Marxists, Miliband’s invocation of pluralist elites incorporates and instrumentalist, agency centred 
approach which may vitiate against the specified aims of the critique by accepting the 
epistemological assumptions of bourgeois social science.  Instead, according to Poulantzas, the 
focus of study should be the state itself.  This results in an overly structuralist account in which 
social agents are considered as merely passive ‘bearers’ of objective structures which they are 
largely incapable of influencing.      
In many ways, the Miliband Poulantzas debate generated more heat than light.  Despite the 
somewhat rancorous nature of these early debates, both writers over time came to adopt more 
dialectical approaches to the study of the relations between the state and dominant classes and 
their respective merits have been developed by subsequent writers in interesting and valuable 
ways.  To the extent that any resolution might be found, the previous discussion of the strategic 
                                                          
68 Miliband makes an early concession to the importance of Gramsci based on the only two works published 
in English at that time 
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relational approach to the structure agency problematic corresponds to the relations of class and 
state discussed here.  Indeed, that approach was developed by Jessop, largely from his reading of 
the later work of Poulantzas, in particular his most valuable book State, Power, Socialism (1977), 
which defined the state as a more complex and contingent social relation than his earlier 
formulations.  This shift was largely a result of his engagement with the work of Foucault and the 
implications of the knowledge/power nexus in practices of governmentality.  I discuss the work of 
Foucault in more detail in the following chapter on discourse.  For now I want to retain a focus upon 
the changing political form of the state and in particular, Poulantzas’ earlier notion of relative 
autonomy, to which Miliband eventually came to concede some ground (1977: 74).  According to 
this theory of relative autonomy, 
the state is not subject to direct and immediate control by the capitalist class, but that it has a 
degree of autonomy from such control. This insight makes clear that not all state actions can be 
explained as responses to the interests of particular fractions of the capitalist class, but rather 
many actions can be understood as flowing from the state's function as the 'factor of cohesion' 
in the social formation. Yet in fulfilling these functions, the state is acting in the interests of the 
capitalist class as a whole-hence the autonomy of the state is relative and limited. (Block 1980: 
228) 
This reading of the function of the state is useful and pertinent for understanding the institutions 
of GEG which arrange and regulate the political and economic processes we associate with 
globalisation.  The relationship between governing elites and these political forms is not a simple 
one but the connection is complex and contingent and central to understanding the possibilities for 
alternative politics at the global level and within local and regional polities. 
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Conclusion 
While the above debates may now seem rather dated and arbitrary, I suggest they have been useful 
in order pave the way and to stimulate new perspectives on state transformation and the emerging 
institutions of globality.  In comparison to Marxist theories of imperialism and world systems 
analysis, I argue that theories of the state have been much overlooked in the IR/IPE literature.  
However, I suggest that if we acknowledge that the state is not a static object but an evolutionary, 
shifting, contingent form, then Marxist theories of the state can be deployed to help us understand 
the complex relational interplay of ideology, class and state.  
If politics and governance, albeit without formal government, is evolving at the supra-state level as 
suggested by much of the literature, than it should be at least considered that something 
resembling a global state is apparent.  That being the case then, some account of its historical 
emergence and political character is called for.  This must entail a consideration of the role of ideas 
and ideology in relation to the material and structural transformations that we can trace in recent 
history.  In so doing, we must identify an agent or agents which have established those ideas.  In 
short what follows seeks to identify a transnational capitalist class which disseminates a neoliberal 
ideology through which it attempts to legitimise a particular regime of accumulation and system of 
exploitation.  I argue that a discourse historical methodology is the most effective means by which 
to carry out such an interpretive analysis of the role of ideology in contemporary political and 
institutional transformation.   
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 Ch. 6 Discourse as Theory and Method 
Introduction 
In this chapter I continue the theme of hegemony initiated in the previous chapter on Ideology, 
elaborating the role of discourse within and upon hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices.  It 
will further address some of the theoretical questions raised in the earlier discussions of structure 
and agency and in turn contribute to that debate (without making any claims to resolve it).  This 
chapter continues to develop the theoretical and historical context necessary for the empirical 
analysis of neoliberal discourse in the final chapter. It discusses some of the key problems and 
criticisms associated with some discursive and post-structuralist perspectives.  While 
acknowledging some of these criticisms, I suggest ways in which discourse theory and method can 
be effective tools for analysing the emergent, dynamic and shifting political institutions and 
identities involved in the struggles around globalisation, democracy and neoliberal capitalism.  
Furthermore, I propose that such analysis can itself contribute to, identify with, and in the process 
become an aspect of that critical movement seeking more democratic alternatives to the current 
hegemony.  As such, the chapter asks how discursive dissent can be imbued with the capacity to 
exert counter-hegemonic human agency.  Such a claim emphasises a disavowal of claims to 
objectivity in favour of an explicitly situated analysis which seeks to empower marginalized groups 
engaged in ‘anti-capitalism’, ‘alter-globalisation’ and radical democratic projects.    
 
Chapter 4 attempted to trace the evolving analysis role of culture and ideology within politics and 
the hegemonic project of capitalism through the work of Marx and subsequent Marxist writers, in 
particular, Antonio Gramsci.  I continue this line of theory (with Gramsci as a key connection) by 
demonstrating the continuities between the concept of discourse, which I will show can also reveal 
important cultural aspects of late capitalism, and the older and currently less fashionable one of 
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ideology.  I suggest that while sharing some characteristics with ideology (particularly the 
Foucauldian notion of ‘orders of discourse’), the way in which the concept of discourse has been 
developed, refined and deployed provides a set of theoretical and methodological tools effective 
for the understanding of the struggles over global governance between an existing neoliberal 
hegemony and a potential/emergent radical democratic counter-hegemony.  
 
The contemporary global socio-historical juncture begins in the crisis laden 1970’s and became 
consolidated in the 1980s climate of ‘endisms’ in what appeared to be the decline of socialism and 
any plausible alternatives to capitalism and (neo)liberal ‘democracy’ (Fukuyama 1991).  As I have 
already suggested and will further argue below, there is some evidence for this ‘crisis’ period 
marking a fundamental punctuation in history. Nevertheless, crucial as these events still seem, the 
continuities should appear at least as remarkable as the changes.  In hindsight, the end of the Soviet 
Union and its sponsorship of state socialism in other parts of the world increasingly appears in 
hindsight to have been an obvious historical outcome of the snowballing processes of neoliberal 
capitalist expansion (see Cox’s concept of Global perestroika in Socialist Register 1992); the ‘end of 
empire’ appears now to be more of a change in form than in substance.   
 
In the grand scheme of things it is perhaps the scientific and technological discoveries of this period 
that mark the most significant transformations and the socio-economic cultural and political 
changes described have come largely but by no means solely as a result of these.  Many 
commentators recognise that the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism was bolstered by new 
developments in information technology that were used to justify privatization, deregulation, 
streamlining and downsizing of organizations across the world (Chase-Dunn and Gills, 2003).  The 
novelty, character and cultural emphasis of late capitalism is highlighted by Castells: 
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Cultural battles are the power battles of the Information Age. They are primarily fought in and 
by the media, but the media are not the power holders.  Power, as the capacity to impose 
behaviour, lies in the networks of information exchange and symbol manipulation, which relate 
social actors, institutions and cultural movements, through icons, spokespersons and 
intellectual amplifiers. […] It is, however, a different kind of capitalism than that formed during 
the industrial revolution, or the one that emerged from the 1930s depression and world war 
two, under the form of economic Keynesianism and social welfarism.  It is a hardened form of 
capitalism in its goals, but is incomparably more flexible than any of its predecessors in its 
means. (1998:368 and 374) 
 
The realms of knowledge and meaning have been utterly transformed by these unprecedented 
developments in new communications media.  Such developments are comparable to the invention 
of the printing press or perhaps even the emergence of the written word itself in terms of their 
impact on social relations.  Indeed, there has undoubtedly been a global technological revolution 
of sorts and in communications especially, and one which has vast political implications as 
recognised by Gill: 
There are new technologies of organised violence, extended surveillence and incarceration 
(disciplinary power) and, on the other hand, new forms of global political innovation and 
collective action have nevertheless emerged to begin to pose alternatives to disciplinary neo-
liberalism (often by using the very same technologies of global communication for organisational 
and persuasive purposes). (2003: 153) 
 
I attempt to explore some of the potential implications of these changes for understanding 
contemporary forms of political struggle and the current chapter maps out a concept of critical 
discourse theory and method which, I argue, is well suited to such a task.  The chapter also picks up 
from themes introduced earlier where I suggested that structure and agency debates were 
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unhelpful to an exploration of hegemony and resistance and that drawing on some critical and 
strategic-relational insights and in particular the concept of discourse enables a necessary 
decentring of structures that attempt to fix meanings and identities in the interests of the powerful.  
The combined purpose of the chapter then is to show how discourse theory emerged from the 
debates discussed in the previous chapter and to demonstrate how a concept of discourse is both 
theoretically and methodologically appropriate for an analysis of neoliberal hegemony and the 
possibilities for a democratic counter-hegemony.   
 
Clearly then, this thesis is dealing with two additional, yet I argue related, questions – questions 
which I suggest concepts of discourse and methods of discourse analysis may provide some 
tentative answers and further avenues for political action and research.  One is the ontological and 
epistemological question of dualities, in particular the grand structure/agency debates and their 
Marxist variants of base and superstructure etcetera.   I suggest that a discursive approach, while 
in no way solving these questions, provides an alternative way of looking at social and political 
conflict and change that attempts to avoid such dualities.  In relation to the contemporary historical 
juncture however, a more pressing methodological question arises and provides a context for this 
study.  The changing nature of capitalism, relations of production, modes of commodification, and 
the emerging forms of transversal politics deeply implicated in these changes have left many 
traditional tools of analysis and theoretical perspectives wanting.  Discourse analysis and its 
sensitivity to language, text, symbols, cultural production and the third dimension of power so 
intrinsic to hegemonic struggles, is part of a tradition of thought which has largely emerged to 
specifically understand and respond to these changes.  The transversal and cultural nature of late 
capitalism and new forms of global resistance demands a scholarly approach which is equally 
sceptical toward any notions of fixed spatial boundaries and disciplinary limitations.   
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I begin here then, by briefly suggesting why the emergence of ‘late’ capitalism since the 1970s has 
demanded a renewed attention to the power/culture/economy nexus in the disciplines of IR/IPE.  I 
suggest that attention to language, and more specifically, critical discourse analysis, provides a set 
of tools that bring into focus aspects of these legitimising strategies and political struggles which 
other methods sometimes fail to reveal.  The ‘linguistic turn’ which provides the theoretical 
stimulus for much of this chapter must be seen as occurring within, and representing a substantial 
part of, what can be regarded as a broader ‘cultural turn’ that has characterised a significant 
tradition of, and sometimes opposition to, left/social(ist)/Marxist criticism.  As discussed in chapter 
4, that tradition stretches from aspects of the work of Marx and Engels through Lukacs and Gramsci, 
and elements of the Frankfurt school.  In other words, what has come to be known as ‘western 
Marxism’ and also in the various guises and occasionally baffling extremes of post-Marxism, post-
structuralism and postmodernism.  
 
This chapter develops that with a brief argument for further attention and broader understanding 
to ‘new’ media and communications technology, and the transformation of cultural, informational 
and knowledge production and consumption in analyses emergent in a context of neoliberal 
capitalist hegemony.  The argument prioritises knowledge and ideology as a crucial aspect of 
hegemony, attending to the ways in which certain schemas of knowledge become hegemonised 
and how opportunities and tactics for effective counter-hegemony might be revealed by such 
discursively informed and oriented critiques.  In short, it attempts to provide a rough theoretical 
account and methodological map which should also indicate many further avenues for analysis of 
the myriad discursive spaces where the fissures of power and opportunities for counter-hegemonic 
praxis are exposed. 
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Discourse, culture and the knowledge economy 
 
The focus, in chapter 4, on culture and ideology as elements increasingly pertinent and even 
historically central to hegemonic struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries, continues in the 
contemporary context, where culture assumes new relevance in a late capitalist ‘knowledge 
economy’ and cultural processes and artefacts become increasingly central to economic growth in 
late capitalism as commodities in themselves.  It provides a historical backdrop for the case that a 
discourse-historical approach can reveal the changing political nature of the production of culture 
and illustrating its importance for the process of reification in constructing and maintaining 
neoliberal hegemony.   
 
The trans-disciplinary and critical roots of discourse analysis (and perhaps post-structuralism more 
generally) draws, strongly but by no means exclusively, from cultural studies, literary criticism and 
the radical critique of capitalism carried over from structuralism in the form of ‘western’ or post-
Marxism.69  This variously left leaning, critical theoretical heritage presents an explicitly political 
reading of cultural forms and practices and recognition of how they act as vital sources of resistance 
and forms of dissent.  As noted by Martin Shaw  “In periods of transition, the strongest early 
intimations of change appear in culture—before politics or economics—but these are also the least 
clear indicators of the eventual shape of the new order”  (2000: 6).  A focus on discourse provides 
greater flexibility than the more fixed approaches which might be associated with an ‘ideological 
lens’ and some of the marxist baggage associated with that approach. However, there are many 
intellectual debts owed to the older tradition of ideology critique. 
 
                                                          
69 See in particular J. Culler’s introduction in Framing the Sign (1988) which suggests Althussers work on 
‘structural causality opened the way for Jameson’s The Political Unconscious which marked a key turning 
point in Marxist literary criticism and the political implications of literature and text more generally.  On this 
see also Marx, Althusser, Jameson: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious. 
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Many counter-capitalist movements and their discourses demonstrate an acute awareness of the 
importance of culture and many advocate and pursue culturally based forms of protest, in 
traditional forms of carnival and street-theatrical protest, through more modern media such as film, 
photography and to more ‘post-modern’ forms such as culture-jamming and subvertising.  
Discursive analysis of these forms of self-representation and communication reveal aspects of their 
being, their collective subjectivities and their historical potential, which are closed to, or simply 
ignored by, other tools of analysis.  Discourse analysis then, is particularly relevant to this kind of 
study, not just for its receptiveness to a richer understanding of new forms and representations of 
capitalism and the dynamics of globalisation, but also the transversal dissident responses to them 
and the questions of power and resistance which frame these struggles.  As I will attempt to show 
here, the concepts of culture and ideology and their role in hegemonic struggles discussed in the 
previous chapter are deeply implicated in, and helpful for the understanding of, the history and 
development of discourse theoretical approaches.  
 
As Castells argues, the late twentieth century witnessed the beginning of a discernible shift in the 
nature of capitalism, one that appears to be on-going.  Not just its transition from an international 
to a global economy but a move toward an informational or knowledge based economy as distinct 
from one based predominantly around the manufacture of material products.   
 
This new economy emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth century because the information 
technology provided the indispensable, material basis for its creation.  It is the historical linkage 
between the knowledge information base of the economy, its global reach, its network based 
organisational form and the information technology revolution that has given birth to a new 
distinctive economic system. (Castells 2000:77) 
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Indeed, this process has been largely facilitated by the multiplication of the sources70 of knowledge, 
primarily through the expansion of mass communications media.  The extraordinary extent to 
which these new forms of interaction and information dissemination have proliferated has far 
reaching implications for questions of democracy, power and global governance.  As Nigel Thrift 
suggests: 
 
As knowledge has been ‘mediatized’ through new communications technologies which play a 
critical role in the disposition of objects, information and persons, becoming part of a sea of signs, 
so the rights to knowledge have become crucial since increasingly it is the co-constructive 
interaction between knowledge and the media which defines property.  (2000: 73) 
 
Thrift is drawing heavily on the insights of Michel Foucault in his persuasive argument for the need 
to examine new practices and networks of knowledge which constitute new formations of power 
above and beyond the nation state.  The function of these discursive networks of knowledge is to 
create new cultural systems of expertise (ibid.: 73).  Thrift further suggests that a vital element of 
this ‘soft power’ of late capitalism expresses itself primarily through a ‘Euro-American’ discourse of 
managerialism71 which appears to have strengthened the hand of a core of capitalist states and 
increased the salience of discursive power in a context of cultural globalisation.  Such highly 
influential ‘cultural circuits of capitalism’ illustrate the everyday workings of Foucault’s concept of 
Governmentality (see below and also Dean 1999; Burchell, Gordon and Miller eds. 1991). 
                                                          
70 If we take the internet for example, some of the fastest growing non-commercial uses of this media is the 
development of weblogs (Blogs) and wikipedia.  These texts, in wikipedia’s example, an encyclopaedic body 
of knowledge which is the product of tens of thousands of contributions and changes and ‘corrections’ to 
other entries. Here ‘balanced’ knowledge is supposedly ‘democratised’ at least to the extent limited by the 
fact that those with the most time, resources and access etc have the most discursive opportunity and thus 
carry more weight interestingly reflects the other myriad power structures which order and re-order the 
various productions of knowledge.  Despite these concerns, wikipedia appears to somewhat transgress the 
divide between subjective and objective knowledge. 
71 For a thorough discussion of the relationship between new managerialism and capitalist globalisation see 
Martin Parker’s Against Management (2002). 
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Perhaps the key contribution of Michel Foucault to our understanding of ‘late’ (or as Thrift refers 
to it as ‘soft’) capitalism, has been the examination of this fundamental relationship between 
knowledge and power, understood both in terms of the power of knowledge and the knowledge of 
power.  This intimate relation, at least for this study, becomes ever more important for the 
interpretation and understanding of capitalism with the advance of what has been called the 
knowledge economy.  A knowledge economy constitutes forms of production and services based 
on knowledge-intensive activities and which in turn contribute to a faster rate of technical and 
scientific advance and rapid obsolescence. Contemporary cultural forms such as music and fashion 
exemplify this rapid obsolescence where quality and sustainability are secondary to short term 
capital extraction.  These sectors are now almost exclusively and unquestioningly referred to as 
‘industries’ in their own right and no state government with an eye to its comparative advantage 
can afford to ignore this shift in emphasis.  An example is the marketing of ‘Cool Brittania’ by the 
UK New Labour government, exporting UK cultural capital within a discourse of branding the nation 
as young, affluent, creative – all that is desired and rewarded in ‘knowledge capitalism’ and thus 
feeding into and drawing on a range of other discourses which constitute those overarching 
discourses of ‘dynamism’, ‘progress’ and ‘growth’ that underpin neoliberalism.  
One of the key aspects of the shift to globalised post-fordist techniques of production  has been the 
tendency for multinational corporations to hive off or ‘outsource’  their manufacturing to smaller 
‘flexible labour’ operations and export processing zones in the periphery and semi-periphery where 
states seeking inward investment set up export processing zones72 while the production in the core 
nations concentrates upon the manufacture of signs, labels, branding, and other intangible 
constructions of meaning which add value and kudos to the material garments and products.    
                                                          
72 See International Labour Organisation, Bureau of Library and Information Services Resource guide on 
Export Processing Zones. 
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Central to this kind of economy then is an increased reliance on intellectual capabilities and inputs 
instead of physical skills or natural resources.  As a result, ‘value is placed increasingly upon cultural 
artefacts and the knowledge which renders them valuable’ (Powell, W and Snellman, K. 2004: 199, 
my emphasis). Clearly, the present capitalist system employs a range of discourses to shape our 
tastes and notions of value.  This is important as it rejects what appears to be the common sense 
notion that we put meaning on things, and suggests instead that the objects around us and our 
relationship to them constitute us as subjects, partly constructing our consciousness. 
 
This change in the nature of capitalist production toward more cultural artefacts not only relates to 
the consciousness of consumers who ‘value’ them but also the nature of the work and workers 
which produce them.  In addition it can be seen as directly related to the changing nature of class 
discussed earlier (see also Kees van der Pijl, 1984 and 1989) and described by Hardt and Negri: 
 
In the final decades of the twentieth century, industrial labour lost its hegemony and in its stead 
emerged “immaterial labour,” that is, labour that produces immaterial products such as 
knowledge, information, communication, a relationship or an emotional response.  (2004:108) 
 
This tendency towards a widespread commodification of more intimate, and often culturally 
specific, forms of human activity is illustrated by the increasingly familiar references to the 
knowledge worker and the knowledge economy in everyday parlance.  According to Graham,  this 
terminology “presumes forms of labour, which can be bought and sold in order to produce 
commodified artefacts of conscious experience, or knowledge commodities” (2002: 228).  A 
process of technological objectification alienates these ‘commodified artefacts’ of knowledge from 
the conscious human activity which is their source. 
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This intertwining of the cultural and economic forms of domination and homogenisation associated 
with late capitalism can be seen as a defining and central economic aspect of contemporary 
neoliberal hegemony and the new forms and practices of alienation which it constitutes.  
Furthermore, these transformations in the content and form of capitalism have an obvious effect 
on the nature of resistance to it.  Trades unions in the SIACS, traditionally formed around 
manufacturing labour and the supply of finite material resources, no longer carry the same political 
force they had in the Fordist era of production as they are geographically and spatially removed 
from the new productive and manufacturing core of the economic system.    On the profound 
implications of this transformative process of knowledge commodification and its significance for 
counter-hegemonic strategies of resistance, Frederic Jameson has argued that: 
 
Commodity production is now a cultural phenomenon, in which you buy the product fully as 
much for its image as for its immediate use.  An entire industry has come into being to design 
commodities’ images and to strategise their sale: advertising has become a fundamental 
mediation between culture and economics and it is surely to be numbered among the myriad 
forms of aesthetic production. (2000:53) 
 
The important relationship between culture, knowledge production and power/resistance, 
suggests that an analysis of discourse presents not only a valid supplementary or alternative 
methodology, but one which may have important advantages that enable it to engage more 
effectively with central aspects of global or ‘late’ capitalism. Within, and in a sense constituting, the 
broader processes of socio-economic re-scaling and re-structuring, late capitalism is reliant on new 
and instantaneous communication and media technologies and the increasing brand/logo 
awareness of corporations and consumers.  These elements combine to create new and more 
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powerful forms of advertising and marketing which themselves not only serve to sell products and 
services but also, perhaps more importantly, further embed the neoliberal globalist discourse 
underpinning the establishment of a global market society (Hooper 2001).   As people come to 
identify with certain brands and logos which are imbued with meaning through discourses of 
marketing and advertising it becomes increasingly difficult for them to challenge or even see 
beyond the current system to alternatives in which democracy is more substantially practiced.  
Consumer ‘democracy’ supplants more substantive forms of politics through discourses of ‘choice’ 
that resonate linguistically in people’s minds to notions of freedom and thus reifying individualist 
rational choice assumptions as simple ‘facts of life’.  Indeed, in this sense advertising discourse and 
the practice of branding are perhaps the key lynchpins of late capitalism as it compels the increasing 
levels of consumption required for its renewal and survival.  This compulsion to ‘grow’ and for 
‘more’, is granted widespread consent of the subjective construction of citizens as consumers in 
their inculcation into corporate discourses, absorbing repeating and disseminating them as popular 
culture and conventional wisdom (eg. ‘Just do it’; ‘because I’m worth it’; ‘we’re lovin it’; ‘the futures 
bright…’)   
 
A slightly different but equally interesting example would be the global ad campaign of HSBC which 
uses cultural differences and particularities as a means of selling a universal corporate culture (Best 
and Paterson 2010).  As Rao puts it: ‘the "keeping in place" of difference but the simultaneous 
marking of a universal’ (1996 n.p.).  These discourses demand some critical scrutiny in order that 
we begin to recognise and understand how they are doing more than merely selling a product, they 
are also shaping the knowledge that people have about themselves and the world, their very 
consciousness and the institutions which they value.  Attention to such practices and performances 
must therefore be key to understanding the nature of late capitalism, its reification of individualism, 
homogeneity, consumption and greed.  Such attention also highlights the major challenges facing 
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progressive social and political movements engaged in counter-hegemonic counter-capitalist 
praxis. An understanding of such discursive and productive power is fundamental to their project. 
 
Corporate discursive power 
 
Doris Fuchs has argued that the growing power of global corporations in the contemporary context 
of globalisation is largely and increasingly discursive in nature.  In addition to traditional schemas 
of instrumental and structural power, Fuchs suggests that the discursive element in 
corporate/business power has led to its increased legitimacy to speak and act on political issues.  
Within broader debates on global governance in which actors such as TNCs, global institutional and 
regional frameworks (WTO,IMF World Bank, EU, OECD ) and NGO’s of various persuasions are 
assumed to have growing influence over policy in relation to individual states, the main source of 
this legitimacy, according to Fuchs (2005) has been: 
 
the increasing emphasis on efficiency, competitiveness and growth in the last three decades of 
the twentieth century.  This has turned business into the politico-economic expert; the primary 
actor considered able to provide and guarantee the provision of desired goods.  Due to its 
possession of [and unrivalled access to] superior information and expertise, in combination with 
the view that complex and fast changing technological and economic environments require 
decentralised governance and flexibility in reaction. (778) 
 
These ‘discourses of globalisation’ are a central focus of this study and are closely in line with the 
discursive readings of globalisation such as those provided by Nigel Thrift (above briefly) and Ian 
Douglas (1996). 
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The availability of resources to those groups and individuals articulating this kind of discourse also 
skews this discursive power in favour of corporations.  Access to the global visual media of television 
and film for example is evermore tilted in favour of the dominance of late capitalism.  Even if the 
resources were available, mainstream networks are rarely open to disseminating messages which 
question and critique the very basis of their own corporate ‘freedom’.  The example of Adbusters’ 
attempts to purchase airtime in order to screen an advert for Buy Nothing Day met with a refusal 
by most TV companies in the US to provide airtime, even at the market rate.  Often states legislate 
against the airing of overtly ‘political’ messages, leaving the inherently and subliminally political 
message of all advertising to go largely unchallenged.  Where space is legally available, networks 
are unlikely to air paid-for anti-corporate messages as their main sponsors will likely react 
negatively, withdrawing their own campaigns from networks which do not show complete 
corporate solidarity.73  
 
Largely as a consequence of these ongoing processes of restructuring and re-scaling in the global 
economy, the political struggles which flare up in the spaces of alienation, marginalisation, silencing 
and disappropriation no longer occur at the factory gates but in forms and spaces that are more 
highly mediated and discursive.  This is mirrored somewhat by contemporary examples of 
technologized military conflict where the operators of remote ‘state of the art’ weapons are often 
far removed from the field of battle and the key conflict for the western ‘alliances’ in wars such as 
Yugoslavia and Iraq becomes the media war.  Casualties are measured in ‘public opinion’.  Indeed,  
‘one of the lessons the US Pentagon took from Vietnam was that the power of television meant 
that control of the military’s message was central to the success of their operation’ (Campbell, 
                                                          
73 See www.adbusters.org for examples of ‘subvertising’ and culture jamming in North America.  Kalle 
Lasn’s  (1999) ‘Culture Jam’ provides an account of his own frustrated attempts to buy air time on Canadian 
and USW TV networks p29-35.  
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2003:59).  The ‘winning of hearts and minds’ (for which we could supplant knowledge and 
consciousness) requires not the free flow of information but its tight control and regulation. 
 
Similarly, in the struggles over capitalism and democracy, the weapon is also increasingly the word.  
While in one sense the technologies of surveillance, coercion and control have shifted the balance 
in favour of the dominant minority, they have also been harnessed in the counter hegemonic ranks 
of democratic resistance,  The battle between public and private cyberspace has seen a 
proliferation of political movements shift much of their message to the digital medium of the 
internet.  The educational, organisational and lobbying capacity of this space has probably yet to 
reach its full potential.  Yet, consider for example the way in which the indigenous and localised 
resistance of the EZLN (Zapatistas) overcame the overbearing military might of the Mexican state 
by harnessing the internet to publicise their struggle and plight forging connections with wider 
grassroots democratic and anti-capitalist movements .74 Without this medium their message of 
largely non-violent (but lightly armed) insurrection would not have been possible. 
 
Approaches incorporating discourse analysis in its variety of forms therefore appear to be an 
especially pertinent and revealing method of studying and understanding these important 
elements of political struggle the global political economy and world politics in general.  Before 
proceeding to carry out such an analysis I will provide a more detailed account of the concept of 
discourse and its historical emergence within broader theoretical debates on the left. 
 
                                                          
74 For a detailed analysis of the Zapatista Movement see the various works of Adam David Morton 'Mexico, 
Neoliberal Restructuring and the EZLN : A neo-Gramscian Analysis', in Barry K. Gills (Ed.) Globalisation and 
the Politics of Resistance . London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 255-79. and '"La Resurrección del Maíz": 
Globalisation, Resistance and the Zapatistas', Millennium: Journal of International Studies , 31:1 (2002): pp. 
27-54. 
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From ideology to discourse 
 
The bold assertion by V.N. Voloshinov in his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, that “without 
signs there is no ideology” (1929:9)  marks an early recognition among Marxist and other left 
intellectuals of the connections between language, knowledge (consciousness) and relations of 
power.  While Gramsci can be shown to have implied the importance of language in his cultural 
reading of hegemony and ideology, it is really the lesser known Voloshinov who first makes this 
connection explicit within what might be called Marxist thought.  While these texts remained 
unpublished and largely unknown outside of Russia until the 1970s, the dominant perspective on 
language and society seems to have been shaped most strongly by the structuralism of Saussurrean 
linguistics.  In this model, which forms the early basis of linguistics and a little later sociolinguistics, 
language is conceived as system of signs where the meaning of any one element in the system is 
derived from its opposition to other elements.  For Saussure, words and images work as signs within 
language systems where the sign comprises two elements, the signifier and the signified.  The 
signifier is the actual form (word or image) itself which ‘points to’ the signified which is the 
corresponding concept in our consciousness. 
 
Saussure further distinguished between langue and parole in human language.  Parole consists, 
according to Saussure, of the acts of speaking and writing which are made possible and intelligible 
by an agreed structure or ‘system of forms’ (Culler, 1976:29), the langue.  Saussure believed that 
the langue was the important social aspect of language and could be studied, due to its fixed 
structure, scientifically.  Lacking such structure, parole on the other hand represented the infinite 
surface utterances and speech acts through which language is practiced.  Despite the flaws in 
Saussure’s theory such as his lack of attention to change in language structures and the operation 
of power in language, his approach was a key challenge to the assumption that the subject is the 
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originator of language and meaning.  Saussure showed that the codes and meanings of a language 
already exist in society and its shared cultural understandings. 
 
Saussure’s model then, is key to the emergence of what has become known as structuralism and 
influenced a range of scholarship undertaken under the structuralist banner across a range of 
disciplines.  This has been largely due to the fact that “[t]he closed structured character of language 
at the level of its rules and laws, which, according to Saussure, enabled it to be studied scientifically, 
was combined with the capacity to be free and unpredictably creative in our actual speech acts” 
(Hall 1997, 33-34).  As such it led a number of key theorists in other areas to develop his scientific 
approach to the broader study of culture and society (e.g. Levi Strauss).   It is therefore perhaps not 
so much Saussure’s narrow linguistic methodology but his more general view of language as being 
first and foremost social that is of most importance to an account of the roots of discourse theory 
and method.  
 
Importantly though, the system of signs for Saussure is decontextualised and therefore abstracted 
from the concrete lived experience of society, in a sense then it is a ‘closed system’.  As such it was 
a theory of language that largely ignored the infusions of power in language use and the way in 
which communication is itself partly constitutive of perceived ‘reality’.  This intertwining of 
(linguistic) structures and (communicative) actions in a kind of dialectic would have been familiar 
ground to those Marxists still puzzling over the contradictions of base and superstructure, culture, 
hegemony and the facilitation of revolutionary consciousness.  It is perhaps not surprising then that 
the linguistic turn and subsequent discourse-based approaches evolved through debates largely 
within the structuralism of the theoretical left and have as a result more or less consistently 
contained a critical political element of some description. 
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As a convenient but not completely arbitrary starting point for that tradition, Volosinov’s 
presentation of a Marxist inflected and thus inherently political analysis of language is remarkable. 
It is an analysis that accounts for its social context and is embedded within those struggles, 
contradictions and ambiguities of everyday life.  In contrast to the Saussurean approach, Bahktin 
and Volosinov argued that language should not be regarded and studied as a closed abstract system 
(the langue) but as it is practiced in its material everyday reality (parole).  The Marxist background 
and framework, particularly in the works attributed to Volosinov, render their reading of language 
as essentially social and rooted within the historical struggles between different social groups (or 
classes).   
 
In this way, Voloshinov provides us with an early outline for what Eagleton recognises as a 
‘materialist theory of Ideology which does not simply reduce it to a reflex of the economic ‘base’ 
but grants the materiality of the word and the discursive contexts in which it is caught up, their 
proper due”. (1991:195)   These insights are remarkable in that they were developed decades 
before similar ideas emerged in what has come to be known as ‘western Marxism’ and the broader 
debates in post-structuralism. 
 
The (re)discovery of these works proved highly influential and it is perhaps fair to say that 
Voloshinov represents ‘the father of Discourse Analysis’ (Eagleton, 1991: 195) as it is variously 
practiced today.  I will elaborate further on my own methodology for a critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) later in this chapter with more detailed and concrete examples in the next chapter.  Before 
doing so I want to lay out in some more detail the theoretical developments which have influenced 
and are still sometimes confusingly associated with that particular method of analysis and which 
have drawn on the work of Saussure and Volosinov among many others.  This is not the only route 
through which it is possible to trace the emergence of discourse as a theory and method in the 
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social sciences but attempts to highlight the left/critical and structural/post-structural tradition 
with which it is imbued and in which this work loosely situates itself. 
 
Pecheaux 
 
One of the more recent key developments in Marxist analyses incorporating a linguistic or 
discursive element is associated with Michel Pecheux in particular his Language, Semantics and 
Ideology (1975[1982]).  As a follower of Althusser, Pecheux’s contribution was to attempt to 
overcome the criticisms of the Althusserian model made by Hirst (1979: 64-8) among others.  
Pecheux drew upon Althusser’s assertion that ideology comprised not just disembodied thought 
and ideas, but occurs also in material forms.  He attempted to do this through a combination of 
Saussure’s structural linguistics with insights developed in the field of psychoanalysis based in 
particular on the work of Freud and Lacan.  Rejecting Althusser’s theory of subjectivity that was 
largely restricted to instances of recognition and misrecognition in the processes of interpellation, 
Pecheaux’s work can be seen as a welcome attempt to overcome some of the tension in Althusser’s 
still rather deterministic theory of the subject.  Borrowing some of his key terminology from 
Foucault, Pecheaux introduced the central notion of ‘discursive formations’ into what otherwise 
remained a largely Althusserian framework.  Nevertheless, his identification of discourse as an 
important material element of ideology and thus hegemony has been influential in a number of 
subsequent theoretical and methodological strands including critical linguistics and social 
semiotics.  Discursive formations, in Pecheaux’s view, consist of “that which in a given ideological 
formation […] determines what can and should be said” (1982:111 original emphasis). 
 
This kind of focus upon the narrative forms and linguistic procedures moves the analysis on to a 
new dimension of a Marxian theory of ideology, one which attends more to the material context of 
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social interaction and struggle than simply to the role of ideas and consciousness.  However, 
according to Howarth, Pecheux’s effort to go beyond the structural determinism of Althussers 
account of ideology and his development of methodological tools for a discursive social and political 
analysis do not release him sufficiently from the straitjacket of structural Marxism.  “His [Pecheux’s] 
approach remains entrapped within Saussure’s privileging of langue as a static and unconscious 
system of linguistic differences, and this militates against a historical and contingent conception of 
meaning and signification” (Howarth 2000:97).  Perhaps the key development for the concept of 
discourse over ideology then is a recognition that language is not merely the means or vehicle by 
which hegemony is achieved, it is itself a location of political struggle and counter-hegemony, 
“discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing 
for which and by which there is struggle” (Foucault in Mills p.43). 
 
Whereas critics of ideology illustrate the domination of one group over another through 
mechanisms of false consciousness (or in Althussers terminology misrecognition) in the process of 
interpellation, theories of discourse provide broader avenues for resisting and re-shaping these 
processes and structures.  While theories of ideology place some emphasis on the overthrow or 
subversion of repressive power relations, they are problematic when trying to account for this 
agency at a theoretical level.  The revolutionary subject lies at the heart of many such analyses but 
it is sometimes difficult to understand how subjects overcome the ‘false consciousness’ in which 
ideology immerses them.  Social transformation is itself considered to be embedded in the 
structural contradictions of capitalist relations of production. Discourse theory provides a means of 
understanding and revealing forms of hegemony that does not assume that subjects are purely 
passive victims of systems of thought (Mills 1997:30).  However, while Marxist perspectives of 
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history and progress lay out explicit goals of ‘Utopia’75, political practice informed by discursive 
approaches tends to produce less teleological and more complex, indeterminate and contingent 
visions of the future.  This is in part due to the similar lack of attention afforded to agency within 
some discourse theoretical approaches.  Indeed, as a result of this lack of attention to agency, many 
have argued that discourse theory, like some accounts of ideology, prevents an articulation of 
agency as humans are engulfed so deeply in discursive webs that they are unable to escape them. 
This largely depends on how one conceives of discourse.  Discourse is not simply another term for 
ideology but, as ‘a particular set of effects within ideology’ (Eagleton 1991: 194).  It does not replace 
the concept of ideology but permits a method of interpretation and revelation.  It can also respond 
to the call to restore the agency of strategic subject to political analysis (Hay 2001).  
 
Discourse then, refers not only to the dominant structures of meaning (akin to notions of ideology) 
but also, and in particular for methods of discourse analysis, to the myriad and interconnected 
subjective discursive practices which variously construct, maintain, challenge and resist those 
meanings (see Hall on Foucault in Potter, weatherall)  This focus on practice and its play within 
permeable and contingent structures of meaning reinstates a role for agency within discourse 
theory.   
Discourse and agency 
In political theory, particularly its cultural left variant, the question of agency is perhaps one of the 
most crucial questions of our time.  The theoretical ‘advances’ of the 20th century, discussed briefly 
in this and the previous chapters, appear to have stranded many on the political left, leaving them 
                                                          
75 Thomas More’s use of the term referred more to a vision of something that he probably believed could 
not be achieved in reality.  “It is a world of dreams, a world beyond existence” (see: http://www.online-
literature.com/more/utopia/ ) The term "utopia" is in all probability combined from 2 Greek words - "not" 
(ou) and "place" (topos), thus meaning "nowhere".  More cleverly  created the word "utopia" to suggest 
two Greek neologisms simultaneously: outopia (no place) and eutopia (good place). In this original context, 
the word carried few of the modern connotations associated with it.  
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in need of new foundations to build a political project.  These foundations have often been found 
in the personal realm of identity politics where ‘the personal is the political’ (Klein 2000).  A 
reluctance and widespread suspicion (verging sometimes on embarrassment) with broader political 
aims and movements of a collective nature also resonates with a common resignation to the 
dominant system displayed in common parlance phrases like ‘you can’t buck the market’.  The 
hesitancy of critical perpectives to lay out definite goals for society and concrete programmes for 
social change is matched with a popular depoliticisation where it is assumed that there is no 
alternative to the system.  This hesitancy on the part of social theorists and political philosophers 
comes understandably with the lessons of twentieth century history in which some of the best 
intentions have brought some wretched consequences and western/global ‘civilisation’ to its brink.  
The discursivity of ideological structures, revealed by a close critical focus on textual practices, 
renders structures of domination more vulnerable to alteration but falls short of any utopianism.   
We may be reminded of Gramsci’s famous dictum regarding a pessimism of the intellect combined 
with an optimism of the will. 
 
So, with the provisos of extreme caution, consistent reflection and self-critique, political agency in 
the form of radical democratic social movements can progress despite the essential recognition 
that power cannot be eliminated from social relations and political practice, or indeed any form of 
communication or signification.  Such movements must in this sense be open to agonistic models 
of democracy in which conflict is assumed to be an inherent element of the democratic process. 
Progressive politics then entails the construction of institutions that allow or even require these 
conflicts to play out at the discursive level and limits the possibility for forms of domination either 
through direct physical force or more structural forms of violence.  Agency is about the freedom 
and ability for subjects to construct and voice alternative discourses which contest and potentially 
undermine existing orders of discourse. 
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Roland Bleiker suggests that this “alleged inability to speak of agency is largely a reflection of anti-
postmodern polemic, rather than a position that is inherent to or advocated by most authors that 
have sought to apply a discursive approach to the study of social and political phenomena” 
(2003:26).  I will return to issues of agency again in more detail in the final chapter (6) in relation to 
concepts of agonistic democracy and the challenge of Foucault’s critics to these ends in particular 
will be addressed in this chapter below. 
 
In this brief section I have attempted to show how developments in the Marxist theory of ideology 
have led toward some convergence with post-structuralism and critical concepts of discourse have 
emerged therein.  They have created a theoretical space which, despite some considerable 
limitations, has maintained it’s critical, political and perhaps even emancipatory assumptions that 
now reside within much contemporary discourse theory and method.  This convergence occurs 
most fully in the work of Laclau and Mouffe whose theory of discourse, drawing on Foucault, 
Derrida and Lacan, rejects much of the Marxist theory of ideology and ultimate determinacy.  I will 
return to the work of Laclau and Mouffe following a more general account of the concept of 
discourse within poststructuralism and more specifically the work of Michel Foucault and the 
contributions brought to the debate by his theorising of power.  
 
Discourse theory: beyond structuralism? 
Perhaps partly for some of the reasons outlined at the beginning of this chapter, recent years have 
seen the concept of discourse play an increasingly significant role in the social sciences.  Its 
theoretical perspectives and methods of analysis are deployed across an expanding set of 
disciplines by a growing number of scholars. I suggest this is more than simply an intellectual fashion 
but a response to the increasingly textual and immaterial social universe that we inhabit.  
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Unsurprisingly then, among these scholars, a wide and proliferating range of definitions has been 
applied to the term.  Some, narrowly defined, concentrate upon single utterances or speech acts, 
others such as Derrida associate the concept with the entire social system and regard discourse as 
literally constituting the social and political world.  While others such as Foucault apply the term in 
a variety of ways: 
 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word discourse, I believe I have in 
fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes 
as an individualized group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a 
number of statements.  (Foucault 1972, cited in Mills 1997:6) 
 
Amid this relative confusion, this section will begin to clarify my own use of the term for the purpose 
of the subsequent analysis.  As the title of this chapter suggests, a significant part of the problem in 
this area stems from the fact that discourse refers to both a theory and a method in the social 
sciences.  Before proceeding to outline some methodological aspects of discourse, I want to discuss 
its more recent theoretical development in some detail and so as to explain further why such a 
methodological approach is warranted. 
 
In a sense both following and diverging somewhat from Foucault, I retain and elaborate briefly upon 
the ‘macro’ notion of ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘discursive formations’ in which the term is used to 
describe an overarching structure that attempts to fix meanings and representations according to 
dominant interests. In short, the meta-discourses which engender and maintain neoliberal 
hegemony at the macro level.  In addition however, I undertake a slightly more systematic approach 
which scrutinises some of the micro discourses which are both shaped by and constitutive of the 
overarching orders of discourse.  This position is consonant with (and influenced by) much of 
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Foucault’s work on domination and power which also presses this point.  I return to questions of 
power in the work of Foucault in more detail below (and how his insights have been developed and 
somewhat re-worked by Laclau and Mouffe). Before doing so, and in line with the broader analysis 
of Gramscian moves from structural Marxism to the more discursively oriented and post-structural 
approaches of Laclau and Mouffe, I want to discuss how the development of post-structuralism 
evolved more broadly from structuralist social theory and philosophy. 
 
Structuralism and Post-structuralism 
Most, if perhaps not all, of these discursive approaches owe something to the general move from 
structuralism toward post-structuralism within western philosophy and critical social theory.  Going 
back a little further, the language games of the later Wittgenstein should also be seen as important 
and influential.  However, there remains considerable debate and disagreement regarding what 
actually represents a post-structuralist position or mode of thought.  It would perhaps be more 
accurate to refer to it as a range of positions or schools of thought.  What does seem to be a 
common thread running through these perspectives though, is some form of response to, or 
reformulation of, structuralist thought.  Indeed, some scholars even prefer the term neo-
structuralism tending to de-emphasise the difference/separation between their work and 
structuralists such as Levi Strauss and Saussure for example and furthermore to acknowledge the 
intellectual debts owed to these influential thinkers (Peters 2001). 
 
Perhaps the common theme, which draws these neo- and post-structuralist thinkers together, is a 
concern with textuality and the important and complex relationship to which I have alluded already 
between language, knowledge and power.  These developments have come to be referred to by 
some as the ‘linguistic turn’ in social science and they have emerged in a period really since the late 
1960s and early 70s.  Such a turn entails a shift in stance that rejects, in David Campbell’s words an 
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“epistemic realism, whereby the world comprises material objects whose existence is independent 
of ideas and beliefs about them” in favour of “a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the 
improbability of cataloguing, calculating and specifying ‘real causes’, concerning itself instead with 
considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another” (1993: 7-8). 
 
If however, one were to identify a distinct theoretical break from structuralist linguistics then some 
mention should be made of Jaques Derrida’s critique of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic 
structuralism.  The important question of just how and where meaning resided in language was the 
key issue in this initial post-structuralist move embodied in Derrida’s Writing and Difference (1967).  
In this seminal text, Derrida sought to remedy the deficiencies (discussed above) he saw in 
Saussure’s work, characterised narrowly by his emphasis on speech as opposed to writing and a 
broader critique of language and society as closed or fixed systems.  However, the political salience 
of Derrida’s work is drawn into question by a number of writers, including Foucault and others 
associated with the post-strucural movement. His assertion that “there are nothing but signs…   
nothing outside the text… [and that] the thing itself is a sign” (1976: 49-50), might give us reason to 
wonder what space for political agency and radical democratic projects exists in the light of such 
assertions. 
 
Notwithstanding these claims, others have perceived important political implications in the work 
of Derrida and his ideas have been undeniably influential for the development of discourse theory 
and method across a range of disciplines.  His concept of deconstruction, outlined briefly below, 
has been particularly useful for methods of discourse analysis.  In another related vein, Howarth 
notes that “Derrida’s conceptual infrastructures and logics, when articulated with concepts and 
logics gleaned from thinkers such as Marx, Heidegger and Foucault are vitally important for 
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analysing all types of social and political discourse” (2000: 47).  I have attempted to show already 
how concepts of discourse emerged largely from the critical tradition initiated by Marx. Foucault is 
perhaps the only figure of equal significance and his own valuable contributions are discussed in 
the following section of this chapter.   In particular, Derrida’s ideas have influenced the explicitly 
political and post-Marxist analyses of Laclau and Mouffe, to whom I shall turn briefly at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
The importance of language and textually as relational, which post-structuralism draws from the 
structural linguistics of Saussure, distinguishes it from other approaches that share a concern with 
the social construction of meaning.  Alexander Wendt, for example, comes near to a discursive 
approach as he defines social structures as “shared knowledge, material resources and 
practices”(1995: 73). However, as we have seen, many thin constructivists such as Wendt remain 
receptive to a positivist epistemology, acknowledging the relevance of causal analyses and scientific 
principles.  There is a sense in these works that social science should seek to mirror the explanatory 
potential of the natural sciences.  Indeed, Onuf maintains that “constructivists need not repudiate 
positivism just because it is liable to criticism” (1997:8).  Such criticism comes largely from post-
structuralists who are generally sceptical of all forms of positivist knowledge.  Flyvbjerg (2001)76 
provides an interesting discussion of this theme in his Making Social Science Matter in which he 
abandons the quest for an explanatory social science in favour of a Phronetic one which is based in 
the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom and follows from four key questions which should guide 
social research:    Where are we going?  Is this development desirable?  Who gains and who loses, 
and by which mechanisms of power? What, if anything, should we do about it?  The point is that 
critical scholarship and research can proceed effectively without a denial of foundations.  I do not 
                                                          
76 See also Noel 1999 and Sanford and Caterino 2006. 
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suggest that interpreting texts is the only way to accurately gain understanding of the world but 
one among many possible critical alternatives    
 
The distinctive way then, in which discourse theory is distinguishable from much social 
constructivism, is that emphasis is placed upon the relationship in which things are located in a 
system of signs and more importantly, the way in which these relations distinguish one object from 
another within that sign system.  This line of thinking perhaps represents a key insight of 
structuralist thought drawn from disciplines as diverse as linguistics, anthropology, psychoanalysis 
and literary criticism.  Indeed, it is the relational aspect that represents structuralism’s most 
important contribution to social inquiry in general and the development of discourse analysis in 
particular as a method in the social sciences.  Words, objects, events ideas and activities have no 
meaning in themselves—they only make sense in relation to other words, objects, events ideas and 
activities.  To illustrate the point, Saussure (1974) gives the example of the word ‘man’ which he 
suggests can have no meaning except in relation to other words such as woman, boy or animal.  
While these ideas draw heavily upon the work of Saussure, they have been developed and refined, 
primarily through Derrida’s (1981) philosophy, to highlight the way in which relationships are 
structured largely in terms of ‘binary oppositions’ e.g. rational/irrational, modern/primitive, 
educated/ignorant   Derrida’s key insight then was the hierarchy of signs where the valorisation of 
one end of the opposition works to vilify and denigrate the supposedly opposing term.  In this way 
it is possible to recognise the workings of power within our systems of language and 
communication.  The notion of social and cultural construction still holds but can be shown to 
operate at a more fundamental discursive level.   
 
Derrida introduced a strategy for undermining the inherent hierarchy of these oppositions known 
as deconstruction. 
215 
 
 
In a traditional philosophical opposition we have not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms but a 
violent hierarchy.  One of the terms dominates the other (axiologically, logically ), occupies the 
commanding position.  To deconstruct the opposition is above all, at a particular moment, to reverse 
the hierarchy. (Positions 56-57/41,cited in Culler 1982: 85)  
 
An approach to processes of neoliberal globalisation and resistive agency, which draws on the 
insights of post-structuralism, must therefore incorporate an attempt to identify and deconstruct 
such binary oppositions within the discourses of neoliberal governance and political economy.  It is 
worth remembering that such oppositions are not restricted to neoliberal conceptions of political 
economy but also characterise many Marxist notions of base/superstructure in which the political 
and cultural processes are merely contingent upon and hence subordinated to the particular form 
of economic production.  A key aim of post-structuralism and in particular the post-Marxism of 
Laclau and Mouffe is to deconstruct this deterministic account of political economy.  This 
commonality between two otherwise diametrically opposed worldviews displays their shared 
heritage in Enlightenment thought and subsequent moves in western philosophy and social theory.  
It highlights the extent to which the debates over globalisation, neoliberalism, and social justice 
reflect the predominantly western episteme within which all these struggles play out.  Derrida’s 
legacy therefore bears heavily upon any approach to the social sciences which addresses the 
(re)construction of meaning and representations of 'truth' through an analysis of language or, more 
broadly, discourse.  The shift to a broader definition of discourse as something more than just 
linguistic signification was also a key element in the work of Michel Foucault who, as we have seen, 
has been hugely influential in the development of discourse theory and method, particularly in 
relation to power, knowledge and the subject. 
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Foucault and Power 
In many respects the work of Michel Foucault spans the rickety theoretical bridge between Marxist 
inflected theories of ideology and later post-structuralist positions which have been largely 
responsible for the further development of the concept of discourse in the social sciences.  It is 
possible to regard much of Foucault’s contributions as a response to, and dialogue with, the term 
‘ideology’’and Marxism more generally. For Foucault, discourse offered a more nuanced concept 
than ideology, in which he found three key ‘difficulties’: 
 
The first is that, whether one wants it to be or not, it is always in virtual opposition to something 
like the truth… The second inconvenience is that it refers, necessarily I believe, to something like 
a subject.  Thirdly, ideology is in a secondary position in relation to something which must function 
as the infrastructure or economic material determinant for it.  (Foucault 1979: 36) 
 
Foucault is widely associated with post-structuralist and post-modern thought, yet some 
commentators have identified a strong structuralist remnant in his early works such as The Order 
of Things and The Archeology of Knowledge.  Foucault however later distanced himself from what 
he regarded as the formalism of structuralist thinking but was equally unhappy with the 
postmodernist label.  It is perhaps his genealogical works in which he developed his concept of 
power more fully that began to display a greater distance from some of his earlier more structuralist 
assumptions. 
 
The overarching contribution that Foucault made to political thought has been to highlight the ways 
in which historical conditions and configurations of power influence the ways in which knowledge 
is produced and thus the way in which society classifies, thinks, values, discriminates, makes 
judgements   Like many continental (especially French) post-structuralist philosophers, much of his 
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work can be seen at least partly as a response to the failure of Marxist analyses to sufficiently 
account for the continued survival of capitalism following what appeared to many to be it’s 
impending decline in the late 1960’s and early 70’s.  His work is therefore important to this study 
at a number of levels.  Foucault was directly involved in the anti-capitalist student protests in France 
in 196877  and his work has therefore developed (and duly altered course) in the historical light of 
late capitalism (what some would call the postmodern era).  Foucault was conscious of the effects 
of that historical context on his ideas and work, indeed, such effects were a central concern for 
much of his research.  Despite numerous claims to the contrary, his work represents a politically 
important critique of capitalism due perhaps chiefly to his insights into the workings and 
insinuations of power.  These are revealing not just for a clearer understanding of late capitalism, 
but also useful as ideas for counter-hegemonic practice; in Foucault’s words ‘as a spanner or a 
screwdriver to short circuit, discredit or smash systems of power, including those from which my 
books emerged […] so much the better” (quoted in Mills 1997:17)  He thus suggests an approach 
to the study of power relations that is: 
 
more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations 
between theory and practice.  It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of 
power a s a starting point.  To use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance a s a chemical 
catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out there point of application 
and methods used.  Rather than analysing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it 
consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies. (1986: 211) 
                                                          
77 Much of the recent literature on ‘anti-capitalism’ has emerged from  ‘anti-globalisation’ and as such 
locates the movement historically as emerging in the 1990’s.  A number of commentators and activists 
however stress a longer lineage.  The 1968 protests in Paris were part of a broader international resistance 
which linked protests in the US (civil rights) Mexico and elsewhere.  In France the involvement of the PCF 
and trade unions in mass strikes gave it a particular anti-capitalist slant. see the 1968 declaration of the PCF 
Secretary General Waldeck-Rochet at: http://www.Marxists.org/history/france/may-1968/lhumanite-05-
25.htm. 
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 Foucault’s critical approach to modernity led many to label him postmodern or even  anti modern 
and nihilist, but this would be a mistake.  He regarded himself as neither and resisted attempts of 
others to classify him and his intellectual endeavours.  He famously demanded: “Do not ask who I 
am and do not ask me to remain the same. More than one person, doubtless like me, writes in 
order to have no face.” (Foucault, What is an Author, cited in Butler 2005:111). Much of his work, 
as I will attempt to show, demonstrates a commitment to democratic ideals of freedom (admittedly 
somewhat removed from the liberal limitations of parliamentary and representative forms) and the 
clear influence of key democratic thinkers of the enlightenment, Kant, Marx and Nietzche. 
 
The Foucault/Habermas debate: discourse, democracy and power 
While the German social theorist Jurgen Habermas is rarely, if at all, considered in the canon of 
discourse theorists, he did produce a highly influential account of discourse ethics which are 
considered to be a robust critique of Foucault from within the critical tradition.  As a result his work 
is of considerable relevance for this thesis. His work has been widely compared and contrasted to 
that of Foucault and other postmodernists/poststructuralists (see Peters, 2001 p.55-6, Kelly, 1994 
and Flyvberg, 2001).  
 
This is an important debate as there exist within progressive movements for democracy and justice 
deep divisions as to the understanding, usefulness and validity of universal concepts of democracy 
and human rights.  The Foucault/Habermas debate speaks to many of the real divisions and fissures 
between and within neoliberalism and alter-globalism.  Indeed, what might be termed the ‘human 
rights movement’ in its formal UN centred sense, is itself in some dilemma as to the reconciliation 
of indigenous and minority rights with traditional liberal democratic civic principles.  The arguments 
of Habermas and Foucault map roughly onto one reading of global political struggles as liberal 
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enlightenment values of human rights and progress (Habermas) running up against the more 
particularist relativisms of communitarian sometimes conservative and often national politics.78  
 
In a similar way the disagreements between Habermas and Foucault reflect rather closely the 
theoretical bases of each side of what might be termed the schism of the contemporary left.   The 
apparent irreconcilability of these positions reflects one of the key challenges for alter-globalist 
movements, the divisions and disagreements between reform and revolt.  These can often in turn 
reflect similar fissures between those who pursue ‘direct action’ politics, including damage to 
property, and elements which take a more dialogical route of ‘pressure politics’ (in places equally 
difficult and dangerous and often more so).  This spiky/fluffy debate assumes greater significance 
for political activists in light of the ‘Global War on Terror’ where any such ‘active’ opposition to the 
current order is increasingly met with the full force of the state.79    These conflicting discourses will 
be discussed in more detail later but will be somewhat clearer in the light of a summary of the often 
contrasted Habermasian and Foucauldian approaches.  Furthermore, I suggest Habermas’ 
formulations reveal many reasons why the work of Foucault is so important to the study of 
contemporary global struggles.  
 
Habermas’ analyses and practical suggestions provide early intimations of the kinds of debates 
circling in the current progressive/radical democratic, counter-capitalist and alter-globalist 
networks and his status provided important impetus and theoretical foundations for such networks 
and their goals, to become the objects of widespread social scientific analysis (eg. Della Porta and 
Diani 2006; Doerr, 2007).  Habermas’ ideas apply to a broad spectrum of issues and of particular 
interest to this study are his earlier suggestion that New Social Movements, as supposed 
                                                          
78 indeed, Habermas once referred to Foucault as a young conservative, see Fraser (1985). 
79 Although Bondaroff (2008) notes that such external threats such as religious terrorism may have led state 
security agencies to pay relatively less attention to domestic ‘ecotage’ since 9/11. 
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practitioners of a ‘communicative rationality’ attempting to enact an ‘ideal speech situation’, might 
represent the best hope for models of a radical pluralist democracy and represent key agents in the 
reclamation of the public sphere from the encroachment of the capitalist system upon the 
‘lifeworld’.  This tension between public and private spheres identified early on by Habermas has 
been influential in the framing of globalisation resistance debates of recent years.80  These claims 
will be discussed in more detail in the last chapter on social movements and anti-capitalist/alter-
globalist networks. For this chapter I want to focus more specifically, if briefly, on Habermas’ use of 
the term discourse, primarily to demonstrate why the work of Michel Foucault is so important to 
the claims of this thesis. 
 
Despite their rather different understandings of the term, both Foucault and Habermas both 
regarded the concept of discourse as central to understanding the democratic project, however, 
the way in which they conceive these terms, and their respective understanding of the relationship 
between them is markedly different.  Habermas developed a more empowering notion of discourse 
in which democracy is underpinned by universal human reason which connotes, in the form of an 
ultimate communicative rationality, “a non-coercively unifying, consensus building force of a 
discourse in which participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favour of a 
rationally motivated agreement” (Habermas 1987:315). 
 
Largely due to his assertion that new social movements might be the bearers of new forms of 
democracy, Habermas’ work has attracted much attention and interest in recent political theory.  
His work has often been explicitly geared toward political investigations, specifically around 
                                                          
80 Naomi Klein, perhaps one of the most publicly known commentators on these issues frames the problem 
in very much this way, suggesting that in opposition to rampant privatisation of everything “people are 
reclaiming bits of nature and culture and saying ‘this is going to be public space’” NLR 9, May-June 2001: 82. 
Much of Habermas’ project is oriented to this goal of reclaiming a public or common sphere for democratic 
dialogue. 
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democracy and changes in the public sphere.  More recently his own work has taken a linguistic 
turn most famously in his Theory of Communicative Action.  As a result one might expect his work 
to be as relevant to the study of anti-corporate and counter-capitalist movements as that of 
Foucault.  As Gemma Edwards suggests “The existence of the anti-corporate Movement has once 
again unleashed Habermas’ potential for analytic insight into the realms of contemporary social 
theorising” (2004: 127) However, I suggest that Habermas attention to power (or rather the lack of 
it) limits his analysis in a number of ways which a Foucauldian approach can improve upon.  
 
As a young member of the Frankfurt School, Habermas sought to rescue the enlightenment project 
from the death which Adorno and Horkhiemer had proclaimed for it.81 The post-war German 
context of his writing unsurprisingly influenced Habermas and other members of the Frankfurt 
School in a number of ways.  Like his colleagues, Habermas was understandably sceptical about the 
supposed promises of modernity but regarded the enlightenment ideals and the emancipatory 
project contained therein too important to be dismissed.  His theory of communicative rationality 
argued that social conflicts could be resolved through what he termed an ideal speech situation.  
This argument has been influential in the ideals and philosophy underlying the recent construction 
of social forums as spaces to challenge the neoliberal forums such as Davos and G8 etcetera.   
 
Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ elaborates five necessary conditions or requirements which must be 
met to ensure an ideal communication situation:  Firstly, the requirement of generality. All parties 
affected by the debate should have equal opportunity to be involved in the discourse.  Second, 
                                                          
81 Dialectic of Enlightenment, written in the 1940s and first published in 1947, showed how Enlightenment 
norms had turned into their opposite, how democracy had produced fascism, reason had produced 
unreason, as instrumental rationality created military machines and death camps, and the culture industries 
were transforming culture from an instrument of Bildung and enlightenment into an instrument of 
manipulation and domination’ (see Foucault’s Subject and power and the discussion in Kellner 1989, 
Chapter 4). Quoted from Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention by Kellner 
www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/habermas.htm accessed 16/6/05. 
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autonomy; the process of discourse must allow all participants equal opportunities to have their 
arguments’ claims to validity presented and evaluated.  Thirdly, ideal role taking demands that 
participants must be willing and able to empathise with the validity claims of all involved in the 
debate.  Fourth, the eradication of power differentials among those participating in the discourse 
such that the arrival at consensus is not affected by these inequalities and finally fifth, the intentions 
and goals of those involved must be made explicit so as to discourage strategic action by 
participants.  In short then we can summarise the above as generality, autonomy, ideal role taking, 
power neutrality and transparency are required to provide the ideal speech situation in which 
democratic decision-making finds its full realisation (Dahlberg 2005).  Flyvberg rather cynically adds 
to these the sixth possible requirement of “unlimited time” (2001: 91).  While some commentators 
have pointed toward the European and World Social Forums as close to enacting at least some 
version of Habermas’ ideal.  Others have asserted that Habermas’ work provides a model around 
which the forums could be organised (Wenman 2008; Doerr in Teune 2010).   
 
It is perhaps with the last two of these that Habermas’ conceptualisation of power can be shown to 
be lacking and thus problematic for Habermas’ commendable project of realising more substantive 
and participatory forms of democracy.  In this work, power is the pink elephant sitting in the corner 
of the room about which Habermas refuses to comment, depite his earlier criticisms of Gadamer 
for overlooking power in his discussions of dialogue.82  It would be incorrect to suggest that 
considerations of power are entirely absent from Habermas work but in this particular strand of his 
philosophy he appears to assume that its effects can somehow be eradicated.  He is not sufficiently 
clear however on just how this might be achieved. 
 
                                                          
82 See: http://www.press.jhu.edu/books/hopkins_guide_to_literary_theory/jurgen_habermas.html. 
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This insufficient attention to, or misunderstanding of power, by Habermas in processes of discourse 
and dialogue is challenged by Foucault whose contributions to the theorisation of power have been 
little short of revolutionary and spawned a great deal of controversy and criticism.  Foucault’s own 
recognition of the problem gives a clue as to the nature of some of these criticisms when he asks: 
 
Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be 
asserted as a basis for analytical work.  But this analytical work cannot proceed without an 
ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought – a constant 
checking. (Foucault 1986: 209) 
 
Despite this often overlooked commitment to democracy and refusal to be ‘blackmailed’ by the 
enlightenment ideals Foucault rejects the unquestioning faith in human rationality.  This does not 
represent anything like a synthesis as such, the basic premises of these respective ‘giants’ remain 
starkly at odds.  Indeed, summing up what appears to be the crux of this debate and in rather stark 
opposition to Habermasian optimism, Foucault declares that:  
 
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal 
reciprocity, where the rule of law [the writing of constitutions] finally replaces warfare; humanity 
installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination (In Rabinow 1991: 85 [brackets added]). 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible for elements of each to inform the current analysis.  Foucault authorised 
such an option in his invitation that his works be seen as a toolkit from which to draw and pursue 
new lines of inquiry.  At the same time, the very breadth and scope of Habermas’ contributions 
reveal a range of theoretical elements which might be deployed in any number of ways.  
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Drawing heavily upon and further pursuing this line of thought for the contemporary climate of 
multiculturalism and ‘international terrorism’, further critique of Habermas comes from more 
recent work by Mouffe who also stresses the impossibility of eradicating conflict from human social 
relations and rejects Habermas’ assertion that ‘liberal’ democracy, underpinned by the rule of law, 
represents the most effective model for a global democratic project.  (Mouffe and agonistic 
politics83) 
 
While this thesis does not represent a strictly Foucauldian analysis (if indeed such a thing can exist), 
the work of Foucault has been influential in a number of ways and his contribution to the 
development of discourse theory has been huge.  Without doubt, many of the arguments in this 
work would have met with Foucault’s disapproval (not least perhaps the more systematic textually 
oriented discourse analysis demonstrated in later Chapters).  The introduction to this thesis made 
explicit my departure from some post-structuralist positions which limit the possibility for 
emancipatory projects while adopting some of the more nuanced conceptions of power developed 
in or at least influenced by that theoretical tradition.  Foucault is no exception; his work has often 
been criticized for foreclosing any prospects for radical democracy.  It is Foucault, perhaps beyond 
any other theorist of the late 20th century, who has applied  the concept of discourse in such close 
relation to that  of power.  It is this contribution which I seek to discuss in what follows. 
 
As I have suggested, the shift from structuralism to post-structuralism and the assumed distinctions 
between them are a little blurred.  In a similar fashion, while Foucault’s work is sometimes 
discussed as a shift from a largely structuralist position to a post-structural and post-modern 
direction, such a shift is debatable. This supposed theoretical development has been the source of 
                                                          
83 Mouffe deploys Wittgensteinian insights to question the problematic universalising tendencies of 
Habermas’ claims that liberal democracy holds the possibility for emancipatory politics (see: 
http://them.polylog.org/2/amc-en.htm) 
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much discussion among Foucauldian scholars and beyond.  While it is not my intention to rehearse 
these debates in any detail here, the unnecessary controversy over the extent of the change relates 
to the view that the distinction between structuralism and poststructuralism is often overstated 
and undeniably contentious.  Foucault himself commented upon the criticisms of his changing 
stance replying that he should have worked for all these years merely to say the same thing?  
 
It is perhaps best to begin by showing how Foucault extended the concepts of language and 
semiosis to consider discourse as a system of representation.  Moving away from the structuralism 
of Barthes and Saussure and hinting at the inherently political and conflictual nature of discourse 
Foucault asserted that the: 
 
point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of 
war and battle.  The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that 
of a language: relations of power are not relations of meaning. (1980: 114) 
 
This concern with the conflictual nature of discourse, echoing somewhat the earlier insights of 
Volosinov, betrays a remnant of Marxism in Foucault’s thought. However, moving beyond Hegelian 
Marxism of Althusser and the semiotics of Barthes and Saussure, he argued: 
 
Neither the Dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, 
can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts.  ‘Dialectic’ is a way of evading the always 
open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian Skeleton, and ‘semiology’ is a 
way of avoiding its violent bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of 
language and dialogue. (1980: 114-115) 
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 The key point in the work of Foucault then, which distinguishes it from the earlier semiology of 
Saussure and Barthes, was the move from studying language, to a conception of discourse as a 
system of representation where power and thus conflict are a central feature.  Discourse had been 
previously understood as a purely linguistic concept, meaning passages of connected writing or 
speech.  Foucault’s contribution expanded the concept of discourse to incorporate the overarching 
rules and practices that give meaning to statements and regulate discourse in particular historical 
periods.  According to Hall (1992:291) the new meaning which Foucault attributed to discourse in 
which it referred to a collection of statements that provide a common language through which 
historically situated subjects attribute meaning to objects of knowledge.  The term refers to those 
combined statements which serve as a language for discussing a particular topic during a specified 
historical juncture. 
 
In short then, much of the empirical analysis in what follows in the next chapters will attempt to 
show how the hegemony of a dominant neoliberal historic bloc is maintained and potentially 
challenged by discursive practices and formations.  Foucault’s genealogical work is relevant as it 
helps understand how those specific discourses emerged and as such may provide some indication 
of how they may be effectively challenged and altered.  As such, in sharp contrast to the claim that 
Foucault’s work forecloses possibilities for articulating resistance and creating alternatives, I 
suggest that it serves to highlight the workings of power (which without an inherent understanding 
of resistance would be completely meaningless) in such a way as to expose new opportunities for 
transformation.   
 
I have alluded already to the variety of ways in which Foucault employed the term discourse.  In his 
early writings he pioneered the concept in what have come to be known as his ‘archaeological’ 
writings.  In these Foucault advanced a notion of discourse as constituting or constructing society 
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along various dimensions. For instance, social relationships, identities and shared cultural 
understandings (or common sense in Gramsci’s terms), a realm of intersubjectivity. 
 
The meaning of objects, the knowledge people have about them does not exist independently of 
references to them.  They are constructed, maintained and transformed in discourse according to 
the rules of a particular discursive formation.  Using the example of madness, and how its meaning 
was constructed within the discourse of psychpathology since the nineteenth century, Foucault 
argued that ‘mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, explained it…’(1972:32) However, in defining a discursive formation we 
need to take account of the fact that objects of knowledge are not fixed or stable.  They are subject 
to transformation, either within a particular discursive formation or between one formation and 
another.  
 
Clearly then, the concept of discourse is closely linked to forms and applications of knowledge and 
this relationship requires some further discussion.  It might be useful to begin with some 
consideration of what is meant by ‘knowledge’.  I refer here in the main to what I call cultural 
knowledge as distinct from personal or group knowledge.  Personal knowledge is that which 
represents the sum of our daily experiences such as conversations, news reports   Group knowledge 
is that shared by distinct social groups eg corporations, social movements, scientists   According to 
van Dijk, such knowledge ‘may be biased and ideological and not be recognised as ‘knowledge’ by 
other groups at all, but be characterised as mere ‘belief’.  Indeed, knowledge is regarded in its 
broadest sense here as more than simply recognition but something more akin to notions of 
consciousness discussed in the previous chapter 
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CDA: Theory and Methodology 
Among the variety if sub-fields which can be said to operate with a concept of discourse, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) has come to align itself with an explicit political agenda.  This above all 
marks it out as a distinct approach within the field of discourse.  The nature of the problems which 
CDA is concerned is different in principle from those methods which do not determine their interest 
in advance.  Indeed, “the line drawn between social scientific research, which ought to be 
intelligible, and political argumentation is sometimes crossed […] since it endeavours to make 
explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden, and thereby to derive results which are 
of practical relevance” (Meyer in Wodak and Meyer 2001: 15). 
 
CDA refers to field of research which emerged as Critical Linguistics (CL) at the University of East 
Anglia in the 1970s and associated primarily with the work of fowler, Kress etcetera and drew 
substantially on the work of Halliday and Frankfurt school (critical theory).  The emerging field of 
CDA has a number of elements that distinguish it as a distinct approach to the social sciences.  Based 
largely around the journal entitled ‘Discourse and Society’ and evoking a strong 
interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary focus, CDA directs its research toward empowering marginalized 
groups and subaltern subjects.  It can therefore be said to have a strong political focus and 
recognition of the interrelationship between political commitments and research interests.  The 
methods invariably involve and investigation into the ways in which certain discursive 
representations come to dominate within a particular field of practice. 
 
In contrast to some other fields of discourse analysis, CDA regards texts alone as insufficient objects 
of enquiry.  For the analysis to be critical, attention must be paid to describing and theorizing the 
social processes and historical structures through which texts are produced as well as those within 
which actors create meanings in their interaction with texts (Wodak in Wodak and Meyer 2001:3)  
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As such, the concepts of power, history and ideology must be central to any CDA as they are to any 
critical enquiry.  CDA is unlike more traditional forms of sociolinguistics, and conversation analysis 
which are seen by many critical linguists as conceiving of language as an autonomous system, 
insufficiently correlated to the variables of social context.  Such simple and often deterministic 
accounts of the relationship between texts and the social are largely avoided by CDA. 
 
Despite the range of methodologies pursued within this perspective in terms of the kinds of text 
analysed, how they are gathered , Critical discourse scholars agree that texts must be closely and 
consistently related to the social context or ‘order of discourse’ as such, the research ‘oscillates  
between a focus on structure and a focus on action’ (Fairclough in Wodak and Meyer, 2001:124).  
The following quote from van Dijk clearly illustrates this distinction and commitment: 
 
Instead of focusing on purely academic or theoretical problems, it starts from prevailing social 
problems, and thereby chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyses 
those in power, those who are responsible, and those who have the means and the opportunity 
to solve such problems. (1986: 4) 
 
The key points of CDA can be summarized as follows: 
 
● Language and other semiotic forms are seen as a social practice. 
● Theory and method are explicitly related but a range of theoretical and methodological 
approaches are pursued 
● All discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood in reference to their social 
context. 
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● A focus on concepts of intertextuality—the way in which discourses draw upon and influence 
each other. 
● A critical approach—research plays a practical advocatory role for the marginalized and 
disempowered.  
 
We can see how these necessary criteria for discourse analysis method owe a great deal to the 
theoretical insights of a long tradition of critical thought which has engaged with language as a site 
of political struggle and social analysis.  Before proceeding further however it is necessary to return 
briefly to the key problem which this thesis attempts to address. 
 
While concepts of ideology and discourse are not the same thing they are so intimately related that 
there has been a temptation to simply switch from discussions of one to the other in the vain hope 
we can dispense with the difficulties of the former. Indeed, CDA inherits much of the difficult and 
contentious baggage that comes with the analysis of ideology and arranges it in accordance with a 
normative and critical commitment to emancipation for the multitude (thereby encompassing the 
social, cultural, gender, racial ); A commitment to the continuing and a primary focus on the power 
relations and implications which are crystallised in myriad forms of discursive representation and 
thus the inherent contingency of knowledge and truth claims 
 
The discourse and historical analysis carried out in the following chapter seeks to address and 
further explore the democratic deficit inherent within emerging forms of global governance where 
allocation of resources is increasingly determined by a global market mechanism and so-called 
democratic states cede decision-making procedures to less accountable technocratic institutions.  
These new neoliberalised institutions of governance (corporations, IGO’s NGO’s and the combined 
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efforts of governments of the wealthy SIACS (eg. G8, OECD), are significantly constituted by ideas 
and discourses that represent the interests of a transnational power bloc or ruling class.    
 
An interrogation of the discourses underpinning this historical process can reveal the ways in which 
changes in forms of governance, often referred to in terms of ‘globalisation’, are represented as 
irresistible through various discourses of freedom, necessity, rationality, progress  In addition, the 
way in which these discourses construct popular understandings (common sense) of the global 
justice movement(s) particularly in terms of so-called ‘anti-globalisation’.  I examine the discourses 
of late capitalism and in particular the way in which resistance and alternative worldviews are 
represented and de-legitimized..  
 
Discourse analysis, applied in this critical fashion, can be used to reveal various mechanisms by 
which a dominant or ruling class is able to maintain its hegemony and marginalize subordinate 
groups and movements.  Such an approach highlights the way in which certain dominant discourses 
act as systems of signification which help construct social realities and identities of political actors.  
The underlying assumption here is that things or objects (in the case below, resistive agents, but 
equally nation-states, corporations, NGO’s, the environment or the market ) have no intrinsic or a 
priori meaning or significance of their own.  Their meaning, significance and purpose derive entirely 
from what is said and thought about them, their representation within discourses.  These sign 
systems are predominantly but not exclusively linguistic. Discourses also allude to the full semiotic 
range of representational media including photographs, film, animation, advertising etcetera.   
 
Perhaps most importantly and on the wider terrain of social theory more generally, critical 
discourse analysis can provide an empirical account of the relationship between structure and 
agency.  It is therefore well equipped to discuss and better understand some of the larger ‘macro’ 
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issues and processes e.g. globalization and social transformation, by examining the ‘micro’ political 
practices and discourses of both dominant and subaltern groups.  It provides a lens which draws 
sharply into focus the many ways in which discourse and communicative action are shot through 
with multiple relations power which at first we may not comprehend or even notice.  An 
understanding of the concept of hegemony and the contributions of critical constructivism 
including the insights of Michel Foucault on the concept of power, help us to identify and critique 
the workings of power within the struggles over contested forms of democracy and the possibilities 
for a post-liberal democracy.   The following chapter will proceed to a more systematic and detailed 
analysis of these discursive contestations.   
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Chapter 7. Neoliberalism: from normative to normalized discourse84 
 [T]he novelty of the present situation stands out in historical view. It can be put like this. For the 
first time since the Reformation, there are no longer any significant oppositions – that is, 
systematic rival outlooks – within the thought-world of the West; and scarcely any on a world 
scale either, if we discount religious doctrines as largely inoperative archaisms, as the experiences 
of Poland or Iran indicate we may.  Whatever limitations persist to its practice, neo-liberalism as 
a set of principles rules undivided across the globe: the most successful ideology in world history. 
(Anderson 2000: 43) 
Introduction 
As laid out in the introduction to this thesis and indicated in the chapters so far, this study seeks to 
explore certain aspects of transnational socio-economic, cultural and political change through an 
understanding of historical and ideological shifts in the dominant forms and representations of 
political economy during the second half of the 20th century.  It is concerned in particular with the 
role of ideas and discourse in these transformations and attempts to draw lessons from the 
establishment of a neoliberal world order by way of an examination of neoliberal ideas and how 
these came to shape and dominate the institutions of the contemporary global political economy, 
both its core capitalist states (SIACS) and the organisations and institutions of global governance 
constructed by elite groups/classes within and across those states.  It does so in order to 
demonstrate the importance of ideas and discursive strategies of legitimation and justification for 
socio-economic changes.  I argue that a crucial lesson to be drawn from the neoliberal ascendancy 
                                                          
84 I borrow the terms ‘normative and normalized in this context from Hay’s (2004) article which develops a 
similar and more rigourous scheme from which I draw here but hope to complement that work with a 
critical analysis of neoliberal discourse. 
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is the recognition that the popular consciousness or common sense of the general public can be 
seen to be alterable, so as to accept a set of principles which previously had been prone to deep 
suspicion and open and widespread derision.  In one sense then, it may be regarded as a large scale 
historical experiment in the Gramscian theory of hegemony, a struggle for new forms of 
consciousness and consent in a war of position against a dominant social-liberal consensus.  Despite 
the spurious claim to separate economics and politics in most liberal theory, many neoliberals had 
an unrivalled understanding of how these realms of thought and practice intertwine, along with 
elements of philosophy, history, psychology etcetera, in humans’ general understanding of their 
world and their relations with it.  Importantly though, as we shall see, they also had substantial 
material resources at their disposal in the form of private economic power and vested commercial 
and industrial interests. 
Some examination of how such neoliberal propositions became not only acceptable but swiftly 
assumed the apparent status of being themselves beyond dispute would seem cogent at the 
current historical juncture of yet another global crisis of capitalism, where many commentators 
now question the efficacy and sustainability of a political economic system that such ideas draw 
into being.  Not simply the stark inequalities which follow from the release of market forces on a 
global scale (Chossudovsky 1997; Wade 2007), the ecological crisis entailed by untrammelled 
growth and the celebration of conspicuous consumption (George 2004: 29-52), but also the political 
malaise and democratic deficit which seems to follow from the perceived exigency for states to 
respond through a very narrow and restrictive set of policy measures (Hay 2004; Pauly 1997; Falk 
2001; Moravsik 2004). 
This chapter will commence with a description of neoliberalism and the features which distinguish 
it from the broader liberal tradition from which it emerged.  It will consider the role of an expanding 
transnational capitalist class as a key factor in that emergence and discuss the key historical and 
235 
 
institutional transformations, both domestic (largely with respect to the US and UK) and 
international.  The second part of the chapter will present a case study of The Economist which will 
serve as an example of how neoliberal discourse has become largely normalised and processes and 
institutions of financial liberalisation and deregulation. 
Part one considers the historical emergence of neoliberal ideas during the latter half of the 
twentieth century as a normative project and consists of two elements.  Firstly it outlines a 
genealogy of neoliberal ideas and their relationship to parallel intellectual currents in the course of 
the second half of the twentieth century.  Secondly, it discusses how these ideas relate to the 
material processes and policies which surfaced to reshape the global political economy from the 
1970’s. It draws upon neo-Gramscian conceptions of hegemony and class power in that it is not 
simply a state of pure ideological domination as such, but a continuous struggle for power in which 
all social groups participate, albeit on largely unequal terms.  In doing so, it will maintain the focus 
on the importance of the production and dissemination of ideas in the political struggles 
surrounding the development of neoliberal globalisation.  Hegemony, as Stuart Hall puts it, “is 
always contested, always trying to secure itself, always ‘in process’” (1988: 7).  This work will extend 
the research of both neo-Gramscian thought and critical constructivist discourse analysis by 
blending their insights into an examination of a theme which is central to both their research 
agendas.  How powerful groups and elites develop, maintain and entrench their combined 
ideological and material power. 
 
Part one – A Historical/ideational analysis: Neoliberalism as a normative 
project 
 
As I have already discussed, the profound changes that have swept world politics over recent 
decades, beginning with the demise of the Bretton Woods system and the economic crises of the 
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early 1970s and compounded by subsequent technological and geopolitical developments, have 
had a dramatic and in many ways detrimental effect upon the hard-won democratic advances made 
over the previous two centuries and particularly since the end of World War Two.  During the 
twentieth century, the social-liberal democratic states which emerged in various forms and degrees 
across Western Europe and the Americas, have been the locus for some of the most profound and 
progressive democratic accomplishments, many extending the project of emancipation beyond the 
individually based civil and political rights and into the more socially rooted rights of economic 
justice.  In the core of the world system, public healthcare, free education and systems of social 
security all emerged in some guise and to some extent in these variously social-liberal democracies 
during the so-called golden era of capitalism.  
Internationally, systems of direct colonial rule fell away in much of Africa and Asia (at least until the 
Cold War proxy conflicts turned many of these fledgling democracies against themselves and each 
other).   The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) and the widespread ratification 
of its subsequent covenants, combined with the wider normative power of the democratic project 
and human rights discourse more generally, eventually helped to dislodge even the most persistent 
of totalitarian regimes such as those in South Africa and the USSR.85  The fact that these democratic 
achievements and advances have been achieved within a ‘capitalist’ economic framework is widely 
deployed as an argument that capitalism is a fundamental framework for freedom and that liberal 
democracy represents the so-called ‘End of History’ (Fukuyama 1989, 1991).  This has become a 
central assumption and fundamental normative and ideological pillar of neoliberalism, that free 
markets create free people(s).  
                                                          
85 Although by the time these fell, the neoliberal ideology was already in the ascendant and thus played its 
own role in the changes which took place (see Chossudovsky, (1997) The Globalisation Of Poverty: Impacts 
of IMF and World Bank Reforms. London: Zed Books.) part five of this book is devoted to an analysis of the 
‘neoliberalisation’ of the former Soviet Union and the dire consequences which were a result of that 
experiment in economic ‘shock therapy’. . 
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However, a wide range of scholars and commentators from various perspectives, even sometimes 
from a broad liberal academic tradition, have made persuasive claims that these accomplishments 
were founded upon an international system of fixed exchange rates and regulation of global finance 
and  have since been dangerously undermined by the expansion and entrenchment of a 
deregulated global market economy brought about by a handful of neoliberal states and other 
actors  (Gill 2003; Casanova 1996; Overbeek and van der Pijl  1993; Held 1995; Held and McGrew 
2002; Falk 1999; Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000; Sernau 2000).  A perhaps more contentious 
argument is outlined below, that this process also involves (even requires) the establishment of 
complex systems of governance and policy networks which help entrench the ideological 
dominance and political interests of a global ruling elite or ‘class’n(Robinson 2004; Sklair 2001; van 
der Pijl 1998).  The combination and consolidation of this neoliberal elite and the ideological 
apparatus that surrounds and extends from it represents a ‘historic bloc’ in the Gramscian sense.  
This argument will be developed through a historical, genealogical and, in part two, discursive 
analysis of neoliberalism. 
In the grand scheme of human history, the period since the Second World War is of course a 
relatively short one.  Nevertheless, in the few generations which have passed since the end of that 
terrible conflict, the world has changed almost beyond recognition, at a rate and to an extent not 
previously experienced in any time or place.86  In short then, this chapter will attempt to explain 
how during this brief period, a marginal and initially truly radical set of economic ideas, which have 
                                                          
86 Furthermore, these recent transformations have come hot on the heels of the hardly unremarkable 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Such unprecedented processes of exponential social change 
have seemed unstoppable since the birth of the enlightenment whose ideas spread far and wide on the 
back of Gutenberg’s first media revolution.  In this sense, the foundations of globalisation stretch back 
many centuries.  I hesitate to rely on historical punctuation marks but 1945 would perhaps seem as cogent 
as any.  One could say it marked a temporary conclusion to the mayhem which, beginning in 1914, was not 
resolved with any satisfaction until the victory of the constitutionally democratic and liberally minded 
‘United Nations’. 
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come to be described generally as neoliberal, emerged as a dominant socio-economic and political 
ideology towards the end of the twentieth century.  As Susan George notes: 
In 1945 or 1950, if you had seriously proposed any of the ideas and policies in today's standard 
neo-liberal toolkit, you would have been laughed off the stage at or sent off to the insane asylum. 
At least in the Western countries, at that time, everyone was a Keynesian, a social democrat or a 
social-Christian democrat or some shade of Marxist.  (George 1999: n.p.) 
How then, did neoliberal thought become so deeply embedded in public discourse as common 
sense? (as in Gramsci’s understanding of sense held in common). Through a historical, discursive 
and normative analysis the chapter will attempt to provide a critical understanding of the 
emergence and entrenchment of these ideas and processes.  It is, at least in part, normative in that 
it seeks to demonstrate how neoliberal ideology works to silence and exclude alternative 
conceptions of the political which, I argue, provide the possibility for more substantive 
opportunities for freedom, justice and human security for the majority world.  As we shall see, the 
concept of freedom lies at the centre of liberal and neoliberal ideology but it is a highly restricted 
version, both theoretically and practically.  It is theoretically restricted in that it limits freedom to 
an individualist, rational choice based version in which the free market determines the patterns 
and relations of production and consumption.  As a result, the freedoms of neoliberalism are 
increasingly restricted to the minority who benefit sufficiently to have relative ‘freedom of choice’ 
in the marketplace.    
Indeed, when we speak of neoliberalism and its etymological antecedent, liberalism, we should be 
sceptical about the assumed correspondence with democracy.  As we are reminded by Norberto 
Bobbio “the liberals of modern times, for their part, were from the outset extremely suspicious of 
all forms of popular government, throughout the nineteenth century, and later, they upheld and 
defended limited suffrage” (1990: 31).  We must therefore treat with suspicion the assumption that 
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capitalism and democracy are natural bedfellows.  There is a profound “tension between the theory 
of neoliberalism and the actual pragmatics of neoliberalization” (Harvey 2007:21). A historical 
account which acknowledges the class element central to neoliberalization will help to debunk such 
assumptions and show that democracy has in many ways been more of a hindrance to the 
neoliberal project than any kind of necessary adjunct.  The actual practice of neoliberalism has 
successfully subverted democratic forms whilst maintaining the powerful liberal discourse of liberty 
to promote the freedom of the few at the expense of the majority.  The effort to tease out a feel 
for a definition of neoliberalism requires that we first have an understanding of liberalism.  This is 
no simple task as, according to John Gray “liberalism is no more than a matter of loose family 
resemblances amongst a variety of views, thinkers institutions and movements, and accordingly 
there are indefinitely many liberalisms, none of which can claim to be uniquely authoritative or 
authentic” (Gray, 1995:87).  Turner concurs: “neoliberalism is a tendency within 
liberalism”(2007:68) and which is itself not so much a coherent single political ideology but, as 
Jessop (2002: 453)points out:   
a complex, multifaceted phenomenon. It is: a polyvalent conceptual ensemble in economic, 
political, and ideological discourse; a strongly contested strategic concept for restructuring 
market-state relations with many disputes over its scope, application, and limitations; and a 
recurrent yet historically variable pattern of economic, political, and social organization in 
modern societies. Liberalism rarely, if ever, exists in pure form; it typically coexists with elements 
from other discourses, strategies, and organizational patterns. Thus, it is better seen as one set 
of elements in the repertoire of Western economic, political, and ideological discourse than as a 
singular, univocal, and internally coherent discourse in its own right. 
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Indeed, while neoliberalism is one among many incarnations of liberalism (one which contains a 
considerable element of conservatism)87, neoliberalism itself has a number of forms due to its 
emergence in various contexts.  These variations have been detailed by Foucault who distinguishes 
between German and American manifestations of neoliberalism and Turner who, in addition, 
recognises the importance of an earlier British tradition which informed the German and U.S. 
variants.  Despite these degrees of national variation it is easy to recognise the close connections 
between these and that the intellectual foundations of neoliberalism lie together in what Kees van 
der Pijl has called a ‘Lockean Heartland’. 
The growth of a Lockean heartland accordingly involves, in addition to a transnationalisation of 
civil society, the restructuring of state power along two axes: one of international socialisation of 
state functions, the other of a struggle for primacy between the states between which these 
functions are to be  shared.  Along either axis evolves an immanent ‘world state’ sustaining total 
capital on a global scale by upholding the Lockean state/society complex and the specific 
arrangements it defines—separation of politics from economics, a ‘level playing field’ in 
competition, individual freedom under the law,   (van der Pijl 1998: 70-71) 
During the second half of the eighteenth and early 20th century, mass migration from the UK to the 
US and the expanding circuits of finance capital essentially fused the two economies into a single 
core of the global economy.  This combination also facilitated the growth in transnational networks 
of business cooperation and policy planning groups such as the Round Table and Rhodes Milner 
Group (Quigley 1981).  These networks and collaborative groups were the foundation for both the 
rapid expansion of transnational institutions and the establishment of a transnational capitalist 
class (van der Pijl 1998). 
                                                          
87 See Gamble 100-125 and Freeden 373-378 for discussions of the close links between neoliberalism and 
conservativism.  See also Hayek (1960) ‘Why I Am Not a Conservative’ In The Constitution of Liberty.Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. Available: http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/hayek-why-i-am-not-
conservative.pdf  
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Agents of Neoliberalism: A Transnational Capitalist Class TCC? 
 
As van der Pijl has noted, "Understanding the relation between structural changes in production 
and the political struggles through which they take shape requires a historical as well as a 
transnational analysis" (1998: emphasis in original).  In addition to this, and in a sense in which van 
der  Pijl would concur, it must involve some form of class analysis in order to identify and in some 
sense classify the key agents of neoliberal capitalism and how they are connected.  It is here that 
the chapter begins, with questions regarding the existence and influence of a ruling transnational 
neoliberal capitalist elite or class. 
As already stated, it is indeed now almost beyond argument that we are witnessing, at some level 
at least, the emergence of a globally functioning, transversal socio-economic and political system 
based on the ‘mechanism’ of the free market, a process widely referred to as neoliberal or late 
capitalist globalisation.  This process, I argue herein, is driven not simply by the irresistible and 
inexorable logic of capitalism to expand independently, but also by agents of a powerful ruling class 
whose discourses legitimise and reify the ideas, values  and assumptions of neoliberalism, thus 
shaping the systems and processes (along with the injustices and inequities) associated with 
contemporary globalisation.  The term class is not here used to denote specific ownership of the 
means of production as in the traditional Marxist sense, but to identify those who control, support 
and benefit most from it.  According to Sklair, “this new transnational capitalist class (TCC), is 
composed of corporate executives, globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals 
and consumerist elites” (2000:4)  Identifying this class and its discursive strategies can help us 
better understand neoliberalism as a set of social practices as well as simply an ideology.  In short 
it can reveal its ‘performative’ nature.   
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An understanding of the performativity of neoliberal capitalism is necessary, if perhaps not on its 
own sufficient, for its de-legitimisation and dismantling, both as a set of ideas and a range of social, 
political and economic practices. When we speak of the performativity of capitalism, we are 
referring to the extent to which its various discourses, identified by Bourdieu as ‘strong discourses’ 
(1998), constrain our perceptions of the opportunities reasonable to us and are therefore 
transmitted into the actions we take and the decisions we make, both as individuals and social 
groups, as workers, consumers, students, parents and in almost every aspect of our daily lives.  The 
extent to which neoliberal discourse is now embedded as a dominant set of practices guided by 
‘common sense’ is the most important obstacle for social transformations or even the most timid 
reforms.  Discourses are not performative in and of themselves however, they require the action of 
conscious and practicing subjects or agents.  These agents are not isolated individuals but conceive 
of their interests in terms of their social or intersubjective consciousness.  In particular, this 
intersubjectivity is expressed and can be analysed through the concept of class. 
Considering the fascination with globalisation among the left there has been surprisingly little 
attention paid recently, either in mainstream IR/IPE or indeed the social sciences more generally, 
to notions of class other than its demise as a useful category for analysis.  Class as a concept has 
fallen out of favour since the 1970s as systems of production and patterns of consumption became 
ever more complex.  Indeed, Clark and Lipset have asked in their (1991) article: Are Social Classes 
Dying?   In so doing they assert that “Class analysis has grown increasingly inadequate in recent 
decades as traditional hierarchies have declined and new social differences have emerged.” (397).   
Such an argument is perhaps understandable from the viewpoint that, in a post-industrial society 
(and it is important to remember here that much of humanity remains in an industrial or even pre-
industrial society) the emergence and expansion of a politically salient middle class confuses and 
subverts the traditional notion of a mass proletarian class, poised to seize the means of production 
from the bourgeoisie.   While I do not wish to challenge these observations and do not regard class 
243 
 
conflict on its own to be a sufficient medium for progressive social change or indeed that all 
inequalities can be reduced to class.  Rather, I maintain that some aspects of the concept of class 
remain necessary categories for political analysis and the understanding of social power.  Indeed, 
while many have found fault with a good deal of Marx’s work, few attempt an outright denial of his 
assertion that any society marked by the unequal distribution of power must display elements of 
class formation, at least at some level(s). 
Following Mann (1987), my focus here is almost exclusively upon the ruling or governing class which 
has emerged around circuits of transnational capital and in particular, the circuit of finance capital.  
As such, I suggest that in order to understand origin and development of global governance and 
governmentality, “emphasis should be placed on the strategies and cohesion of ruling classes” 
(Mann 1987:339).  This is by no means to celebrate or overemphasise such power or to portray it 
as beyond resistance, although we must be wary of so doing.  On the contrary, I suggest that the 
project of surmounting these material and ideological structures and edifices of power requires a 
deep understanding of their foundations, locations and strategies.  The effective formation of a 
‘counter-hegemonic bloc’, through a ‘war of position’ entails a realistic assessment of the 
considerable obstacles to maintaining social justice and participatory democratic institutions. A 
strategically selective analysis of the field of struggle demands an effective assessment of the 
existing institutional arrangements. 
One of the best know arguments for the demise of the kinds of class conflict which seemed to 
characterise the late 19th and early 20th centuries has been the pioneering work of T.H Marshall 
(1973) who has suggested that the achievement of citizenship rights among industrial societies has 
curtailed the opportunity for open class conflict, although he maintains that conflict still continues 
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in an institutionalised and rule governed form.88  In brief, Marshall’s three generations of citizenship 
rights which achieved this apparent compromise were the civil-legal rights of the 18th century such 
as the rights to freedom of expression and assembly; the political rights gained largely through the 
19th century which granted individuals the opportunity to participate in government through voting 
and standing for office.  The 20th century saw the development of social and economic rights 
associated with the welfare state and social democracy.  Marshall was writing at the very high point 
of social democracy and did not envisage the curtailing and rescinding of public social and economic 
rights, enshrined  by the social-liberal democratic state, which I argue is a central prescription of 
neoliberal socio-economic policy.  As a result, according to Marshall’s thesis, we might presume 
that open class conflict may become more likely as these institutions are withdrawn, particularly in 
times of economic downturn and crisis where a greater number become reliant upon such public 
provision and the private supply of social goods is further restricted.  
Furthermore, class analysis has been undertaken almost exclusively on a national basis as in the 
pioneering work of T.H. Marshall.  One of the most relevant of these to the position taken here is 
still the classic analysis of C. Wright Mills more than 50 years ago in his seminal text The Power Elite.  
According to Mills this elite comprised: 
[M]en whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and 
women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences […] They are in 
command of the major hierarchies and organisations of modern society.  They rule the big 
corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives.  They direct the 
military establishment.  They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which 
                                                          
88 It should be noted that Marshall’s chronology of citizenship is explicitly restricted to the development of 
rights in Britain and Mann, while holding to the most basic premise of Marshalls account, shows that a 
comparative study reveals a far more diverse array of possibilities for the development of citizenship 
(1987). 
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are now centred the effective means of power and the wealth and celebrity they enjoy. (1956: 
4). 
A good deal of Mills analysis remains remarkably true today, the key difference is the shift from a 
national (or even regional ) elite to a global one and had Mills been writing 50 years later we might 
safely assume that his attention would be drawn in this direction.   It is perhaps a little surprising 
then that aside from Sklair (2001), van der Pijl (1998) and some notable others working in the 
loosely neo-Gramscian tradition (Robinson 2004, Morton 2006), few social and political theorists 
have argued for the existence of a dominant class beyond the borders of the nation-state.  Scott 
addresses the question briefly in Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes (1997) where he 
suggests that a TCC cannot be said to exist until the demographic relations of national capitalist 
classes change so that social relations between members of different nation states are as important 
as those between members of the same nation-state.   
Sklair’s interviews with senior executives and middle managers from the Fortune 500 however, 
showed that the vast majority of these regarded their corporations to be “in a transitional state 
between the multi-national corporation and the global corporation” (2001:73).  This would suggest 
that a capitalist class is indeed emerging at the global level, with corporations in particular showing 
little or no attachment to any one country other than on a broad cost-benefit analysis.  Further and 
equally  compelling evidence is presented in a more recent contribution from David Rothkopf in his 
book Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They are Making (2008) in which he argues 
that a group of around 6,000 individuals represent a closely interconnected global power elite that 
wields an extensive and overarching influence upon the rest of global society whilst benefiting 
almost exclusively from the enormous wealth and new freedoms which unbridled global capitalism 
has produced in recent decades.  However, Rothkopf details the huge wealth of the superclass but 
fails to sufficiently link his research on inequalities of wealth with the workings of power and their 
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ability to maintain and efforts to legitimise their status.  As Aristotle asserts in the opening passages 
of Nichomachean Ethics: “wealth […] is merely useful and for the sake of something else” (I.1096a5).  
What is in need of analysis is not so much the accumulation or disparity of wealth itself but the 
means by which it is transferred into the discursive power to sustain such inequities and render 
them ‘acceptable’ and normal.  Nevertheless, a very brief look at current inequality trends is 
pertinent to the question of class and global stratification and the arguments presented here. 
While Rothkopf admits 6,000 may appear to be a rather arbitrary figure, he expands and develops 
his analysis by acknowledging this group is an elite within an elite and furthermore within that 6,000 
there exists a smaller group with even greater wealth and power.   To illustrate, he draws briefly 
upon Vilfredo Pareto’s 80/20 principle which, to summarize considerably,  observes that 20 per 
cent of the causes are responsible for 80 per cent of the consequences.  Pareto (1927) developed 
this idea in studying income distribution in Italy where he discovered that roughly 20 per cent of 
the population was in receipt of 80 per cent of the national income.89   Although the principle has 
been applied to myriad circumstances and contexts it does not deserve the pseudo-scientific status 
which it has gained in some areas.  It is often ‘hedged’ by other ratio’s such as the ‘10/90 gap’ 
referred to by the Global Forum for Health Research (n.d.) in their findings that only ten per cent of 
worldwide expenditure on health research and development is devoted to the problems that 
primarily affect the poorest 90 per cent of the world's population.  Nevertheless, the UN statistics 
on inequality appear to fit quite closely with the Pareto principle.  The Report on the World Social 
Situation: The Inequality Predicament states that “eighty per cent of the world’s gross domestic 
product belongs to the 1 billion people living in the developed world; the remaining 20 per cent is 
shared by the 5 billion people living in developing countries” (United Nations 2005). This report 
goes on to describe the many measures by which global inequality across a range of scales and 
                                                          
89 See also the account of Pareto’s theory by Shirras (1935). 
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measures can be seen to have grown significantly since the beginning of neoliberalization in the 
early 1980’s.  
Rothkopf applies the Pareto principle merely to illustrate that within each elite grouping, wherever 
one chooses to draw the line of stratification, there exists another elite at a similar ratio. 
When seeking to understand elites, always look for the elite within the elite.  Within almost every 
application of the 80/20 rule there is another one waiting to be discovered.  And oftentimes it 
turns out that an 80/20 rule understates the case.  The reality is that when it comes to the unequal 
distribution of power, we will find that within the broader application of the 80/20 rule lies a 
90/10 or even sometimes a 99/1 rule waiting to be revealed. (2008:38)90 
What is more important here though is not so much the identification of specific individuals or 
numerical demarcations and stratifications of wealth.  More so the important relationship between 
cultural and material inequality and the global networks and hierarchies of power which this elite 
group or class have developed in the process of establishing and maintaining their influence as part 
of a global hegemonic historic bloc.  Rothkopf details the ways in which his ‘Superclass’ 
demonstrates an increasing disconnection with the rest of society, living and working as a kind of 
variously spatially dispersed and socially and culturally isolated global community.  However, he 
also shows how they are inter-connected not only instrumentally though interlocking directorships 
and links between politics, business and the media, their interaction goes beyond global 
conferences (WEF, G8, Bilderberg ).  They are also united by cultural similarities; their ease of travel, 
exclusive residences, shared luxury leisure pursuits and holiday locations, their exclusive access to 
each other within these less formal circuits tends to consolidate their hegemony and status as an 
active class and securing their consciousness as such (Rothkopf 2008: 111-144).  An appreciation of 
                                                          
90 The 99/1 ration has been picked up by the recent ‘Occupy’ fraction or manifestation of the global justice 
movement in their slogan of ‘we are the 99%’. 
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the cultural complexity in this class formation demands, at least, recognition of the informal as well 
as the formal connections which bind their consciousness and confirms their awareness of 
themselves as a class (‘for itself’).  Unless necessary for political reasons and ‘the right kind of 
regulation’, they owe little or no allegiance to any particular nation, region or territory.  Their 
domicile is largely determined by minimal tax burdens and access to the objects and lifestyles of 
luxury consumption.  According to Rothkopf then, “such linkages are as distinguishing a 
characteristic of members of the superclass as wealth or individual position” (2008: 46).  The 
growing divergence which Rothkopf demonstrates between the socio-economic  and cultural 
networks or ‘lifeworlds’ of this class and any notions of national identity or loyalty suggests that 
Scott’s conditions of a kind of ‘self-awareness’ for the ontological existence of a TCC have been 
largely fulfilled  (ibid.: 24-30). 
Furthermore, the analysis is useful in that it identifies some internal stratification or ‘fractions’ 
within a capitalist class which may represent important fissures within the capitalist class between 
a ruling ‘superclass’ and a more functional or technocratic managerial class which operationalizes 
the knowledge, policies,  legislation and institutional arrangements devised at the level of the ruling 
class and transmitted through what Thrift (2005: 19-98) has referred to as the ‘cultural circuits of 
capitalism’.  These apparatchiks and technocrats of capitalism, while relatively wealthy and 
powerful on a global scale, are increasingly squeezed out of the larger cultural and economic 
rewards which accrue at the higher echelons of power, particularly in times of economic 
contraction.  Moreover, their roles are increasingly devoid of serious decision-making or creativity 
and tend more toward administering pre-planned operational procedures and reporting and 
monitoring these processes for their auditing at higher levels of management, coordination and 
governance.  Even outside the corporate/business environment, their work takes place within and 
is guided and surveilled pastorally by the exigencies of new public management (Salskov-Iversen et 
al 1999; Drechsler 2005).  
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The significance of this is that this particular section or strata of global society, largely knowledge 
and cultural workers of various types in the developed core of the global economy but also in parts 
of the underdeveloped periphery (‘the north within the south’), is crucial for any prospect of alter-
globalism. This 2nd tier neoliberal class fraction is both sufficiently numerous and wealthy for their 
political consciousness to be a key ideological battle ground in the struggle for social justice and 
new participatory democratic institutions.  Their mass purchasing power is as vital for the 
sustenance of late capitalism as their technical knowledge and socio-cultural influence will be for 
an effective global justice movement. The growing inequality between these particular strata of 
global society is likely to be as significant a stimulus for transformative social change as any in the 
foreseeable future.  The increasing socio-economic cleavages between the relatively rich and the 
superrich are illustrated in an article for the New York Times by Eric Konigsberg.  He states that 
“while the percentage change in average real household income between 1990 and 2004 was an 
increase of 2 per cent for the bottom 90 per cent of American households, it increased 57 per cent 
for the top 1 per cent and shot up to 85 per cent for the top 0.1 per cent and up to 112 per cent for 
the top 0.01 per cent” (Konigsberg 2006: n.p.).  This demonstration of a rising disparity among the 
most wealthy and influential sectors of the global economy is politically significant and deserves 
further research.  It suggests that a TCC may not be as homogenous as some observers assume, or 
at least that we might need to think more carefully about how we define and demarcate classes 
and social strata on a global scale.  Despite these caveats careful consideration must be given to 
these questions as any widening of such social cleavages within the ruling echelons might indicate 
opportunities for alter-global and counter-capitalist resistance to increase their support base and 
with an influential and politically powerful social stratum. 
These ‘cultural circuits of capitalism’ which operate within this knowledge economy (such as 
journalism, academia, and, according to Thrift (2005), especially business schools, management 
discourse and the corporate/ business media), comprise the primary means by which the neoliberal 
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ideology is disseminated and transmitted into social and political practice.  They represent the 
discursive and performative aspects and agency of neoliberalism in that they influence the way 
businesses and, as a corollary, workers function, (re)produce, consume, communicate and 
(inter)act. 
While Rothkopf (2008) identifies military and religious leaders, media personalities/cultural ’icons’ 
and even organised crime syndicates in his analysis, he concedes that “[o]f all the different types of 
individuals who make up the global superclass, the single largest group is leaders in business and 
finance” (2008: 33).  Although his attention to the ‘celebrity’ (to borrow again from Mills) members 
of the superclass indicates the importance of these figures to reproduce popular cultures of 
‘aspirational’ consumption, Rothkopf pays insufficient attention to the ways and means by which 
their ideas, values and influence are transmitted into the popular public consciousness.  Despite an 
account of how wealth and power has been maintained by the superclass through inheritance and 
the establishment of corporations (77-110), his analysis is rather short on any suggestion as to how 
such massive and growing inequality is legitimised by the culture and the system of ideas the 
superclass maintains and reifies.  The standard justification is noted yet remains largely 
unchallenged in his work: “one of the first rationales given is that such people are best able to 
reinvest the money and thus create jobs and fuel growth.  The merits of the argument aside, it is 
certainly true that having substantial financial resources translates into that asset allocation power” 
(ibid.: 89, my emphasis).  The argument, whose merits cannot really be just left ‘aside’,  is based 
upon neoliberal assumptions about human nature and social organisation that stem from an 
assertion that the ‘free market’ is the most reliable and legitimate institution by which to decide 
upon the distribution of economic resources and hence the various kinds of power which flows 
from their accumulation.  This justification for a market society draws its legitimacy from the 
classical liberal arguments stretching back through John Stuart Mill to John Locke and even, to a 
lesser extent, Thomas Hobbes.   
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These ideas deserve some further attention in attempting to understand neoliberalism and their 
philosophical (and ideological) links with later liberal thinkers will be explored briefly below.   John 
Locke however, is perhaps the key thinker to mention briefly here as a philosophical foundation of 
classical liberalism and neoliberalism.  Locke, in his Two Treatises on Government concurred with 
Hobbes in maintaining the existence of a ‘state of nature’ but implied a much less brutal conception 
where human reason (and the resulting contractual obligations) would temper the baser instincts 
of greed and selfishness.  Locke insists that "the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult 
it" (2nd Tr., §6).   Turner (2008) has detailed the centrality of Lockean constitutionalism to neoliberal 
ideology and practice and suggests that as a result, neoliberalism emphasises a rule of law which 
must circumscribe the range of activities in which government might engage. 
Locke also followed Hobbes in recognising the need for a pooling of individual sovereignty into a 
central sovereign but argued, anticipating Mill, for a vigorous private sphere comprising relatively 
autonomous individuals, associations and institutions by which the authority of the central 
sovereign state might be mediated or restrained.  This is the original liberal conception of the term 
civil society later appropriated and further developed by Gramsci in the 1930s.  In Locke’s 
philosophy however the authority of the private sphere was legitimised through its allocation to 
those with most at stake in society i.e. those with property.  The contemporary hegemony which 
these ideas and assumptions have attained, unsurprisingly leads to an increase in power for those 
agents most able to accumulate economic resources, i.e. business corporations.  Before continuing 
my discussion of the resurgence and partial reinvention of these ideas in the revival of neoclassical 
liberal economics during the 20th century, I wish to say a little more about the agents and networks 
which have both facilitated their renaissance and in turn, benefited so greatly from it.  
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Transnational corporate power 
 
Undoubtedly, the state, and some states to a significantly greater extent than others (SIACS), 
retains the ability to wield considerable power as a result of its exclusive ability to accumulate and 
redistribute material resources, or ‘property’, through taxation.  Its legitimacy stems from its 
provision of social goods and the maintenance of the rule of law upon which, to varying degrees 
this wealth is dispensed.  In recent decades however, corporations, and in particular multi- or trans-
national corporations (TNCs), a relatively new actor in international relations, have come under 
scrutiny for their own greatly expanded ability to exert power due to their increased capital power 
and the structural changes (state policies of deregulation and privatisation since the 1980’s) both 
at the behest of neoliberal governments in the core of the global economy such as the US and UK 
and also as a result of multilateral trade agreements and structural adjustment programmes 
negotiated by institutions which were dominated by those governments.   
The point here is that much of the power assumed by TNCs in recent decades has been afforded to 
them by a handful of neoliberal governments in states where these corporations emerged and were 
originally domiciled.  This acquiescence on the part of advanced states in the Lockean Heartland 
must be considered in tandem with the deepening enmeshment of political elites with commercial, 
cultural, industrial and in particular financial elites.   As these relationships have developed through 
recent decades, the distinction between the two (state and market) becomes increasingly difficult 
to sustain.  The interlocking directorships which van der Pijl and Sklair referred to now stretch 
deeply into the highest echelons of government.  George Monbiot provides an extensive list of such 
connections in the early UK New Labour administration in his (2000: 208-224) Captive State.  More 
recently, close links between the Bush administration and the oil industry have allowed the latter 
to operate with far fewer constraints in the Middle East (Madsen, 2002; Little 2008).  Sklair (2001) 
regards TNCs as the most important aspect of what he identifies as an elite social movement for 
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capitalism and highlights the close connections between them and its other constituent groups in 
the TCC. 
The increasing salience of various dimensions of corporate power represents a vast and rapidly 
expanding body of literature in and around the discipline of IR/IPE (Barnett 1975; Strange 1996; 
Korten 1995; Kaplinsky 1991).  Gilpin has noted that their growing salience has “profoundly altered 
the structure and functioning of the global economy” (2001: 290) and Cox has argued that such 
“changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which , in turn, bring about 
changes in the structure of states and […] alters the problematic of world order” (1986: 220). This 
fact in itself testifies to the growing importance of these actors among the wider proliferation of 
powerful non-state actors in global politics.  Interest in TNCs in IR began as far back as 1972 with a 
special issue of International Studies Quarterly entitled ‘Multinational Corporations and World 
Order’ and remains an important focus today with large sections of contemporary IR textbooks 
addressing TNC’s and/or corporate power in some way.   Another important early text came from 
Stephen Hymer, who as early as 1970 recognised that “large corporations are consciously moving 
towards an international perspective much faster than other institutions and especially much faster 
than governments, and are in the vanguard of planners of the new international economy” (1970: 
443).  Drawing on his detailed and widespread study of TNCs, Hymer soon came to recognise that  
“an international capitalist class is emerging whose interests lie in the world economy as a whole 
system of international private property which allows free movement of capital between countries” 
(1979: 262) and that TNCs were absolutely central to this process.  
Among the most comprehensive accounts of these developments written from within the broadly 
liberal tradition has been the work of David Korten.  His (1995) book, When Corporations Rule the 
World, provides a detailed account of the historical and legislative changes (mostly specific to the 
United States) which have led to a massive growth in the political power and salience of these 
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actors.  Again, here the 1970s is portrayed as a watershed in that it marks a profound shift in the 
behaviour of TNC’s.  Korten notes how from this period in particular, TNC’s began to act more 
widely and vociferously in public affairs and their focus expanded from business into a more overtly 
political role.  The massive profits generated by these actors have been instrumental in cementing 
a neoliberal agenda through the funding of numerous cultural and educational institutions.   In 1978 
the Institute for Educational Affairs was set up in the USA to facilitate stronger links between 
corporate funders and sympathetic scholars who would produce research favourable to corporate 
interests (Korten 1995: 143; Alliance for Justice 1993: 3).  More broadly, the formation of new 
neoliberal think tanks such as the Institute for Economic Affairs in the UK and the Heritage 
Foundation in the USA and the revival of existing ones such as the American Enterprise Institute, 
which experienced a ten-fold increase in its budget through the 1970’s (Greider 1992: 48), has been 
central to the dissemination of neoliberal ideology.  In the process the AEI was transformed into 
one of the key agents for this counter-revolution in ideas, manipulating the opinions and reflexes 
of both policy-makers and the mass media.  The AEI receives substantial annual subscriptions from 
some of the largest Banks and corporations in the USA: AT&T $121,000; Chase Manhattan, 
$171,000; Chevron, $95,000; Citicorp, $100,000; Exxon, $130,000; General Electric, $65,000; 
General Motors, $100,000; Proctor and Gamble, $165,000 (ibid.: 48)   It is not hard to see how the 
scholars of this thinktank, and the numerous others, might be wary of producing research which is 
contrary to the interests of major TNCs. 
In addition to these educational and cultural institutions, TNCs have also widely adopted a more 
directly political role in order to increase their influence.  Since the early 1970s, large scale 
corporate actors, working together and combining their shared business interests and muscle, 
began to set up their own so-called citizens organisations as a front to dismantle government 
regulations over the environment and consumer protection (Korten 1995: 142-148).  Many of these 
organisations and lobby groups have evolved from their national roots and plugged into a proto-
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world-state structure of transnational policy networks and institutions with a responsibility to 
formulate the global regulatory framework for economic governance.  This has also been achieved 
through the various corporate-political channels of neoliberal states.  Indeed, it is the connections 
between TNCs and a range of quasi-governmental policy networks which presents the most 
compelling case for the existence and agency of a TCC.  Carroll and Carson (2006) identify five key 
international policy groups.  These are the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); Bilderberg 
conferences (BC); The Trilateral commission (TC); the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).  According to Carroll and Carson, these 
groups (as well as a number of others) “provide intellectual leadership that is indispensable in the 
ongoing effort to transform transnational capital from an economically dominant class to a class 
whose interests take on a sense of universalism” (2006: 60).  In order to demonstrate this close 
connection between transnational policy groups and TNCs, Carroll and Carson (2006) show the 
membership of 28 corporate directors on the global policy boards of the above five policy networks 
(see chart below). 
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Figure 4. The TCC and global policy networks 
 
Undoubtedly, the institution which has benefited most from the rise of neoliberalism then is the 
TNC and it represents a major instrument of change in the armoury of the neoliberal TCC.  Granted, 
a handful of core and ‘BRIC’ states have maintained and may even have increased their power, at 
least in relation to many other peripheral states, but they have done so largely as a result of wealth 
and influence created by their support for, and close collaboration with, corporations through the 
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introduction, maintenance and development of neoliberal policies, institutions and legislation at 
multiple levels of governance.  TNCs then have become increasingly powerful in terms of their 
considerable and growing influence upon the overlapping and intertwining political structures and 
institutions of class and state.  Concurrently, multiple institutions of governance have expanded 
their influence in recent decades to challenge and re-scale the sovereignty of the state and these 
are by no means all neoliberal in origin.  Such institutions vary greatly in terms of their size, age, 
formality, influence, salience, autonomy, ideology  but all have come to be influenced and 
significantly re-constituted, to some extent at least, by the ideas of neoliberalism.91  An 
understanding of this trend is necessary in order to navigate these complex historical processes and 
so that alternative modes of socio-economic organisation, based on different underlying ideas and 
beliefs about politics and considered ‘against human nature’ within neoliberal ideology and 
discourse, can gain greater purchase and legitimacy in public discussion and debate.  I suggest that 
such alternatives need not discount or reject all aspects of the liberal tradition of thought, but must 
understand that the core tenets and proscriptions of neoliberalism, according to which these 
transformations have occurred, represent a highly restrictive and narrow formulation of the liberal 
ideas from which they purport to stem and derive much of their legitimacy. 
As these developments and their implications have been discussed and analysed in more detail 
elsewhere, what remains is to interrogate the history and discourses of neoliberalism with a view 
to further revealing the ways in which it represents and thus reproduces the social and political 
world.  We are left with question of just how this dispossession, disenfranchisement and 
redistribution of power and resources to a minority group (what we have termed the TCC) has been 
achieved and legitimised with such surprisingly little resistance.   
                                                          
91 Outside of intergovernmental institutions such as the EU or UN, IMF or World Bank, Perhaps the most 
important of these institutions are global corporations who are now themselves important sources of 
neoliberal discourse.  
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While I have referred to a post-Bretton Woods global economic system somewhat homogenously 
as ‘late capitalism’ underpinned with an ideology of neoliberalism, even within this period, 
capitalism has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and respond effectively to new 
circumstances, opportunities and obstacles.  It is important to remember that capitalism is not 
purely determinant but also profoundly responsive to, and highly dependent upon, events and 
developments in global politics and society.  This contingency makes it difficult to gain an accurate 
‘picture’ of neoliberalism and despite many studies which have examined its effects and 
implications at particular times and places, more detailed accounts of neoliberalism in the abstract 
have until recently been relatively rare.  In the past few years however, some welcome exceptions 
to this lacuna have emerged. (Harvey 2006; Turner 2007; 2008 Howard and King 2008; Plehwe et 
al 1996; Dumenil and Levy 1994). 
 
Neoliberalism and the counter-revolution in ideas 
 
Just one month after the end of hostilities in Europe, The Economist, which as will be shown below 
became a leading proponent of neoliberal ideology, clearly signalled its support for the prevailing 
consensus over the need make some limited attempt to reign in the laissez faire liberalism of free 
market ideology: 
It is a matter of the most obvious common sense that in this day and age, the best form of 
economic organisation for a complex industrial country lies somewhere between the extremes 
of laissez faire and bureaucracy, of full control and no control…there are…two vital principles of 
economic action, the adventuring power of the individual and the organizing power of the state 
and if a democratic community is to successfully confront the complex problems of this puzzling 
age, it will need the maximum assistance that both principles can give. (The Economist 1945 
23rd June) 
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The discourse analysis which forms the final part of this chapter will reveal a rather different 
perspective and a far greater scepticism, even outright hostility, toward democratic state control 
and planning from The Economist.  
However, in order to fully understand the nature and significance of neoliberal discourse as 
represented by the contemporary Economist, it is first necessary to comprehend some of the more 
long-standing tenets of liberal ideology from which it emerged.  For those countries representing 
the core of the global economy, the birthplace of the industrial revolution and the intellectual roots 
of contemporary ‘western civilisation’, liberal culture has, in its various forms, been long dominant.  
Indeed, for many, liberal values lie at the very heart of western civilisation (Turner 2007).  The 
intellectual and active movements of ‘the left’ have, as we have discussed, been constructed largely 
in opposition to this dominant set of values.  Nevertheless, critical and radical movements have 
shared much of the terminology of liberalism due to their shared inheritance of enlightenment 
thought and some commentators have suggested that some of “the differences between 
egalitarian liberalism and some theories of social justice are often difficult to discern” (Turner 2007: 
80 fn).  Indeed, Eric Hobsbawm notes that “[t]he socialist labour movements, were actually, both 
in theory and in practice, as passionately committed to the values of reason, science, progress, 
education and individual freedom as anyone” (1994: 110).  In support of this claim he goes on to 
describe the Mayday medal of the German Social Democratic Party as showing Karl Marx on one 
side and the Statue of Liberty on the other (ibid.).  
Social democrats such as Bernstein were increasingly persuaded that socialism might be achieved 
through parliamentary means rather than revolution.92  At the same time the suspicion that the so-
called self-regulating market could not be ‘dis-embedded’ from the social and political realm 
                                                          
92 Indeed, while Marx had insisted on the inevitability of socialism, he did not revolution was the only 
means by which it might be achieved but that only if other avenues were closed off then revolution would 
foster the transition. 
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without catastrophic consequences.  The stock market crash and subsequent depression was 
perhaps the final nail in the coffin of classical liberalism and what remnants remained became 
bound up in the collectivist zeitgeist. It was this convergence of liberalism and socialism in the years 
following WWI that led some liberals to speak of a crisis of liberalism.    
The resulting practical, theoretical and discursive tensions have persisted, perhaps most notably 
around the traditionally controversial relationship between notions of freedom and equality/justice 
and more recently around conceptions of democracy, sovereignty and civil society (Held 2002; 
Pogge 2002).  Such far-reaching debates cannot be rehearsed in detail here, but I suggest that what 
I draw out in the historical emergence and theoretical distinctions of neoliberalism and in a brief 
discourse analysis of The Economist will contribute to these debates and highlight their 
contemporary importance.  It should help demonstrate how neoliberalism and the ruling class or 
historic bloc which it serves, has reinterpreted and subverted long-standing elements of classical 
liberal thought that have maintained throughout a strong hold upon western/modern political 
consciousness, whilst jettisoning many of those aspects on the left of the broad liberal spectrum.93  
The evident failures and contradictions of late capitalism such as inequality, insecurity, imperial 
wars, exploitation, injustice, unsustainability  are all ‘addressed’ in neoliberal discourse (and in The 
Economist).  But they are legitimised as natural, necessary, temporary or merely the result of 
insufficient market reform or residual regulation, through a lexicon which connects with the 
conventional wisdoms and common sense notions which are buried in our everyday language and 
social practices.  
 
                                                          
93 We might consider the work of Hobson, Hobhouse, Keynes, Dewey, Rawls and Rorty among a host of 
other ‘liberal’ scholars all of whose thought, in quite different ways, strays very wide of the neoliberal 
model.   
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Rational choice theory and ‘freedom of choice’ 
 
For example, rational choice theory, as already discussed in chapter two, which appears to have 
successfully traversed the supposed divide between economics and politics and still represents a 
major school of thought in Politics and IR, gains greater purchase due to common assumptions 
regarding its binary opposite.  An irrational choice, or argument, in everyday use would be one that 
appears to defy logic or even verging on the nonsensical.  Such general discursive devices reify both 
the embedded notions of the rational and irrational in everyday discourse as well as the neoliberal 
ideology that market forces are a sensible and beneficial means to organise society and politics.   
Theories of rational choice became repackaged in Politics as ‘public choice’ theory which then 
become more closely and easily linked with a public discourse and ‘common sense’ notions of 
freedom of choice in a market society (Dunleavy 1991).  This then becomes translated into 
arguments which intrinsically link consumer capitalism with democracy.  In short, such arguments 
seem to equate a freedom to choose, for example, from dozens of different breakfast cereals, with 
an ability to participate meaningfully in political decision making.  When spelled out in such a stark 
way this seems a ludicrous argument, but it is one of the most fundamental ways in which market 
society has become associated in popular consciousness with freedom and hence a quite formalized 
democracy based on highly circumscribed and unequal economic freedom.   
Freedom is what all these groups claim to stand for.  But the freedom they promote is of a 
particular kind.  They are not campaigning for freedom from hunger or poverty.  They are not 
demanding free access to health and education.  They are not lobbying for freedom from 
industrial injuries, exploitation, pollution or unscrupulous banking.  When these libertarians say 
freedom, they mean freedom from the rules that prevent their sponsors behaving as they wish: 
mistreating their workers, threatening public health and using the planet as their dustbin.  
(Monbiot 2011: n.p.) 
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While individual freedom holds an exalted place in the neoliberal lexicon then, democracy in any 
substantive sense is not so valorized.  Indeed, for Hayek, democracy was a distinctly bounded 
concept and by no means necessary for a market order.  According to him “If democracy is taken 
to mean government by the unrestricted will of the majority, I am not a democrat and I even regard 
such government as pernicious and in the long run unworkable” (1982: 39).  Indeed, For Hayek, 
democracy may be discarded in circumstances where individual liberty is threatened.  
Neoliberalism then accepts that when democracy poses a threat to principles of liberty, 
authoritarianism may be preferable in order to maintain those freedoms (Gamble 1996 : 92). 
Despite the rather spurious democratic credentials which neoliberalism claims for itself then, it 
remains the dominant ideology of a TCC and effectively holds forth as a normalised discourse in the 
mass media and general public consciousness.  Such a state of affairs was of course not always the 
case.  Indeed, it is useful to remember that neoliberalism began as a counter-movement.  Perhaps 
unwittingly, the neoliberals had learned the lessons of Antonio Gramsci well.  The theory of 
hegemony recognises the crucial role of ideas in the establishment and maintenance of a particular 
socio-economic and political order. 
Indeed, despite the Marxist heritage associated with the theory of hegemony, it is the New Right 
which appears, perhaps unwittingly, to have drawn most benefit from Gramsci’s thought.  This 
political movement recognised the power of ideas and therefore the role of ideas, culture, 
education and knowledge production for the task of discrediting of collectivism and the dismantling 
of the Keynesian welfare-based state and full employment model of national and international 
political economy, in favour of a neoliberal global market society.  As we shall see, many of the 
ideas and debates that crystallized into the policies of neoliberalism from the late 1970s percolated 
for decades through regular international conferences, well-resourced thinktanks and even the 
lecture halls and dusty journals of academia.  These institutions provided space and resources for 
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a very free exchange of ideas from which neoliberal thought benefited hugely and the lesson was 
not forgotten; the crucial role of academia, especially Economics and later Business and 
Management schools, in providing opportunities for new and critical ideas to freely challenge the 
new orthodoxy has been a concern for neoliberals since their ascendancy and their solution is as 
simple as it is obvious.  The extension of market logic into higher education is not merely another 
example of state services to be subsumed with all the others.  Certain cultural sectors such as 
education, media and information and communications technology, are particularly important to a 
ruling class with an understanding of hegemony.  To borrow from the famous terminology of 
Marshall McLuhan, the medium itself becomes the message, control of the medium provides 
control of the message.  Critical perspectives are further marginalised and the dominant discourse 
prevails as it presents a more marketable product, be that a newspaper, TV channel, journal, 
conference, course module, research proposal   Such things are increasingly evaluated according to 
their crudely economic and monetary returns rather than their broadly social or cultural benefit.  
Their inherent political value and utility becomes bound up in the commercial process. 
In recognition of the importance of ideas to political power, since World War Two, wealthy disciples 
to this creed of liberalized conservatism,94 who would later evolve into the New Right has funded 
scholarship, set up research centres, endowed university chairs, paid for numerous conferences, 
seminars and periodicals and supported any development and dissemination of ideas beneficial to 
corporate capital and financial markets.  Conservative foundations and think tanks such as The 
American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation were founded with the huge fortunes 
amassed by corporations in the post-war United States.  According to Susan George (2004: 192), 
“In the past 20 years ultra-conservative US foundations have spent a billion dollars to these ends” 
(i.e. the development and dissemination of neoliberal ideology).  Their efforts have culminated in 
                                                          
94 Anthony Fisher is a particulary influential figure for the British neoliberal story.  For an excellent account 
of his founding of the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) see Cockett (1995: 122-199). 
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such confident declarations as ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama,1989, 1992) and ‘there is no 
alternative’ (TINA).95  In the core economies of the global system, democracy and citizenship have 
been forged into a liberal-capitalist and consumerist form, restricted to parliamentary 
representational systems where business interests freely influence domestic and international 
policy.  This outright rejection of alternatives stretches back to some of the earliest proponents of 
the neoliberal model: 
The alternative is not plan or no plan. The question is: whose planning? Should each member of 
society plan for himself or should the paternal government alone plan for all? The issue is 
spontaneous action of each individual versus the exclusive action of the government. It is 
freedom versus government omnipotence. (von Mises 1936:31-32) 
The clear implication here is that the extent to which government might be democratic is simply 
not a concern.  Government is ‘paternal’, suggesting that it treats citizens as children, and it is 
‘omnipotent’, which implies a certain religious or god-like status which can be seen as derogatory 
in the rational, secular worlds of business, economics and in many respects the social ‘sciences’ 
more generally.  The counterposition of freedom to government intervention or planning is a 
familiar theme of neoliberal discourse today but in the 1930s, when von Mises was writing, 
government intervention in the economy, long term planning and protectionism were increasingly 
the norm in a variety of national forms96 and we should read the above quote in its historical 
context. 
                                                          
95 This quote, widely attributed to the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, refers to the supposed 
victory of capitalism over all other forms of social organisation.  The alter-globalist mantra ‘Another World 
is Possible’ is sometimes assumed to be a direct response to this claim.   
96 From Stalin’s five year plans to the command economy of Nazism and in between were the variously 
Keynesian economic models of, for example, Britain (Rooth 1993), the US (Blyth 2002: 49-95), Sweden 
(Berman 1998) and a range of other national  manifestations of social democratic arrangements.  
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Indeed, in order to unearth the ideological origins of neoliberal thought we must consider the years 
preceding World War Two during which classical  liberal thought began to fall out of favour, both 
with the masses as well as with many intellectual and elite groups.   This decline of classical 
liberalism and the rise of various forms of collectivism represents the context in which a small group 
of political and economic thinkers began espousing the ideas which condensed into those we 
recognize today as neoliberalism.  In order to understand those ideas it is necessary to understand 
that socio-cultural, historical and political context. 
 
Between the wars: from laissez faire to The Death of Liberalism? 
 
Liberal philosophy had unquestionably been the dominant school of thought in the West for much 
of the nineteenth century in terms of both politics and economics and toward the latter half had 
begun to drift toward a more laissez faire perspective associated with the marginalism of Jevons, 
Menger and Walras (van der Pijl 2009) and Manchester school capitalism (Grampp 1960).  Despite 
the feeling by many that such tendencies had played an important part in the apparent collapse of 
the ‘hundred years peace’ and the descent into world war and the subsequent economic crisis (see 
Polanyi 2001[1944]), liberal values persisted into the 1920’s and were generally perceived by many 
as being in opposition to the rise of the extremist politics of fascism and communism.  Indeed, aside 
from Russia, all the countries which emerged from the catastrophe of WWI were essentially 
representative parliamentary regimes.  Importantly though, the classical liberalism of the 19th 
century  had begun to incorporate  much of the collectivist zeitgeist, to the extent that the dominant 
model of political organisation in Western states was a very different one from that which had 
characterised them before World War One.97  Indeed, the forced collectivism, centralisation and 
                                                          
97 Such values were also beginning to spread beyond Europe to much of Latin America and even parts of 
Asia (see Hobsbawm 1994:111).   
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intensive state planning which those states had undergone before and during the war had left them 
far more capable of centrally organising their peacetime economies.  The rapidly expanding 
communications revolution ushered in new propaganda opportunities for governments and the 
fostering of collective national spirits.  This potent cocktail of culture and national politics reached 
its dark climax in the propagandist work of Leni Riefenstahl and Joseph Goebbels.  However, it was 
not just governments and politicians who recognised the vast opportunities offered up by these 
new technologies.  Corporate executives and those who they hired to advertise their products were 
also salivating at the new markets opened up by these novel forms of mass communication. 
In the years between the world wars extremist politics placed states and societies in conflict of 
various intensities from Russia, across the continent of Europe to Spain.  For the most part spared 
the political turbulence across the water, in Britain and the US political liberalism was alive and well 
and widely still considered a necessary corrective to the hot-headed passions of the continent.  
Many of the continental neoliberal founders such as F.A. Hayek emigrated to these bastions of their 
beloved liberal traditions.  Nevertheless, a discernibly collectivist element was a growing feature of 
this Atlantic liberalism also.  The global economic crash of 1929 led an increasing number of 
politicians, philosophers, economists etcetera, to further question the efficacy of classical liberal 
economic theory.  The economist John Maynard Keynes and his General Theory of Employment 
Interest and Money (1936) offered a solution which seemed to chime with the widespread 
understanding of the causes of the Crash and subsequent depression and sat well with the 
prevailing collectivist ethos.   
In short, Keynes’ work, responding to the rising and dangerous levels of unemployment affecting 
the economies of many liberal democratic states at the time, suggested that such a phenomenon 
was not determined by the price of labour, as argued in the neoclassical economics of the 
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marginalists and Austrian school98but by ‘aggregate demand’ (spending of money).  Such demand, 
argued Keynes, could be stimulated by government intervention and public spending on capital 
projects.  This policy framework was adopted most notably in the USA under Roosevelt’ New Deal 
and after the war formed an important economic pillar of US policy through the Kennedy 
administration and into Johnsons ‘Great Society’ programmes.  In Britain, the Beveridge Report 
which would form the cornerstone of post war labour economic policy, was also based on 
Keynesian principles. (Cockett 1995: 57-99) 
It was a theory which the neoliberal economists of the Austrian School were vehemently opposed 
as they were of the opinion that such government intervention accelerated collectivist tendencies 
and as such contained the danger of pushing these liberal democracies in the direction of fascism 
or communism.  This was by no means the intention of Keynes and his followers.  Keynes recognised 
that the substantial advances toward constitutional democratic in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had been largely borne on the back of liberal ideas and he regarded his 
proscriptions as a necessary means to protect those important accomplishments from the tide of 
extremism and totalitarianism.  Keynes regarded his ideas as the only means by which liberalism 
might be rescued from its widely recognised decline.  This palpable decline is illustrated in the words 
of Laski, speaking at the Tenth Hobhouse Memorial Lecture at the LSE on 24th of May 1940 on ‘The 
Decline of Liberalism’: 
We must if we are to be honest, admit that the liberalism for which Hobhouse battled so bravely 
has suffered an eclipse as startling and as complete as that which attended the doctrine of the 
divine right of Kings after the revolution of 1688. (in Cockett 1995: 59) 
                                                          
98 As Veblen notes, “the so-called Austrian school is scarcely distinguishable from the neo-classical, unless it 
be in the different distribution of emphasis” (1919: 171) 
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In the US, the New Deal Keynesianism had caught the attention of influential columnist Walter 
Lippmann whose (1937) Good Society mirrored many concerns of the European neoliberals 
regarding the fate of liberalism.  Lippmann is a crucial figure due to his earlier writings on 
Propaganda and Public opinion which demonstrated some distinct reservations about democracy 
which he considered dangerous due to the supposed propensity to irrational drives and ‘mob rule’ 
of newly emergent mass societies.  Lippmann was also a close colleague of the propagandist and 
inventor of public relations Edward Bernays.  Lippmann worked on the Committee for Public 
Information which Bernays had founded and their combined interest and talents can be seen as 
crucial for the successful strategy employed by the neoliberals through the subsequent decades.  
The expertise and connections of Lippmann made him an invaluable ally for those recognising the 
importance of ideas in politics and seeking to engineer the rebirth of liberalism in Europe.  
In honour of Lippmann’s Good Society, the European neoclassical liberals organised an international 
conference in Paris in 1938 to discuss the book and the project to revive the liberalism which they 
held so dear.  Aside from Lippmann, the conference was attended by 25 other sympathisers from 
across Europe.  This conference, The Colloque Walter Lippmann, would have a considerable impact 
on the fate of liberalism over the subsequent decades.  According to Turner: 
It represented the first coherent attempt to bring together the leading proponents of freedom in 
the world for a reconsideration of the legacy of liberalism. Attempts were made to develop a 
‘new’, revitalized interpretation of liberalism that both moved beyond the outmoded nineteenth-
century conception of laissez-faire liberalism and challenged existing collectivist streams of 
thought. (2007: 72) 
The central aim of the conference was to create an altogether ‘new’ liberalism to combat the 
dominant collectivist impulse without resorting to the crude and discredited laissez faire 
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Manchester capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th century.99  Those attending agreed to develop 
their cause internationally through regular conferences and the publication of their ideas both in 
academic journals and the popular press. 
F.A Hayek: The Road to Serfdom and the Mont Pelerin Society 
 
Just a year after the conference however, Europe descended into open conflict and many of the 
short-term plans of the group were shelved.  The ideas percolated through the war years however 
and in 1944 F.A. Hayek published perhaps the most important work on neoliberalism to date.  The 
Road to Serfdom.  The central claim of this book was the notion that collectivism of any kind would 
inevitably intensify in its regulation and circumscription of individual freedoms and as a result end 
in totalitarian forms of government.  The central planning advocated by Keynes then, was seen as 
the first step in a journey which would inevitably lead to dictatorship and slavery or ‘serfdom’.  The 
Road to Serfdom began as a series of papers responding to the work of Oskar Lange and others 
during the 1930’s regarding the economic feasibility of  socialism and the possibility, in the case of 
Lange in particular, of market socialism.  These debates led Hayek to develop a series of articles in 
the years preceding WWII the result of which was the publication in 1944 of The Road to Serfdom.  
It was a direct and explicit attack on Keynesian political economy and the governments which were 
implementing those policies.  Hayek argued that such policies would, one way or another, end in 
crisis as they required ever more state intervention. The only solution to such a situation was the 
‘spontaneous order’ order of the market mechanism.  This ‘hidden hand’ of Adam Smith is a far 
more efficient distributor of goods than the state as no government can gain sufficient information 
about the economy to direct it efficiently.  The automatic ‘laws’ of supply and demand are the only 
means by which goods can find their proper price and position in an economic system.   
                                                          
99 It was here that German economist Alexander Rustow coined the term neoliberal but it was never 
especially popular with those who it sought to describe (Turner 2007: 72) 
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The importance of the book is underscored by the success with which its ideas were disseminated.  
Its polemical style and populist appeal gave it an appeal beyond the economics profession.  Indeed, 
Hayek admits in the preface to the work that ‘it is a political book’.  The immediate popularity of 
the book, combined with wartime paper rationing, meant that it sold out instantly and in 1945, 
Readers Digest published a condensed version which sold in the hundreds of thousands (Cockett 
1995: 100).  Shortly after, General Motors commissioned a ‘childrens’ illustrated version for Look 
magazine where the arguments are stripped down yet further to their most basic form.100 
Hayek is then perhaps the single most important thinker in the development and transmission of 
neoliberal ideas.  Indeed, Hayek is hardly a surprising individual to pick out in an analysis of the 
emergence of neoliberalism.  He has been seen, at least in recent decades, as much of a bogeyman 
of left politics, commentary and academia as he has been a darling of the New Right.  What is less 
appreciated among his many proponents and critics however, was his early marginalisation in (and 
even ostracization from) the field of economics for many years.  There are a number of reasons for 
this; perhaps the most notable was his contribution to many different academic disciplines 
including politics, philosophy, the history of ideas and psychology.  Many economists felt these 
excursions into the social, cultural and political aspects of human existence obscured and polluted 
his (or anyone’s) economic analysis.  In the end however, it was perhaps these wider intellectual 
pursuits which gave his work such readability and credibility among those groups wishing to 
overturn the growing democratisation of politics and dominant Keynesian consensus. 
Hayek was always critical of the scientism which still today pervades and dominates the discipline 
of economics.  Interestingly, the strict separation between politics and economics which is often 
professed within contemporary neoliberal discourse and the field of economics generally is not 
wholly or consistently evident in Hayek’s thought.  What is clear though is that Hayek had a quite 
                                                          
100 See Ludwig von Mises Institute: http://mises.org/books/TRTS/  
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restrictive view on what government and politics should entail.  His strictly constitutional view of 
the role of government is akin to what is sometimes referred to as the nightwatchman state 
(Gamble 2001). 
In this and other ways, Hayek, like many social and political thinkers before him including Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx, has been widely misunderstood and misappropriated for various political 
ends.  This is nevertheless, not an attempt to defend Hayek on this ground, indeed Hayek and his 
fellow intellectual travellers themselves stripped away important social aspects of liberal thought 
in order to reformulate liberalism to fit his own political prejudices and philosophical conception of 
political economy. 
However, it should not be forgotten that despite the important contribution of Hayek, and in 
particular the Road to Serfdom, the neoliberal project was very much a collective effort.  To 
appreciate the impetus for and subsequent impact of the book it is important to consider the 
growing international circle of intellectuals who shared Hayek’s concerns for the future of 
liberalism.  Fellow Austrian anglophile and philosopher Karl Popper’s (1945) The Open Society and 
its Enemies expressed many similar concerns (Mirowski n.d.) and Michael Polanyi, brother of Karl, 
was also a fellow traveller, both intellectually and in terms of the emigration from Vienna to England 
and then the US. 
Hayek and other proponents of this recrudescent liberalism and its anti-collectivist sentiment such 
as Lippmann, von Mises, Rustow and a growing band of influential thinkers and writers, academics, 
journalists, business people and politicians, were active in driving the neoliberal project ahead.  The 
movement which began in Paris at the Colloque Walter Lippmann re-grouped after the war at a 
conference in Mont Pelerin.  This conference gave its name to the society which would take the 
ideas of neoliberalism onto the world stage and within a few decades, into the conventional wisdom 
of the governing class and prevailing public opinion, The Mont Pelerin Society (MPS). 
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The founding statement of the society is worth quoting in full to further reveal some of the 
underlying philosophical assumptions and political objectives in the language and style of those 
who proposed them: 
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the 
essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared. In others they are 
under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy. The position of 
the individual and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary 
power. Even that most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, 
is threatened by the spread of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the 
position of a minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress and 
obliterate all views but their own.  
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth of a view of history 
which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the 
desirability of the rule of law. It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief 
in private property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative 
associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be 
effectively preserved.  
Believing that what is essentially an ideological movement must be met by intellectual argument 
and the reassertion of valid ideals, the group, having made a preliminary exploration of the 
ground, is of the opinion that further study is desirable inter alia in regard to the following 
matters:  
● The analysis and exploration of the nature of the present crisis so as to bring home to others its 
essential moral and economic origins.  
● The redefinition of the functions of the state so as to distinguish more clearly between the 
totalitarian and the liberal order.  
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● Methods of re-establishing the rule of law and of assuring its development in such manner that 
individuals and groups are not in a position to encroach upon the freedom of others and private 
rights are not allowed to become a basis of predatory power.  
● The possibility of establishing minimum standards by means not inimical to initiative and 
functioning of the market.  
● Methods of combating the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds hostile liberty.  
● The problem of the creation of an international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and 
liberty and permitting the establishment of harmonious international economic relations.  
(Schneider 2003: 66-67) 
We can see from this statement that the reinvention of liberalism was at the very heart of the 
thinking behind the MPS.  Its principal aim was to rescue liberalism from the collectivist ideals which 
had come to dominate that school of thought.  As I have suggested, this was not, as some have 
suggested, a simple return to the nineteenth century laissez faire liberalism but a more complex 
reinvention and philosophical reworking of the liberal tradition.  Many of the most influential 
political thinkers and economists of the interwar years would have regarded themselves as 
unquestionably liberal,101  yet proposed an institutional and intellectual framework that was largely 
collectivist.  Hayek and the Mont Pelerin liberals were constructing a false dichotomy between 
collectivism and liberalism which failed to recognise the elements of liberalism that required some 
government intervention.  Through the 1950s and 60s they rejected the possibility, demonstrated 
by the democratic advances made in both the US and Western Europe, that a social liberal mixed 
                                                          
101 Keynes was a member of the liberal party and although Hayek was sceptical of his liberalism, stating 
that: “Keynes believed that he was fundamentally still a classical English liberal and wasn't quite aware of 
how far he had moved away from it. His basic ideas were still those of individual freedom. He did not think 
systematically enough to see the conflicts."  Hazlett, T. (1977 and 1992). The Road from Serfdom. Reason 
Magazine, July.  http://reason.com/archives/1992/07/01/the-road-from-serfdom/singlepage  Accessed on 
20/5/09. 
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economy was both domestically sustainable and compatible with international arrangements to 
promote trade and investment. 
The MPS, according to historian and former president of the society: 
can be best described as a voluntary association of like-minded people who have more than an 
ordinary attachment to the idea of a free society and the conviction that ideas ultimately 
determine the way in which the world is seen and the methods by which it is organised. (Hartwell 
1995: 24) 
The importance attached to ideas and their promulgation is here shown to be an early priority of 
the MPS.  Not just ideas about the present and future but how the writing of history can be used as 
a device to shape the current and future order.  As Orwell famously noted: “Those who control the 
present, control the past and those who control the past control the future”.  For the Mont Pelerin 
neoliberals, intellectuals and their links with and influence upon governing classes were central to 
the project to de-collectivise the dominant discourse of liberalism.  According to Hayek, the most 
crucial aspect of the struggle to establish neoliberal ideas was the “free acceptance or rejection of 
ideas of the governing groups of our time” (1967: 147).  For Hayek then, ideas were a more 
important factor than interests in understanding the ebb and flow of power in history world politics.  
He recognised that “[w]hat to the contemporary observer appears as the battle of interests has 
indeed often been decided long before in a clash of ideas confined to narrow circles” (1967: 179).  
What the Mont Pelerin liberals were engaged in then was what Gramsci referred to as a ‘war of 
position’ whereby their ideas would percolate through the governing classes an corporate elites 
until such a time when the necessary critical mass was reached and history became ripe for 
transformation.   
If the crisis is deep – ‘organic’ – these efforts cannot be merely defensive.  They will be formative: 
aiming at a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 
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‘historic bloc’, new political configurations and ‘philosophies’, a profound restructuring of the state 
and the ideological discourses which construct the crisis and represent it as it is ‘lived’ as a practical 
reality: new programmes and policies, pointing to a new result, a new sort of ‘settlement’ – ‘within 
certain limits’.  These new elements do not emerge’: they have to be constructed.  Political and 
ideological work is required to disarticulate the old formations and to rework their elements into new 
ones. (Hall 1983: 23) 
 
A War of Manoeuvre: Neoliberalization and the Demise of Bretton Woods 
 
By the end of WWII a general consensus had emerged among the western powers as they moved 
toward victory that some form of collectivist state planning and international organisation would 
be desirable to secure the peace.  In the years which followed WWII then, neoliberalism and its 
ideologues would remain on the margins, but worked consistently to get their ideas into 
policymaking circles.  Meanwhile, the Keynesian prescription for domestic economic management 
was extended into the international sphere in the form of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but 
flexible exchange rates. This system would regulate international finance in order to prevent the 
kind of short-term capital flows which had destabilised the interwar period.  In the words of the 
then US treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, a central aim of the system was “to drive the 
usurious money lenders from the temple of international finance” (in Gardner 1981: 76).   
Despite the apparent stability of the first decades of the Bretton Woods system, a range of 
complicating factors and processes combined to de-stabilise that system culminating in the 
purported crisis of the 1970s.  The system had been underwritten by the economic and political 
and military might of the USA.  The Dollar served as a reserve currency to which other currencies 
would be pegged and the Dollar in turn would be convertible into gold at a rate of $35 per ounce.  
276 
 
As the power of the US declined relative to the rest of the world, debtor countries became worried 
about the ability of the Federal Reserve to convert all the dollars in the global economy into gold.   
If any single point or event can be said to mark the actual beginning of neoliberalization, the 
decision taken by US president Richard Nixon to abandon the gold standard and shift to an 
international system of floating exchange rates would be a contender.  It has been suggested that 
Nixon had little choice in the matter but whatever the stimulus, this move provided a clear 
opportunity for the neoliberals to shift to a war of movement from its war of position.  At the same 
time the abandonment of fixed exchange rate left the door wide open for currency speculation and 
a range of other financial practices which were expanding exponentially as a result of rapid 
developments in information and communications technology. 
Despite the significance of this act, this second ‘great transformation’ (Blyth 2002: 4-5) was as much 
a result of growing unease regarding the spreading and deepening of democratic forms.  The 
process of decolonisation had led many in the newly emerging developing world to call for a New 
International Economic Order with fairer terms of trade and an end to the domination of the global 
south by a handful of formerly colonial powers.  Within those powerful countries, significant unrest 
and further democratic demands were making governments and powerful elites distinctly 
uncomfortable.  A (1975) report to the Trilateral Commission spoke of a ‘crisis of democracy’ in the 
west and suggested many aspects of the crisis stemmed from an excess of democracy (129).  The 
turn to neoliberal ideas then was not simply a response to a supposed economic crisis of Keynesian 
demand management toward monetarism but should be regarded as more of a political response 
to the extending reach and appeal of democratic governance. 
So neoliberalism is not the same as globalisation, nor was it by any means a cause of globalisation.  
Neoliberalism was merely a set of radical ideas waiting in the wings as the post-war economic and 
geopolitical order began to unravel amid the turbulent political events and cultural currents of the 
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late 1960s and early 70s.   It had spent decades on the margins, refining its arguments, building 
resources and developing networks, foundations and thinktanks.   
 
 
The End of History? 
 
Perhaps the high tide of neoliberal practice came in the aftermath of the historical watershed of a 
collapsing Soviet Union.  Liberalism in general and neoliberalism as the dominant strain of that 
gained much credibility as a result of these rather unexpected and rapidly evolving events and 
processes. Commentators and politicians of the new right on both sides of the Atlantic saw this as 
further incontrovertible evidence that alternatives to a liberal democratic capitalist world order 
were no longer realistically conceivable (Fukuyama 1989, 1992; Kumar 1992).  What is more 
interesting is the process which followed 
As the apparatus of state socialism in the USSR withered in the face of haemorrhaging populations 
in Eastern Europe in the short term, coming largely as a result of more long term processes of 
cultural and political penetration, through increasingly widespread forms of mass communications 
media, of (neo)liberal ideology. I bracket ‘neo’ here as much of the more persuasive and powerful 
aspects of this ideology were those which neoliberalism has curtailed in practice.  That these ‘civil’ 
and individual aspects of enlightenment ‘rights’ had been sacrificed in the face of a predominant 
concern with social and collective rights in that system, made the ideals of liberalism seem perhaps 
all the more appealing to the disenfranchised masses east of the Iron Curtain.   Whatever the 
original appeal, the end of the Cold War has secured neoliberalism as the globally dominant 
paradigm by which to organise politics and the state.  It has secured for itself the status of a 
normalized discourse with few challengers to its ideological supremacy.  In order to understand 
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how it maintains that dominance, some attention must be paid to the way in which it respond to 
the criticisms of those who recognise the democratic deficit in neoliberal thought and practice. 
In the next section I examine neoliberalism as a largely normalised discourse which must sustain its 
dominance through certain representations of anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist resistance.  Anti-
capitalist and anti-corporate resistance is a relatively recent aspect of resistance in the UK at least, 
coming in part from radical environmentalism and with some longer traditions in socialist politics.  
Previous anti-corporate activism on the traditional left had occurred almost exclusively through the 
trade union movement and, as until the early eighties, these were then confrontations with 
government as much of the fundamental industrial infrastructure was in public ownership.  Trade 
unionism is not generally directly anti-corporate in that it requires corporate institutions to thrive 
in order to improve conditions and rewards for workers.  Such political resistance now is a rather 
different form of thought and practice than in previous incarnations. 
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Part two – A critical discourse analysis: normalising neoliberalism 
 
The previous chapter (six) attempted to show how discourse analysis, informed by some of the 
insights of Marxism, post-structuralism and social constructivism, provides a particularly suitable 
methodology for an examination of contemporary political and ideological struggles over the 
relative merits, costs and supposed benefits of neoliberal globalisation.  Building upon the first part 
of this chapter, which has outlined the historical emergence of a neoliberal ideology in tandem with 
the emergence of a dominant transnational capitalist class, the purpose of part two then is to 
provide a critical discourse analysis of late capitalism through a close and critical examination of the 
discourses of neoliberal globalisation as it has been represented in the world famous business and 
current affairs journal, The Economist. 
What remains then, is to interrogate more narrowly the discourses of neoliberalism and late 
capitalism with a view to revealing some of the ways in which it represents, reproduces and in part 
constitutes the social and political institutions of neoliberalism.  We can find examples of these 
discourses in an almost infinite number of locations.  I focus here on just one, The Economist, and 
focus on a particular aspect of neoliberal discourse, its normalisation and purported necessity.  By 
this I mean the particular ways in which The Economist represents those agents and groups which 
might attempt to oppose or resist neoliberal processes and institutions of globalisation.  
Specifically, I refer to The Economist’s representations of democratically elected institutions of 
government, particularly where these stand in the way of deregulation and privatisation and to 
non-state agents and new social movements who more explicitly oppose and protest neoliberal 
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globalisation.102  These groups and movements, which I have so far refereed to variously as counter-
hegemonic, counter-capitalist or alter-globalist, are in general referred to in The Economist under 
the term ‘anti-globalisation’.   
I do not suggest that The Economist will provide an adequate account by itself own for a full 
understanding of neoliberal discourse and ideology, it is merely one important source of discourse 
among many which would provide interesting and useful insights into the maintenance of 
neoliberal hegemony.  A discourse analysis of forms of marketing and advertising, interviews with 
CEO’s, documentation from global economic institutions, thinktank outputs (e.g. The Adam Smith 
Institute, Institute for Economic Ideas, Mont Pelerin Society etcetera), statements of corporate 
social responsibility, government documents of various kinds would all reveal important aspects of 
neoliberal ideology and represent fruitful alternative avenues for further enquiry.   The abundance 
of neoliberal discourse is both part of its strength and evidence of its dominance. 
 
The period of analysis 
 
The texts analysed were extracted from a period ranging from 1996 to 2003.  This period is 
significant and interesting for a number of reasons  It represents perhaps the high water mark of 
globalisation and neoliberal dominance, the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’103 but  also a period 
                                                          
102 For a discussion and analysis of these various groups see: Starr (2000, 2005);Fischer and Ponniah (eds.) 
(2003); Notes from nowhere (2003); Smith (2008).  For accounts of opposition to globalisation more 
generally see Held and McGrew (2003); Stiglitz (2002). 
103 Alongside Joseph Stiglitz, Noam Chomsky (1999) is perhaps best known for this phrase, using it to link 
neoliberalism with US imperial power in his book Profit over People.  It was originally coined in 1989 by 
John Williamson to indicate the link between the Washington based institutions of the IMF and World Bank 
and a set of global policies designed to promote trade and foreign direct investment.  The policies he 
identified included a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, eg. primary health care, primary education, and 
infrastructure; tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base); interest rate liberalization; a 
competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment; 
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when serious questions and increasingly widespread doubts were beginning to be voiced regarding 
the supposed benefits and efficacy of neoliberal political economic policies for state and global 
institutions.  These doubts were the result of growing evidence that such policies appeared to 
continue to benefit the rich largely at the expense of the poor, both within and between countries 
and regions of the world.  Also, growing concerns over the ecological sustainability of the economic 
growth model which defined the very essence of the neoliberal project led increasing numbers to 
suspect the sustainability of a programme of unlimited economic growth.  In addition, the Asian 
financial crisis of 1998 and the subsequent global contagion were interpreted by many as evidence 
of the dangerous instability and precarity of such neoliberal models of global economic governance 
(Haggard 2000; Noble and Ravenhill 2000; Goldstein 1998). 
Furthermore, in the wake of the attacks of September the eleventh, some had pronounced the ‘end 
of globalisation’.   Such claims came not only from critics of globalisation but also from its neoliberal 
advocates.  For example, an editorial comment by the Chief Economist of Morgan Stanley suggested 
that the increased costs of international production and trade subsequent to 9/11 might result in 
‘the world turning its back on globalization,’ and that the terrorist attacks and their aftermath ‘may 
bring about its demise’ (Kobrin n.d.).  This resonates with the advice of George Bush to the American 
people after the attacks to ‘go out and shop’ (Schanberg 2004) in recognition of the threat to the 
neoliberal order presented by that shocking event imbued with such global resonance.   In fact, it 
might be argued that while certainly a different historical track was taken than would otherwise 
have been the case, the neoliberal course of globalisation ran on much as before but with the added 
neo-conservative twist of the global war on terror which in time became incorporated as simply 
                                                          
privatization, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) and secure property rights. See 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.htm 
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another element of the neoliberal capitalist world order and a profitable excursion for the already 
wealthy and powerful. 
Indeed, before 9/11 by far the most numerous and significant debates in global politics were those 
surrounding globalisation and resistance.  It is now difficult to recall in the wake of that event and 
the subsequent barbarous wars on terror just how salient these issues were on the global political 
agenda and the popular press.  Around that time, The Economist was preparing a long survey 
addressing exactly those themes which was suspended indefinitely.   The London Financial Times 
had also begun a series of articles called ‘Globalisations Children Strike Back’ dedicated to the so-
called ‘movement of movements’, the first part and only one published was  entitled: ‘The 
Mosquitoes begin to Swarm’ and described the movement thus: 
It is wide in its tactics and ambitions, violent and revolutionary on the edges, peaceful and 
reformist in the main. It rushes in often contradictory directions, anti-corporate and 
entrepreneurial, anarchist and nostalgic, technophobe and futuristic, revolutionary and 
conservative all at the same time. It does not have one source. Many tributaries have swollen 
counter-capitalism: the anti-apartheid movement, the campaigns against US intervention in 
Central America, environmentalism, the emergence of protest movements in the Third World, 
famine relief in Africa, the Asian financial crisis, human rights protection, Acid House raves in 
Europe, road rallies organized by Reclaim the Streets and hip-hop music in the US. (Harding 
2001) 
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon that same day put paid to that series of 
articles and a new set of political priorities dominated the  popular press and hence the public 
consciousness.  Not until deep into the 2008 crisis and subsequent global depression did a similar 
level of popular resistance to neoliberal globalisation begin to emerge again, both in the streets and 
in the popular press.  After 9/11, the movement of movements was side-lined, but in the months 
leading up to that disaster, they were at the forefront of The Economist’s discussions of the merits 
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and necessity of globalisation.  Much of the focus below is on how The Economist has 
(mis)represented these movements and protests.  Analysis of these representations identifies some 
of the ways resistance is delegitimised and highlights the importance of this process for maintaining 
the dominance of the late capitalist neoliberal discourse of globalisation. 
 
About The Economist 
 
First published in 1843, The Economist was designed from the outset to be an advocate of free trade 
and was initially set up to challenge the growing calls for regulation and trade protectionism of the 
era and in particular the newly introduced corn laws (repealed just three years later in 1846).  From 
the very start then, The Economist’s focus has largely been upon the tensions between government 
intervention and protectionism and the promotion of markets and free trade, tensions which 
remain at the very core of debates over globalisation today.   As shown earlier in the chapter, The 
Economist has not always been devoted to a neoclassical paradigm of economics as characterised 
by the neoliberal model.  As Brown and Lauder note, it has in fact been more of a “bellweather of 
economic fashion” (2001: 77).  It should be noted then that the argument here is not that The 
Economist itself determines or even reflects the thought process and consciousness of all its 
readers, although it may help to do so in some cases.  I suggest only that it is an interesting source 
for a case study on particular aspects of neoliberal ideology and how they are ‘discursified’ in the 
current historico-ideological juncture.   
It is important to remember that The Economist is now not only a popular journal, but increasingly 
wields its heavy influence through many other media forms, channels and outlets, particularly as a 
result of the new media opportunities afforded by the internet.  The Economist.com includes a vast 
array of searchable comment and analysis under a number of headings.  Its ‘Global Agenda’ 
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conference provides yet another forum for the gathering of like minds, the collaboration and 
consolidation of transnational classes and business elites.  In addition, an expanding and regularly 
updated collection of ‘Country Briefings’ includes articles, brief histories, political forecasts and 
socio-economic statistics, market and currency updates, newswires and links on over 60 countries 
(http://www.economist.com/countries).  A ‘Cities Guide’ (http://www.economist.com/cities)  
provides a focus on cities as much as countries demonstrates The Economist’s recognition of the 
development of ‘global cities’ as key central organisational nodes for globalisation and capital 
expansion and entrenchment—capitalism is itself a profoundly  urbanising phenomenon and global 
cities are emerging as political actors in their own right alongside nation states.  It is described on 
the website as ‘insider information for the business traveller on major destinations around the 
world.’  The ‘Global Executive’ section provides articles, interviews and book reviews on 
management thinking and business education 
(http://www.economist.com/business/globalexecutive).   
While these newer elements of The Economist’s output will not form a major part of this study, 
their nature gives us some clues about the kinds of knowledge dissemination and entrenchment 
that are vital for promoting and facilitating neoliberal globalisation and make The Economist an 
even more vital component of those processes.  Seen with these new services to the neoliberal 
business class, The Economist appears to be more than just a journal then, it has become and 
arguably sees itself as a key institution of globalisation.  Its ‘Intelligence unit’ provides resources ‘to 
help executives make informed business decisions through dependable intelligence delivered 
online, in print, in customised research as well as through conferences and peer interchange’ 
(http://www.eiu.com/).  The Economist is the flagship journal and ‘front of shop’ publication for an 
expanding media empire under The Economist Group.  This also includes a number of other paper 
publications including ‘More Intelligent Life’, a glossy lifestyle/leisure magazine with longer, more 
cultural, historical and biographical articles and a heavy focus on high-end advertising of luxury 
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consumer goods and lifestyles for the super-rich cultural elite.  These are also the business elites 
and high priests of capitalism, but of equal importance, The Economist’s readership goes far beyond 
this group to a huge number of globally dispersed middle managers in the private, and what is left 
of the public, sector.  With its unusual ownership (50% owned by the FT group and 50% by private 
investors including the Rothschilds), The Economist has long been relatively immune from the cuts 
that other publications suffer during economic downturns.  It is the only large circulation 
publication not to have seen its print edition fall in numbers with the advent of electronic media.  
Indeed, its paper circulation has increased significantly in recent years.   
Every week we take readers from around the world on a tour of business, politics and culture. 
The Economist sells nearly 1.5m copies a week, and the number keeps rising. What’s more, our 
readers are Ideas People. People who are united not by age or demographics, but by how they 
think and how they view the world. (http://www.economistgroupmedia.com/planning-
tools/circulation/)  
The above marketing blurb also expresses quite clearly how The Economist regards itself in a 
leadership role in which readers are 'taken' into the world of business politics and culture.  A 
reference to its readership as ‘Ideas People’ suggests a recognition and celebration of the 
ideological influence of its readership and the importance of ideas in the world more generally.  This 
is in addition to a more commercial function to appeal to readers who likely consider themselves 
to be ‘ideas people’.  Indeed, who would not wish to be deemed as such?  It is worth recalling the 
importance afforded to ideas and their dissemination by economists by noting the advice given to 
Antony Fisher by Hayek that “the decisive influence in the battle of ideas and policy was wielded by 
intellectuals whom he characterised as the ‘second-hand dealers in ideas” (quoted in Cockett 1995: 
123).  Additionally, Hayek’s ideological opposite number, Keynes, was in considerable agreement 
on the importance of ideas. 
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The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are 
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, 
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.  (Keynes 1936: 383) 
The Economist is not only read widely by business elites and senior managers, the movers and 
shakers of capitalism, but also by many professionals and also academics, perhaps especially those 
teaching and researching in the fields of Politics IR/IPE, Business and Economics.  Indeed, it should 
be remembered that the power of The Economist is derived from its reputation for high quality 
journalism which often breaks into research based analysis.  As a result, he paper now claims a 
worldwide circulation of 1.6 million, about one fifth in the UK,104  making it one of the most widely 
read weekly current affairs journals anywhere in the world with a distribution in every single 
country of the world.  The Economist has built for itself a reputation as being balanced, even-handed 
and traditionally ‘liberal’. This is linked to, and goes some way to help explain, its readership among 
many academics who also regard themselves as rational and objective observers of the world.  It 
has a long history and tradition as the primary international journal of business and commercial 
elites.  The content of the journal is interesting for discourse analysis due partly to the way it is 
structured so as to combine editorials, reportage and a substantial amount of advertising and 
marketing.  Such a range of semiosis provides fertile ground for examinations of intertextuality.  
However, the analysis below is predominantly (but not exclusively) from the written editorial 
content.  The editorial style is also interesting due to the widespread practice of anonymous 
columnists and commentators and can be seen to add to the rhetorical power of The Economist.  It 
presents a further impression of objectivity and disassociation from particular individual 
                                                          
104 http://www.economistgroup.com/AboutTheGroup/cfo.html  
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perspectives, opinions or viewpoints and bestows the paper with its (I hope to show, undeserved) 
dispassionate, neutral and balanced credentials. 
Any one of these factors would make The Economist an interesting and valuable object of analysis. 
Their combination makes it an especially important and potentially fruitful source for a critical 
discourse analysis of neoliberalism.  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, it has already been subjected to 
this type of close reading from a feminist perspective by Charlotte Hooper (2001). That excellent 
study focused primarily on the discursive links between representations of capitalist globalisation, 
discourses of masculinity and dominant perspectives in the academic field of IR. This study will 
analyse The Economist’s shifting representations of globalisation in light of the increasing salience 
of opposition and resistance to those processes.  In this way I hope to show that a close and critical 
discourse analysis of some selected articles from The Economist betray its claims to balance and 
supposed objectivity  and in fact demonstrate a strong political bias in that journal, exposing it as a 
powerful discursive agent for the neoliberal project of globalisation.   
The following analysis will examine more closely the way in which the reportage and criticism of 
opposition and resistance to neoliberal globalization can be highlighted in order to further 
demonstrate the ways in which knowledge about global politics have become entrenched in a 
particular hegemonic discourse of globalization.  I re-iterate that the period which marks the major 
object of analysis (1996-2003) is chosen as it incorporates the emergence of a political movement 
(of movements) which has come to be widely (mis)labelled as ‘anti-globalisation’.   
The texts selected have been chosen due to their implicit and explicit reference to globalization and 
the rise of a global justice movement that is more often referred to and recognised as anti-
corporate, anti-capitalist or anti-globalisation.  The defining characteristic of this movement is that 
it has begun to understand and articulate the many connections between a range of apparently 
disparate and unconnected issues and the construction of a globally oriented neoliberal regime.  
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This regime has itself adopted and been ascribed many labels, from ‘Washington consensus’ (see 
Stiglitz 2002; Chomsky 1999) to an American or global ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000; Panitch and 
Gindin 2004).   
 
Augmented consensus? The shift to a more conciliatory tone 
 
It is interesting to contrast the editorial/textual tone of The Economist around the beginning of the 
21st century to that of the early/mid-1990’s.  Prior to a number of crises and setbacks in the mid/late 
nineties to the neoliberal project of a global free market The Economist had adopted a more strident 
and at times even quite aggressive tone.  To suggest a crisis of confidence would be to overstate 
the case but the ‘red in tooth and claw’ language of globalisation exampled by such comments as 
the following: 
It would be pointless to deny that globalization is causing large changes in every society.  It is also 
clear that such influences act on different cultures differently, enforcing a kind of natural 
selection between those cultures which rise to the challenge and those which do not. (The 
Economist  1996: 30) 
Such a bold and strident tone is not uncommon during this period but is less in evidence during 
more recent years as the inevitable fallout from deregulation became more widespread and visible.  
Adopting such a rather extreme Darwinian line, The Economist here betrays a rather blatant 
dismissal of cultural diversity as insignificant, even problematic, with respect to the inexorable 
processes of neoliberal globalization.  The article from which the above text is drawn, entitled 
‘Cultural Explanations’, holds that culture, which according to The Economist seems puzzlingly 
divorced from ideology, is an insignificant factor in socio-economic explanations.  The article 
concludes that “[w]hile culture may continue to exercise an important influence on both countries 
289 
 
and individuals, it has not suddenly become more important than, say, governments or impersonal 
economic forces” (ibid.: 1996: 30).  An interesting point here then is the contrast of “impersonal 
economic forces” (i.e. supposedly spontaneous market mechanisms) which are assumed to be 
somehow devoid of the unpredictabilities of human behaviour, or ‘culture’.  No such similar 
qualification is provided for governments either which, as I will show below, are a common target 
of criticism for The Economist as they are often assumed to be inconvenient obstacles to neoliberal 
governance, whereas the market makes good, predictable, rational decisions on a simple and 
rational calculation of supply and demand.  Without recognizing any of the obvious connections or 
contradictions, the article goes on to distinguish culture from the even more deplorable concept of 
‘ideology’, something which appears to The Economist to be mysteriously linked here only with Cold 
War rivalry and as such consigned to the dustbin of history, a familiar liberal take on ideology as 
only of historical significance.  It continues: “Nor does it [culture] play the all-embracing and 
defining role that ideology played during the Cold War.  Much of its influence is secondary, i.e., it 
comes about partly as a reaction to the “knowledge era” (ibid.: 1996: 30). Culture and ideology, for 
The Economist here then, are merely problematic ‘epiphenomena’. 
As a result of this dismissal of culture as merely a kind of temporary and misguided irrational 
response to irresistible forces, The Economist must assume that “[w]ithin the overall mix of what 
influences people’s behaviour culture’s role may well be declining, rather than rising, squeezed 
between the greedy expansion of government on one side and globalization on the other” (ibid.: 
1996: 30).  Such a position on the role of culture is somewhat harder to sustain in the light of the 
intervening ten years where cultural considerations have come to the political and economic fore 
in a number of ways and in no uncertain manner (Best and Paterson 2010).  Capitalist practices now 
increasingly recognize the importance of cultural sensitivity and adaptability according to cultural 
difference, although the seemingly inevitable outcome of this adaptability will be to slowly smooth 
out and erode that problematic diversity rather than to simply deny its very existence. 
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Resistance and ‘terror’ 
 
In the post 9/11 context, there appears to be the beginnings of a different way of talking about 
resistance, with the increasing tendency to speak of resistance in terms of terror, (e.g.  guerrilla 
attacks on US occupying forces in Iraq) it might even be possible to identify a new discursive 
formation in which resistance is represented as far more destructive and dangerous.  This was 
beginning to take shape even befor 9/11. Consider for example this closing paragraph to an article 
on the Genoa summit: 
And the rioting in Genoa, though it was not due only to the Italians, may well have deep 
consequences in the country.  The slogans, the letter bombs, the violent tactics and much of the 
indulgent comment of the intelligentsia remind many Italians of what happened in the 1970’s.  
What began then with angry slogans against multi-national companies evolved into street clashes 
and ended in terrorism, which left many dead and deep political scars.  This must not happen 
again. (The Economist 2001a: 40) 
The title of the article: ‘Picking up the pieces’ also connotes and emphasises the destructive aspect 
of the protest and The Economist and its readers are left with the task of repairing the valuable 
consensus which has been broken by the irrational and dangerous protesters.   
While previously, The Economist’s editorial line on globalisation was that it was unquestionable and 
irresistible, during the late 1990’s this shifted somewhat toward a more explanatory and almost 
apologetic tone. More recently however, the tendency seems to be rather than simply dismiss any 
doubts about the appropriateness of the grand global venture, to argue that it really is for the good 
of all in the end, and despite its imperfect nature, it remains a necessary if sometime and for some 
people uncomfortable – the medicine must simply be taken.  In this line of representation then, 
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there are traces of the defensive and cautious admissions of imperfection but no other course is 
considered as plausible or permissible. 
This resonates with some of the work of those theorising the emergence and activity of a 
Transnational Capitalist Class who argue the case that hegemony is not perpetuated without 
conscious and concerted action on the part of the dominant class. A close reading of The Economist 
since the later 1990’s reveals some evidence of what Leslie Sklair refers to as the “siege mentality” 
of global capitalism and the TCC (Sklair 1999:23). This mentality is increasingly discernible in The 
Economist in phrases such as:  “The dismal science is suddenly sexy […] People who used to be 
regarded as pen pushing bureaucrats have become warriors in the struggle between the forces of 
global capital and the forces of something-or-other”  (The Economist 2001: 16 my emphasis).  The 
quote combines both an explicit acknowledgement of growing opposition with a more subtle 
dismissal of that opposition.  The quote displays a clear example of the dominant 'inside' and the 
contingent 'outside'.  Described nevertheless as a force, the main point is to suggest that they do 
not stand for anything and are thus represented as incoherent, implausible, dis-organised etcetera. 
Further evidence is contained partly within an attempt to represent those critical of globalisation 
(and its constitutive elements of privatisation, liberalisation and free trade) as being misguided and 
naïve in their aims.  Their goals are often represented in The Economist as being threatened by their 
means.  
It is possible to further illustrate this move with reference to a cover story which appeared shortly 
after the protests at meeting of the WTO in Seattle in 1999. The cover of the journal shows a close 
up of a small child (intimating what is perhaps the ultimate image of innocence and vulnerability) 
behooded in rags and staring intently (pleadingly?) at the camera.  It is captioned: 'The real losers 
from Seattle'. 
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The meanings of the picture alone may of course be somewhat ambiguous, however, as 
demonstrated by Barthes (1977), it is the caption which selects the one out of the many possible 
meanings for the image and fixes it with text (see also Hall 1972).  The meaning of the photograph 
does not lie exclusively in the image but in the careful and deliberate conjunction of the image and 
text.   The suggestion then, is that the protestors themselves might be somehow responsible for 
the plight of the destitute and famine stricken child.  As if the Seattle talks (and subsequent 
gatherings of the transnational neoliberal political classes) had been allowed to proceed 
unmolested then this child, and those her image is given to represent, would have stood more 
chance of being lifted from that situation and spared their suffering. 
The Economist only rarely enlists the ‘the poor’ to its noble cause.  It may seem churlish to suggest 
that something must be amiss when it does, but precious little evidence is produced here to support 
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its sudden bout of humanitarian concern. The accompanying text goes on to criticise the Indian 
governments, India, “home of our cover child” (1999:15 my emphasis), is poor only because “for 
four decades it pursued policies of socialist anti-globalization”(ibid.: 15).  Thankfully for The 
Economist it has finally come to its senses and “begun to embrace globalization, gradually opening 
itself up to the world. Finally, its economic growth rate, and with it the welfare and prospects of 
the poor, has begun to pick up. The process has barely begun, but hopes are high” (ibid.: 15).   The 
familiar promise of ‘more jam tomorrow’ seems to be the basic solution.  Nothing is said of the fact 
that India weathered the storm of the Asian financial crisis better than most of its neighbours and 
other developing countries due to its apparently misery inducing “socialist anti-globalisation” 
(ibid.:15).  In fact the years since India began de-regulating its state and globalising its economy 
have seen consistent grinding poverty, rapidly increasing inequality and rising levels of social unrest 
(Pal and Ghosh 2007). 
Reports in The Economist of later meetings which collapsed as a result of resistance and 
demonstrations both inside and outside the talks continue this theme of blaming the protestors for 
harming those which they claim to represent.  In a cover story response to the collapse of the 
Cancun WTO talks, The Economist seethed: 
"VICTORY to the people," cheered a press release from a globophobic activist group, Food First, 
after the world trade talks broke down in Cancún on September 14th. This delight is widely shared 
among developing-country advocates and even among many poor-country governments. Great 
news from Cancún? What scandalous rubbish. The failure sprang not from principle, nor even 
from intelligent calculation, but from cynicism, delusion and incompetence. It is going to leave 
most people in the world worse off--and, without a doubt, those who will suffer worst are the 
world's poor. (2003: 11-12) 
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Here again, any substantial  questioning  of the forms which global economic governance takes is 
presented as “globophobia” born of a supposed simple lack of understanding the ‘truth’ and 
inevitability of neoliberal globalisation.  To be against the neoliberal agenda is assumed to be 
against any form of globalisation. This kind of labelling or scripting of criticism is a constant and 
recurring theme in the discourse.  It is most notable in the repeated use of the pre-fix ‘anti’ which 
reinforces a representation of resistance as defined by its negativity and that it’s only identity or 
coherence is that it is ‘against’ globalisation but not ‘for’ anything in particular, as quoted above in 
the term “the forces of something-or-other” (The Economist 2001:16). 
 
The strategy of 'anti' labelling 
 
The Economist relies heavily upon the terms anti-globalisation and anti-capitalism as convenient 
umbrella terms in an attempt to de-legitimise a democratic movement that is marked  by its 
valuable diversity of ends and means and a distinctly global understanding of politics and 
economics.  While this may be merely a convenient shorthand, labelling in such a way bolsters the 
claim that such opposition is lacking in coherent alternatives to the current order, harking back to 
the famous refrain of the UK Thatcher government in response to critics of its own laissez-faire 
economic policies 'There is no  alternative (TINA)'.    
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, there is little attempt to give voice to the protestors in such a way as 
to allow them to state common objectives such as equality, social justice, democracy and ecological 
sustainability.  Where such space is set aside those who are quoted are employed in the task of 
reinforcing negative representations.   For instance, in an article entitled ‘The New Trade War’, the 
unlikely figure of Pat Buchanan is singled out to speak on behalf of the protesters.  The Economist 
sees nothing strange in such a choice of spokesperson for global justice: 
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Unsurprisingly, Pat Buchanan, a conservative protectionist demagogue…who was also in Seattle 
this week revelled in the controversy. "There is something higher than commerce" he declared. 
"It's called country, and we're joining the battle in Seattle to ensure that someone still stands for 
ours." (The Economist 1999:55) 
This association is a deliberate tactic to lump left progressives together with nationalist 
conservatives.  This corresponds with the general assumptions of neoliberals since Hayek that all 
forms of collectivism are grouped together as working against liberty and therefore unified in their 
destructive and dangerous irrational anti-democratic tendencies.   
Many in the global justice movement in fact recognize the necessity of some alternative form of 
globalisation rather than retreating to nationalist politics but criticize the capturing of this process 
by the neoliberal political project as a purely capitalist framework.  They themselves often have 
scant sympathy for the modern capitalist state as a political institution which might adequately 
meet the needs of the majority world.  As we have seen, the state is deeply and irretrievably 
implicated in the promotion and maintenance of globalisation.  This is a fact which The Economist 
rarely recognises and certainly not in explicit fashion.  States, governments and politicians are 
essentially obstacles to the free movement of capital and liberty in general unless they are 
deliberately engaged in practices and processes of de-regulation, privatisation, de-nationalisation 
or somehow engaged in foreign policy which extends free trade and the invisible hand of the market 
worldwide.   Indeed the crucial role of the state, in particular the SIACS, in these struggles forms a 
central element of the critical debates within the global justice movement.  These movements are 
aware of the close proximity of economic and political power which is held apart in the neoliberal 
discourse of The Economist. 
Such associations deliberately and effectively obscure the progressive and increasingly 
transnational nature of the majority of opposition to the WTO and associated organisations, 
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attempting to connect their aims with the parochial and paternalistic nation-state.  The clear 
strategy is to represent resistance as both conservative and regressive.  Implicit in this process is 
the construction and maintenance of binary oppositions, one is either committed to a global 
neoliberal ideology and its constituent elements of  private power, unregulated trade and finance 
and the minimal residual state, or one is devoutly protectionist, luddite, and committed to 
'irrational' or delusional means of attaining political and economic objectives.  As a result the 
dominant discourse closes off space for dialogue and different perspectives. 
Again, focusing on an individual with alleged 'anti-global' credentials, the book review of Naomi 
Klein's Fences and Windows links representations of irrationality with an infantile and heavily 
gendered mind-set and a range of discursive markers with which these are underscored.  The 
‘review’ which is much more of Klein that the actual work itself, is titled: 'Why Naomi Klein needs 
to grow up', a clue to what is to follow.  Indeed, the reviewer judges that: 
Klein has all the incoherence and self-righteous disgust of the alienated adolescent… She 
measures the growing pains of capitalist development not against real world alternatives but 
against a Disneyesque utopia…  [She] is all aflutter over Subcommandante Marcos. (2002:70) 
“all aflutter” is a term that would be inconceivable if the author of the book were not female.  Here 
The Economist is clearly and openly objectifying Klein and mocking her as some giddy teenage girl 
with an infatuation for the ‘brave soldier’ (Marcos).  In the process it is her gender which is under 
scrutiny, not so much the actual work itself.  Or rather, Klein’s gender, and of course her age, is 
used against the work under review.  Reference to Disney also serves as an attempt to infantilise 
and therefore reduce the authority of the work which paints a view of globalisation different from 
the mainstream representation which must retain its own authority against any dissenting voice.  
The representation of infantilism and immaturity is underscored in the final sentences where, 
having rejected Klein’s hardly ground-breaking or radical suggestions:  that TNC's exert considerable 
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power over governments and individuals, the reviewer 'concedes' that “for an angry adolescent, 
she writes rather well. […] What a pity she has turned her talents as a writer to a cause that can 
only harm the people she claims to care most about.  But perhaps it's just a phase. (ibid.:70) 
We could here be reminded of the kind of condescending reprimand that might be directed toward 
a wayward adolescent by the authoritative parent.  ‘She'll grow out of it when she calms down and 
understands’.  This kind of trivializing and ridicule to which The Economist subjects  those critical of 
neoliberal globalisation remains a major rhetorical device in an era of increasing uncertainty about 
the adequacy of global capitalist institutions to address the growing salience of inequality, injustice, 
economic crisis and ecological meltdown.  The system only needs marginal tweaking or reform and 
remains the only game in town.  As the voices of dissent grow in number and in volume such an 
approach is likely to form a major part of discourses which sustain that system. 
In line with the emerging ‘augmented Washington consensus’ mentioned above, the editorial tone 
of The Economist increasingly demonstrates attention to, and some apparent discomfort with, the 
losers of globalisation who are becoming increasingly visible and vocal.  However this appears to 
be largely a discursive strategy through which to undermine criticisms of capitalism and neoliberal 
globalisation which assumes that more growth and less government is the only viable solution to 
these problems which can no longer effectively be ignored, even by The Economist. 
 
Governments as incompetent 
Another key component of The Economist’s neoliberal discourse then, is that it is widely critical of 
governments and as a corollary the regulatory institutions of states, even relatively democratic 
ones.105  It is therefore an extremely good example of the type of discourse that Ian Douglas refers 
                                                          
105 Indeed, the most substantively democratic states such as those in Scandinavia have been some of the 
last to capitulate to some form of the neoliberal model. 
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to in his (1997) Globalisation and the Retreat of the State, i.e. the discursive rendering of 
globalisation in the popular consciousness as an inevitable, inexorable and natural process.  There 
is a representation of the state as anachronistic, incompetent and interfering in the natural and 
spontaneous order of the free market.  This is usually carried out under the guise of referring to 
politicians in general rather than particular states by name although certain states regularly appear 
as exemplary bogeymen of protectionism.  For example, Clueless in Seattle (The Economist 
1999:19) presents the WTO agenda as threatened by governments and protesters alike:  
It is hard to say which was worse--watching the militant dunces parade their ignorance through 
the streets of Seattle or listen to their lame brained governments respond to the "arguments".  
No, take that back: the second was worse.  At least the rioters had a good time.  It was the 
politicians who made the biggest hash of things […] France's trade minister says here is the proof 
that economics and politics cannot be kept apart: statism lives! (1999: 19) 
France is a regular bête noir of The Economist.  The combination of its considerable economic 
muscle and international political significance with a popular cultural suspicion of globalisation and 
neoliberalism marks it out as a significant obstacle to the free market model of globalisation and 
European Unification.  More recently however, its traditions of resistance, effectively organised and 
active labour movements and large public sector provision have been gradually dismantled by these 
combined institutional processes and the ideas and discourses which underpin them. 
In the aforementioned article about the demonstrations in Genoa, Italian Politicians are held 
equally to account for their failure to adequately protect the summit. 
Predictably, the politicians, who—government and opposition alike—failed to foresee just how 
bad things would get, are now at each other's throat.  […] plainly the government misjudged the 
scale of the protest (2001a: 40). 
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It is the politicians of the left which unsurprisingly become marked out by the Economist as 
especially culpable for the failure of the summit. 
Blame the police as it may, it was a centre-left government, in power until May—indeed, formally 
until June—that picked Genoa for the summit, and planned the event. But, after losing the 
election on May 13th, many left-wing politicians started to back the protesters' umbrella 
organisation, the Genoa Social Forum. (ibid.: 40) 
Of course, the article soon returns to a more familiar denunciation of the protesters themselves, 
comparing the demonstrations to the activities of Italian far left groups in the 1970’s and reminding 
the reader of the political violence which became associated with that era.106  This consistent 
reference to the danger, violence and disorder represents an underlying fear of radical or 
revolutionary transformation.  It seems to be both regarded as a distinct possibility and 
simultaneously dismissed as inconceivable. 
 
Subsuming violence and ignorance  
 
Perhaps the most consistent theme in the neoliberal discourse of The Economist and its 
representations of resistance is the repeated allusions made to the violent nature of alter-
globalisations and global justice protests.  Another binary opposition is erected whereby the 
disorder and chaos associated with demonstrations is placed in counter-position to the supposed 
order and safety and security provided by a neoliberal order of global free markets.  The chaos of 
economic crisis and regular financial collapse is obscured by the over-representation of more overt 
                                                          
106 Note again the reference to political terror campaigns of 1970’s Italy in the quote on ‘rioting in Genoa’ 
illustrated on page 267 (from The Economist 2001a: 40). 
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and deliberate disorder, contestation and conflict which sometimes obtains at the meetings and 
summits of financial technocratic elites. 
For all but the anarchists and sundry Marxists for whom worse means better, it was a disaster.  
Last weekend’s G8 summit in Genoa saw two days of violent riot and police reaction that left one 
rioter shot dead. (ibid.: 40) 
In line with this tactic, the picture at the head of the article is of a single isolated protester framed 
by burning vehicles and smoking tear-gas grenades, bedecked in para-militaristic gas mask and 
wielding the ominous black flag of the anarchists.  This is given as a representative image of the 
protests, not democratic and socially diverse mass participation, as was in fact the case, but 
signifying with dangerously narrow criminal anti-democratic elements re-emphasising the 
order/disorder binarism. 
Indeed, a common theme of image-text representations demonstrated in these articles is to avoid 
pictures of crowds and stick to individuals or very small groups engaged in throwing missiles, setting 
light to property or even sometimes devoid of people completely in favour of dramatic imagery of 
smoke and fire.  The suggestion appears to go along the lines of: ‘this could be your stuff burning’.  
Images of seething masses such as those published in the more popular press and broadcast media, 
may prove too discomforting for the liberal business elite that constitutes much of The Economist’s 
readership.  (see also burning flag picture with article on Cancun ‘WTO under fire’ (2003:28).   
The prevailing ignorant, violent and dangerous representation resonates strongly with domestic US 
trades unions stereotyping, highlighted by Mark Rupert, of “ignorant and inarticulate strong-arm 
thugs with underworld connections.  On national television, President Clinton denounced labor’s 
‘roughshod’ and ‘musclebound’ tactics and the theme was picked up in the press” (Rupert 2000: 
61).  The portrayal of resistance as ignorance also entrenches and reinforces the managerial 
dominance and supposed economic technocratic ‘expertise’ of institutional capitalist elites.  The 
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argument goes that violence is born of frustration at the lack of understanding of the intricacies of 
finance, trade and development economics.  It is a tactic long deployed in professions such as law 
and medicine as well as a host of other ‘disciplinary’ institutions to privilege and entrench the power 
of dominant groups and institutionalised practices through the use of technocratic jargon.  Part of 
the role of the unnecessary complexity of language in financial discourse is to maintain it as the 
realm of professional economists and to exclude lay interpretations which might expose the 
inherent contradictions of financial capitalism. 
However, in addition, and in a sense perhaps contrasting these fear inducing representations 
discussed above, there is also a tendency to represent resistance as disorganised and ineffectual, 
in the words of Tony Blair “An anarchist’s travelling circus going from summit to summit” (quoted 
in Graves 2001:22).  In this discursive strategy the resisting subject is again belittled and trivialised 
in order to cast it as without import, strategy or meaningful direction.  So, in order to deny the 
intellectual and practical validity of popular interventions at the summits of neoliberal global 
governance and to forestall any repetition of such inconvenient events it suggests less accessible 
and glamorous locations for multilateral trade talks: 
Seattle and Gothenburg have a low-key marine charm as well as a reputation as hippy heaven. 
Advertising a summit in that sort of place is pure provocation to a bored anarchist in a bedsit in south 
London.  The world is full of alternative locations guaranteed to discourage the soft-bellied young of 
today. (The Economist 2001:16) 
Again, not so subtle representations of protestors as “the soft-bellied young” implies they are 
immature, middle-class, well-educated and state protected privileged who therefore have no right 
to question the system which creates the wealth which has both softened and enlightened them.  
Their stance is considered contradictory and incoherent as it is beyond the rationalist assumptions 
of The Economist that people would not resist on behalf of those less fortunate than themselves.  
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The more recent gatherings of the global financial elite have indeed opted for more far away and 
inaccessible destinations and the security measures employed to keep protestors at bay are 
extensive to say the least.  The War on Terror has helped to foster a political climate which has 
heightened the security measures surrounding these summits to a military scale and more recent 
demonstrations have been far removed from the actual negotiations themselves. 
Even articles that appear to show some genuine curiosity about the nature of protest and those 
involved such as one entitled 'Mayday, Mayday' reverts in the final paragraph to a familiar editorial 
line:   
But the ragbag anti-capitalists are probably too disorganised to create real havoc, or to rank alongside 
the truly epoch-making protests that London has seen over the past few centuries.  Farce is a likelier 
outcome than tragedy. (2001b: 36) 
The softer line may also have something to do with this particular event (traditional Mayday 
demonstrations) being aimed more at the state than at global neoliberal institutional processes and 
arrangements promoting and driving globalisation such as the summits for the G8 and the WTO.  
These are perhaps not so much then ‘anti-globalisers’ but the yet more farcical ‘anti-capitalists’.  
Their politics is directed at state structures which also sometimes represent an inconvenience to 
the interests of global finance capital and transnational elites.  In this instance the resistance is 
considered somehow more credible and legitimate when it is turned towards an institution of 
mutual suspicion.  However, anti-capitalists appear more overtly aware of the role of the British 
state in the processes of neoliberal global governance.  For them it is not an independent actor but 
deeply implicated in the global capitalist order.  
More interestingly here however, is the thinly veiled allusion to Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire.  The 
final sentence of the article is a reworking of the classic and much rehearsed quote from the 
opening lines of the Brumaire where Marx is himself drawing upon Hegel’s observation that “all the 
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great events and characters of world history occur twice”.  To this Marx adds “the first time as high 
tragedy, the second time as low farce” (Marx 1851[1977]: 300).  The Economist is demonstrating a 
familiarity tinged with an easy contempt for the intellectual resources of its assumed critics and 
detractors, many of whom retain a view of politics and economics inspired by the writings of Marx 
and Engels.   Perhaps it is intended as a reminder to socialist sympathisers that the tragedy of 20th 
century communism is only matched by the supposedly farcical notion that socialism might still 
hold an appeal.  
I think there appears to be some discernible weaknesses displayed in The Economist’s 
representations of globalisation and resistance (and neo-liberal discourse more generally) marked 
by an apparent confusion as to whether Global Justice Movements are irrational, violent and 
dangerous or ignorant infantile and insignificant.  Both kinds of representation however fall under 
The Economist’s bottom line, that of the rational versus the irrational, the objective against the 
subjective, the educated and the ignorant.  This again returns to the paper's predilection with 
either/or alternatives and binary representations of politics more generally.  In this way it can be 
seen to fall within a broader hegemonic discourse which uses these oppositional devices to 
perpetuate the status quo while at the same time defining it as progress and development. 
Perhaps more important, and encouraging for critics of neoliberalism, is the way in which The 
Economist demonstrates a softening in the tone of neoliberal discourse on globalisation this could 
be merely coincidental rather than causal.  Points of weakness and stress in the dominant 
discourses and structures of power can only be identified and worked upon through a continuous 
scrutiny and analysis of their forms and procedures.   
Despite the marginal gains which may have been made, dissenting voices and activists would be 
advised to take note of the way in which their activity and identity is constructed through the 
multiple channels of neoliberal media.  These movements should attempt to avoid essentialist 
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standpoints in order to develop and maintain more fluid subjectivities and remain open to 
hyphenated identities within which they may find themselves less vulnerable to such fixed external 
constructions.  Such an approach places them in a strategically superior position to expose and 
undermine simplistic binary oppositions and linguistic fixings which frame and define the discursive 
parameters within which the articulation of normative democratic  alternatives are rendered 
possible.   Furthermore it can serve to identify and potentially widen the contradictory fissures 
inherent in dominant neoliberal discourses.  Drawing on an array of post-positivist feminist 
literature on identity, Bleiker suggests that: 
an exploration of the discursive struggles that surround the pluralistic nature of identity is the 
very precondition for human agency and for an adequate assessment of the processes through 
which its transformative potentials are unleashed. (2003:32) 
Thus a rejection of static and objective foundations of identity for resistive agents is likely to make 
it far harder to objectify them and fix their meaning and significance as merely contingent upon 
dominant processes and discourses.  
While the above exercise in CDA exposes both a number of interesting aspects of the social 
construction of alternative worldviews carried out in The Economist’s reporting and its own broader 
role in the maintenance of late capitalist and neoliberal hegemony more generally, there are a 
number of caveats which I think are necessary in adopting a poststructuralist position on resistive 
agency. 
Some readings of post-structural analyses appear to leave limited scope for the possibility of 
transformative human agency in global politics due to a scepticism of so-called ‘grand narratives’.  
However, an appreciation of narrativity and discursivity in the relations between power and 
knowledge is vital for any politics of resistance.  I do not suggest here that transformation is 
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imminent, or even foreseeable, merely that without such an appreciation of one of the key means 
by which power is maintained and exerted, it will be impossible.    
Many have criticized post-structural and post-modern thinkers for their suggestion that 'there is 
nothing outside of discourse'.  This is largely based on a (perhaps deliberate) misreading and 
subsequent misrepresentation of these works.  What I have tried to suggest and hopefully 
demonstrate in the above chapter is that it is meaning which is constructed discursively, therefore 
it might not be overstating the case to say that things indeed have existence outside discourse but 
they have no meaning beyond it.  It is vital that we attend to these meanings and the ways in which 
they emerge and shift in relation to events and processes in order to challenge their authority.  
Movements for global justice and those engaged in progressive and transformative politics more 
generally should be aware of the myriad discursive strategies employed by neoliberal discourse to 
represent both the world itself and the potential for transforming it.   
This chapter has traced the emergence of neoliberal ideas from their foundations in the work of a 
handful of marginalised economists and commentators.  It has described the way in which powerful 
actors seized on those ideas to transform the political and economic crises of capitalism of the 
1970’s into an opportunity to reshape western societies and then remould the rest of the world in 
their image.  This normative project has now become a normalizing discourse in which alternatives 
are marginalised at best and often simply not considered at all.  As a new crisis develops there is a 
dearth of alternative ideas which seem capable of challenging the neoliberal orthodoxy.  This can 
be seen as at least partly a result of a specific aspect of that normalizing discourse which portrays 
resistance and opposition in a particularly negative way.  The normalized nature of neoliberal 
ideology is ensured and entrenched largely due to the way it represents other alternative 
perspectives.  The strategies employed in that process can be made visible through a critical 
discourse analysis.  Such an analysis was applied to the business journal The Economist. 
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Ch. 8 Conclusion 
This closing chapter will summarise the main points of the thesis which I have laid out above and 
attempt to draw some conclusions from that study.  Before doing so, it is worth repeating the 
research questions which it attempted to address.  How, and to what extent, does neoliberal 
ideology (ideas, beliefs, norms and discourses) constitute the processes, mechanisms and 
institutional arrangements of GEG?  This broad question was also supplemented with two further 
related questions with a narrower focus:  (1) How and from where did neoliberal ideology emerge 
as a normative discursive force and (2) How does the neoliberal discourse of The Economist reify, 
help to authorise and legitimate a particular conception and practice of GEG as inevitable and 
inexorable? 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the crucial role that cultural and ideational factors play 
in politics and world history.  More specifically it has argued that such factors are especially 
important in understanding processes of social change and institutional transformation.  In making 
such a claim, the thesis suggests that the complex concept of ideology represents a particularly 
important tool with which to better understand such historical processes.  Running within this 
discussion, an attempt has been made to address the essentially contested concept of power and 
the way in which theories of hegemony combine an analysis of the material and ideational in order 
interpret the complex workings of power in society.  The purpose of such an analysis is to help 
render power more ‘visible’ somehow.   Although, of course, power could never be anything like 
fully visible or completely understood, there is a normative assumption in the thesis that it might 
be relatively so.  It is normative because understanding more about the location, operation, 
legitimization and mystification of power, and how it is perceived, is vital for its democratic 
regulation and effective distribution.  Obviously, we can never dispense with power, but it has been 
the problem par excellence of politics since time immemorial and democratic politics must, at least 
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in part, be about addressing and coming to the best terms possible with that problem.  For such a 
democratic project then we need not only a material/institutional politics but also an intellectual 
politics.  If ideas are as important as the above thesis suggests, then the dismantling of old ideas 
and the creation of new ones is a fundamental task for those engaged in the struggle for a more 
substantively democratic politics, from the local to the global. 
I began the thesis with the important assertion that any study of global politics must refrain from 
treating the state as a unitary actor whose internal structures and institutions can be understood 
in isolation from the international/global historical context.  As a result of this assertion it follows 
that all studies of the social/political must account for external human influences and forces.  This 
is certainly not to say that all studies should be global in focus.  Indeed, we may learn a lot about 
‘the global’ from many different studies of ‘the local’, even more so if that is also our intention.  The 
point is that however and wherever the study is focused, there are few solid boundaries in the 
social world and where they are asserted or erected we should ask where the power lies in drawing 
such divisions, be they intellectual, material or cultural.  Adhering to boundaries without question 
can only artificially limit the scope of the analysis.  The universal is constituted by the particular; the 
local is constituted by global; structure and agency are both necessary aspects of a mutually 
constitutive historical process which can only be conceived in terms of its complex contingency and 
not from reducing it to any one determining force or essential nature.   
The thesis suggests that the combined intellectual resources of neo-Gramscian political economy 
and critical elements of socio-cultural constructivism are invaluable for a coherent understanding 
of both the contemporary world historical conjuncture and the events and processes which have 
led us here.   These perspectives focus attention on a range of important considerations which are 
necessary in order to understand the transformation of political and economic institutions which 
took place in the second half of the 20th century.  Neo-Gramscian perspectives draw attention to 
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the class structure which forms the basis for hegemonic struggles over the control of institutions 
and resources which determine the general framework of the global political economy and the 
states which comprise it.  Indeed, it is the fundamentally interrelated nature of politics and 
economics recognised by neo-Gramscian perspectives that makes them such an important 
corrective to the mainstream separation of these fields in much of the mainstream literature on 
world politics.  The role of ideology is also crucial for neo-Gramscians as a central element of the 
master concept of hegemony.  Chapter four discussed the nature of ideology and the extent to 
which a given ideology can be said to be dominant in a particular time and space.  It is recognised 
that no discussion of power can proceed very far without consideration of the role of ideas and 
ideology. 
These neo-Gramscian perspectives have been enhanced by some elements of social constructivism 
but the very broad scope of that approach requires that we be more specific about which part of 
the wide spectrum of constructivism is being used.  As chapter two showed, constructivism can be 
seen as a means by which the post-positivist accounts of world politics can engage with the 
positivist mainstream and thus move towards greater consensus regarding the nature of the 
ontological and epistemological subject matter.  However, the danger of such a rapprochement is 
that the critical and normative element of IR/IPE is watered down in the process.  A self-consciously 
critical constructivism sits more easily alongside the neo-Gramscian approach and sacrifices some 
mainstream engagement on the basis of ‘scientific explanation’ in order to maintain a sharper 
normative edge and to promote better understanding of the current world (dis)order and the 
means by which justice, security, sustainability and democracy might be enhanced. 
This critical and post-positivist constructivism also permits a range of methods which do not fit with 
many mainstream assumptions about what constitutes social science.  Drawing on Foucauldian and 
post-structuralist accounts, this form of constructivism embraces discursive and historical analyses 
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in order to interpret the ideas and processes by which some groups maintain power.  Chapter six 
argued that a critical discourse analysis represents a particularly rich methodology by which to 
interrogate the history and discourse of late capitalism and neoliberalism.  The inherently 
informational nature of contemporary capitalism requires an ever closer focus on the discursive 
elements of those phenomena.  If we fail to attend to the discourses of late capitalism and 
neoliberalism as ‘real’ phenomena then we are in danger of ignoring some of its most important 
cultural aspects which are crucial for the maintenance of its hegemony.  
The final chapter then draws on the theoretical claims and methodological resources in order to try 
and better understand how during the twentieth century, different forms of liberalism ebbed and 
flowed in the historical tide.  This ebb and flow, I argue, must be seen in relation to the ideas and 
activities of a ruling class which has during the period in question extended and deepened its 
dominance as a result of its establishment as a fully transnational capitalist class comprising 
governments, financiers, industrialists and a handful of cultural elite groups comprising academics, 
journalists and other media executives.  The chapter represents a case study of neoliberalism which 
forms two distinct elements.  The first part traces the historical process by which neoliberal ideas 
became dominant during the closing decades of the twentieth century.  It describes the emergence 
of neoliberal ideas in the chaotic crucible of interwar Europe and how certain individuals combined 
their notable talents in order to create a credible alternative to the tide of collectivism which they 
perceived to be threatening the liberal achievements of the nineteenth century.  As such this 
represents an analysis of neoliberalism as a normative discourse where it sought to transform the 
existing institutional arrangements in favour of a more privatised, de-regulated, market driven 
society where the autonomy of the individual is held as the highest priority.  It examines the key 
agents and organisations of this process and analyses the successful way in which the neoliberal 
moment was established during a period of widely perceived crisis when the institutions of 
embedded liberalism appeared weak and open to transformation. 
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The second part of the last chapter examines neoliberalism as a fully normalised discourse.  Having 
achieved a cultural hegemony, its proponents and beneficiaries are well aware of the importance 
of discrediting and de-legitimizing alternative proposals and worldviews.  This is demonstrated 
through a critical discourse analysis of The Economist and how that journal (mis)represents the 
agents which represent an obstacle or impediment to further deregulation, privatisation and 
market reform. Resistant governments and politicians, movements for global justice, ecological 
sustainability, and more substantive democratic forms and practices are among those which 
neoliberal discourse, exemplified by The Economist, marks out for such discursive denigration.  I do 
not suggest that this discourse purely creates the reality of neoliberalism but that it represents a 
compelling case study of how discourse plays a highly significant role in the constitution of that 
reality.  Moreover, an examination of the prevailing values and norms of society is possible through 
the critical analysis of mainstream discourses.  Recognising the relationship between power and 
discourse is crucial for understanding the social relations and institutional arrangements of a given 
situation.  As a result, constructing coherent alternative and resistive discourses represents a vital 
strategy for progressive counter-hegemonic political movements to resist the neoliberal order and 
to pave the way for new pragmatic forms of democratic governance.  In Gramsci’s terms, the war 
of position must be fought before the war of manoeuvre can begin.  A good deal can be learned 
from the lessons of neoliberalism’s meteoric rise from the marginalised theories of a few ‘crackpots’ 
to becoming accepted as the sole feasible alternative to a perceived crisis of the prevailing 
framework of world order. 
From this study we can conclude that ideas represent a highly significant factor in understanding 
the processes by which one institutional framework breaks down and another emerges.  This does 
not simply take place ‘out there’ in the observable world of organisations, groups, states, 
institutions, policies etcetera.  Just as important are the transformations in people’s minds.  The 
transition in the popular consciousness or conventional wisdom, what Gramsci referred to as the 
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‘sense held in common’, the intersubjective values, beliefs, norms and priorities which people hold 
to be ‘true’ in a given era are a crucial determining factor in terms of the arrangements by which 
society distributes and these ideational factors can be observed in the dominant discourses and 
prevailing representations of the era. 
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